Would you agree that the politics involved includes the interpersonal ? Not just forums like this, but friendships, marriages. Language is a crowbar, a smokescreen, a mirror, all kinds of things. — plaque flag

Yes. I meant politics in the broadest sense. The application of power. I'm simply making the point that the choice of theory as to how accessible 'the truth' is, immediately affects one's power in terms of access to it. I might benefit greatly from a theory which holds truths to be mostly psychological. A scientist gains power by holding truths to be accessible only through the instruments she has access to. A well-read philosopher likewise will profit by an epistemology which places emphasis on the history of ideas.

At the end of the day, 'true' is just a word, and like any other it can be used to cooperate with or coerce those listening, but rarely is it just a label.

There's also the issue of metaphor itself. What exactly is a metaphor ? If human cognition is fundamentally metaphorical, it's an important question. Roughly I relate it to analogy. I sometimes try to open my front door (where I live) by pushing a button on my car keys. The mind exploits skill in one domain in a new domain. Something like that. — plaque flag

:up:

Insightful.

"Analogy" in this context is also a metaphor, but a valuable one. Off the top of my head, I'd suggest that metaphors are simplistic but epistemically pragmatic abstractions (EPAs) we use in lieu of knowledge of things in themselves which is beyond the capacity of our brains to acquire.

I personally frequently think of metaphors as things we use in considering emergent properties that supervene on reality in ways more complicated than we can grasp. As an electrical engineer I see transistors as such EPA metaphors. While I know that the physics subvenient to the behavior of a particular transistor could in principle be investigated in order to have a more complete and complex understanding of the thing in itself, I don't have a pragmatic need for such understanding and can leave it to other engineers and scientists to be cognizant of such things. In turn, I can design things which use transistors and then provide a computer programmer with a higher level metaphor which the programmer uses in determining how to have a microprocessor interact with what I designed. The higher level metaphor I provide to a programmer is another EPA with no need to discuss the subvenient transistors for the programmer's pragmatic purposes.

Of course what I've presented here is a rather narrow perspective on metaphors, but perhaps others may find it useful to their thinking.

Yes. I meant politics in the broadest sense. The application of power. I'm simply making the point that the choice of theory as to how accessible 'the truth' is, immediately affects one's power in terms of access to it. I might benefit greatly from a theory which holds truths to be mostly psychological. A scientist gains power by holding truths to be accessible only through the instruments she has access to. A well-read philosopher likewise will profit by an epistemology which places emphasis on the history of ideas. — Isaac

I completely agree. My pet generalization is the triangle inequality. One person claims authority over another in terms of being closer to a sacred object (the laboratory, the guru, the celebrity, empirical science, taste, ...)

I'd associate this insight with various infamous masters of suspicion, but it goes back at least to the sophists. Thrasymachus comes to mind. I like Szasz well enough to get myself cancelled (without of course taking him as a final world.) Institutions, by their nature, can only pretend to assimilate critical thinking (it exists always within a golden cage, a conspicuous mascot.)

It's a conceptually simple realization, but it cost something emotionally. One wakes up to the world as largely a great stage of fools and pretenders. One is also endlessly suspicious of oneself, generating the Hamlet type ( I think Nietzsche is a pretty good example of a self-eating master of suspicion.)

Thought I'd address the actual topic for a moment.

While we may wish to reject the materialist realism of science as a form of metaphysical prejudice, we cannot do so in favour of an alternative metaphysical framework that also claims to describe an ultimate reality be it a new form of idealism, panpsychism, or some Hollywood influenced Matrix version of 'we are living in a simulated reality' without having a theory of language that explains how any of these realist claims are possible. — Lawson

I think the beauty of Lawson’s promise (which I still don’t understand) is that if there’s no realist theory of language then discussions about effete topics like idealism and panpsychism bite the dust for good. That would be an interesting development. — Tom Storm

But also apparently materialism, all of which just amounts to this:

Most of the issues that raise a ruckus in philosophy are metaphysics. They are matters of point of view, not fact. — T Clark

But I'm a little confused why he cast this in terms of language and how the claims are made. Presumably because verification is off the table from the start? And the claim that there is something wrong with the very words in which idealism, say, is proposed -- that *is* the old logical positivist diagnosis, that you're not even really saying anything.

On the other hand, if you don't think of language as the home of claims about reality, there's no particular problem with metaphysics. If your endorsing panpsychism gets you a job or gets you laid, it's just another day at the office for language.

