Proto-consciousness? That's fine, I suppose, but I'd add the caveat that whatever matter ends up being, it is also almost a "proto-everything", including proto-sensations, proto-liquid, proto-heart, etc. — Manuel

Whatever matter ends up being, it is not necessarily proto-everything according to some current theories.

For example, the two main current theories of consciousness can be broadly divided into Dualist solutions and Monist solutions.

Within the Dualist Solutions can be Substance Dualism, where the mental can exist independently of the body, or Property Dualism, where mental properties supervene on physical properties.

Within the Dualist Solutions, matter is not explained as being proto-conscious. Only within the Monist Solutions is matter explained as being proto-conscious.

That's true.

I don't know of many substance dualists today, maybe some theological-leaning philosophers might be substance dualists, but there aren't many.

It seems to me as if most people try to aim for a monist account. Within this, you find a significant amount of property dualists.

If we are having trouble with one "substance", matter of the physical, it's difficult to argue that we need to add another substance, but, as you point out, view vary.

Thank you and sorry for the late answer! I'm very confused when it comes to Chomsky, so it takes time for me to come up with something.

I.

According to him, consciousness is emergent — Manuel

I know the video very well, he didn't say consciousness was emergent, he just said radical emergence was real. I was very intrigued by this part because it seemed to me that after RLK argued that water wasn't radical emergence, Chomsky didn't defend his view but rather he ran away abruptly using the movement analogy. I think it's a soft spot for Chomsky, it seemed that way for me.

II.

According to him, consciousness is emergent — Manuel

, then you say

But saying consciousness is reducible to brains doesn't make any sense, how is that a reduction? I don't see how a brain is a "lower level" phenomena of mind, it seems to me to be a higher one, in terms of, we discover brains through consciousness, otherwise, we couldn't even postulate them. — Manuel

.

So mind is strongly emergent, but it is lower than the brain, the reason being that we discover brains through consciousness. Am I right?


III. Let's clarify the weak-strong emergence issue. Let's forget about what is or isn't intuitive for us, or about our capacities. Strong emergence is when new irreducible properties come into play, regardless of human capacities to understand that or not. Liquid may be difficult for our intuition, but it is not strongly emergent.
So does Chomsky believe or not in REAL strong emergence?

IV. Here's what I believe drives Chomsky into mysterianism:

1. He doesn't care much about the logical arguments in the debate between those who claim consciousness is fundamental and those who don't because he believes science (and not logic) should answer this question. When science tells us what are the properties of what we call matter, then we will have the answer.

2. He has the intuition that there is nothing in the current way of doing science that would ever give us a fully satisfactory answer.
Therefore, it seems we're stuck with a mystery.

Am I wrong?

V. You didn't answer my initial question, or I simply missed your answer. So...
Does Chomsky believe consciousness is one of the three (fundamental, weakly, strongly emergent), or he believes there are many other options that our logic cannot comprehend?

Thank you!

I know the video very well, he didn't say consciousness was emergent, he just said radical emergence was real. I was very intrigued by this part because it seemed to me that after RLK argued that water wasn't radical emergence, Chomsky didn't defend his view but rather he ran away abruptly using the movement analogy. I think it's a soft spot for Chomsky, it seemed that way for me. — Eugen

Radical emergence is the idea that a new property arises which was not evident in its constituent parts. Some people like to say that since we understand the theory in which molecules turn into liquids, then it isn't radical emergence.

Chomsky can follow the theory and understands it, but doesn't see how particles could lead to liquidity. In a similar, if not significantly more complicated manner, a physicist can understand quantum entanglement, but the phenomenon doesn't make sense.

I know you asked, but it's not entirely possible to do away with intuitions. If we could see how particles combined in a certain way could lead to liquidity, then we'd understand the theory and the phenomenon. It's the phenomenon which is puzzling, not the theory.

So mind is strongly emergent, but it is lower than the brain, the reason being that we discover brains through consciousness. Am I right? — Eugen

That was a very poor explanation on my part, happens when I get carried away. What I should have said is that "saying consciousness is reducible to brains... doesn't say much in our current state of knowledge", instead of saying "doesn't make any sense". Thanks for pointing it out and letting me clarify.

We know that consciousness arises in specific configurations of matter, but not in our pinkies or noses. It's in our brains. We lose a limb; we still think rather well. We lose our heads, we don't think much, etc.

In our current state of understanding, if we say that consciousness is simply brain activity, then we are leaving out almost everything we value about consciousness, including emotions, colors, music, reflection, etc. Our studies of the brain say very, very little about these phenomena so far.

