To be free, one must overcome the shackles of instinct, desire, and circumstance. How is this accomplished? In The Phaedo and Book IV of The Republic, Plato argues that this can only be accomplished by having our soul unified and harmonized by our rationality. Why should our rationality be "in charge?" Why not have reason be a "slave to the passions," as Hume would have it? — Count Timothy von Icarus

A well written OP. You’ve touched upon passion vs. reason. Here only want to present the case that Hume’s stipulation that “reason is a slave to the passions” is not necessarily contrary to the overall gist of the OP, at least as I currently interpret the OP.

It can be upheld that whereas passions in themselves always addressed ends (passions always being in some way wants and that wanted being the end pursued), reasoning (even when human reasoning is construed to be a part of the universal logos) will always strictly be a means toward the ends pursued—including potentially those ends of discerning what is true or, else, the end of a maximal eudemonia.

Hence, without any held ends, reasoning is useless and thereby devoid of meaning. On the other hand, ends held and pursued without reasoning can be likened to a headless chicken’s moving to and fro (this metaphor here primarily addressing the inability of obtaining the ends pursued in the absence of any and all reasoning).

At which point lesser lifeform’s reasoning changes from reasoning that is in some way human-like in being consciously appraised to being purely that of the universal logos (which applies to rocks and to automata alike) is of course not something that can be definitively delimitated. That aside, were there to be a universal logos, it than stands to the reason here presented that it too would hold its own end toward which it only serves as a means. For example:

The OP references the Platonic notion of the Good. Here, a somewhat subtle but important change in focus can be found occurring between Platonism and Neoplatonism: wherein, tmk, the first addressed the Good as that upon which all else is contingent on (only implicitly at best upholding that the Good is to be pursued as an end), the latter furthers this by explicitly framing the Good as also being that which is to be pursued as end in the form of henosis with the One. In at least this latter conceptualization, then, the universal logos is not equivalent to the Good / the One but is that which emanates from it and which is reconciled in it—with logos being here considered the intermediary between soul, nous, and highest level of reality: the One. My point here being, in this case as example, the logos (universal reasoning) is still a means toward the One, with henosis (unification with the One) being of itself a passion: here again making reasoning subordinate to (end-driven) passion(s), albeit at a more universal level of contemplation.

Going back to Plato as you’ve mentioned in the quote, reasoning here is also only a means to the end of freedom and the related eudemonia that results from a unified and harmonized soul. The want for this end is then a passion, to which reasoning is then again subservient to.

I know its not a definitive argument and there are alternative ways of interpretation. All the same, that reason is subordinate to passion—either on an individual basis or on a global scale—seems to me an important observation, and one which in no way contradicts the authority of reasoning per se. Granted, to avoid radical relativism, these very observations would then need to be embedded within the very metaphysics here addressed: wherein “the Good” is an absolute end (and is absolute in so being).

I'll leave it there, but for now I think it's worth considering how much our society is driven by appetites (consider the electorate's response whenever consumption must decrease) and passions (consider the fractious, tribal political climate), as opposed to its rational part and how this constricts freedom of action on implementing ethically-minded policy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This implicitly presumes that individuals are goal-driven and hence hold desires that they want satisfied. In which case, the question isn’t one of whether reasoning is subservient to passion but, instead, whether the reasoning being employed satisfies the very core passions addressed. Judging by the ever increasing rates and depression, suicide, and related issues, they give no indication of so doing.

p.s. This is a topic that gets complicated very easily by our having predominant passions to subordinate passions. But I find that it is precisely reasoning which facilitates all our subordinate passions optimally satisfying our predominant passion(s). Again, serving as a means toward (desired) ends.

Further, it is clear that knowledge of the truth enhances our causal powers. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As noted above, the enhancement of our causal powers (and thus freedom of action) in knowledge is a communal effort. — Count Timothy von Icarus

as opposed to its rational part and how this constricts freedom of action on implementing ethically-minded policy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Durkheim looks closely at how this communal-instrumental mind (which he consistently refers to as a real and essentially living thing, the cultural mind) is produced through the mechanism of habits, enlisted by moral norms, essentially. Or the normative power of morals I guess you could also say. Great post and topic.

Thank you.

