Sorry, I don't buy it. It seems a contrivance to lead to some desired conclusion, or the product of naivetee. But of course, I haven't yet seen your argument that shows it metaphyisically necessary that a gap exists. Got one? — Relativist

I already mentioned that. Could we agree that if all events lay on the same point then we cannot have any change?

I can agree that: change iff time elapses. An event is any point in time (excluding an initial state, if there was one).

Change to me is the chronological occurrence of events. You cannot possibly order events chronologically if they occur at one point. Does this make things more clear?

I don't have a problem with that. I have a problem with your assumption there's a "gap" between points of time.

There is either no gap or there is a gap. There is no other option. All events lay on the same point if there is no gap or the gap length is zero.

All events lay on the same point if there is no gap or the gap length is zero. — MoK

Non-sequitur, and confused.

If time is continuous, it maps to the real number line. There are no "gaps" in the real number line.

If time is discrete, then each point of time corresponds to an indivisible/unmeasureable duration (relative to the real number line) - each unit abutting the next. Still no "gap", as you've described it.

Non-sequitur, and confused. — Relativist

That is not correct.

If time is continuous, it maps to the real number line. There are no "gaps" in the real number line. — Relativist

If the distance between two immediate points on time is absolutely zero then these points are simultaneous. Moreover, the number of points on the real number line is known to be "c" so-called the cardinal number of the continuum. This number however is not the biggest infinity. This means that you could accommodate more points on the real number line therefore the real number line or any small segment of the real number line no matter how small is still divisivable.

If time is discrete, then each point of time corresponds to an indivisible/unmeasureable duration (relative to the real number line). Still no "gap", as you've described it. — Relativist

Yes, each point of time corresponds to an indivisible duration. But that is not what I am talking about. I am talking about two consecutive points on time.

If the distance between two immediate points on time is absolutely zero then these points are simultaneous. — MoK

If there is 0 distance, it is the same point.

Moreover, the number of points on the real number line is known to be "c" so-called the cardinal number of the continuum.

Apples/oranges. The cardinality of the set of real numbers is not a member of the set of real numbers. Transfinite math is only relevent to comparing sets (e.g. the set of natural numbers to the set of real numbers). It has zero bearing on the discussion.

Yes, each point of time corresponds to an indivisible duration. But that is not what I am talking about. I am talking about two consecutive points on time. — MoK

If time is continuous, there are no "consecutive" points of time (there are no consecutive real numbers- just a "less than"/"greater than" relation.

If time is discrete, then the smallest unit of time is a duration, and there's no correspondence to points. (More apples/oranges).

if someone claims that an essential change like this has taken place, don't we just tell them, "We don't consider people to swap their consciousness, they are born with one and die with that same consciousness"? Are these theories and claims falsifiable? — Leontiskos

Perhaps my statement was too wrong. Theorems (statements) about a concept must follow the concept's definition, lest we are talking about something else. Within the definition that consciousness is something that starts at birth and ends at death, if a body would happen to die and be somehow reanimated, that would imply they have a different soul now. Maybe that is a problem.

A number of folks seem to think that if you get cloned then die, you don't stop experiencing. — Leontiskos

Well, their view is problematic. If you get cloned and don't die the two bodies share the same consciousness then?

For example, on this view, it appears to be possible for two future persons to be psychologically continuous with a presently existing person. Can one really become two? In response to this problem, some commentators have suggested that, although our beliefs, memories, and intentions are of utmost importance to us, they are not necessary for our identity, our persistence through time. — IEP

Since this conclusion violates the transitivity of identity (which states that if an X is identical with a Y, and the Y is identical with a Z, then the X must be identical with the Z), personal identity relations cannot consist in direct memory connections. — IEP

It violates the tansitivity of identity.

Well as I understand it there are clearly documented cases of people coming back from brain death, — Leontiskos

I didn't know that. I looked into an article, and also found a definition of brain stem death:

"Brain stem death is where a person no longer has any brain stem functions, and has permanently lost the potential for consciousness"

Also "The tendency to asystole in BD can be transient and is attributable more to systemic factors than to absence of brain function per se. If BD is to be equated with death, it must be on some basis more plausible than loss of somatic integrative unity."

So it seems there is some disagreement on "brain death" happening. Not sure what to make of it yet.

