I kind of agree.
I sometimes slip and use the term non-physical.
What I mean and how someone else might interpret it could be different. Mental subject matter might be better words. It explains how things that cannot physically exist can exist in a brain state. The way brains handle the number pi for example. And endless other things.

The big picture is that mental content has the ability to drive physical matter, which is a special case in a universe of physical matter.

I have no fear of science. Your posts are too long to deal with. — Wayfarer

No, you just don't seem to understand it. You seem to just understand a pop-science media caricature of what science is, and it has formed your entire defense of idealism. But neither does your argument succeed in countering what you aimed to criticize in science, since you ignore how scientists actually conceptualize their perspectives and just bluntly position them as having to frame everything through "Gestalts". You also lump together all science approaches into purely reductionism, which isn't a perspective that's very active in scientific communities. The fixation on objects becomes an irrelevant critique since emergentism doesn't view the mind as an object.

In the end you have a simplistic counter to physicalism that only functions against reductionism specifically, have a simplified insight into what the experience actually is for a scientist conducting research and you still don't provide an alternative that disprove my initial claim that science is the best method to explain reality, which was what you objected against. What's your alternative? That was what I asked and have yet to hear from you? If you can't produce an alternative method that functions better in the pursuit of knowledge about reality, then you can't say I'm wrong when I'm positioning science as the best method for it. That just comes off as desperate defense of some belief system because you don't like it. As if you've studied the history of science, seen some shit and then just lump together that shit with the methods and system of science. Like I wrote in the argument:

It's like the waiter blaming math for you not able to count your money correctly when failing to pay for dinner — Christoffer

Details in the post you ignore.

The modern period is defined by the success of applying mathematics to the world, and over time Plato gets inverted. Now there is no problem with the world, it exemplifies perfect mathematical beauty, but with the the mind.
— Count Timothy von Icarus

Perhaps a relevant aspect of the inversion - I'd say contra Plato's anamnesis, that we are all born ignorant and we are all going to die only somewhat less ignorant.

(Not that I know much about Plato's thinking that hasn't come from secondary and tertiary sources.)
@Fooloso4 — wonderer1

Since I was flagged I'll jump in. Much is made of the Forms, but they are posited as hypothetical, and inadequate as explanations. They are “safe and ignorant” (Phaedo 105c). An adequate explanation is in need of physical causes as well.

So why does he make such extensive use of them?

The problem is that one who does not “allow that for each thing there is a character that is always the same" will “destroy the power of dialectic entirely” (Parmenides, 135b8–c2). Something like the Forms underlies (hypo - under thesis - to place or set) thought and speech. Perhaps Plato intends here to reconcile Parmenides and Heraclitus.

Socrates references Anaxagoras, who says that it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything. In Socrates' discussion of this he shifts from Mind as prior to what is ordered to how his own mind makes sense of and orders things.

Nice try! Much appreciated by myself, but wooists gonna woo.

Main problems I feel are: Framing science as some kind of simple one-note group functioning under religious dogma, which is false. While there are bad actors who act like that both within and outside scientific research, it's not representative of science as a whole, especially not the methods used and the way conceptualization are actually performed by specialists in a specific field. A theoretical physicist does not look upon reality with a simplified reductionist perspective that only sees "objects" through the reference of how a human experience reality. There's a reason why the line "can you hear the music" is in the movie Oppenheimer. "Hearing the music" is closer to how the experience is, a kind of transcendent elevated conceptualization that does not feature forms by vision, sound by waves etc. but a form and shape that feels undefined by normal perception. This is because the practice of thinking through it is training the mind to conceptualize out of abstract concepts like math rather than relating it to perception based concepts. It's only when the conclusions gets published and reported on that we get these simplified visualizations of physics that are found in our school books and in science media. If that's all you use as the source of criticizing science through an argument of perception limitations, then it renders an argument simply not correct.

The main other problem is that I still haven't heard an actual argument for an alternative method in the pursuit of knowledge about reality. If someone criticizes science and calling it some dogmatic power over the world, then provide an alternative that function better. Because structuring the world based on anything other than modern scientific conclusions requires a level of result that I've yet to see any other method or system produce. Quite the opposite, it's within realms of using belief systems that just follow human biases where we find the most horrors. Notice that I'm saying modern science. Because I have heard again and again the same old arguments about how science in the past led to horrors of its own. But science has evolved with the conclusions; the rigor and practice has evolved and been sharpened to function past old non-functioning practices.

The ability to bypass human biases is better than ever and we are still bettering its ability to be the best method for knowledge. People who study the history of science usually gets lost in the malpractice of old sciences, and are unable to see how things function today, unable to see how good it has become and is still evolving. I dare anyone who think they can trick some bad conclusions into scientific consensus to try and do that today. Compared to spreading misinformation beliefs through the usual channels of human bias.

Hi Christoffer, I find myself inclined to endorse what I will coin "process physicalism." Due to religious commitments, I do not think "all of reality" is physical. But I do think consciousness may be one of the things that can be given a meaningful physical account. And I think science is not only the best method for learning about the physical world, I also think accepting the results of science are crucial for truth and understanding.

What I wanted to ask you is, can you say more about "emergent physicalism?" Is it roughly the same as "process physicalism" (my thesis here is that consciousness just is a physical process) ?

In a somewhat less robust formulation, I maintain that physical processes give an adequate explanation of consciousness.

Not first thing in the morning
— frank

No energy until coffee. — wonderer1

ALL IS COFFEE - NotAristotle (c. 2000 - 2200)

Notice the difference between "smoking causes cancer" and "The assassination of Franz Ferdinand caused World War I" What is the same between these such that we should say that they're both using "causation"?

There's a difference between making a distinction between correlation and causation, which I agree with, and making the metaphysical case for the reality of causation. One is a bit of scientific pedagogy that points out that it's too easy to see patterns so make sure you get a good one (and what a good one is depends upon the particular science, experiment, task). The other is the philosophy of metaphysics. I think that it's a good thing to look at science in thinking of metaphysics, but we shouldn't assume they are one and the same. We'd need some basis of judgment to go from science to metaphysics.

Hume's argument regarding causation should be understood to put it in the place of custom and habit as opposed to saying we cannot use it. It's not that we cannot use causation -- as a human we have no choice but to think this way. It's just not a demonstrative science where the rules are certain and infallible. Rather we are accustomed to believe in causation, but our fallibility makes this an uncertainty. Further the only means which we have to correct belief is the same means we had in forming the belief -- an appeal to reason or the senses. But since our reasoning is fallible even this correction can be incorrect, and so we are forced to concede that cause -- being a non-demonstrative science, but a case of probabilistic reasoning -- is a habit of thought that cannot be justified to the level of necessity we are habituated to think it has.

Also I'll reiterate the point that even if we grant causation as a metaphysical reality that this won't secure physicalism given the Kantian frame for causation -- if causation is necessary and universal then that could be seen as a reason to believe in Transcendental Idealism.

In the end you have a simplistic counter to physicalism that only functions against reductionism specifically...

I'm sympathetic to the idea of something like "physicalism without reductionism," but as is discussed earlier in this thread, I'm not sure such a thing currently makes much sense with how physicalism is generally defined. Physicalism might have to become just a vague commitment to naturalism and metaphysical realism to deal with strong emergence (which, to be fair, I think that's how many people colloquially use the term).

I would say with high confidence that most scientists do not spend much time focused on the ontology of physicalism, problems related to supervenience, the causal closure principle, etc. Kim's argument against the possibility of strong emergence, given a substance metaphysics, seems very strong. Given that, strong emergence doesn't seem to be an option for physicalism.

To be sure, I've seen theoreticians who do end up having to consider things like Kim's work suggest a move to a process metaphysics. But this move probably requires jettisoning a lot of what makes physicalism "physicalism."

It's an example of Hemple's Dilemma, I guess.





It's definitely overly simplistic, but I didn't want to get into a long analysis. I still think the idea that we have, in some respects, an inversion of Plato in the modern period holds water though. Maybe it just shows an overall tendency to want to reduce things we don't understand to things we (think we) understand.



