So asserting the Kuhnian proposition that empirical knowledge has a paradigmatic structure which makes Popperian progress incoherent is just a kind of temper tantrum designed to lay waste to every position? — Joshs

I don't see temper tantrums as particularly relevant. However, I do see what I infer to be your interpretation of Kuhn's and Popper's thinking to be a bit simplistic. Popper recognized the importance of falsification to recognizing faults in one's naive hypotheses/intuitions. Kuhn recognized the importance of new paradigms arising in the aftermath of naive hypotheses/intuitions being falsified.

I gather Stephen Law is more sympathetic to Popperian realism than to Kuhnian relativism, but perhaps one can counter his ‘Going Nuclear’ model with one that posits someone named Stephen who, in getting over their head in a philosophical discussion, decides to impugn the motives of their interlocutor rather than attempt to revise their own construction — Joshs

I don't know enough about Law's thinking to speculate on his interpretations of Popper and Kuhn, and I don't think it is particularly relevant. I do think there is value in recognizing the use of rhetorical tactics pointed out by Law, regardless of speculation as to what is motivating the use of such rhetorical tactics.

Given that the link I provided was an excerpted chapter from Law's book Believing Bullshit, I think Stephen's concern might have more to do with people believing and defending bullshit, than with analyzing people's motivations for believing and defending bullshit in any sort of comprehensive way. It can be way too easy to jump to wrong conclusions about people's motivations.

Be clear. — Banno

I can be more specific, at least, and we'll see whether it's any clearer. This is the end of what I quoted:

The anti-realists failure to commit amounts to a failure to understand how language functions; "the ball" is the ball. — Banno

That's quite a dichotomy there, but the interesting bit is after the semicolon: what's the nature of that little "is" there?

"the ball" is the ball

My issue here is not the apparent use/mention violation. It's that "is" suggests there is a fact of the matter about what "the ball" refers to. You are, of course, extravagantly on record endorsing a Wittgensteinian "meaning is use" and everything Davidsonian, so you cannot possibly mean there is a fact of the matter about whether "the ball" is the ball.

Yet there it is, an emblem of the fundamental failing of anti-realists, that they don't understand such self-evident truths.

Honestly, I'm not interested in either of your options. The fact that you think there is a war between realism and anti-realism, and that one of them is true and the other false, well, that's just your realism working overtime, it's realism about realism, as if there is a fact of the matter about realism. This is exactly the structure of debate Dummett was trying to clarify, that realists tend to put anti-realists on their back foot by forcing them to give yes/no answers to questions that suit the realist but not the anti-realist. It's why @Isaac -- though he considers himself a kind of realist -- considers words like "real" and "true" useful mainly for bullying your opponents.

It's why Isaac -- though he considers himself a kind of realist -- considers words like "real" and "true" useful mainly for bullying your opponents. — Srap Tasmaner

:lol:

:up:

"But -- but -- isn't it true that there are true statements?!"

It can be hard to convince yourself -- hard even to see the possibility -- that the answer to that question does not matter.

I do see what I infer to be your interpretation of Kuhn's and Popper's thinking to be a bit simplistic. Popper recognized the importance of falsification to recognizing faults in one's naive hypotheses/intuitions. Kuhn recognized the importance of new paradigms arising in the aftermath of naive hypotheses/intuitions being falsified — wonderer1

Popper’s concept of falsification assumes that the practices and methods of science that are involved in making the determination that a theory has been falsified are independent of the content of the theory in question.
Kuhn argues instead that the understanding of method , the determination of what counts as evidence, use of apparatus and norms of measurement and a host of other features that come into play in falsifying a theory change along with changes in paradigms. As a result, paradigms do not change via falsification, but through a re-envisioning of all of the above practices. This is why Kuhn said that paradigm shifts are more like transitions from one artistic movement to another than like a linear progress.

Just a few remarks ...

When you ask "How Does Language Map onto the World?" what kind of "world" you have in mind?

The world, in the sense of our external world, the physical universe, is independent of any language. It is there whether we exist or not. (Although there are theories that say that it is us who create it. I really can't see how, except if one assumes our own worlds, i.e. our own reality of the world.)

The world, in the sense of our internal world, our reality, is obviously much connected to our language. But also obviously not limited by our language, as Wittgenstein has said. (Which most probably has rejected later in his life as I have read, but not by himself and which, anyway, is something totally unimportant for me.)

So, I guess that your question of the topic refers to our own word, am I a right? In which case, the question of the topic would have more meaning as "How Does Our Language Map onto the Our World?", wouldn't it?

