This is what we want. — Paine

What are you saying the poem is saying of what we want? Ascetic stillness? Grace from suffering? Death? Dreamless sleep? Nirvana? Moksha into the cosmic reality of nothingness?

Excellent quote!! SO much to unpack there actually. — schopenhauer1

Yes. Part of the humor and yet truth of it is Freud's avoidance of you-go-girl cheerleading. The goal is hilariously realistic.

I want everyone from sub-Saharan Africa, to Western Europe, Mongolia, and North America to achieve the level of existential ennui on par with Cioran. In other words we need to get past the socio-economic, and acute psychological issues to the existential ones so we can all see the human condition as it is. — schopenhauer1

:up:

I'd add though that there's a wicked pleasure in Cioran. He doesn't strike me as someone who wanted to be anyone else. Same with Schopenhauer. 'I'd rather be this gloomy asshole than anyone else.' What is the perverse pleasure here? A glorious doomed rebellion against godnature or something.

Same with Schopenhauer. 'I'd rather be this gloomy asshole than anyone else.' What is the perverse pleasure here? A glorious doomed rebellion against godnature or something. — plaque flag

It's the pleasure in watching George Carlin on a pessimistic rant perhaps. But to me, it's a little more. Rather, we are always but evaluative creatures. There is no such thing as "non-evaluative view of existence". Even so-called "neutral" views are with the capacity of evaluation being in the background. So it is about seeing it for what it is. And they are evaluating it more realistically and accurately as to the how humans experience their way-of-life within it. Of course, Schopenhauer tries to reify it to metaphysical proportions, but you don't even need that. Will can simply be human's will. Becoming and not being, as the human condition.

But I do think taking seriously the pessimistic mindset is significant and not just a fun thing to toy around with. I think it leads to greater empathy (goes with commiseration). The gallows-humor is actually also part of this. — schopenhauer1

Toying around with it is the transcendence of gallowshumor. That detachment from the mortal self is the 'demonic' Will glorying in its indestructibility, seeing through the triviality of a merely personal death to the ongoing life of the species. Cosmic humor, what Blake might call perception of the infinite, is like some ironic irreverent twist on Nirvana. Golden laughter, winged feet. Easier talked about than activated of course. But traces of it are all over that Freud quote and all through Cioran.

Toying around with it is the transcendence of gallowshumor. That detachment from the mortal self is the 'demonic' Will glorying in its indestructibility, seeing through the triviality of a merely personal death to the ongoing life of the species. Cosmic humor, what Blake might call perception of the infinite, is like some ironic irreverent twist on Nirvana. Golden laughter, winged feet. Easier talked about than activated of course. But traces of it are all over that Freud quote and all through Cioran. — plaque flag

I'm reminded of Eduard Hartmann:

The essential feature of the morality built upon the basis of Von Hartmann's philosophy is the realization that all is one and that, while every attempt to gain happiness is illusory, yet before deliverance is possible, all forms of the illusion must appear and be tried to the utmost. Even he who recognizes the vanity of life best serves the highest aims by giving himself up to the illusion, and living as eagerly as if he thought life good. It is only through the constant attempt to gain happiness that people can learn the desirability of nothingness; and when this knowledge has become universal, or at least general, deliverance will come and the world will cease. No better proof of the rational nature of the universe is needed than that afforded by the different ways in which men have hoped to find happiness and so have been led unconsciously to work for the final goal. The first of these is the hope of good in the present, the confidence in the pleasures of this world, such as was felt by the Greeks. This is followed by the Christian transference of happiness to another and better life, to which in turn succeeds the illusion that looks for happiness in progress, and dreams of a future made worth while by the achievements of science. All alike are empty promises, and known as such in the final stage, which sees all human desires as equally vain and the only good in the peace of Nirvana. — Eduard von Hartmann Wiki

Toying around with it is the transcendence of gallowshumor. — plaque flag

It has been my observation that people generally only toy around with pessimism and indulge in gallows humour when they are not actually facing the gallows (metaphorically speaking, of course). It is easy enough to laugh at the reaper, when you are not standing in his shadow. Perhaps some "heroic spirits" keep up the humour until the bitter end, but it would take a lot to convince me that is anything more than pretence. (Which I guess is what you would expect given that most of human life seems to be pretence). Wisdom perhaps consists in knowing that you are just pretending, showing-off...and then,,,to show-off or not to show-off, that is the question,