Chomsky is following Russell's "Three grades of certainty", in which Chomsky seems to agree with Russell, that what we are most confident about are out own conscious experience, following that we are confident about what other people say about their own conscious experience - if they're being honest. Following that we are confident about our theories about the world.

It's in this sense that, as Russell points out, when a neuroscientist is looking at a patient's brain, they are actually having an experience of looking at another person's brain, it's not as if the scientist can get out of his body to study a patient's brain, in a "view from nowhere".

A brain, in this respect, is a construction we postulate to make sense of our anatomy. It doesn't mean brain aren't real or that they're "only in our minds", but that, neuroscience is part of our capacity for formulating a science.

That would be more accurate. But there's a lot to add as well.

1. He doesn't care much about the logical arguments in the debate between those who claim consciousness is fundamental and those who don't because he believes science (and not logic) should answer this question. When science tells us what are the properties of what we call matter, then we will have the answer. — Eugen

I'm not clear on what you have in mind here. In the video, he was interpreting what Galen Strawson's view are, and he takes it that Strawson argues that if we want to find out what a mind is, you need to find out more about the nature of the world, because the mind is a part of the world.

He doesn't believe consciousness is fundamental, as opposed to Strawson, he sees no good evidence for panpsychism. The arguments for it are interesting, but not persuasive to him.

2. He has the intuition that there is nothing in the current way of doing science that would ever give us a fully satisfactory answer.
Therefore, it seems we're stuck with a mystery. — Eugen

That's more or less accurate. I think he'd say that we currently have no theory of consciousness, but we could have one, one day. But even if we do, it wouldn't do away with the issue of the misleadingly called "hard problem", because as Locke pointed out, we don't understand how matter could lead to consciousness, even if we are confident that that's what consciousness is, matter specifically arranged.

V. You didn't answer my initial question, or I simply missed your answer. So...
Does Chomsky believe consciousness is one of the three (fundamental, weakly, strongly emergent), or he believes there are many other options that our logic cannot comprehend? — Eugen

As for this question, I don't think he distinguishes much between these views. Radical emergence has become a problem recently in philosophy, these new properties, of liquidity or heat just arose from the phenomena, they're emergent. But if you call it strong or weak is mostly terminological.

As I interpret him, if pushed, he'd probably say that he takes emergence to be "radical" or "brute", in that new properties constantly arise from parts which seem to lack the new property in isolation. He'd also say that calling it "radical" would likely be misleading, because it's normal science.

We do the best we can to construct theories from these new properties.

I know that was long, and I probably left something out, but I needed to clarify a badly phrased reply. Obviously if you want more clarifications or have doubts, let me know, I'll try and help.

If we could see how particles combined in a certain way could lead to liquidity, then we'd understand the theory and the phenomenon. It's the phenomenon which is puzzling, not the theory. — Manuel

Forgive me for butting in, or if it's been covered, but if one knows all the properties of certain particles, can't one predict which phenomena will emerge? For example, if we knew enough about H and O, would H2O's liquid properties be surprising?

Forgive me for butting in, or if it's been covered, but if one knows all the properties of certain particles, can't one predict which phenomena will emerge? For example, if we knew enough about H and O, would H2O's liquid properties be surprising? — RogueAI

That's exactly my point. Moreover, I don't even care if one is surprised or not. There is a clear difference between weak and strong emergence and it has nothing to do with intuitions, human capacities, or Chomsky being puzzled by liquidity, which is rather silly in my opinion because there's nothing puzzling about liquids.

Radical emergence is the idea that a new property arises which was not evident in its constituent parts. — Manuel

This is one way to look at things, but for me, it is not interesting. Again, it is not about properties being or not evident, it is about being new and irreducible or not, regardless of anything else. That's the strong emergence I'm interested in. So... does Chomsky believe in this type of radical emergence?

I'm not clear on what you have in mind here. — Manuel

- It seems to me Chomsky denies the possibility of consciousness being fundamental on the basis of empirical evidence. So he doesn't care if for instance panpsychism makes perfect sense from a logical point of view, he will still dismiss it because there is no empirical evidence for atoms being conscious.

As for this question, I don't think he distinguishes much between these views. Radical emergence has become a problem recently in philosophy, these new properties, of liquidity or heat just arose from the phenomena, they're emergent. But if you call it strong or weak is mostly terminological. — Manuel

Coming back to the same old problem. This is why this conversation keeps missing a key point - we simply have to differentiate these two notions, i.e. weak and strong emergence. If you want to help me, you have to forget what Chomsky or anyone else believes about weak and strong emergence, and try to give an answer based on what I call weak and strong emergence.