Now, you have said the you have made some modest reading about this subject. And you have selected the views of Hilary Lawson as most appealing to you. Yet, these views only lead to a kind of impasse making you wonder if the problem of creating a realist(ic) theory of language is insurmountable. How I see it is as if you have started to walk to a place you wanted to visit and you created obstacles in addition to what the road itself already has, with the result of creating your own dead end. So, I believe that you kind of "killed" your topic, a very interesting one indeed.

The subject of this topic belongs to the "philosophy of language", which is huge and its history begins from the antiquity. It is offered for so many paths to choose from, which could lead to a more pleasant travel and destination.

But -- but -- isn't it true that there are true statements?!"

It can be hard to convince yourself -- hard even to see the possibility -- that the answer to that question does not matter. — Srap Tasmaner

Because truth and an affirmation of realism are so basic to speech, thought, and action, even if you're in a dream.

I think for some, the emphasis on true statements is about smuggling in correspondence theory. If there are true statements, and truth is correspondence, then there must be a real world for our true statements to correspond to (even if it's a hologram.)

A realist doesn't need correspondence, though. I could adopt Davidson's approach to truth (if I could remember how it works) and just add realism on as an appendage. I wouldn't have an argument, though. Just sentiment.

I explicitly proposed that the issue is one of the choice of grammar, where you suggest I see a "war". Yours is a smarmy reply with little content, mischaracterising my position.

You've proffered a few jokes, but nothing substantive.

You might be too hard on pragmatists. To me, anyway, the original spirit of pragmatism is about not wasting time on differences that make no difference. It's a reaction against a tendency to get bogged down. — plaque flag

Sure, pragmatism can be of use...

Each of us might think that they are the most popular writer on the forum. That may be useful in buoying us each up to write the next post, to advancing the standard of writing, or to keeping the forums interesting. But several thousand of us will be wrong.

Like all substantive theories of truth, pragmatism isn't wrong so much as insufficient. It does not tell us what "truth" is. But of course, no other theory does, either.

And of course my not giving phenomenology enough credit is mostly a rhetorical ploy to keep the discussion in an area in which I am both more comfortable and more interested. That's not something I am alone in doing. It is quite self-consciously done. None of which detracts from my criticism of phenomenology.

I explicitly proposed that the issue is one of the choice of grammar — Banno

Or that the difference between realism and anti-realism is more one of choice of grammar than profound ontology? But that is all philosophy is - wordplay. — Banno

Couple things: that's a question, not a proposal; also, it's hard to know what the proposal implied would amount to, since you follow Davidson in claiming there are no alternative frameworks -- but if not an alternative framework, then what's the difference a different grammar makes? Style? Are you claiming that realism and anti-realism say the same thing in different ways? That doesn't sound like you. Or is it that we're all realists, but anti-realists don't admit it (perhaps not even to themselves)?

You've a few jokes, but nothing substantive. — Banno

But that is all philosophy is - wordplay.

The problem is set up by an excessive emphasis on "internal" and "external", and appears to be inherent in the phenomenological approach itself, from it's emphasis on direct experience. — Banno

I disagree -- surprise! :D

I think the phenomenologists overcome internal/external, but it's very easy to read our Cartesian assumptions into their work. I don't think a proper phenomenology can have an "out there", though.

But I do read them from a materialist perspective, or a realist perspective. It's a reading, too.

Nice reflection on anti/realism, though. Reducing anti/realism to a choice in logic in a particular context is very interesting. Not sure I can respond or even critique just yet, but it's interesting!

Perhaps it would have been clearer to you in that new context if I had written that all ontology is word play.

It remains unclear what you mean by "framework", and so what the "alternatives" might be. Further, in looking for a framework one steps outside the discussion, diminishing it in the way focusing on the score detracts from enjoying the tune. But of course in the end, it's the performance that counts - the doing.

Which may be the question you are raising in your new discussion with @Wayfarer.

So maybe it would help if you tied all this back to the OP?

Nice reflection on anti/realism, though. Reducing anti/realism to a choice in logic in a particular context is very interesting. Not sure I can respond or even critique just yet, but it's interesting! — Moliere

Thanks - I'm pleased that approach was understood.

I think the phenomenologists overcome internal/external — Moliere

Then they overcome an obstacle they themselves put in their path - hardly a triumph.

Phenomenology would build an understanding from a foundation of personal, private, indubitable phenomenal experience. A better approach might be to begin with what is at hand, our being as embedded in a world that is by that very fact, already the subject of our manipulation. This latter seems to me the view Wittgenstein offers.