Of course language might also be useful for doing science. In which case we're back to

Such an ephemeral ontological object cannot really be the subject of any serious investigation — Isaac

Or to

I'm not sure what's to be gained from lining up on two sides to say "There's one kind of thing!" or "There's two!!" More interesting is what you can do with such a claim. Naturalism is pretty straightforward as a working assumption, rather than a dogma; you know how to proceed, what sorts of things to look for, how to design experiments, how to craft a research program. I'm not clear what the other side offers except a defense of people's common pre-scientific beliefs. — Srap Tasmaner

(@Isaac likes it when I quote myself.)

It feels like a pragmatist take on language ought to fit better with science-engendering prejudices (or metaphysical assumptions) than with science-blocking ones, but it's beyond me at the moment.

I can totally relate to your 'layer' approach. I'm trained in math, and group theory (for instance) completely ignores everything about a group but its groupness, so that its results apply to every group. The real number system has various constructions, but they all satisfy a nice set of axioms, so it suffices for almost all purposes to leave the construction undefined.

I also have some training/experience in computer science, and abstraction dominates the field.

Perhaps what you are saying is roughly that metaphors are interfaces 'protecting' us from too much complexity. That sounds like part of the truth, a big part.

knowledge of things in themselves — wonderer1

I prefer the notion of horizon or background to that of things-in-themselves, but it's not that important in this context. The idea is that we can zoom in on reality, that we have a sense of greater detail waiting for us in every direction, if making the effort becomes worthwhile. The lifeworld (the encompassing world in which and for which we make models) has 'depth' but (for me) no ultimate Reality 'behind' it.

Anyway, I'm sure there's little stomach for political discussion in what's otherwise a nice bit of effete curiosity... — Isaac

I don't see a problem with a bit of effete musing along with one's morning coffee. Not dissimilar to doing a crossword or chess puzzle before setting off to solve the world's problems. Or in my case, move that soil to the back garden.

Are you saying that overwhelming agreement on what is the case is a form of hinge proposition? — Joshs

No. Hinge propositions need not be agreed on, nor need agreement depend on hinge propositions. They are distinct notions.

The remainder of what you say in that paragraph relies on the notion that beliefs must be "rational", whatever that is, apparently something like having a justification. But there is no reason to think this so. Indeed, the point of hinge propositions it that they are believed and yet need not be justified.

Odd, that Kuhn has made some sort of come-back. Davidson's point holds for Kuhn, that if you are going to make any comparison between paradigms, you will need to hold something constant between them. Hence the very idea of such conceptual schema is fraught.

Kuhn's theory of paradigms itself relies on overwhelming agreement. After all, those who read his book understood it.

Language, world, self --- we never achieve full understanding of any of these, so we go on our entire lives in with this partial understanding, just as when we were infants. And it works. — Srap Tasmaner

Hence the point is not to understand language but to use it.

One that we might agree, at least after one finishes one's coffee.

Hence the point is not to understand language but to use it. — Banno

The point of what?

Exactly.

But I'm a little confused why he cast this in terms of language and how the claims are made. Presumably because verification is off the table from the start? And the claim that there is something wrong with the very words in which idealism, say, is proposed -- that *is* the old logical positivist diagnosis, that you're not even really saying anything.

On the other hand, if you don't think of language as the home of claims about reality, there's no particular problem with metaphysics. If your endorsing panpsychism gets you a job or gets you laid, it's just another day at the office for language. — Srap Tasmaner

Nice conclusion. Of course logical positivism is untenable based on this too. In the end what all this seems to amount to (as I read it) is that for a non-realist our conversations are doomed, regardless of all the facts and rationalism we seek to muster in favour of our particular fancies. Our language doesn't mirror reality, it is just a tool which humans use to communicate and while it has many useful applications to get things done - metaphysical truth isn't one of them.

Interesting that you raise getting laid - one could almost summarise this by saying - if naturalism and evolution are accurate, they highlight what it takes for a species to thrive. Truth doesn't play a key role in evolution - it's fitness and survival (as per Donald Hoffman's recent theories). This could take us to the venerable evolutionary argument against naturalism. But that's a digression. :wink:

No. Hinge propositions need not be agreed on, nor need agreement depend on hinge propositions. They are distinct notions.

The remainder of what you say in that paragraph relies on the notion that beliefs must be "rational", whatever that is, apparently something like having a justification. But there is no reason to think this so. Indeed, the point of hinge propositions it that they are believed and yet need not be justified. — Banno

Hence the point is not to understand language but to use it. — Banno

Isn't this leading towards anti-realism? It also sounds a bit like 'shut up and calculate'. That said, this has generally been my utilitarian or pragmatic approach to language.

Isn't one understanding of later Wittgenstien that he was an anti-realist? I am no expert of course, but doesn't he seem to argue that language is social practice? This seems close to a constructivist understanding of how language works. No doubt there are debates amongst the cognoscenti.