Glad you brought up Von Hartmann. I really want to get into him but I have no idea how. His “philosophy of the unconscious” seems like a massive tome dealing with all sorts of crap and owes a lot to Hegel. Doesn’t help that he seems very obscure by todays standards

Glad you brought up Von Hartmann. I really want to get into him but I have no idea how. His “philosophy of the unconscious” seems like a massive tome dealing with all sorts of crap and owes a lot to Hegel. Doesn’t help that he seems very obscure by todays standards — Albero

Oh it is as you say, which is why sometimes secondary sources are fine for me. I don't need a bunch of wrong attempts at psychology and science stretched out over long tombs and translated from another language nonetheless. But my main point was how thorough he rode the pessimist wave. In a way he has a prior and parallel idea to my notion of "communal catharsis". That is to say, he thinks that humanity, in Hegelian fashion, will go through some sort of dialectic whereby it reaches an end state of admission of ascetic quietude. But we can only achieve this through going through the prior stages.. that this life has nothing to offer, that an afterlife has nothing to offer, that "progress through science" has nothing to offer, and that at the end, we should just kind of realize the pessimism of it all. That is some thoroughgoing pessimism! He even thinks that we should attain the end state through moving the prior states along. In other words lean into progress through science (presumably this phase) so we realize it is all for naught! Shit man, there is some cynicism par excellance!

I think he just needs to lose the dialectic and scale it down. That is to say, simply offer the idea that we can communally commiserate on small scales. Even the anti-utopian utopia of an End Phase, is some sort of hopeful idea (ala Hegel).

It has been my observation that people generally only toy around with pessimism and indulge in gallows humour when they are not actually facing the gallows (metaphorically speaking, of course). — Janus

Not this guy:

Working in the metaphysical framework of Schopenhauer, Mainländer sees the "will" as the innermost core of being, the ontological arche. However, he deviates from Schopenhauer in important respects. With Schopenhauer the will is singular, unified and beyond time and space. Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism leads him to conclude that we only have access to a certain aspect of the thing-in-itself by introspective observation of our own bodies. What we observe as will is all there is to observe, nothing more. There are no hidden aspects. Furthermore, via introspection we can only observe our individual will. This also leads Mainländer to the philosophical position of pluralism.[2]: 202  The goals he set for himself and for his system are reminiscent of ancient Greek philosophy: what is the relation between the undivided existence of the "One" and the everchanging world of becoming that we experience.

Additionally, Mainländer accentuates on the idea of salvation for all of creation. This is yet another respect in which he differentiates his philosophy from that of Schopenhauer. With Schopenhauer, the silencing of the will is a rare event. The artistic genius can achieve this state temporarily, while only a few saints have achieved total cessation throughout history. For Mainländer, the entirety of the cosmos is slowly but surely moving towards the silencing of the will to live and to (as he calls it) "redemption".

Mainländer theorized that an initial singularity dispersed and expanded into the known universe. This dispersion from a singular unity to a multitude of things offered a smooth transition between monism and pluralism. Mainländer thought that with the regression of time, all kinds of pluralism and multiplicity would revert to monism and he believed that, with his philosophy, he had managed to explain this transition from oneness to multiplicity and becoming.[16]

Death of God
Main article: God is dead
Despite his scientific means of explanation, Mainländer was not afraid to philosophize in allegorical terms. Formulating his own "myth of creation", Mainländer equated this initial singularity with God.

Mainländer reinterprets Schopenhauer's metaphysics in two important aspects. Primarily, in Mainländer's system there is no "singular will". The basic unity has broken apart into individual wills and each subject in existence possesses an individual will of his own. Because of this, Mainländer can claim that once an "individual will" is silenced and dies, it achieves absolute nothingness and not the relative nothingness we find in Schopenhauer. By recognizing death as salvation and by giving nothingness an absolute quality, Mainländer's system manages to offer "wider" means for redemption. Secondarily, Mainländer reinterprets the Schopenhauerian will-to-live as an underlying will-to-die, i.e. the will-to-live is the means towards the will-to-die.[17] — Philipp Mainlander Wiki

It seems to me that the world is declared empty not because the world lacks things that are good but exactly because those good things are so fragile and (sometimes) difficult to obtain. As far as I can tell, much of spirituality is a version of nothing is good or bad but thinking makes it so. Diogenes trained mind and body toward a radical independence of the goods of the world, all but the truly essential.