A better approach might be to begin with what is at hand, our being as embedded in a world that is already, and by that very fact, the subject of our manipulation. This latter seems to me the view Wittgenstein offers. — Banno

It is also the approach Heidegger offers, and in much more detail than Wittgenstein. That said, Heidegger himself later came to think that the attempt to explain the "background" or 'form of life' discursively is doomed to failure and he turned to a kind of obscure philosophical poetry in an attempt to invoke (show) rather than describe the human form of being.

It is also the approach Heidegger offers — Janus

maybe, (what Heidegger offers is not all that clear), hence my use of Heideggerian language. As to the detail, an analytic approach better sets the logical, grammatical context.

It's also easier to read.

It's also easier to read. — Banno

For some.

When you ask "How Does Language Map onto the World?" what kind of "world" you have in mind? — Alkis Piskas

I have no world in mind. I am simply interested in what others think of this matter. If this means they need to describe a particular world before they talk about the mapping process, so much the better.

Now, you have said the you have made some modest reading about this subject. And you have selected the views of Hilary Lawson as most appealing to you. Yet, these views only lead to a kind of impasse making you wonder if the problem of creating a realist(ic) theory of language is insurmountable. — Alkis Piskas

I chose Lawson because he put what he thought was a key problem for ontology in plain English - as per below -

metaphysical frameworks, such as idealism and panpsychism, which were derided as baseless nonsense by the positivists of the past, are back in new forms. But such claims cannot be taken as a true description of an ultimate reality for there is no credible realist theory of language that would make sense of such claims. — Tom Storm

I am wondering what people who study philosophy think of this claim as it strikes me as an interesting argument and might breathe some new life into debates about idealism.

I have no commitments to Lawson - I think he is interesting because he comes at this after reading Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Rorty, and others and he has put forth a non-realist metaphysics, which I happen to find intriguing. I am curious about phenomenology and post-modernism. On matters of philosophy, I am interested in what others think and why. This is not about me trying to formulate my own ontology.

metaphysical frameworks, such as idealism and panpsychism, which were derided as baseless nonsense by the positivists of the past, are back in new forms. But such claims cannot be taken as a true description of an ultimate reality for there is no credible realist theory of language that would make sense of such claims. — Tom Storm

I am wondering what people who study philosophy think of this claim as it strikes me as an interesting argument and might breathe some new life into debates about idealism. — Tom Storm

As someone how holds imperfect knowledge in this realm (in all realms, actually), at this point in our history I find the quoted argument for the most part valid. Nevertheless, for those of use don't remove the objective idealism from out of Peirce's metaphysics of objective idealism (with his notion of Agapism, for example, very much included), his is one example of a description of reality which can - I so far think - at the very least facilitate a "a credible realist theory of language" that thereby makes sense of the very metaphysics addressed - one wherein the physical world is effete mind in relation to which propositions can either be true or false. But I grant that Peirce's writings (and I have not as of yet read all of them) are not amongst the most analytically stringent writings out there in terms of presenting a coherent whole. (My favorite in this regard was the pantheistic metaphysics of Spinoza's Ethics; agree or disagree with it, it was exceedingly transparent in its premises-conclusion format; but no, not a system of either idealism or panpsychism.)

As someone how holds imperfect knowledge in this realm (in all realms, actually), at this point in our history I find the quoted argument for the most part valid. — javra

Cool.

Nevertheless, for those of use don't remove the objective idealism from out of Peirce's metaphysics of objective idealism (with his notion of Agapism, for example, very much included), his is one example of a description of reality which can - I so far think - at the very least facilitate a "a credible realist theory of language" that thereby makes sense of the very metaphysics addressed - one wherein the physical world is effete mind in relation to which propositions can either be true or false. — javra

I have no idea what any of this huge sentence means. Sorry.

I have no idea what any of this huge sentence means. Sorry. — Tom Storm

no worries

I think the phenomenologists overcome internal/external, but it's very easy to read our Cartesian assumptions into their work. — Moliere

:up:

Phenomenology would build an understanding from a foundation of personal, private, indubitable phenomenal experience. — Banno

That might fit some of early Husserl, but it's very much counter to the later Husserl and to all of Heidegger. The phenomenon for phenomenology is not what is was for Kant. Husserl is even a direct realist in his weird way (not just my opinion, but also Zahavi's.)

I just feel the need to stick up for the sophistication of the movement.

And of course my not giving phenomenology enough credit is mostly a rhetorical ploy to keep the discussion in an area in which I am both more comfortable and more interested. That's not something I am alone in doing. It is quite self-consciously done. None of which detracts from my criticism of phenomenology. — Banno

I appreciate the honesty, and indeed we are all personalities on a stage.

