what's the source of the state of affairs — AmadeusD

I'm not sure what you're asking.

I can only imagine (as previously mentioned) a supernatural origin for such a brute claim. — AmadeusD

What do you mean by "supernatural"? If you mean "non-physical" then yes, the moral realist will accept that moral facts are not physical facts; a moral statement being true has nothing to do with the existence of matter, energy, space, or time. Some moral realists may believe in the existence of abstract moral entities (much like mathematical realists believe in the existence of abstract mathematical entities), but I don't think this is required.

I'm not sure what you're asking. — Michael

Well, the statement, taken as a state of affairs, floats freely with no grounding. It references two states of affairs and then makes a judgment on them viz. That there are other's, and that other's can be harmed. Those are two states of affairs. The claim that one ought not harm those others who can be harmed isn't a judgement. So would I then be fine in simply concluding that this claim is nonsensical?

What do you mean by "supernatural"? If you mean "non-physical" then yes, the moral realist will accept that moral facts are not physical facts; a moral statement being true has nothing to do with the existence of matter, energy, space, or time. — Michael

This doesnt get me anywhere unfortunately., I still see absolutely no justification for the claim unless one relies on revelation in some form.

Fair enough.

I reject 1.

Obviously if you reject the premise that ordinary language philosophy is correct then the argument will fail, but then what better theory of meaning do you have?

I am not quite sure what you mean by "theory of meaning" nor why I would need it for this discussion. Metaethics is about, among other things, whether there are moral facts--irregardless of what the signification of colloquial words mean. By moral fact, I mean a normative fact (and by 'normative fact' I mean a stance-independently existing prescription) that is subject-referencing.

I am not quite sure what you mean by "theory of meaning" — Bob Ross

Theories of Meaning

nor why I would need it for this discussion. — Bob Ross

The starting point of any metaethics is the question "what do moral statements mean?".

When I say "you ought not murder" am I saying something like "don't murder" (non-cognitivism), am I saying something like "I disapprove of murder" (subjectivism), or am I trying to describe an objective feature of the world (realism and error theory).

My example argument is that non-cognitivists and subjectivists misunderstand the meaning of moral statements: "you ought not murder" just doesn't mean either "don't murder" or "I disapprove of murder". When we claim something like "one ought not murder" we are trying to describe an objective feature of the world. As such, if there are such features then realism is true and if there aren't such features then error theory is true.

I see. So the problem I have is that promises are not normative statements which exist mind-independently, — Bob Ross

That's not a problem for me. Why does it cause you pause?

What do you mean by "supernatural"? If you mean "non-physical" then yes, the moral realist will accept that moral facts are not physical facts; a moral statement being true has nothing to do with the existence of matter, energy, space, or time. — Michael

This doesn't get me anywhere unfortunately. I still see absolutely no justification for the claim unless one relies on revelation in some form. I can't figure out how a moral fact could escape needing to be tied to space and time, but that aside, even if granted, there's absolutely no moral force in the statement as-is.

I also just plum deny that it could be a state of affairs that a judgement on a behaviour is a fact. Seems counter to its definition.

The starting point of any metaethics is the question "what do moral statements mean?". — Michael

So what's the difference between metaethics and metalinguistics?

Ethics first. Metaethics second. Meta ethics endeavors to think about behavioural codes. Not all codes are on equal evolutionary footing. Not all metaethics precede language acqusition. Some does. Prior to the ability to take note of, bring attention to, and/or subsequently begin discussing ethics as a subject matter in and of itself, we're already figuring out how we're supposed to act by thinking about our own behaviours at the time as well as the events that immediately followed.. We're already taking part in meta ethical endeavors. We just do not know it at the time we're doing it. The question neglects to keep our early years in mind.

Some creatures begin drawing correlations between their own behaviours and what else is going on around them at that particular time. That's the basic connection from which all others diverge. All things metaethical involve thinking about acceptable and/or unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. The question neglects the fact that we're already figuring out what's acceptable or not(acceptable/unacceptable behaviour) long before the ability to talk about and discuss things like the meaning of terms.

We're discussing that which existed in its entirety prior to our naming and describing it. We're thinking about the social norms, i.e., regularly practiced codes of conduct that influence each and every one of our worldviews, particularly during our early formative years. We were figuring out how we're supposed to act. We draw all sorts of correlations prior to and during language acquisition. Some are between our behaviours and what else was going on at the time(what immediately followed). Such experiences were and are meaningful to the language less creature under consideration.