I think asceticism is often a kind of minimalism that economically emphasizes fantasy over reality. As Kojeve put it ( with earnest communist bias ?) stoicism and skepticism are escapisms that settle for ('merely') internal freedom. But to me the roleplay of politics can all too easily become (and probably usually is) just as fantastic. The key image is something like a squid drawing in from the world the tentacles representing simultaneously its interest, its investment, and its vulnerability. The form of beauty has been lifted away from the bodies of the fragile and expensive boys of Athens and distilled into a vapor one can carry in the pocket. The earthly crown has been replaced likewise with the idea of True status, invisible to the unworthy.

it is true that some find their lives so intolerable that they run to the gallows.

As far as I can tell, much of spirituality is a version of nothing is good or bad but thinking makes it so. — plaque flag

I'd say it is more precisely attachment to things which makes them bad; changing the way you think may be a start, but it is not enough.

Love is where you found it
floundering
sometimes it’s cool
sometimes it’s hot
whether of or for
a fool or not
some say it’s all you got

love is not a tool
you should not use it
if you try
you will abuse it
and your love will die

love is everything
the universal glue that binds
yet bondage is unkind
to love so let it go—
although
you held on tight
you must be ever ready
to say “goodnight”

I'd say it is more precisely attachment to things which makes them bad; changing the way you think may be a start, but it is not enough. — Janus

I think we agree that there are limits to mere thought. I'm trying to sketch what I see as what many spiritual life strategies have in common as 'causi sui' autonomy projects. The body remains stubbornly foundational. The world can't be completely conquered with attitude and philosophy.

How does one triumph over attachment ? I've suggested that the images (note the metaphor in Plato's 'ideas') are peeled off and internalized. Photographs replace reality. The beauty of a particular boy (I use 'boy' as a metonym here) is dangerously out of the philosopher's control. (The madness of the greedy lover is sketched in Phaedrus.) The philosopher must detach this beauty from the fragile and unruly flesh and convert it to an imperishable possession which time cannot steal.

I'm not claiming that this can be achieved completely or even that it's desirable. I'm just trying to sketch a particular enactment of the hero with a thousand faces.

love is everything
the universal glue that binds
yet bondage is unkind
to love so let it go—
although
you held on tight
you must be ever ready
to say “goodnight” — Janus

Reminds me of 'Love is a rose but you better not pluck it, it only grows when it's on the vine.' Deep idea there. I think it'd be very difficult to be detached from a spouse or a dear friend (a creative partner perhaps in a project that's going well.). Definitely a noble ideal, to transcend a grasping possessive jealousy. The quote reminds me also a bit of some stuff in Phaedrus. How does a greedy young soul become wise ? What emotional training is necessary ?

To me projection seems like a key concept. The young person's love object is largely 'false.' The beloved as a real person functions largely as a screen for this unconscious projection. The lover is self-fooled and finds something essential to him out of his control.

Through suffering and reflection, the lover separates projection from reality, becoming less capable of intense passion. This is the form of beauty becoming detached from individual bodies and being recognizing as an idea (etymologically a [projected] image).

FWIW, I think a similar projection is involved in the personal hero myth or the archetype of The Cause. In this case, sorting projection from actual human nature tends toward Qoheleth. Or the best lack all convention, while the worst are full of passionate intensity. This old man, as I picture him, drifts above the world that he can almost take or leave. As James put it, the world is a stage for heroic action.

To me it seems like the two great incitements to life (the two glues that keep a soul in the world) are the romantic-sexual game and the egoistic status game, both largely dependent perhaps on illusion/projection.

I think we agree that there are limits to mere thought. I'm trying to sketch what I see as what many spiritual life strategies have in common as 'causi sui' autonomy projects. The body remains stubbornly foundational. The world can't be completely conquered with attitude and philosophy. — plaque flag

Spiritual projects tend to be trying to short circuit mere thought. I'm all for that, but it is a different conception of philosophy—"philosophy as a way of life", as Hadot or Sloterdijk would have it. The latter was a disciple of Osho for several years and sees Osho as being the greatest spiritual genius of the 20th century. Spiritual disciplines and philosophy conceived in this way are not concerned with discussion and the pursuit of discursive truth so much as they are concerned with altering consciousness and experience.