Your argument must be something like <The only (second-person) evidence of consciousness is bodily movement; after death there is no bodily movement; therefore after death there is no consciousness>. This sort of argument is only objectionable in the case where we have an extremely high standard of proof a la Descartes, which we perhaps do in this thread. This sort of argument is probable but not certain. — Leontiskos

That is fine. I didn't think we had to accomodate for after-life. For that purpose we could refine the definition to: Consciousness then (or the soul etc) would start at birth or whenever we wanna say we first become conscious (mirror test?) and presumably ends in death.

So a larger amount of memory loss than being unable to recognize family members? — Leontiskos

I was proposing an accidental change in the soul, not an essential one. Not recognising family memberes is also an accidental change. An essential change would amount to swapping the soul for another one. I think that is implied from the definition of essence.

This whole thing is reminiscent of the Cartesian move that, "We of course have good reason to believe that X, but do we also have the fullness of certitude?" What standard of proof is being imposed, here? Are we trying to jump over the fence or over the moon? — Leontiskos

As I will say below, the fence is good. Your proposal that it is the standard view amounts to me to simply accepting things because it feels better that way — dogmatism. I am exploring the reasons why we must think otherwise. I also think that your 1-2-3 arguments comes with an issue.

1. We are not perduring.
2. We are perduring, but we don't know it.
3. We are perduring, but we know it.

You will say that 2 is false, but that is circular. We are trying to find out whether we last or not, appealing to knowledge of it ties it in a circle. I want to find out, do we really know these things?

Your trilemma ought to be rephrased instead to "We are being destroyed and recreated, but we can't know it". Then we have something that is epistemically the same as "We are not being destroyed and recreated". But if we can't know whether we are being destroyed and recreated, we can't know otherwise too, so we can't know if we last and the conclusion of the discussion is agnosticism.

Otherwise, there are two possibilities:

1. We persist through time and we can come to reasonably believe that.
2. We don't persist through time and we can come to reasonably believe that we don't.

And that is the discussion. The knowledge claim depends on the metaphysical claim, not the other way around.

but what about sleep? Usually when we sleep we lose consciousness, along with the experiential and psychological continuity. — Leontiskos

If there is a loud noise, we wake up. We dream during sleep. So there is some conscious activity there, even if at a lower level. For example, when we are relaxing at a beach, staring at the cloudless sky, there is much less conscious activity than if we were engaging in engineering work at a live production line.

You define the soul in terms of consciousness, and in those cases a dramatic and permanent change in consciousness occurs. — Leontiskos

Because "dramatic" is arbitrary, and most changes are permanent, often changing out opinion on a movie is permanent, yet we are not dying. How dramatic does it have to be for us to die? Arbitrary.

Do we have the highest degree of certitude that the soul perdures, such that it could overcome the most extreme version of Pyrrhonism? No, I don't think so. — Leontiskos

I don't think extreme Pyrrhonism can be defeated, only overcome. Which is why the title of the thread is Reasons for believing (aka arguments), not proof. A poor reason to believe that the soul perdures is better than no reason at all.

what reason do I have to believe in the maintenance of the self as opposed to its constant creation and subsequent destruction and replacement by another self? — Lionino

You don't. But they aren't exclusive either. Prior to destruction, it is set in place that your replacement is similar to what comes before. Because every copy isn't exactly identical, over time there is more and more noticeable change. The idea is to preserve the parts of you that are good over time, and purge the parts of you that are bad over time.

PS: Even though it may be that I feel as though I am the same person as I were yesterday, that might simply be an illusion created by the neurological conditions of the body, which are the memories I/we hold. — Lionino

Correct. Its even worse then that. You're really just a ton of brain cells teaming up together to survive. Which is why we need an emphasis on things greater than ourselves. 'We' are extremely temporary. It is the preservation of continued existence of not only our selves, but others where possible which is paramount.

If there is 0 distance, it is the same point. — Relativist

That is my point. If the distance/gap between two events is zero then events are simultaneous.

Apples/oranges. The cardinality of the set of real numbers is not a member of the set of real numbers. Transfinite math is only relevent to comparing sets (e.g. the set of natural numbers to the set of real numbers). It has zero bearing on the discussion. — Relativist

Are you talking about the power set? It was a mistake on my part to write "c" instead of "R". If we define "R" as the cardinality of the real number lines then this number is the number of members of the set. This number is infinite but it is not the biggest infinity. Therefore, any small interval on the real number line no matter how small is divisible.

If time is discrete, then the smallest unit of time is a duration, and there's no correspondence to points. (More apples/oranges). — Relativist

There are points. The smallest duration/gap in fact separates points from each other. For example, the gap for any immediate points of natural number is 1.