:up: , it's definitely very much the opposite with early empiricist tabula rasa



I agree with all that, particularly that cause alone cannot act as support for physicalism. The question of science re Hume as a whole is sort of interesting, as his attack on induction would seem to cut the legs out from underneath the entire scientific project.

One of the things I've considered about Hume's position on cause is that it seems to be somewhat guilty of begging the question. If one billiard ball really does cause another to move, then watching them collide is observing cause. His position on cause then ends up being heavily reliant on his position on induction holding up.

But this move probably requires jettisoning a lot of what makes physicalism "physicalism." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not sure why that is so. Unless by process metaphysics one is arguing that only processes, not the physical constituents involved in the process are real? If that is what is meant, that's starting to sound like some kind of idealism in my opinion. In any case, that is not what I mean by "process physicalism."

In the end you have a simplistic counter to physicalism that only functions against reductionism specifically...

I'm sympathetic to the idea of something like "physicalism without reductionism," but as is discussed earlier in this thread, I'm not sure such a thing currently makes much sense with how physicalism is generally defined — Count Timothy von Icarus

Can someone spell out to me what is being reduced and why this is a bad thing? (Because if the answer is subjective experience, I don't see in what sense physicalism is a "reduction").

Can someone spell out to me what is being reduced and why this is a bad thing? (Because if the answer is subjective experience, I don't see in what sense physicalism is a "reduction"). — NotAristotle

Off the top of my head, all things pertaining to laws of thought and to all aspects of value theory (including the metaethics of what “good” is) is in physicalism reduced to the physical—this when laws of thought and value per se (such as one’s valuing of truths or of correct reasoning or of objectivity—or else not) are prerequisites of arriving at any conclusion whatsoever, including that of physicalism wherein everything is reduced to the physical. Moreover, a clear definition/demarcation of “the physical” is wanting to begin with. It’s worse than circular reasoning: it’s reasoning that the cart pulls the horse forward. I’m a great supporter of the scientific method, but science (when thus understood) cannot address these issues in principle.

The question of science re Hume as a whole is sort of interesting, as his attack on induction would seem to cut the legs out from underneath the entire scientific project. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I expect a transition from concern with induction, to greater recognition of pattern recognition as naturally occurring as a matter of our neurology. I.e. a more naturalized epistemology that more accurately capture what really occurs in our thinking than the idea of induction does.

Not that I think this will keep a lot of philosophers from allowing the perfect to be the enemy of the good, but I think worrying about induction is barking up the wrong tree. People tying themselves in philosophical knots isn't going to stop scientists from making progress using the cognitive tools we have, so scientifically it's a pseudoproblem.

all things pertaining to laws of thought and to all aspects of value theory (including the metaethics of what “good” is) is in physicalism reduced to the physical — javra

Why would it trouble us if everything was reducible to the physical?

Seems to me that all those thoughts are just physical processes.

I get the sense there is something about physicalism that has not been articulated that you are concerned is problematic?

I get the sense there is an assumption at play that has not been articulated with physicalism that you are concerned is problematic? — NotAristotle

I'm not sure it's worth debating, merely provided you with an answer to your initial request. But as to this second question, I have addressed it here:

It’s worse than circular reasoning: it’s reasoning that the cart pulls the horse forward. — javra

... where the cart is the ill-defined "the physical" and the horse is the very laws of thought and value-structures previously addressed which are prerequisites for any conclusion.

I still think the idea that we have, in some respects, an inversion of Plato in the modern period holds water though. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think, maybe, it’s because we retained the elements of Platonism that are useful for science and engineering (book of nature written in math) but discarded the ethical perspectives (the One, the Good) mainly because of their absorption into, and rejection alongside, Christian philosophy. Also simplistic, but I’m sure with a grain of truth.

Okay javra, thanks for your comments.

Ouch.

Excellent post.

I'm interested in your take on emergence. From the SEP:

What about emergence? The term is used in a variety of ways, in the sciences as well as philosophy. These uses are so wildly divergent that it is not clear that there is a common core notion. — Supervenience

Can you offer any clarification?

t seems to me that supervenience is all about existential dependency
— creativesoul

I don't think it's about dependency. It's just that two things that track together: "There cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference." — frank

If that goes only one way; that is if there can be a B-difference without and A-difference then A could be said to be dependent on B.

A number of writers make a distinction between physicalism and naturalism on the basis of the inclusion or exclusion of the role of subjective point of view in the determination of the object. — Joshs

If the object is defined as 'the object as perceived' then of course it is trivially true that the subjective point of view would be a determinant. But if the object is defined as 'that which interacts with our senses resulting in perception' then the subjective point of view would be a result, not a determinant.

The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned. — Evan Thompson

Of course, but this says nothing about the "mind-independent something'. It seems obvious that our cognitions are the result of interactions between minds (or embrained bodies) and that which is other to the embrained bodies.

I'm sympathetic to the idea of something like "physicalism without reductionism," but as is discussed earlier in this thread, I'm not sure such a thing currently makes much sense with how physicalism is generally defined. Physicalism might have to become just a vague commitment to naturalism and metaphysical realism to deal with strong emergence (which, to be fair, I think that's how many people colloquially use the term). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think the idea that everything should be explainable in terms of fundamental physics is essential to physicalist views per se, although that might be a defining feature of some reductive physicalist views.

As long as an organizing contribution of a subject can be detected in the description of physical phenomena, then a species of idealism is at work. — Joshs

I don't think this is right. Of course, Ideas can be detected as organizing contributions in the descriptions of phenomena, but it does not follow that the phenomena are pre-cognitively organized by our ideas. In other words, you seem to be conflating descriptions of phenomena with phenomena.

As I have already noted, it seems to me that the most parsimonious characterization of physicalism is simply the view that the Universe existed before there were any minds, or in other words that there have been, are, and will be existents which are not dependent at all on minds. This would not be to deny that there are potentially semantic and semiotic aspects, attributes, relations or functions of physical existents. Naturally that potential cannot be actualized without an interpreting mind.

The argument that claims that because it is a mind which says that there are existents which are mind-independent, it follows that there can be no mind-independent existents, is a very weak argument which trades on conflating what we say with what actually might exist independently of our saying. As far as I can tell this impoverished argument (in the West at least) comes from Schopenhauer.

In other words, you seem to be conflating descriptions of phenomena with phenomena. — Janus

The congenital problem with idealism.

I agree with all that, particularly that cause alone cannot act as support for physicalism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Cool.

The question of science re Hume as a whole is sort of interesting, as his attack on induction would seem to cut the legs out from underneath the entire scientific project.

Another way to read him is to say that if both Hume is right and science works, then science must not proceed by induction.

One of the things I've considered about Hume's position on cause is that it seems to be somewhat guilty of begging the question. If one billiard ball really does cause another to move, then watching them collide is observing cause. His position on cause then ends up being heavily reliant on his position on induction holding up.

I don't think he's guilty of begging the question, though yes I think that his position on skepticism follows from previous positions in the book -- he doesn't start with skepticism but ends the first part of his treatise with it.

But what vindicates him is that we do, in fact, change our beliefs about causation as we learn more, especially in the sciences. The overturning and re-overturning of belief gets along with his epistemology, at least insofar that science has anything to say about causation.

Another way to read him is to say that if both Hume is right and science works, then science must not proceed by induction. — Moliere

I don't think science needs to claim that what appear to be the invariances of nature must of necessity forever remain invariant. As far as science knows they have up until now remained invariant, so it can proceed on the basis of "if such and such law remains invariant, we can expect to observe this and that or whatever".

:up:

I don't think science needs to claim that what appear to be the invariances of nature must of necessity forever remain invariant. — Janus

I agree -- I don't think scientists are prone to claim this, or that it's necessary for scientific knowledge.

As far as science knows they have up until now remained invariant, so it can proceed on the basis of "if such and such law remains invariant, we can expect to observe this and that or whatever".

Even if the laws remained the same forever and ever it's always the case that there could be some other intervening cause or a conjunction of causes that's unknown and grouped under a single name to the effect.

While I eschew falsificationism I think Popper captured something in positing it as a criteria for science which is that while we have some good beliefs what makes them scientific is that they can be defeated by evidence rather than supported by evidence -- there's always the possibility of finding something later which undermines our theory. So rather than assuming that laws are invariant I think the more common assumption is that they are good enough for now until someone comes along and points out where we messed up, and on and on the scientific project will go.