So, I think you are right in one sense, but in another sense the world can be and is being conquered with attitude and philosophy, and this conquering is a terrible tragedy. The very idea of conquering the world is a dualism-driven error

The self cannot be mastered completely by means of discourse (attitude and philosophy), but they are perhaps the first step on the way, for some at least.

.

The philosopher must detach this beauty from the fragile and unruly flesh and convert it to an imperishable possession which time cannot steal.

I'm not claiming that this can be achieved completely or even that it's desirable. I'm just trying to sketch a particular enactment of the hero with a thousand faces. — plaque flag

I think the idea of eternity is often misinterpreted as meaning everlasting life and bliss. I see this dream too as being a form of attachment. I like Blake's notion of eternity—‘To see a World in a Grain of Sand and a Heaven in a Wild Flower, hold Infinity in the palm of your hand and Eternity in an hour.’

So, I don't think seeking the imperishable is the royal road to eternity, in fact quite the opposite. Combine Parmenides and Heraclitus to find the changeless right there in the heart of endless change.

Through suffering and reflection, the lover separates projection from reality, becoming less capable of intense passion. This is the form of beauty becoming detached from individual bodies and being recognizing as an idea (etymologically a [projected] image). — plaque flag

Yes, the ancient idea of passion was actually related to passivity, to being helplessly affected. The more modern idea is to love whatever is your calling intensely. It's not easy or common for sexual relationships to reach the heights of passion in the latter sense, while in the former sense it is arguably largely hormone-driven.

I think the poem speaks to the idea that loving another should honor their individuality and freedom to the utmost. If this involves letting them go their own way, then so be it. Surely this is common enough with good parenting?

So, I don't think seeking the imperishable is the royal road to eternity, in fact quite the opposite. — Janus

I can relate to what you say. Nobby Brown compared lifedeath with undeath or immortality. The immortal is neither alive nor dead. It's frozen. While life, in motion, is always also death.

I think this is part of Heidegger's point about our tendency to identify the permanent with the real. Is there is logical reason for this ? Or an irrational motive ?

At the end of Fast Sofa, a character who was uptight for most of the movie has some insight and loses all fear, basically going 'crazy' and dying in a high speed crash.

I connect this to the 'poisoncure' of philosophy, personified as Hamlet, who questions whether leaving early (dying) is really a thing to be avoided. We typically assume the importance of longevity, as if quantity is not at least threatened with absurdity in the context of the vastness of death.

I'm not equating wisdom with recklessness, but I am challenging the assumption that the goal of life is automatically to live as long as possible (and to identity with something that endures forever). Tristram and Isolde, or the fight for Freedom. We love those plots. Risk is a measure of passion. (Dying for love connects us back to Schopenhauer. The species-pole in us, the genitals, know themselves immortal -- and they overpower the deathfearing ego.

Yes, the ancient idea of passion was actually related to passivity, to being helplessly affected. The more modern idea is to love whatever is your calling intensely. — Janus

:up:

Yes, helplessly affected. That's the meaning I tend. Ovemastered, washed away, swept up, drugged. Young love is like that, or it was for me. When it's reciprocal, it's beyond anything.
Becker writes well on the 'religion of love' that's common among us, analyzes pop songs.

O first great love affair / does anything compare ?

When it's not reciprocated, it's a hell that perhaps one nevertheless is reluctant to part with, for then all magic leaves the world with it. I'm channelling some old memories to write all this.

I think the poem speaks to the idea that loving another should honor their individuality and freedom to the utmost. If this involves letting them go their own way, then so be it. — Janus

As a half-civilized man with some grey hairs creeping in, I agree. But I can't help but think that only a cooling of passion makes this possible. 'I can live without you' seems implied in that admittedly mature attitude. Fair enough...but then life moves toward being a spectacle on the screen for an ego. I speak of this ambivalently. I understand the pull of radical autonomy and basically reconceiving marriage as an intense friendship that includes sex (though sex too loses some of its barbaric-mystic meaning here.)

Let's try this in a different key. Imagine two single mothers trading their children, because in both cases they expect a better fit. Does this not offend us ? But is there no cold-bloodedly ethical/rational case to be made for a switch in some situations ?