That is my point. If the distance/gap between two events is zero then events are simultaneous. — MoK

You're applying the term "simultaneously" in an absurd way by claiming that event-A is "simultaneous with" event-A.

Are you talking about the power set? It was a mistake on my part to write "c" instead of "R". If we define "R" as the cardinality of the real number lines then this number is the number of members of the set. This number is infinite but it is not the biggest infinity. Therefore, any small interval on the real number line no matter how small is divisible. — MoK

My point was simply that if time is continuous, it maps to the ordered set of real numbers:
there is a point in time for every real number, and there is a real number for every point in time.

The cardinality of the set is irrelevant to the mapping. As I said, cardinality is used only to compare two different SETS, and has no bearing on the mapping.

If time is discrete, then the smallest unit of time is a duration, and there's no correspondence to points. (More apples/oranges). — Relativist

There are points. The smallest duration/gap in fact separates points from each other.

You're conflating the mathematical concept (of points) with a sequence of temporal durations. These durations are not actually divisible into smaller units - except abstractly, which is irrelevant because you're making an ontological claim.

Perhaps my statement was too wrong. Theorems (statements) about a concept must follow the concept's definition, lest we are talking about something else. Within the definition that consciousness is something that starts at birth and ends at death, if a body would happen to die and be somehow reanimated, that would imply they have a different soul now. Maybe that is a problem. — Lionino

Does consciousness need to be continuous?

Well, their view is problematic. If you get cloned and don't die the two bodies share the same consciousness then? — Lionino

It only works backwards. Both people would be the same person at the instant of the copy being made, but then instantly diverge.

From the perspective of either copy though, they've always been the same person. There is no reason why there'd be a discontinuity that's any different from going to sleep.

It violates the tansitivity of identity. — Lionino

I guess I'd see the self more as a process than a state in this sense.

You're applying the term "simultaneously" in an absurd way by claiming that event-A is "simultaneous with" event-A. — Relativist

No, I am talking about three different types of processes, namely discrete, continuous, and simultaneous. A simultaneous process is a process in which all the events occur at the same point.

You're conflating the mathematical concept (of points) with a sequence of temporal durations. These durations are not actually divisible into smaller units - except abstractly, which is irrelevant because you're making an ontological claim. — Relativist

I am not conflating anything. If time is discrete then the points are points of time and the interval between two consecutive points is the smallest duration.

You're applying the term "simultaneously" in an absurd way by claiming that event-A is "simultaneous with" event-A. — Relativist

No, I am talking about three different types of processes, namely discrete, continuous, and simultaneous. A simultaneous process is a process in which all the events occur at the same point. — MoK

OK, I see your point. However, that approach is vulnerable to objections based on special relativity (see this article). Since we're talking about the metaphysics of time in general, it usually makes more sense to consider the temporal evolution of the universe: the universe evolves from state S1 at time T1 to state S2 at time T2. T1 and T2 are points of time, and also correspond to events. On this global scale, there are no "simultaneous events". Does this work for you?

You're conflating the mathematical concept (of points) with a sequence of temporal durations. These durations are not actually divisible into smaller units - except abstractly, which is irrelevant because you're making an ontological claim. — Relativist

I am not conflating anything. If time is discrete then the points are points of time and the interval between two consecutive points is the smallest duration. — MoK

Yes, you are. Here's an excerpt from the Wikipedia article on the chronon:

"A chronon is a proposed quantum of time, that is, a discrete and indivisible "unit" of time as part of a hypothesis that proposes that time is not continuous. In simple language, a chronon is the smallest, discrete, non-decomposable unit of time in a temporal data model. "

You're trying to divide something that is indivisible, treating time as continuous (that's what you're doing when you consider the chronons divisible into points) - but events are merely advancing in stutter-steps. You can't have it both ways.

Perhaps my statement was too wrong. Theorems (statements) about a concept must follow the concept's definition, lest we are talking about something else. Within the definition that consciousness is something that starts at birth and ends at death, if a body would happen to die and be somehow reanimated, that would imply they have a different soul now. Maybe that is a problem. — Lionino

I think we are running up against a terminus problem. For example, you said, "they are born with one and die with that same consciousness[/soul]." The question is something like, "Do they die with a soul that has perdured, or is death precisely the cessation of the soul?" This is the problem of substantial change, where the cessation of a substance ends up being a kind of cessation tout court. Usually we would say that death is the cessation of the soul, but empirically and not merely definitionally.

Well, their view is problematic. — Lionino

I will just agree with you and abandon that line.

So it seems there is some disagreement on "brain death" happening. Not sure what to make of it yet. — Lionino

Right, but the more pertinent fact is simply that the empirical criteria for death is revisable. So many of these questions about souls can be rephrased as questions about what occurs at death, or of what death is.

That is fine. I didn't think we had to accomodate for after-life. For that purpose we could refine the definition to: Consciousness then (or the soul etc) would start at birth or whenever we wanna say we first become conscious (mirror test?) and presumably ends in death. — Lionino

Yes, fair enough.

I was proposing an accidental change in the soul, not an essential one. Not recognising family memberes is also an accidental change. An essential change would amount to swapping the soul for another one. I think that is implied from the definition of essence. — Lionino

So going back to the problem of substantial change, the classical problem here is that a substantial change is not properly a change, because there is no substrate that underlies it. "Swapping souls" is not a change of either soul; on Descartes' view it would simply be like swapping engines in a car without changing either engine.

As I will say below, the fence is good. Your proposal that it is the standard view amounts to me to simply accepting things because it feels better that way — dogmatism. I am exploring the reasons why we must think otherwise. — Lionino

If we are searching for reasons why we must think otherwise then we are trying to jump over the moon, not the fence. If your thread is about, "Reasons for believing (aka arguments), not proof," then you can't be looking for necessary reasons ("reasons why we must think otherwise"). There is a vacillation between the fence and the moon.

The standard view is not dogmatism, it is fence-jumping. It is, "It seems to be this way, and no one has offered an argument to overthrow this seeming."

You will say that 2 is false — Lionino

No, I said that it is otiose, or pragmatically inconsequential, or unable to be practically differentiated from (1). The thing I said is false is (3).

I want to find out, do we really know these things? — Lionino

Again, this reminds me of Descartes:

This whole thing is reminiscent of the Cartesian move that, "We of course have good reason to believe that X, but do we also have the fullness of certitude?" — Leontiskos

Your trilemma ought to be rephrased instead to "We are being destroyed and recreated, but we can't know it". — Lionino

That is exactly what my (2) was. Your (2) is different.

But if we can't know whether we are being destroyed and recreated, we can't know otherwise too, so we can't know if we last and the conclusion of the discussion is agnosticism. — Lionino

I would say that either way we last, at least if 'last' is a meaningful term.

Otherwise, there are two possibilities:

1. We persist through time and we can come to reasonably believe that.
2. We don't persist through time and we can come to reasonably believe that we don't.

And that is the discussion. The knowledge claim depends on the metaphysical claim, not the other way around. — Lionino

How are such contraries the only possibilities? Why assume that we will always be able to know the metaphysical fact of the matter, or have reasonable opinion about it?

If there is a loud noise, we wake up. We dream during sleep. So there is some conscious activity there, even if at a lower level. — Lionino

Hmm. But we don't always wake up with a loud noise. The argument is fair as far as it goes, but if we are to say that we are conscious of the world when we are in a deep, dreamless sleep, then we have stretched the term "conscious" quite far. Who knows what I am now conscious of, on that definition?

Because "dramatic" is arbitrary, and most changes are permanent, often changing out opinion on a movie is permanent, yet we are not dying. How dramatic does it have to be for us to die? Arbitrary. — Lionino

The logical conclusion here seems to be that death is arbitrary.

But perhaps the point is only that the soul can change essentially without dying, like a caterpillar into a butterfly.

I don't think extreme Pyrrhonism can be defeated, only overcome. Which is why the title of the thread is Reasons for believing (aka arguments), not proof. A poor reason to believe that the soul perdures is better than no reason at all. — Lionino

"It seems that way and there are no good arguments to the contrary," is a poor reason, better than no reason at all.

I think at the heart of this is the question of what burden or standard of proof is being sought.

OK, I see your point. However, that approach is vulnerable to objections based on special relativity (see this article). Since we're talking about the metaphysics of time in general, it usually makes more sense to consider the temporal evolution of the universe: the universe evolves from state S1 at time T1 to state S2 at time T2. T1 and T2 are points of time, and also correspond to events. On this global scale, there are no "simultaneous events". Does this work for you? — Relativist

I am familiar with the Relativity of simultaneity but that is not what I mean by simultaneous process. By simultaneous process, I mean a process in which all events occur at a single timeless point. Let me give you an example: A film is made of discrete frames. You can watch frames in order one frame at any given time. What you experience is a temporal change namely the movie. You can also watch all the frames at a single point. That is what I mean by simultaneously.

Yes, you are. Here's an excerpt from the Wikipedia article on the chronon:

"A chronon is a proposed quantum of time, that is, a discrete and indivisible "unit" of time as part of a hypothesis that proposes that time is not continuous. In simple language, a chronon is the smallest, discrete, non-decomposable unit of time in a temporal data model. "

You're trying to divide something that is indivisible, treating time as continuous (that's what you're doing when you consider the chronons divisible into points) - but events are merely advancing in stutter-steps. You can't have it both ways. — Relativist

I am not talking about the quantization of time in which time is made of indivisible units so-called Chronon. I am talking about the classical discrete time.

I mean a process in which all events occur at a single timeless point. — MoK

Change doesn't occur at a point of time. Change entails a passage of time.

You can also watch all the frames at a single point. — MoK

A single point...of what? You could watch a single frame, but time is passing while you look at it.

I get the impression that you are treating time as a metaphysical entity, which I don't agree with. I consider time to be a relation between states. So a passage of time entails transitioning from state to state, while each emerged state is an event.

Also, what is an event? I view an event as a state that was caused by a prior state.

I am not talking about the quantization of time in which time is made of indivisible units so-called Chronon. I am talking about the classical discrete time. — MoK

Describe it. I'll point out that as you make more assumptions, you weaken your case - because each assumption can be rejected (unless you can show it to be logically necessary).

Change doesn't occur at a point of time. Change entails a passage of time. — Relativist

Correct. Perhaps using the term process is misleading. By process, I simply mean a set of events that occur either in a single timeless point or temporary. The set of events therefore is simultaneous in the first case and temporal in the second case. If you are not happy with the term process then let's call it a set of events or simply S for the sake of discussion.

I get the impression that you are treating time as a metaphysical entity, which I don't agree with. I consider time to be a relation between states. So a passage of time entails transitioning from state to state, while each emerged state is an event. — Relativist

Well, I think that time is a physical entity. This can be shown but it is not fruitful in the current stage of our discussion. I will need to discuss it later so let's wait for the proper time.

Also, what is an event? I view an event as a state that was caused by a prior state. — Relativist

By event, I mean a substance that exists in a specific state.

Describe it. I'll point out that as you make more assumptions, you weaken your case - because each assumption can be rejected (unless you can show it to be logically necessary). — Relativist

By discrete time I mean a time that occurs at certain points each consecutive points are separated by a constant interval.

We have made no progress from the point you said:

Let's see if we could agree on (2). — MoK

You seem to be making a number of specific metaphysical assumption that I disagree with, so it's pointless to continue.

You seem to be making a number of specific metaphysical assumption that I disagree with, so it's pointless to continue. — Relativist

I don't think that all the arguments that I provided are assumptions. You are free to finish the discussion if you wish.

You have demonstrated that you argument DEPENDS on assumptions. If I'm wrong, then recast your argument using my definition of time, events, discrete and continuous time.

The fundamental reason for believing in the permanence of the soul is the desire for it to be so.

:up:

You have demonstrated that you argument DEPENDS on assumptions. If I'm wrong, then recast your argument using my definition of time, events, discrete and continuous time. — Relativist

No, my arguments depend on the definitions. So again, consider a change. Is there a gap or isn't? Take your pick.

What is your definition of change by the way?

my arguments depend on the definitions. — MoK

And that is the reason your argument isn't compelling.

I see absolutely no reason to think there's a "gap" between instants of time, regardless of whether it's continuous or discrete.

And that is the reason your argument isn't compelling. — Relativist

Can we make a correct argument without properly defining the terms used?

I see absolutely no reason to think there's a "gap" between instants of time, regardless of whether it's continuous or discrete. — Relativist

If there is no gap between two instants of time then they lay on the same point. Is this correct or not?

What is your definition of change?

There is a theory of time (which I've never seen treated properly, but has never been taken seriously either)which states that time sort of flickers the way frames in a film reel do. Infintessimally small and imperceptibly small "cells" of time flash in and out with the gaps between an analogy to 'antimatter' or whatever. It's vague and science-fictiony but most are.

I can't see why we would pursue it other than a hunch, but thought you might like at least an aesthetic frame for considering other options.

Isn't that the same as time passing in discrete moments (versus continuous points)?

Mor-or-less but there is a baked-in continuity that would be missing on a bare conception of "moment - moment - moment" where dashes are arbitrary distinctions. I think the idea is that the interceding 'parts' of the process are the 'reason' for time passing, or some such. That you could having 'something' between two points of 'time'. Which is otherwise pretty baffling as an idea.