It can be upheld that whereas passions in themselves always addressed ends (passions always being in some way wants and that wanted being the end pursued

I am not sure about this. The "passions" are generally associated with emotion, and I am not sure these always have "ends". Consider being depressed or angry; is there necessarily an "end" here? Oftentimes the passions seem so problematic precisely because we cannot identify ends that would relieve/gratify them.

[reason] will always strictly be a means toward the ends pursued—including potentially those ends of discerning what is true

Again, I am not sure if this is always true. Is intuiting or understanding something we have not set out to understand an end or desire? It seems like understanding and knowledge sometimes come upon us "out of the blue," not as the end of some process, and yet these seem bound up in reason. The advice of mystics in the apophatic tradition - Saint John of the Cross, Saint Denis, the author of The Cloud of Unknowing - is precisely that all ends must be given up for the intuition of the highest goal of reason, contemplation.

But you do raise a good question: "is the desire for truth just one passion among many, or is it different from other passions and appetites?"

For Plato, they are obviously not the same. His entire anthropology is predicated on a distinction between appetites, passions/emotions, and reason. We don't necessarily have to buy the idea of a tripartite soul to agree that these are useful distinctions, and I do agree that there is a phenomenological difference between craving food or drink (appetites), being depressed or angry (passions), and wanting to know the truth, as well as differences in how these affect behavior. Addiction, a disorder centered on the appetites, manifests quite differently from bipolar or major depression, a disorder centered on the passions, which manifests quite differently from schizophrenia or dementia, disorders whose most prominent symptoms lie in how they affect reason.

The desire towards truth and "what is truly good," does not seem to be "just another passion." Why? Consider the following:

The Relevance of Expert Opinion:

Consider Aristotle's classification of the intellectual virtues. Reason would seem to be involved in craftsmanship, prudence, scientific knowledge, intuition, and philosophical wisdom. When we are dealing with our desire for knowledge, the drive for what is "truly good," we look to experts on how to actualize this. As Aristotle points out in Book II of the ethics, our proper reference for right action would be "the excellent/intelligent person's choice given the same scenario." That is, we look for someone who has the same desire as us for goodness and truth to show us how to actualize our goal.

But is this the same for any other desire? Does the hungry person craving a certain type of food look to another hungry person who craves the same thing to learn how to sate themselves or do they look to the person who knows how to cook what they want (the possessor of techne)? Does the depressed person look for help from other depressed people, or to just anyone who seems happy, or do they look to the psychologist or counselor for advice? People who desire truth look to others who desire it for aid and inspiration, but one who possesses an appetite or passion does not look to someone with the same appetite or passion to see how to act in the same way.

Reason's Ability to Affect Character:

At 1114a-b of theEthics, Aristotle discusses how every person aims for the "apparent" good, for it is obvious that we don't always know what is good for us. Our ability to not only do what we think is good, but to enjoy it, is affected by reason.

Per Aristotle's classification in Book VII of the Ethics, a person who has a vice, say overeating or smoking, engages in the bad behavior and gets pleasure from it. They are not conflicted. Whereas the incontinent person knows their actions are bad, but cannot overcome their drives and desires. The continent person then is the one who acts in accordance with their beliefs, but still desires vice. Finally, we have the virtuous person, who acts in accordance with what is good and enjoys it.

A key insight here is that people can move themselves between these states (and be helped in doing so). The first step of AA is "admitting you have a problem," the move from vice to incontinence. In the long term, the desire of reason for what is truly good can shift character, such that we come to be virtuous, enjoying acting in the way we think is right.

This makes the desires of reason take on a radically different role vis-a-vis ethics and the human being's ability to become a free agent from the other desires. For does the fulfillment of any other passion or drive tend to shift our other desires? Does fulfilling the desire for sex change what foods we want? Does lashing out in anger make us interested in different hobbies? I would allow that the fulfillment of one desire might change a persons character and desires in some ways; the alcoholic might have different desires after they've begun drinking. However, these changes have no end, they are incidental. Only the desires of reason can have a structured impact on long term character formation, such that we come to "desire what we want to desire." For this reason, only the desires of reason are likely to lead us towards a harmonized state, where we do what we think is good, and desire to act as we do.