Spiritual disciplines and philosophy conceived in this way are not concerned with discussion and the pursuit of discursive truth so much as they are concerned with altering consciousness and experience. — Janus

I'm reading an excellent book, Schopenhauer's Compass, Urs App. Schop was extremely critical of the other German idealists - specifically Schelling and Fichte (not Kant, but as is well known, scathing about Hegel) - for confusing mysticism and philosophy. He fully recognises the reality of higher consciousness - he called it 'better consciousness' - as being outside time and space, but he says that philosophy as a rational discipline can't be aimed at that. He accuses Schelling and Fichte of confusing theology with philosophy. Schop is saying that philosophy's task is purely critical - in the Kantian sense of making us aware of the limitations of discursive reason. It 'drops you at the border', so to speak.

But at the same time, Schopenhaur's is a 'soteriological' aim - liberation from cyclic existence, very much in accordance with his reading of the Upaniṣads, of which a Persian edition was one of his main sources of inspiration. He's resolutely atheist throughout, although not in the sense of 20th c atheism, because he still recognises, in fact strives for, 'the sacred'. So I would think that he certainly acknowledges the reality of 'the imperishable', although I'm only up to the first few chapters of the book.

As a half-civilized man with some grey hairs creeping in, I agree. But I can't help but think that only a cooling of passion makes this possible. 'I can live without you' seems implied in that admittedly mature attitude. Fair enough...but then life moves toward being a spectacle on the screen for an ego. I speak of this ambivalently. I understand the pull of radical autonomy and basically reconceiving marriage as an intense friendship that includes sex (though sex too loses some of its barbaric-mystic meaning here.) — plaque flag

I think it's funny that the atomism of Western society only focuses on economic institutions. It creates its own self-contained nihilism. If we take anything like Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs at all seriously, why wouldn't society be about properly slotting people's "needs" rather than market-driven transactionism? That is to say, institutions are ad hoc transactions rather than concerted caring about people.

So I would think that he certainly acknowledges the reality of 'the imperishable', although I'm only up to the first few chapters of the book. — Wayfarer

I'm reading the Wallace bio. I think Schopenhauer recognizes two imperishables -- the demonic Will and something like Platonic forms. A strange fusion, really, but fascinating.

Schop is saying that philosophy's task is purely critical - in the Kantian sense of making us aware of the limitations of discursive reason. It 'drops you at the border', so to speak. — Wayfarer

My take is that he fundamentally relied upon a direct intuition of the will. We have special direct access to the will in ourselves (our own little piece of the will ) but must simply watch the stone be overpowered by gravity from the outside. The will splits into pieces that eat one another.

I'm reading the Wallace bio. I think Schopenhauer recognizes two imperishables -- the demonic Will and something like Platonic forms. A strange fusion, really, but fascinating. — plaque flag

Whence the Forms from Will? Whence Objectification of Will into Forms? And "whence" is time, space, causality turning that into the "kaleidoscope" of the phenomenal world of experience? WHAT is projecting this? Mind? Then where does that fit in with Will and Representation?

Whence the Forms from Will? And "whence" is time, space, causality? WHAT is projecting this? Mind? Then where does that fit in with Will and Representation? — schopenhauer1

I think Schopenhauer is an unstable fusion. I never could take his metaphysics as a whole seriously. Also I'm refreshing my memory as I read, so I may get something very wrong.

But parts of his work have stuck me since I read the section dedicated to him in The Story of Philosophy decades ago.

Darwin and Dawkins 'naturalize' Schopenhauer. The 'Will' is an evolved set of 'irrational' motives and fears that serve the 'stupid' replication of genes. It's almost terrifyingly tautological, the theory of evolution.

Darwin and Dawkins 'naturalize' Schopenhauer. The 'Will' is an evolved set of 'irrational' motives and fears that serve the 'stupid' replication of genes. — plaque flag

Certainly, but this would be antithetical to Schop's main point regarding materialism, that it doesn't properly account for the inner dimension of mind. It is all in our heads which is somehow the Will presenting itself to itself via this weird dynamic of objectification conditioned by time, space, and causality. But WHERE is time, space, and causality coming from? It's in the mind, but mind is not itself explained. He claims a subject/object so maybe mind is like the subject-for-object, and then this becomes further conditioned (by time, space, causality?). I am not sure. One of the better diagrams that tries to make sense of it is here:

https://www.friesian.com/arthur.htm

I think it's funny that the atomism of Western society only focuses on economic institutions. It creates its own self-contained nihilism. If we take anything like Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs at all seriously, why wouldn't society be about properly slotting people's "needs" rather than market-driven transactionism? — schopenhauer1

FWIW, I agree that it's not rational or righteous. There's some brutal game theory involve, probably some thermodynamics. To oversimplify, whatever form of society can out reproduce and outfight other societies will end up with the land. Individualistic capitalism proved massively productive, even with all its corruption. It doesn't matter that it has no exit strategy and assumes endless growth. We ourselves 'irrationally' avoid death and pile up resources and make babies who'll do the same. Copies for the sake of copies, because bad replicators didn't last.