Weak emergence: new properties appear, but they are 100% reducible to more fundamental properties.
Strong emergence: new properties appear, and they are new in the real sense, they are irreducible to any other properties.

So forgive me for repeating the same question over and over again. Does Chomsky believe in what I call strong emergence?

Thank you!

"Knows" in English, can be misleading, I think "understanding" is less ambiguous (not that it makes it perfectly clear, but, maybe less confusing.)

If we had the capacity to understand all the properties of particles, then I think emergence would not be surprising. But "understanding" needs to include intuitions if we are going to say that we understand the phenomena.

Our built-in cognitive capacities are mechanistic: if we see a billiard ball hitting another one, we expect one ball to be the cause of movement of the other, until the other ball loses force.

If we kick a football (soccer) ball, we expect it to go a certain trajectory and then fall, because that's what balls do.

If I take the lid off a boiling pan, steam rises because it's going to its natural place, kind of like a big machine.

That's what we understand intuitively, it doesn't puzzle us to see steam rising or billiard balls stopping, etc.

Of course, this is not what is actually happening, the ball billiard ball stops because of friction, objects fall because of gravity, etc.

The actual explanations is science, not folk psychology or intuition. If we had a different cognitive constitution (maybe an advance alien species) gravity, friction and even liquidity could be intuitive to us and we could also have a theory that explains the intuitions, that happens to apply to the external world.

So, to answer your question yes, I think so in principle, but probably beyond us.

which is rather silly in my opinion because there's nothing puzzling about liquids. — Eugen

I mean, if you take that attitude literally, we wouldn't have modern science. The reason why Newton discovered gravity, is because he was puzzled as to why apples fall to the ground instead of levitating or going up to the sky.

It was literally this trivial - once people started being puzzled by trivial things, we got modern science. If Galileo was not puzzled as to why we think heavier objects fall faster to the ground than light objects, he wouldn't have bothered to do the experiments showing that this assumption was false.

So, it may not be surprising to you, but to others it is.

It seems to me Chomsky denies the possibility of consciousness being fundamental on the basis of empirical evidence. So he doesn't care if for instance panpsychism makes perfect sense from a logical point of view, he will still dismiss it because there is no empirical evidence for atoms being conscious. — Eugen

Quoting Joseph Priestley, Chomsky says:

"Priestley then considers the claim that mind “cannot be material because it is influenced by reasons.” To this he responds that since “reasons, whatever they may be, do ultimately move matter, there is certainly much less difficulty in conceiving that they may do this in consequence of their being the affection of some material substance, than upon the hypothesis of their belonging to a substance that has no
common property with matter”—not the way it would be put today, but capturing essentially the point of contemporary discussion leading some to revive panpsychism. But contrary to the contemporary
revival, Priestley rejects the conclusion that consciousness “cannot be annexed to the whole brain as a system, while the individual particles of which it consists are separately unconscious.” That “A certain
quantity of nervous system is necessary to such complex ideas and affections as belong to the human mind; and the idea of self, or the feeling that corresponds to the pronoun I,” he argues, “is not essentially different from other complex ideas, that of our country for example.” Similarly, it should not perplex us more than the fact that “life should be the property of an entirely animal system, and not the separate parts of it” or that sound cannot “result from the motion of a single particle” of air... That seems to be a reasonable stance."

- p. 193

Weak emergence: new properties appear, but they are 100% reducible to more fundamental properties.
Strong emergence: new properties appear, and they are new in the real sense, they are irreducible to any other properties.

So forgive me for repeating the same question over and over again. Does Chomsky believe in what I call strong emergence? — Eugen

I don't understand reduction then. If you are arguing that liquidity is "reducible" to molecules, you mean to say that liquid arises from molecules? And this is weakly emergent because our theories describe the phenomenon?

So, maybe an example of weak emergence that is not liquidity would be heat, right? Heat is just particles moving extremely rapidly, and the faster they move the hotter the object is, while conversely, the slower they move, the colder an object is.

If this is what have in mind as a new property that is fully reducible, no, I don't think it is weakly emergent. It doesn't help that we don't know what a particle is, literally:

https://www.quantamagazine.org/what-is-a-particle-20201112/

To answer your question:

Yes, he does.

I'll add the final caveat (based on what I've read, talked with him, etc.), there obviously must be something in the constituent parts that gives rise to new properties: there is something about the constituent elements of the world that give rise to liquidity, heat, even life, but we don't know what they are.

Finally, I would add, that it could be that we have different intuitions. I agree with Chomsky on these topics, but he could be wrong, and you could be correct. Or maybe you have better or more scientific intuitions. If so, then that's fine.

I don't understand reduction then. If you are arguing that liquidity is "reducible" to molecules, you mean to say that liquid arises from molecules? And this is weakly emergent because our theories describe the phenomenon? — Manuel

- You're missing my point. No, it is not weakly emergent because our theories describe it, it is weakly emergent because there is no property of liquid that it is not reducible to more fundamental properties.

I've got an idea. Let's say the brick is fundamental and its only fundamental property is mass. No brick is a wall, but 100 bricks form one. The wall has the property of being heavy. No brick is heavy, but the wall is. Surprising, but not really. The wall is nothing more than bricks, and ''heavy" is nothing more than mass. Liquidity is the same, only that it is more complex. But the most important thing is that they're both 100% weakly emergent.
Now let's say that the wall, besides being heavy, it is also conscious. And even its consciousness arises because of mass, it is not reducible to mass, it is a totally new property.

So let's assume mass is all there is to know about bricks. So we've defined bricks. Now we would conclude that mass is the secret ingredient to consciousness, but consciousness is not mass, it's something totally different.

Now let's take this one step further.
2049 - physicists find a new property called X, where X is NOT subjective experience. Now, they're able to make a complete theory of quantum and relativity, and everything works in physics. Everything except... consciousness. There are still obnoxious philosophers who state that X and the other properties of what we call matter don't explain consciousness.
Now, what would Chomsky say?
A. Consciousness is 100% reducible to X, mass, electrical charge, etc., therefore weakly emergent
B. Obviously, consciousness is strongly emergent in the way Eugen understands strong emergence, i.e. irreducible property

I've got an idea. Let's say the brick is fundamental and its only fundamental property is mass. No brick is a wall, but 100 bricks form one. The wall has the property of being heavy. No brick is heavy, but the wall is. Surprising, but not really. The wall is nothing more than bricks, and ''heavy" is nothing more than mass. Liquidity is the same, only that it is more complex. But the most important thing is that they're both 100% weakly emergent.
Now let's say that the wall, besides being heavy, it is also conscious. And even its consciousness arises because of mass, it is not reducible to mass, it is a totally new property.

So let's assume mass is all there is to know about bricks. So we've defined bricks. Now we would conclude that mass is the secret ingredient to consciousness, but consciousness is not mass, it's something totally different.

Now let's take this one step further.
2049 - physicists find a new property called X, where X is NOT subjective experience. Now, they're able to make a complete theory of quantum and relativity, and everything works in physics. Everything except... consciousness. There are still obnoxious philosophers who state that X and the other properties of what we call matter don't explain consciousness.
Now, what would Chomsky say?
A. Consciousness is 100% reducible to X, mass, electrical charge, etc., therefore weakly emergent
B. Obviously, consciousness is strongly emergent in the way Eugen understands strong emergence, i.e. irreducible property — Eugen

Ok, I think I understand what you say somewhat better, not unlike Dennett's views. I don't happen to think that heavyness is trivial in an obvious sense. But let's put that aside.

Consciousness is somehow different than these other things for some reason that is not explained. I would add that heaviness would be just as strange as consciousness on this view, as Chomsky says about motion.

Here is a crucial quote about motion:

"History also suggests caution [about assuming that consciousness is uniquely difficult]. In early modern science, the nature of motion was the “hard problem.” “Springing or Elastic Motions” is the “hard rock in Philosophy,” Sir William Petty observed, proposing ideas resembling those soon developed much more richly by Newton. The “hard problem” was that bodies that seem to our senses to be at rest are in a “violent” state, with “a strong endeavor to fly off or recede from one another,” in Robert Boyle’s words. The problem, he felt, is as obscure as “the Cause and Nature” of gravity, thus supporting his belief in “an intelligent Author or Disposer of Things.” Even the skeptical Newtonian Voltaire argued that the ability of humans to “produce a movement” where there was none shows that “there is a God who gave movement” to matter, and “so far are we from conceiving what matter is” that we do not even know if there is any “solid matter in the universe.” Locke relinquished to divine hands “the gravitation of matter towards matter, by ways, inconceivable to me.”

pp. 178-179

On Chomsky's view, not only would consciousness be "strongly emergent" so would heaviness. Just like the quote I provided through Priestley.

These are different intuitions, even if you say they're not. You say "...[t]he wall is nothing more than bricks, and ''heavy" is nothing more than mass. Liquidity is the same, only that it is more complex."

"Nothing more" implies that it's all perfectly obvious. And it's also obvious that these properties are nothing more than bricks doing what they do.

So liquidity is "nothing more" than molecules interacting. Ok. You call this weakly emergent. I think it's strongly emergent, and I think Chomsky would agree that it's strongly emergent.

So Chomsky would say liquidity is irreducible?

If by irreducible you mean that these properties are not to be found in the isolated molecules, then I believe he would.

Manuel look, I appreciate your effort but it seems to me you intentionally avoid some of my clear direct questions.

I mean, you are asking several times if he believes in radical emergence, I've said yes numerous times.

Alternatively, you can just email him yourself, he usually answers very quickly.

Heavyness strongly emergent - I doubt Chomsky would believe that. Heavy is just an arbitrary quantity for mass. What the f is strongly emergent about that?
What is weak emergence?

What's his address?

Heavy under the example you provided.

If you are saying it is a fundamental property, then it's a fundamental property of matter. That's not emergent.

I believe you can email him at: nchomsky3atgmaildotcom

Thank you!
But heavy is not fundamental, bricks are not heavy. Heavy must be > 10kg, and each brick has 1 kg.

Yes, I asked several times, but I want an answer under my definition of strong emergence. Heavyness is ONLY weakly emergent under my definition, even if bricks aren't heavy. Why? Because heavyness represent nothing more than the sum of its constituents.

Consciousness of the wall would be different from heavyness under my example because consciousness and mass are two different properties even if consciousness arises from mass. This and only this is the kind of strong emergence I want to know if Chomaky believes in or not.

Yeah, we are going to continue running in circles given how we define and think about "strong emergence" and "weak emergence".

So it's best if you ask him.

I will. Thank you again for your answers!

Ok, I think I'll have my last shot.
My strong emergence implies Property Dualism (not Substance Dualism!) and consciousness would be over and above its constituents. So, in your opinion, does Chomsky believe in this?

Thanks!

I'd guess he'd say something to the effect of: "yes" on consciousness being over and above its constituents, though it wouldn't be the only property that fits that demand.

No on property dualism, he calls himself a "methodological monist." If you want more information on what that view entails, you might want to read some chapters in his New Horizons in The Study of Language and Mind.

"yes" on consciousness being over and above its constituents, — Manuel

But that is Property Dualism.

I didn't add that liquidity would also be above its constituents, or life, or bipedalism. So it's either property pluralism, or it's natural monism, which is studying aspects of nature. While the aspects are different as life is different from liquids, it's all a study of nature.

But now it becomes terminological...

So what exact part/s of Property Dualism would Chomsky reject in order to say he wouldn't accept Property Dualism?

The idea that consciousness is somehow special in some sense that makes it radically different from other parts of nature.

He takes it that all aspects of nature should occasion the same astonishment as consciousness does.

But being over and above makes it radically different. That's the point.

There's nothing in matter that suggests consciousness, true, at the same time, there is nothing in matter that suggests lack of consciousness. It's as Bertrand Russell says (whom Chomsky agrees with here) we don't know enough about the nature of matter to say if it like or unlike the world of mind.

He'd say the case of liquids is the same as consciousness, you disagree and call it weakly emergent. OK, then you disagree with him.

I suppose this would be my last recourse: this interviewer has quite similar concerns to you, maybe you'd get something out of it:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vLuONgFbsjw&t=3089s

If that doesn't help a bit, I don't know what else could help.

He'd say the case of liquids is the same as consciousness, you disagree and call it weakly emergent. OK, then you disagree with him. — Manuel

I have no interest to make this a me vs Chomsky thing. Forget about my personal opinion.
My issue is that we're stuck in a grey zone when we could easily work this out.

Ok, liquidity is strongly emergent. What is weakly emergent then? Give me some examples please.

I don't personally recall him using that term ("weak emergence) to describe anything, and the reason he even used the term "radical emergence" at all, was to address a point raised by Galen Strawson. He doesn't use these terms.

He uses the word "reduction" and speaks about it in relation to chemistry being reduced to physics, in the quantum theoretic revolution.

But he does not speak nor think about the issue in terms of weak or strong reduction, unless explicitly talking about it in relation with Strawson's arguments.

See page 186 of the article I sent.