Speaking of "meaning" and theories thereof...

All that to ground saying that there are better questions. What counts as "moral/ethical"?

When we claim something like "one ought not murder" we are trying to describe an objective feature of the world. As such, if there are such features then realism is true and if there aren't such features then error theory is true. — Michael

And the true feature of the world in this case is that A society of murderers cannot exist. They die out.

And the true feature of the world in this case is that A society of murderers cannot exist. They die out. — unenlightened

Given the destructive nature of humans, it does seem to some that human extinction would be a great good.

You seem to be talking about normative ethics, applied ethics, and/or descriptive ethics. I'm talking about metaethics.

Metaethics:

One of the central debates within analytic metaethics concerns the semantics of what is actually going on when people make moral statements such as “Abortion is morally wrong” or “Going to war is never morally justified.” The metaethical question is not necessarily whether such statements themselves are true or false, but whether they are even the sort of sentences that are capable of being true or false in the first place (that is, whether such sentences are “truth-apt”) and, if they are, what it is that makes them “true.” On the surface, such sentences would appear to possess descriptive content—that is, they seem to have the syntactical structure of describing facts in the world—in the same form that the sentence “The cat is on the mat” seems to be making a descriptive claim about a cat on a mat; which, in turn, is true or false depending on whether or not there really is a cat on the mat. To put it differently, the sentence “The cat is on the mat” seems to be expressing a belief about the way the world actually is. The metaethical view that moral statements similarly express truth-apt beliefs about the world is known as cognitivism. Cognitivism would seem to be the default view of our moral discourse given the apparent structure that such discourse appears to have.

I have extended this line of reasoning to argue that moral sentences seem to be expressing a belief about the way the world objectively is. The sentence "it is wrong to eat babies" is closer in kind to the sentence "the cat is on the mat" than it is to the sentence "chocolate is tasty."

When we claim that chocolate is tasty we are expressing an opinion but when we claim that it is wrong to eat babies we are doing more than just expressing an opinion. We disagree about morality in a way very unlike how we disagree about the tastiness of certain foods.

As such, it seems clear that subjectivism (like non-cognitivism) misunderstands the meaning of moral sentences.

Therefore, either moral realism is correct or error theory is correct, and if error theory is correct then it is not the case that it is wrong to eat babies.

I can't figure out how a moral fact could escape needing to be tied to space and time — AmadeusD

Do mathematical facts need to be "tied" to space and time? Or are there no mathematical facts?

Nihilism doesn’t choose chaos and hardship, it merely accepts that there is no intrinsic meaning available to us. — Tom Storm

Doesn't the universe seem to though? Space and the world itself is a chaotic, violent place. If there is no intrinsic meaning or purpose available to us- actually. Wait a minute. Is this a faux/proxy theist/atheist argument without either of us realizing it? "Intrinsic meaning" seems to imply, in your usage of it, something that could theoretically only come from intelligent design, no? Meaning, if you do not believe in intelligent design, you automatically are either a nihilist or moral anti-realist? Well that's naturally a pretty easy cookie-cutter argument to make of course.

But if we're looking beyond that- the idea that some form of morals ("right or wrong" as advanced intelligent beings or "progress and regress" as purely cellular beings in a larger scale of actual advancement or purpose or "value" not just simple one-time human observation of what seems to "work" in one man's lifetime levied against purported other lifetimes) might exist and proliferate the Universe and existence itself and we only begin to try to understand it, perhaps pay it lip service in the form of laws, codes, so-called "ethics", and best practices, what concrete proof could any man have against such a notion?

There’s a significant difference between 'there is no inherent meaning' and ‘nothing matters’. — Tom Storm

Well sure, similar to how there's a significant difference between the state of a vehicle that has just drove off a canyon and the state of the same vehicle once it reaches the bottom of said chasm. I see little difference in the two states. Perhaps this is what differs our respective worldview(s).

In layman's terms: "doesn't one inevitably end up as the other?" :)

My example argument is that non-cognitivists and subjectivists misunderstand the meaning of moral statements: "you ought not murder" just doesn't mean either "don't murder" or "I disapprove of murder". When we claim something like "one ought not murder" we are trying to describe an objective feature of the world. As such, if there are such features then realism is true and if there aren't such features then error theory is true.

If you are saying moral subjectivists are misunderstanding the meaning of 'moral' language, then please let me know which part of my analysis of the terms is incorrect.