Nature is red in tooth in claw. I like Schopenhauer's grim honesty about the world. The Will is a 'demon.' The world is fundamentally irrational, a beautiful disgusting monster. Jung also talks about this in Answer to Job. If we want morality and decency, we won't get it from God. But we don't even want it (unambivalently) anyway. If we wanted a good world, it's odd to end up this way. It's as if this or that part of us complains always about an opposed part --and Schop wrote just this thought in one of his early journals -- anticipating Freud's metaphor of the psyche as a civil war.

'For God so loved the world' => 'Forgot so left the world'

It is all in our heads which is somehow the Will presenting itself to itself via this weird dynamic of objectification conditioned by time, space, and causality. But WHERE is time, space, and causality coming from? — schopenhauer1

The it's all in our heads idea has always been doomed, it seems to me. It's with our nervous systems, yes, but these nervous systems are themselves encompassed the world they help us experience.

Even in Kant's own time he was taken out back for a spanking on this issue. (Beiser writes good stuff on this period in German philosophy. )

I don't pretend to know where it all comes from, and I don't think humans even can know, for one can always treat the explanation as itself needing explanation.

FWIW, I agree that it's not rational or righteous. There's some brutal game theory involve, probably some thermodynamics. To oversimplify, whatever form of society can out reproduce and outfight other societies will end up with the land. Individualistic capitalism proved massively productive, even with all its corruption. It doesn't matter that it has no exit strategy and assumes endless growth. — plaque flag

Good points. Well, I did start a thread called "Entropy and Enthalpy" and asked what the ethical implication is. As predicted, the minutia mongering over if "enthalpy" is really the right term, or whether it's natural law or human-derived concept ensued, which helped answer the wrong point. Ha. All well and good moving dirt to grow crops. Let the dirt-movers move their dirt eternally like Sisyphus fussing over the dirtness of the dirt they will be moving eternally. You mentioned Moloch, no? Moloch of science and dirt. Minutia-Moloch.

I leave you with a ChatGPT poem of minutia:
"The paradigmatic synergy of the ontological foundations in quantum mechanics, coupled with the teleological aspects of evolutionary biology, explicates the intricacies of emergent phenomena observed in complex systems. Utilizing a multi-level analysis grounded in statistical mechanics and network theory, researchers can delineate the hierarchical structure and interplay of micro and macro components, uncovering the underlying mechanisms governing self-organization and systemic behavior. Moreover, employing a neurobiological lens informed by cognitive neuroscience, one can scrutinize the neural correlates of subjective experience and elucidate the intricate interplay of neural networks and higher-order cognitive processes implicated in consciousness. These interdisciplinary insights, rooted in the confluence of physics, biology, and neuroscience, foster a comprehensive understanding of the intricate tapestry of natural phenomena."

Please note that while this paragraph includes technical jargon, it may be challenging to understand due to the dense language and complexity of the concepts presented."

Well, I did start a thread called "Entropy and Enthalpy" and asked what the ethical implication is. — schopenhauer1

:up:

We are like burning bags of water that use bones like internal stilts to get around to plop more wood (food) on ourselves. We make new little bags of water because any particular bag of water starts leaking eventually.

Ignoring consciousness for a moment, what is life in energetic terms ?

A little replicating piece of crystalfire (controlled iterable burnstructure). A strange but ultimately futile climb away from the unstoppable heat death, its accidental servant. @apokrisis understands the details much much better than me, but I think I grasp the basic idea. Life can exploit (release) potential energy by using stored energy to pay the cost of activation, push the heavy boulder off the hill, install the waterwheel, build a fission plant over the course of many years at great expense. Can we measure the 'intensity' of life in these terms maybe ?

I leave you with a ChatGPT poem of minutia: — schopenhauer1

Pretty funny stuff: a mixture of sense and nonsense, like a terminator trying to pass as a fellow nerd until its target arrives.