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That the desire for what is truly good and true is different from the desire for other ends is precisely Plato's point. No other desire is capable of shaping the other desires in the same way. No other end might be seen as "the end of ends." The distinction is a key point for our anthropology. Are all things with ends the same "sort of thing," or is this a bad way to classify them? I would tend to agree with the latter. Following Frankfurt, I would consider that the ability to have second-order volitions, "the desire to desire x," is essential to defining persons. But it is precisely the desires of reason that allow for second-order volitions. So, the desires of reason don't seem to be "just another desire" that persons have, but rather key to the definition of persons, making it play an entirely different role in philosophical anthropology.

Durkheim looks closely at how this communal-instrumental mind (which he consistently refers to as a real and essentially living thing, the cultural mind) is produced through the mechanism of habits, enlisted by moral norms, essentially.

Hegel has some good stuff on this too, although in his obscure mode of presentation. I've often thought of statistical offices as the nascent "sense organs of the state." But our institutions seem far off from the "mature state" for whom "thought and consciousness essentially belong." Such that, "the state knows what it wills and knows it as something thought." (Philosophy of Right § 270, Addition)

It can be upheld that whereas passions in themselves always addressed ends (passions always being in some way wants and that wanted being the end pursued - javra

I am not sure about this. The "passions" are generally associated with emotion, and I am not sure these always have "ends". Consider being depressed or angry; is there necessarily an "end" here? Oftentimes the passions seem so problematic precisely because we cannot identify ends that would relieve/gratify them. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here evidencing that this is always true would be difficult at best. So I wont engage in such arguments. That said, it is however not impossible or inconsistent that all passions, or emotions, are contingent on agencies of mind such that some of these passions are unconsciously produced by unconscious agencies of mind; this so that these either consciously or unconsciously produced emotions are all intentional, hence purposive, and hence goal oriented—this even if one is not consciously aware of their particular goals. As with most other emotions, both depression (though I’m not clear if depression qualifies as an emotion) and anger are broad and imprecisely defined umbrella terms for a wide enough range of possible experiences. Here speculatively addressed, some depressions might be one’s unconsciousness’s way of telling one that there is something fundamentally wrong with the way one is operating, such that their possible aim is a fundamental change in one's modus operandi. On the other hand, some forms of anger which consist of animosity and an urge to harm will then hold as their aim the intent that that which one holds animosity toward is to be harmed. But I grant these presented possibilities in no way evidences the goals here speculated upon, much less that it is always true that passions are goal-oriented.

[reason] will always strictly be a means toward the ends pursued—including potentially those ends of discerning what is true - javra

Again, I am not sure if this is always true. Is intuiting or understanding something we have not set out to understand an end or desire? It seems like understanding and knowledge sometimes come upon us "out of the blue," not as the end of some process, and yet these seem bound up in reason. — Count Timothy von Icarus

These too (intuitions and eureka understandings) can be suggested to be resultant from unconscious agencies of mind—which, again, would here unconsciously reason so as to optimally arrive at the goals unconsciously pursued. But again, arguing that this is the case is a difficult challenge, and so I will not here engage in it.

That the desire for what is truly good and true is different from the desire for other ends is precisely Plato's point. No other desire is capable of shaping the other desires in the same way. No other end might be seen as "the end of ends." The distinction is a key point for our anthropology. Are all things with ends the same "sort of thing," or is this a bad way to classify them? I would tend to agree with the latter. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I fully agree with this statement and that not all desires are of the same kind. I would go so far as to express that some subordinate desires are wrong/incorrect in that they are unable to satisfy one’s predominant desire(s) or else right/correct in that they are so able to satisfy. That, in Platonic terms, wrong desires (given their context, etc.) prevent one from approaching the Good whereas right desires (given their context, etc.) facilitate one’s approaching the Good. And that it is only via reasoning one can thereby differentiate between good and bad desires.

But I do have difficulties with this:

So, the desires of reason don't seem to be "just another desire" that persons have, but rather key to the definition of persons, making it play an entirely different role in philosophical anthropology. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Did you by the bolded text intend “desires for reason”? If not, what do you intend by saying that reason per se holds its own desires (i.e., the desires of reason)? I ask because this is so far unintelligible to me: to me it so far seems to entail that reasoning per se holds its own agency of being ... such that, for one example, reasoning can choose between the desires it holds.