It remains unclear what you mean by "framework" — Banno

That's fair -- it was kind of a placeholder.

I started to type out my old answer, but on second thought I'll say this: your framework is a description of how you learn. That's how you update your understanding of yourself and your environment through behavior, even if only mental. Because we're highly social, that will include how we justify and validate beliefs for each other, but there's no reason to think that's a template for all the learning we do.

So maybe it would help if you tied all this back to the OP? — Banno

I would approach the issue in the OP by looking at how juveniles learn. For human juveniles, that includes learning language, and that's the focus of the OP, but you have to wonder if some of the learning mechanisms and strategies of our non-human relatives are still operative in us, so you have to look. A human infant does it all at once, so we would want to know if there are relatively independent subsystems that differ little from other animals, and if there are some that are colored, modified, reshaped from the beginning by the telos of language acquisition -- doing the same things with a different meaning because the system they are part of is different -- besides the ones that are unique to us and involve language.

How does language map onto the world? The obvious place to look is children, who have to learn how they work, how the world works, and how language works, and figure out how it all connects.

I've always thought it's interesting that language is usable from the earliest stages of acquisition: you can say "ball" before you can say "I would like the ball now, please," and that works. Languages are partial-able, as we use them. Now throw in that the child's understanding of themselves and of the world is also partial, and that has to work too. And these have to be linkable, in this partial state, and that has to work.

And that never actually changes. Language, world, self --- we never achieve full understanding of any of these, so we go on our entire lives in with this partial understanding, just as when we were infants. And it works.

No answer there to @Tom Storm's question, but that's where I'd start.

Language, world, self --- we never achieve full understanding of any of these, so we go on our entire lives in with this partial understanding, — Srap Tasmaner

:up:

Just realized there's another way to put this: just as DNA is in some sense instructions for physical growth, I'm using "framework" to mean something like instructions for mental growth, what I was reaching for with the word "learning".

@Janus quoted Bateson the other day, from Mind and Nature, and in that book he talks about his little "how to tell this thing was once alive" test and it comes down to growth, living things have to have grown into the shape they have. So it is with an individual mind, a community, a culture, all things that grow and learn and adapt.

Just realized there's another way to put this: just as DNA is in some sense instructions for physical growth, I'm using "framework" to mean something like instructions for mental growth, what I was reaching for with the word "learning". — Srap Tasmaner

So as a general strategy for assimilation ? Ice-9, something that inspires a particular crystallization. That sounds good. I'd throw in a strong dose of metaphor myself. I find Lakoff's work persuasive I guess. To me metaphor is a profound concept beneath its familiarity.

living things have to have grown into the shape they have. — Srap Tasmaner

I like that. I associate that insight with Hegel too, who seemed to think of the entire concept system as an organism. Vico too. Are you a fan of etymology ? I like thinking about how words are born, often as vivid metaphors that cool into a literality that has genuinely drifted from its source.

I'm not looking for a defence of realism, I'm more interested in the implications of this matter - do we need a theory of language that explains how any realist claim is possible in order to accept those claims?

If we do not employ a realist account of language (as per postmodern thinkers), what is it we can meaningfully say about this notion of 'reality' we are so fond of describing and seems to be a substitute for god? — Tom Storm

I don't think we need such a theory to accept those claims. If we had such a theory, I could then raise the issue of meaning. Must we have a final and perfect theory of meaning before we accept any claim, for we must know what we mean first, right ? The whole mess is fuzzy together and always will be.

On the reality issue, I think you already said something valuable -- that it tends to function religiously in certain contexts. IMO, examining the meanings of 'real' is great part of the greater examination of meaning. How do these power words function ? We could also talk about the meaning of 'God' or 'truth' or 'reference' -- endlessly. I started a thread about 'semantic finitude' on this topic, as you may recall, because I don't think we can escape the fog, get a perfect grip, only a better one, or at least a new one, so that we don't get bored.

... Austin examines the word ‘real’ and contrasts the ordinary, firmly established meanings of that word as fixed by the everyday ways we use it to the ways it is used by sense-data theorists in their arguments. What Austin recommends is a careful consideration of the ordinary, multifarious meanings of that word in order not to posit, for example, a non-natural quality designed by that word, common to all the things to which that word is attributed (‘real ducks,’ ‘real cream,’ ‘real progress,’ ‘real color,’ ‘real shape,’ and so forth).

https://iep.utm.edu/john-austin/#SH2a