Normative facts are statements referring to stance-independently existing prescriptions; and moral facts are subject-referencing normative facts.

I think those 'meanings' are perfectly aligned with what you are trying to argue for with moral realism; but I don't see how linguistics is helping your case. Just because it seems as though there are moral facts because we colloquially express our norms in a moral realist kind of manner does not entail they exist whatsoever: it's a non-sequitur.

I outlined it in that post, which part did you disagree with?

Just because it seems as though there are moral facts because we colloquially express our norms in a moral realist kind of manner does not entail they exist whatsoever: it's a non-sequitur. — Bob Ross

I’m not saying that there are moral facts.

I'll set out my argument as clear as I can:

1. All moral sentences assert that there is some objective moral fact
2. Either there is at least one objective moral fact or there are no objective moral facts
3. If there is at least one objective moral fact then at least one moral sentence is true
4. If there are no objective moral facts then all moral sentences are false
5. If at least one moral sentence is true then realism is correct
6. If all moral sentences are false then error theory is correct
7. Therefore, either realism is correct or error theory is correct
8. The sentence "one ought not eat babies" is a moral sentence
9. If error theory is correct then the sentence "one ought not eat babies" is false
10. If the sentence "one ought not eat babies" is false then it is not the case that one ought not eat babies
11. Therefore, if error theory is correct then it is not the case that one ought not eat babies
12. Therefore, either realism is correct or it is not the case that one ought not eat babies

But this is the Kantian problem of universalization. I have to first accept that my actions can serve as a "maxim" for others, before the general fate of humankind would matter to me. If I'm simply making an exception for myself, then I can murder as I please, since most other people will not, and the species will be fine.

Carrying on from this, one of these must be true:

1. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of spacetime
2. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of material objects
3. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of abstract objects
4. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of magic
5. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of God
6. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of [some other thing]
7. Mathematical truths do not depend on the existence of anything
8. There are no mathematical truths

I know that mathematical realists will say that (3) is true. Mathematical antirealists like myself will disagree. I can't even make sense of the existence of abstract objects. I certainly will say that (1), (2), (4), and (5) are false.

That leaves me with (6), (7), and (8). I'm unwilling to accept (8) and I can't comment on (6) because it doesn't really say anything.

So I must accept that (7) is true.

And if mathematical truths do not depend on the existence of anything then I see no reason to dismiss the claim that moral truths do not depend on the existence of anything.

Finally, as a passing consideration, "Santa does not exist" being true does not depend on the existence of anything. Rather, by definition, it depends on the non-existence of something (namely, Santa), and I don't think it makes sense to say that Santa's non-existence is itself the existence of something (such as an abstract object).

Now replace “Santa” with “objective moral fact.” Error theory being correct depends on an objective truth that does not depend on the existence of anything, and so an error theorist dismissing realism on the grounds that it depends on an objective truth that does not depend on the existence of anything is self-refuting.

But this is the Kantian problem of universalization. I have to first accept that my actions can serve as a "maxim" for others, — J

You don't have to accept anything. But you ought to accept the truth, otherwise there is no reason or meaning to our discussion.

Hmm, I'm not sure I get your meaning. Isn't it perfectly true that, if only a few people decide to make exceptions for themselves and do whatever they please, this will not affect the human species in the way you described, and therefore this wouldn't serve as a motive for not so doing? A "society of murderers" probably can't exist, but one with just a few is quite feasible, as we know, sadly. I'm not seeing how respect for truth comes into it, at this point. But say more . . .

My "have to" is innocuous. I only meant that one would have to agree to some form of the categorical imperative in order to have the kind of motive you described.

My "have to" is innocuous. I only meant that one would have to agree to some form of the categorical imperative in order to have the kind of motive you described. — J

And I was saying with my innocuous "ought to" only that this conversation has no meaning unless we are morally committed to truth.

But what is the problem here?

If I say I have a desire to do something, no one makes a fuss, but if I say I have an obligation to do something, it is problematic and someone will demand that I get it out of my pocket and show them.

So here I am, getting the obligation out of my pocket and showing you - that talk only works if you commit to truth and refrain from crying "wolf!" when there is no wolf. The game of lying can only get off the ground in a community of truth-tellers, because only when there are truth tellers does anyone have any reason to understand what is being said.