There's also the issue of metaphor itself. What exactly is a metaphor ? If human cognition is fundamentally metaphorical, it's an important question. Roughly I relate it to analogy. I sometimes try to open my front door (where I live) by pushing a button on my car keys. The mind exploits skill in one domain in a new domain. Something like that. — plaque flag

Good point. I tend to think of metaphor as a kind of pattern matching process. Interestingly when people have object recognition deficiencies in dementia, they start to use remote controls as telephones and see the kitchen as the bathroom, etc. The metaphors begin to blur and yet you can often see the patterns which inform them. It makes me wonder just what it is that allows us to keep things straight. Someone with dementia can speak like a poet - 'Turn the sun down, my feelings are burning.' This means, switch off the light, it's too bright. (My dad said this at 97)

The metaphors begin to blur and yet you can often see the patterns which inform them. It makes me wonder just what it is that allows us to keep things straight. Someone with dementia can speak like a poet - 'Turn the sun down, my feelings are burning.' This means, switch off the light, it's too bright. — Tom Storm

:up:

I love that quote. It makes sense to me right away. I've been studying Finnegans Wake, which tries to catch the ambiguous blurrygoround of lifemeaning.

I'm personally quite impressed by this old movie based on the book : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8V9USPiXXK8

I think it's been unjustly forgotten, though it may just happen to scratch my itch.

Nice conclusion. — Tom Storm

Honestly, probably not. Okay as a theory of communication or of social interaction -- I mean, still preposterously reductionist! -- but not an account of language at all.

That's the thing. Even if you take the kind of sociological view of language (and oppose the sort of representational view), you might still want to explain what kind of a thing language is that it can be used for communicating or other social functions (signaling of various kinds, etc).

On the other hand, even if language has features you don't find in other animal signaling systems -- and it does -- that could be only to say that our signaling is more complicated but not different in kind.

I guess my remark landed somewhere around there, but I couldn't guess whether that's right.

Isn't one understanding of later Wittgenstien that he was an anti-realist? — Tom Storm

Well...

The distinction post-dates Wittgenstein, so any ascription will be mere supposition dependent on how he is interpreted. But.

Given his overall approach was to see such issues as problems of language use, I don't think his position would be too different to that I advocated; that the issue is more about which grammar to adopt, a bivalent logic or some other such.

Yep, shut up and calculate. That's another way of saying that we should look to use rather than meaning.

Isn't this leading towards anti-realism? — Tom Storm

How?

It would be wrong to think I am advocating realism. Rather, I'm arguing against the hegemony of antirealism. Your mate in the OP pretty much takes it as granted, rather than as a conclusion. The friends of discursive approaches to philosophy hereabouts will continue to change topic as soon as their narrative is brought into question.

Discursive, as in digressing from subject to subject. If you flick back through this thread you may see what I mean. Hardly a post follows on from the previous.

As opposed to critical, where a suggestion is held down to see if it can hold it's own.

The latter is far more difficult than the former.

Of course logical positivism is untenable based on this too. In the end what all this seems to amount to (as I read it) is that for a non-realist our conversations are doomed, regardless of all the facts and rationalism we seek to muster in favour of our particular fancies. Our language doesn't mirror reality, it is just a tool which humans use to communicate and while it has many useful applications to get things done - metaphysical truth isn't one of them. — Tom Storm

This reminds me of a couple of points that may be relevant.

How could language mirror reality, at least if it's understood as words ? Words are a tiny piece of reality. So it must be meaning that mirrors reality, right ? But reality is, for humans who could raise the issue, always already meaningful. Only a metaphysician could think reality is hidden 'under' or 'behind' the blaring meaningfulness of human life with all its rules and roles.

The ordinary situation that inspires the mirroring metaphor is something like 'there's plums in the icebox' being confirmed when one goes to the icebox. Husserl wrote about this early on.

Roughly (or so I claim) the meaningful structure of reality is exactly the kind of meaning in language, so 'the world is all that is the case.' The (intelligible) structure of the world is the meaning of all true sentences, or something like that. There's a surplus in humans though, an ability to hypothesize, lie, and be mistaken.

'there's plums in the icebox' being confirmed when one goes to the icebox — plaque flag

As a matter
of fact, no,
there aren't.
Deal with it.

Isn't this leading towards anti-realism? It also sounds a bit like 'shut up and calculate'. — Tom Storm

The flip-side of that is that there is a sense in which all claims are implicitly realist. How can language mirror reality? Only if the reality it mirrors is something created by, or at least co-created with, language. The idea that language cannot mirror reality posits a different kind of unknowable reality that is altogether beyond human experience and judgement. That said, I don't think language mirrors everyday pre-conceptual experience, unless you allow that it is a distorting mirror.

For everyday practical purposes, language mirrors what we see is going on well enough to be a practical tool for issuing instructions, passing along information, and so on. That much is obvious, and of course, that is not to say that is all language does, but whatever it does, it does by virtue of being, or at least seeming, intelligible. Could we ever find a way to tell the difference between seeming intelligible and being intelligible?

A quick doubling down. The idea that language maps on to the world is pretty much the same as the picture theory of language, of loving memory.

That is, again, the premise of this thread is wanting.

I'm trained in math, and group theory... — plaque flag

I've got some talent for math, but never developed a love of mathematics for its own sake. I remember one day, during my first semester of college calculus, the TA telling us that the homework assignment for that day was all story problems. The whole class seemed to groan, whereas my reaction was, "Thank goodness." I enjoy math much more when I can see how to apply it to solving problems I can visualize.

I prefer the notion of horizon or background to that of things-in-themselves, but it's not that important in this context. The idea is that we can zoom in on reality, that we have a sense of greater detail waiting for us in every direction, if making the effort becomes worthwhile. The lifeworld (the encompassing world in which and for which we make models) has 'depth' but (for me) no ultimate Reality 'behind' it. — plaque flag

I like the notion of horizon in this context, but I don't know how to interpret that last sentence. I'd be inclined to say that the lifeworld is an aspect of reality, or at least the part of reality we have some epistemic access to. I don't know what it would mean to talk about a reality behind the lifeworld.

I think sure, we might be in a simulation or multiverse, so the simulation or universe exists in some context we don't have epistemic access to. However, I would still see the simulation or universe as being an aspect of reality.

Undoubtedly part of the context of that for me, is seeing people as varying in the extent that they are in touch with different aspects of the way things are in reality. So maybe you and I are too different in the way we think of "reality", for me to form a clear understanding of what you mean.

If I say "go and get the car out of the garage" you know what I mean. That instruction calls up a picture of opening the garage, starting the car and driving it out, so I'm not sure what you think is the problem with the idea that language can picture things we do in the world.

The premise, or rather question, in the OP is "how does language map onto the world?". It seems to me that the only possible answer is that language maps onto the world insofar as we understand it to do so.

Well, there was this book...

As a matter
of fact, no,
there aren't.
Deal with it. — Srap Tasmaner

:up:

Nice!

Well, there was this book... — Banno

What book? Does that sentence convey any actuality? If so, how would that not qualify as its having pictured a state of affairs?

Did the book in question convey anything about anything?

I'd be inclined to say that the lifeworld is an aspect of reality, or at least the part of reality we have some epistemic access to. I don't know what it would mean to talk about a reality behind the lifeworld. — wonderer1

The bold part is where we agree. But some thinkers try to talk about a reality behind the lifeworld, as if our eyes and ears and concepts are in the way of reality as opposed to some of its ingredients.

I think sure, we might be in a simulation or multiverse, so the simulation or universe exists in some context we don't have epistemic access to. However, I would still see the simulation or universe as being an aspect of reality. — wonderer1

Exactly. So it exists conceptually as possibility. Possibility is a huge part of human reality anyway. Or so I suggest. We swim in it.

Undoubtedly part of the context of that for me, is seeing people as varying in the extent that they are in touch with different aspects of the way things are in reality. So maybe you and I are too different in the way we think of "reality" for me to understand. — wonderer1

It's probably just a different lingo from different influences. In the last few years, I've been very influenced by Heidegger and Husserl. In a strange way, both thinkers defend something akin to common sense. Marriages and promises are as real as electrons and quaternions. All of these entities have their meanings in relation to one another in a big holistic net. For instance, electrons are an output of laboratories and scientific institutions with histories and mathematical abstractions. There's an atomistic tendency to rip things out of context and pretend they can still function meaningfully. The lifeworld is the most encompassing 'unbroken' 'preabstracted' concept perhaps.

In case you find it interesting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lifeworld

The 'lifeworld' is a grand theatre of objects variously arranged in space and time relative to perceiving subjects, is already-always there, and is the "ground" for all shared human experience.[6] Husserl's formulation of the lifeworld was also influenced by Wilhelm Dilthey's "life-nexus" (German Lebenszusammenhang) and Martin Heidegger's Being-in-the-world[citation needed] (German In-der-Welt-Sein). The concept was further developed by students of Husserl such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jan Patočka, and Alfred Schütz. The lifeworld can be thought of as the horizon of all our experiences, in the sense that it is that background on which all things appear as themselves and meaningful. The lifeworld cannot, however, be understood in a purely static manner; it isn't an unchangeable background, but rather a dynamic horizon in which we live, and which "lives with us" in the sense that nothing can appear in our lifeworld except as lived.

The concept represented a turning point in Husserl's phenomenology from the tradition of Descartes and Kant. Up until then, Husserl had been focused on finding, elucidating, and explaining an absolute foundation of philosophy in consciousness, without any presuppositions except what can be found through the reflective analysis of consciousness and what is immediately present to it. Originally, all judgments of the real were to be "bracketed" or suspended, and then analyzed to bring to light the role of consciousness in constituting or constructing them. With the concept of the lifeworld, however, Husserl embarked on a different path, which recognizes that, even at its deepest level, consciousness is already embedded in and operating in a world of meanings and pre-judgements that are socially, culturally, and historically constituted.

Roughly (or so I claim) the meaningful structure of reality is exactly the kind of meaning in language, so 'the world is all that is the case.' The (intelligible) structure of the world is the meaning of all true sentences, or something like that. There's a surplus in humans though, an ability to hypothesize, lie, and be mistaken. — plaque flag

Yes, I see that. It's not cats on mats or plumbs in iceboxes that are the main problem, it's the very values we live by and for. When someone says, 'There is a God' - there is almost nothing that maps onto any reality I understand or is available to us the way cats or plumbs might be. What does 'there is' mean here? What does 'a God' mean or even 'God'. These four words are like a hall of mirrors.

For everyday practical purposes, language mirrors what we see is going on well enough to be a practical tool for issuing instructions, passing along information, and so on. — Janus

Yes, and isn't it interesting that this is the best we seem to be able to do? Most of us posting here have come up with variations of this frame and often from different backgrounds. All roads lead to utility...

When someone says, 'There is a God' - there is almost nothing that maps onto any reality I understand or is available to us the way cats or plumbs might be. What does 'there is' mean here? What does 'a God' mean or even 'God'. These four words are like a hall of mirrors. — Tom Storm

:up:

Excellent points. The meaning of 'there is' is elusive indeed. Maybe akin to 'why is there a here ?'. Almost lyrical.

The God issue is a great one. The root concept is maybe still a father or a king, but of course it's gone through some vaporization since then. Maybe one starts with an ideal father (actual human) and removes all inessential (vulnerable, limiting) attributes ?

I don't see a problem with a bit of effete musing along with one's morning coffee. Not dissimilar to doing a crossword or chess puzzle before setting off to solve the world's problems. Or in my case, move that soil to the back garden. — Banno

Maybe. But recall my stock in trade. The nature of people's 'effete musing', the processes therein, the methods they use, the objectives, their response to the conflicts arising... None of this happens in isolation, it's all at the very least connected to (if not entirely constituted of) our general habits of thought, and those are the same habits we'll apply to the world's problems as to the soil heap.

It's not that I think effete musing without political content is impossible (and as such wouldn't ever want to imply any given person was politically motivated), it's just that I find it rarely done. From earlier...

Seems to me that if one were to follow antirealist ideas into ethics, one would be setting aside any such ethical truths, just as for ontology. Putin, not Christ, is the consequent. — Banno

...you're not telling me that's not political...

It feels like a pragmatist take on language ought to fit better with science-engendering prejudices (or metaphysical assumptions) than with science-blocking ones, but it's beyond me at the moment. — Srap Tasmaner

This seems insightful to me, although I've never been very interested in philosophy of language, and I don't know much about it, beyond the idiosyncratic philosophy of language I've developed on my own.

In science, and at least some engineering, there is a need to be able to zoom your perspective in and out, and switch between different conceptual frameworks (and associated vocabulary) fairly fluidly. It seems to me that efficiency of conveying ideas often trumps the accuracy of statements, in face to face examples of such conversations. There is a trust that the person you are discussing things with can connect the dots, or let you know where you have been insufficiently clear.

So it seems to me, that at least in cases of collaborative or interdisciplinary, science and engineering, there is social reinforcement for speaking in a pragmatic way, and it is a matter of sinking or swimming in many such environments to develop techniques for, and facility with, treating language very pragmatically.

Another factor is a tacit recognition that some things aren't going to be effectively communicated linguistically, and some sort of visualization technique needs to be used. I doubt many scientists or engineers would put it this way, but I'd say that it is neurologically important to communicate to a collaborator's visuo-spatial faculties with through the collaborator's eyes being the most effective only way of engaging the neural networks that instantiate the collaborator's visuo-spatial faculties.