Why would it trouble us if everything was reducible to the physical?

It's not that everything is reducible to some amorphous and expansive idea of "the physical" but rather that everything is reducible to physics. I see three distinct problems here.

1. One problem is the adequacy of the types of explanations that physics offers. Can physics, in something like its current form, adequately explain the experience of seeing a sunset, of tasting coffee, etc.?

It's hard to see how the qualities of first-person experience could be adequately expressed by physics. Even if it is conceivable that physics could tell us why coffee tastes the way it does, it seems perhaps impossible that it should tell us what coffee tastes like. But if there are facts about things like "what coffee tastes like to Bob," then it appears that physics cannot describe all facts about the world.

This is, IMO, the smallest problem. You could argue that this is simply asking too much from an ontology.

2. There is no reason to think reduction must necessarily be true. We might ask: "is there even good empirical evidence to support this hypothesis, or is it just popular because it is intuitive?"

Consider that even basic phenomena have not been successfully reduced despite decades of efforts. Molecular structure is an example. Chemistry is not a new field. It is on the very low end of the complexity scale, just above physics. Yet, if I recall correctly, a small majority of chemists don't believe their field can be successfully reduced (which is meaningful given the popularity of reductionism writ large). That doesn't mean chemistry can't be reduced to physics, it just means that we should consider if reduction should be the "default" assumption and considered highly plausible despite more than a century going by since the heyday of reductionism. There are also plenty of physicists who think their own field has examples of strong emergence, which adds yet another wrinkle.

One of the things that would caution against reductionism being the "default view" would be just how ancient and venerable the idea is. It's an idea that is popular because it's intuitive; it's "neat." From the birth of philosophy on, people have been speculating that all the variety in the world can be reduced to just one thing (e.g. water, fire) or just a handful of things (Empedoclean elements). It's the type of idea we naturally gravitate towards. Particularly, it's appealing when it can be framed as "little balls of stuff make up everything," as it often has been going back to antiquity. I suspect this might have to do with how our senses of sight, touch, hearing, and the vestibular sense all work to build a model of 3D space, meaning that aspect of experience is intrinsically "cross-checked" for veracity more than color, taste, etc.

This is not to ignore all the evidence of successful reduction. However, that not all things are strongly emergent is not evidence that nothing is. IMO, there is a problem in how the burden of proof sometimes get framed, as if strong emergence must be convincingly demonstrated to show that reductionism isn't true, but not vice versa.

3. The problem of showing how first-person subjective experience emerges from nature (assuming pan-psychism is not true) without strong emergence.

A related problem here would seem to be that, if reductionism and the causal closure principle is true, then mental events have no causal efficacy. If mental events have no causal efficacy, then we have to ask why natural selection should result in producing phenomenal experiences that are anything like the real world? Why should pain be unpleasant if whether or not you take your hand off a burning stove has nothing to do with the subjective experience of pain?

The problem with epiphenomenalism in particular is not quite as bad IMO. It isn't really a challenge to reductionism as much as current formations of the causal closure principle, such that mental events are causally ineffective. But that's just a subproblem within 3, although relevant to physicalism because causal closure is often used to define physicalism.

I'm not sure why that is so. Unless by process metaphysics one is arguing that only processes, not the physical constituents involved in the process are real?

Sort of, but not really. Bickhard's "Systems and Process Metaphysics" is a good intro, but I can't find it without a paywall. The idea is that "objects" what we've evolved to focus on, are actually just long-term stabilities in physical processes. Even "fundamental" particles appear to have a beginning and end.

I'm still not entirely sure whether you mean some kind of dualism or just that something like math is obviously not a physical concept. The way I see it, all our categorizations are just high level abstractions of sensory input. Something like a dog is such an abstraction. Math is abstraction in the exact same way imo, only that it is so abstract that it doesn't pick out any specific physical object in the world. We can then make abstractions of abstractions, systems of rules for these abstractions in and of themselves in which we learn to manipulate content and then even superimpose onto other concepts (like when creating a mathematical model of empirical phenomena).

But when you say mental content drives the physical, this sounds like dualism.

Another way to read him is to say that if both Hume is right and science works, then science must not proceed by induction.

I'm not sure I understand this. How is science supposed to work if we can't count on past observations to tell us anything about the future? We've been testing Newton's laws for centuries, but can we accept them now as, in some imperfect way, describing how the world works and will work in the future? We can't if Hume is right (and then he has the whole part about burning all the books that claimed to have knowledge based on past observations, which I did think was a good joke on his part).

I don't think he's guilty of begging the question, though yes I think that his position on skepticism follows from previous positions in the book -- he doesn't start with skepticism but ends the first part of his treatise with it.

You are correct. I can't think of the right term for it. But I can frame it in a question to Hume: "what would it look like to observe causation?" There are all sorts of complex, nuanced issues with causation that have cropped up since Hume's day, but let's ignore those and just focus on billiard balls bouncing or dominoes falling or what have you. When we see one domino topple another, Hume says we aren't seeing cause. But what conceivable observation would qualify as "observing cause" in those cases?

It seems to me that, if one domino hitting another really does cause the second domino to fall, what we see is exactly what cause might look like.



Hume's argument against induction would appear to apply to past events as well though. So inductive arguments about the past get the axe too. "The Declaration of Independence was signed in 1776," or "lunar eclipses have been predictable" are the types of statements we believe because we trust the source that is telling us them or because we remember the past events. However, why should we think any source of information is reliable? It certainly can't be because they have been reliable in the past. Why should we think our memory is reliable? If you cannot demonstrate that you have a reliable memory using only deduction, it seems to me like you are SOL.

I think one of the great think Hume demonstrates is the absolute poverty of what can be demonstrated without inductive inference.

Of course, the guy doesn't argue that we should take him too seriously. The book burning thing is clearly a joke. But if he was truly right, it would seem to make science completely irrational.

I'm not sure I understand this. How is science supposed to work if we can't count on past observations to tell us anything about the future? We've been testing Newton's laws for centuries, but can we accept them now as, in some imperfect way, describing how the world works and will work in the future? We can't if Hume is right (and then he has the whole part about burning all the books that claimed to have knowledge based on past observations, which I did think was a good joke on his part). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Short version: Not only can we count on past observations, we can't not think in terms of causation by our very nature.


Quote from Hume:

Should it here be asked me, whether I sincerely assent to this argument, which I seem to take such pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of those sceptics, who hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in any thing possest of any measures of truth and falshood; I should reply, that this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long, as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine. Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this total scepticism, has really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavoured by arguments to establish a faculty, which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and rendered unavoidable.

But any more would just totally derail the thread, I think.

Popper is worth bringing up in relation to the topic of physicalism because that's another philosophical position which would divorce metaphysics from science.

You are correct. I can't think of the right term for it. But I can frame it in a question to Hume: "what would it look like to observe causation?" There are all sorts of complex, nuanced issues with causation that have cropped up since Hume's day, but let's ignore those and just focus on billiard balls bouncing or dominoes falling or what have you. When we see one domino topple another, Hume says we aren't seeing cause. But what conceivable observation would qualify as "observing cause" in those cases?

It seems to me that, if one domino hitting another really does cause the second domino to fall, what we see is exactly what cause might look like. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think I'd say that I see a domino hitting another domino, and that is real -- it's the bit when we start saying cause that gets funny.

But, also, since we've agreed causation doesn't support physicalism, I think I'd say this is worthy of another thread. Causation has been popping up.

we can't not think in terms of causation by our very nature. — Moliere

Schopenhauer agreed. He called it the law of explanation.

, If it is a way of thinking, is causation then not a thing in the world so much as a way of understanding things in the world?

If it is a way of thinking, is causation then not a thing in the world but a way of understanding things in the world? — Banno

What does the way we are bound to think have to do with the way the world is?

Schopenhauer wanted to answer that by way of Kant. Wittgenstein says we can't have an answer to that question.

What does the way we are bound to think have to do with the way the world is? — frank

:grin:

Are causes in the world or in the way we describe the world?