Nobody has to tell the truth, sometimes people don't want to tell the truth, but they always ought to tell the truth. It is when someone tells me I ought to do something when I don't want to do it that I start to get all sceptical, but if I cry wolf when there is no wolf, I might find that when there is a wolf, no one heeds my cry and no one comes to my rescue. What you ought to do matters to you, and stuff that matters is real.

And this is not a matter of convention, because an opposite obligation cannot function; lies become spam and we stop listening and responding. It is a simple fact that society, and civilisation is necessarily a cooperative affair and such mutual obligations are integral to every human society without exception.

mathematical facts are not moral facts.

What possible morals exist a priori?

and civilisation is necessarily a cooperative affair and such mutual obligations are integral to every human society without exception. — unenlightened

How are you accounting for all of the exceptions?

mathematical facts are not moral facts. — AmadeusD

I'm not saying that mathematical facts are moral facts.

I'm saying that mathematical truths do not depend on the existence of anything (whether material or abstract).

Therefore, it is fallacious to say that truths depend on the existence of something (whether material or abstract).

Therefore, it is prima facie fallacious to say that moral truths depend on the existence of something (whether material or abstract).

You need positive evidence or reasoning to assert that moral truths depend on the existence of something (whether material or abtract).

I reject that.

Moral truths are necessarily attendant to the world in which we live. They must refer.

Moral truths are necessarily attendant to the world in which we live. They must refer. — AmadeusD

If there is no intelligent alien life in the universe then the sentence "there is no intelligent alien life in the universe" is true, even though the phrase "intelligent alien life" wouldn't refer to anything that exists.

If one ought not eat babies then the sentence "one ought not eat babies" is true, even though the phrase "ought not" wouldn't refer to anything that exists.

I see no reason to believe your assertion that if obligation isn't a physical then then there are no obligations. You have yet to justify this assertion.

I won't convince you about moral realism, because you don't need it. :smile:
I will instead support you in your goal. Although you don't actuall need that either. But it's something I can do very easily and I have to take it out of my system. :smile:

As I understand it, "moral realism" --I don't like and never use this term-- is basically about making a list of what things are right and what are wrong. These things resemble very much the rules that every game has. One must follow them in order to play a game. Of course, because they are actually part of the game. And that's all there is to them. They can also be set in groups, as principles of acceptable and inacceptable behavior that members of the group are obliged to follow if they want to participate in a group. All that is of course acceptable.

I could also call them "recipes" of moral behavior. The Ten Commandments is an example of such a moral view of the world. It is an arbitrary and absolute way of defining moral behavior. There's nothing metaphysical or scientific about it. They are so absolute that they don't leave any room for deviating from or breaking them. Even when there can be hundreds of logical, plausible, well-grounded reasons why one is justified to do so. There's no doubt that killing is a crime, that it is immoral to kill. It is even illegal. You go to prison. But what about justified killing for self-defense or in wars? People normally don't go to prison for that. Nor are they considered immoral by the society. You can take every Commandment, one by one, and you can find all sorts of cases in which one is justifies to deviate from or break them. If not for anything else, because they refer mainly to the Jewish people and their old customs. Yet they are supposed to be followed by all Christians everywhere in the world. “Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy.” This is ridiculous. How can be expected to follow these "rules"?

So, can such a moral(ity) system be applied to life as a whole and with all its versatility and multifacetedness?

Of course not.

An moral (I prefer the term "ethical") system must be founded on a basic principle, based on which other principles can be formed and ethical behavior and acts can be determined, allowing also for judgment to take place, based on rational thinking and facts, i.e. considering the conditions under which acts take place.

all “alien” refers to is non-human, non-Earthbound life forms. All of those elements have direct referents which we almalgamate.

But noting the issue you’re outlining my question is - what moral facts could exist a priori? That is, without human knowledge of them?

The concept around geometrical facts ar least is that they exist whether we know about them or not right? We discover aspects of the material world.

What are we discovering when we come across moral facts?

Edit: sorry for post-comment additions - that isn’t my assertion. My contention is it must refer to a state of affairs. “Ought not” isn’t a state of affairs and so I can’t see it to be either a fact or compelling morally to begin with. The states of affairs “of” that statement is that there are others and we can harm them.

You have to do more work to support the “ought not” and I’m not seeing that work

As I understand it, "moral realism" --I don't like and never use this term-- is basically about making a list of what things are right and what are wrong. — Alkis Piskas

No, that's normative ethics.

No, that's normative ethics. — Michael

:up: