The Naive Theory of Consciousness

NOS4A2

I was reading through the 1957 edition of Encyclopedia Americana when I came across the article on Consciousness written by professor John Frederick Dashiell. In it is a delightful passage:

“Consciousness, properly an abstract term which, like “happiness”, “graciousness”, or “thoroughness”, refers to some quality of the human being taken in abstracto. However, the hypostatizing tendency of human thinking has led to its use as if referring to something existential. Since a man may be conscious, it is easy to fall into the assumption that he may have consciousness, then that something like a consciousness exists. This tendency to hypostatization has been strengthened by another circumstance. Much psychological interest has been in the description of one’s experiences when he is conscious, his feelings, perceptions, emotions, thoughts; and to arrest such experiences in mid-career, to hold them in static for detailed description, incurs the danger of misapprehending these cross-sectional snapshots as stable and enduring things.”

Even seventy years ago psychologists were sounding the alarm on the slovenly use of language regarding this topic. I’m afraid not much has changed.

The problem with the Hard Problem of Consciousness is it’s question-begging character and its tendency to hypostatization (reification). It assumes the existence of “conscious experience”. The language often treats it as actual, if not fundamental.

According to David Chalmers* it is undeniable that “some organisms are subjects of experience”. He says it is “widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis”. In order to develop a proper theory of experience, it might be better to “take experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time”.

The problem is: when we look around for what it is Chalmers is talking about we come up empty-handed. The language isn’t helpful when it comes to pointing to what it is in the world the word “experience” signifies. Despite the claims, nothing “arises”, nothing “emerges”, nothing “gives rise” to anything else. Rather than “something it is like”, there appears nothing it is like.

Our Naive Theories of Consciousness

Chalmers believes there is an explanatory gap between two states in his naturalistic dualism, the biological states and the “states of experience”. We need some sort of explanatory bridge to cross it. “A mere account of the functions stays on one side of the gap, so the materials for the bridge must be found elsewhere,” he says.

But upon an objective analysis we find there is only one state and it is wholly biological. Again, nothing has “arisen” from this state, forever discounting the claim that it “gives rise” to something. Rather, instead of two different states, we have two different accounts of one state. Our problem seems to be that both accounts are naive, one practically, the other fundamentally.

Practically (and ethically) we do not have the means to examine a conscious being without altering his consciousness. This is a sort of measurement problem. Perhaps one day we could devise methods and instruments to overcome this burden. For now, the theory resulting from this analysis is practically naive.

The fundamentally naive view will not be able to over come its own burden without conceding to the practically naive view, which may become an informed view. When a conscious being reports on his experience, anyone from any angle but his own can confirm he is reporting on his biological state, found as it is in a particular environment. We can see that a vast majority of his biology, and indeed a majority of himself, is hidden from him. What he is able to perceive of it is limited by his perceptual periphery, the fact that most of his sense organs point outwards toward the rest of the world and not inwards towards the mass where all the business of “experience” is occurring. Finally, given the complexity of every movement of his biology, he is unable to verify which feelings and experiences result from which biological movements.

Since the theory of his own consciousness is a theory about his own conscious state, which is a direct 1-to-1 ratio with himself, a biological state, should he rely on what little data his perception has offered to inform his theories, they remain limited. He might as well form a theory of digestion from the butterflies in his his stomach. His theory is a fundamentally naive one, and the way to bridge Chalmer’s gap is to walk back across it to the other side.

* David Chalmers, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness

frank

According to David Chalmers* it is undeniable that “some organisms are subjects of experience”. He says it is “widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis”. In order to develop a proper theory of experience, it might be better to “take experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time”.

The problem is: when we look around for what it is Chalmers is talking about we come up empty-handed. The language isn’t helpful when it comes to pointing to what it is in the world the word “experience” signifies. Despite the claims, nothing “arises”, nothing “emerges”, nothing “gives rise” to anything else. Rather than “something it is like”, there appears nothing it is like. — NOS4A2

If you looked around for a charge, you'd also come up empty handed. A charge is potential energy. It's an analysis of what's possible. It's not an object. Events arise from a charge in pretty much the same way I picked out black paint because I like how it looks.

NOS4A2

↪frank

Can we measure charge?

frank

Can we measure charge? — NOS4A2

Not directly. The idea of charge is closely related that of force. They're both calculations based on things we can directly measure.

wonderer1

Very good OP, and I largely agree. I do want to quibble with the following though:

What he is able to perceive of it is limited by his perceptual periphery, the fact that most of his sense organs point outwards toward the rest of the world and not inwards towards the mass where all the business of “experience” is occurring.

↪NOS4A2

It is not unreasonable to look at every synapse impinging on a neuron as a sense organ which that neuron uses to detect the state of the neurons providing the outputs to those synapses. If 'sense organ' is broadly construed in such a way, then much of what is being sensed by neurons is the result of earlier information processing by other neurons, and there is much 'internal sensing' going on.

I'm fairly confident that such a neuron by neuron quanitification of sensing would lead to the conclusion that there is actually more sensing of internal than external going on, and I think such is necessary for our phenomenal consciousness.

NOS4A2

↪frank

I'm pretty sure you can directly measure electrical charge with an electrometer.

↪wonderer1

I think you're right, and I'm sure there is much internal sensing, like pain. I mostly meant he is unable to match the internal movements and biological states to those sensations with observation and measurement, but point taken.

RogueAI

It assumes the existence of “conscious experience”. — NOS4A2

That is a safe assumption.

NOS4A2

↪RogueAI

That is a safe assumption.

Why?

frank

I'm pretty sure you can directly measure electrical charge with an electrometer. — NOS4A2

See how strongly we hold onto these reifications? No, an analog voltmeter allows a little bit of current to go through a wire that's in a magnetic field. That moves the needle. If there's a lot of current, we deduce that there's a lot of voltage. Voltage itself is potential. With the same voltage (from a dynamic source like a generator), all sorts of events are possible, the determining factor being the load.

But if you conclude from this that voltage doesn't exist, you're likely to become a member of the 110 Club.

NOS4A2

↪frank

Thanks for the lesson, but I'm pretty sure I wrote "electrometer".

frank

Thanks for the lesson, but I'm pretty sure I wrote "electrometer". — NOS4A2

An electrometer is just a high precision voltmeter.

RogueAI

↪NOS4A2

Are you conscious?

NOS4A2

↪RogueAI

Yes I am.

NOS4A2

↪frank

Are you coming to a point here, frank?

RogueAI

↪NOS4A2

So we're halfway there. We've established the existence of consciousness. Do you have experiences?

NOS4A2

↪RogueAI

I have merely established that I am conscious. The term "conscious" describes me. I exist, sure, but we have not established the existence of anything else.

Alkis Piskas

I was reading through the 1957 edition of Encyclopedia Americana when ... — NOS4A2

Are you browsing encyclopedias as a hobby or for fun? :grin:
Sorry. I couldn't help it. It just triggered my imagination. :smile:

[Re: Consciousness] However, the hypostatizing tendency of human thinking has led to its use as if referring to something existential. — NOS4A2

But it is something existential. It refers to the human existence as well as to all life.

Since a man may be conscious, it is easy to fall into the assumption that he may have consciousness — NOS4A2

It's not an assumption. It's not a construction of the mind. It's something that can be experienced. What is a construction of the mind is the concept of consciousness. Together with the effort to be accurately defined, described, explained and proved. If it cannot be scientifically explained and proved --see the hard problem of consciousness"-- does not mean that it does not exist, that it is not a reality. And this is because science, as we know it, in its current state of evolution and development, does not accept the human experience among its tools of analysis, investigation, kinds of proof, etc.

Much psychological interest has been in the description of one’s experiences when he is conscious, his feelings, perceptions, emotions, thoughts ... — NOS4A2

Right. In psychology --the conventional one, at least the one I know from studies in my college years-- consciousness is taken for granted. Well, this is better than denying its existence, isn't it? :smile:

OK, this is as far as your quotation of this professor.

[Re: HPC] It assumes the existence of “conscious experience”. The language often treats it as actual, if not fundamental. — NOS4A2

True. And for a good reason! :smile:

Despite the claims, nothing “arises”, nothing “emerges”, nothing “gives rise” to anything else. Rather than “something it is like”, there appears nothing it is like. — NOS4A2

I agree.

Our Naive Theories of Consciousness — NOS4A2

Where does this refer to? Who is "we"? And how is it connected to the title of the topic "The Naive Theory of Consciousness"?

Chalmers believes there is an explanatory gap between two states in his naturalistic dualism, the biological states and the “states of experience”. — NOS4A2

Well, I would rather say "connection" or "interaction" rather than "gap", since the latter refers to distance, esp. between two things of a similar nature. But these states are totally different kinds of things, of a totally different nature. They can only be connected in the way fear is connected to adrenaline.

But upon an objective analysis we find there is only one state and it is wholly biological. — NOS4A2

Do you mean that consciousness is a biological process and/or of a biological nature?
Whose viewpoint is this? Yours or Chalmers'?
Anyway, whatever is the case, I wonder what this "objective analysis" is ...

Practically (and ethically) we do not have the means to examine a conscious being without altering his consciousness. — NOS4A2

In what way "examine a conscious being"? I assume you mean examine the contents of a being's consciousness, right?
Well, this reminds me of quantum theory ... (From the little I know, of course.)
But consciousness is not a case of particles that we can examine in a laboratory ...
On the other hand, it's true that I cannot examine your consciousness. Not even your thoughts, emotions, ... anything of this sort. I can only examine your state of consciousness, --i.e. if and how conscious you are. Not its contents. As I can't examine your thoughts, emotions, anything of this sort.

So, what I have gathered from all this is that all (the existing) theories of consciousness are naive.
Is this the main point of the topic or is there some other conclusion?

NOS4A2

↪Alkis Piskas

I picked up the entire 1957 Americana Encyclopaedia collection at a garage sale, all 30 volumes. They came with a very nice cabinet.

What is this "something that can be experienced"? All these references to "something", for instance, "there is something it is like", but once we look there is nothing. Simply saying it is existential doesn't convince me much, I'm afraid. It seems to me that if you want to explain and prove this "something" it must first exist. But, as I said, it can only be assumed in a series of question-begging assertions.

This is evident in the paradoxical notion of "p-zombies", that there is some missing element in one of two identical beings. All that is possible is first to assume this element, and then further assume that this element can be missing.

frank

Are you coming to a point here, frank? — NOS4A2

The point was that abstractions are all over the place. Science is full of them. Charge is an example of an abstraction that is often misunderstood. We could pursue that if you're interested.

Otherwise, just know that Chalmers did not think consciousness is an object like an apple. He knew it's an abstraction.

NOS4A2

↪frank

I'm not interested in pursuing anything irrelevant.

If Chalmers doesn't think consciousness is an object, element, aspect, or entity, then why does he speak about it like it is?

bert1

If Chalmers doesn't think consciousness is an object, element, aspect, or entity, then why does he speak about it like it is? — NOS4A2

He thinks it's a property, like spin charge and mass

frank

If Chalmers doesn't think consciousness is an object...then why does he speak about it like it is? — NOS4A2

Oh, you're right. He does think it's an object. The Hard Problem is about how to locate that little Soul Bean in the human head. :up:

Paine

↪NOS4A2

This tendency to hypostatization has been strengthened by another circumstance. Much psychological interest has been in the description of one’s experiences when he is conscious, his feelings, perceptions, emotions, thoughts; and to arrest such experiences in mid-career, to hold them in static for detailed description, incurs the danger of misapprehending these cross-sectional snapshots as stable and enduring things.”

Dashiell's image of random snapshots does not reflect the way Chalmers frames what is to be explained:

The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta-theory is a theory about theories, the meta-problem is a problem about a problem. The initial problem is the hard problem of consciousness: why and how do physical processes in the brain give rise to conscious experience? The meta-problem is the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem, or in other terms, the problem of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain.
The relevant sort of consciousness here is phenomenal consciousness, or subjective experience. A system is phenomenally conscious if there is something it is like to be that system, from the first-person point of view. — D Chalmers, The Meta-Problem of Consciousness,

From the quote, it is hard to know what Dashiell would say to "something it is like to be that system, from the first-person point of view". With the concern expressed by 'reification', I am guessing he would align with the 'illusionist' against the 'realist' in Chalmer's article on the meta-problem.

Or perhaps Dashiell is viewing the matter as a behaviorist where 'the first-person point of view' is an epiphenomenon within an epiphenomenon.

Wayfarer

Again, nothing has “arisen” from this state, forever discounting the claim that it “gives rise” to something — NOS4A2

What about the computer you're writing this on? The house you're sitting in while writing it? The products you use every moment of every day? How were they made? By unconscious automata? Did they spontaneously form from the aggregation of materials? Of course not. They were built by human designers and inventors.

'Reification of consciousness' is definitely a problem, but it is not Chalmer's problem. The root of reification is 'reify' meaning 'to make a thing out of', from the Latin root Res, 'thing'. And it was Descartes that designated the mind as 'res cogitans', literally a 'thinking thing' (not even thinking being.) This has had many profound and deleterious consequences, crystallised in the depiction of the mind as 'the ghost in the machine'.

I think what your OP demonstrates is the failure to grasp Chalmer's argument.

apokrisis

He thinks it's a property, like spin charge and mass — bert1

Yep. That's the weasel argument. We happily accept the idea of a physical quantity – a measure of "stuff" or substantial being, such as charge. And so the linguistic trick is get us thinking of a quality – qualia – in a similarly physicalist and countable way. Little jolts of experience like the feeling of red or smell of a rose flashing through the mind.

The sleight of hand works as our folk metaphysical notions of physical quantity are as suspect as our ones about mental qualities.

Something fundamental like charge is treated as if it were like a measure of some fluid stuff that flows. It is already pictured and talked about in an overly concrete fashion. Then Chalmers takes that folk physics and applies it to the mind as if consciousness is also a quantity of this atomistic stuff called qualia, or isolated flashes of experience.

'Reification of consciousness' is definitely a problem, but it is not Chalmer's problem. The root of reification is 'reify' meaning 'to make a thing out of', from the Latin root Res, 'thing'. And it was Descartes that designated the mind as 'res cogitans', literally a 'thinking thing' (not even thinking being.) This has had many profound and deleterious consequences, crystallised in the depiction of the mind as 'the ghost in the machine'. — Wayfarer

But Chalmers was a big hit because he was "making it respectable to be a Cartesian dualist again". That was literally the gleeful response of the philosopher sat next to me when Chalmers gave the hard problem talk that made his name.

Descartes may have wanted to locate this special experiencing spirit stuff in the pineal gland of the brain. Chalmers agreed that was silly. But then said well maybe its somehow located in "physical information" or is another "dual aspect" property of particles, like charge.

He became hand-waving when pressed. It was enough that he could convince an audience that dualism could still be treated as a respectable possibility in metaphysics. People were entertained for a few years there. And the "quantum consciousness" folk found it useful in their attempts to get some traction.

A sociological side-show in other words.

frank

We happily accept the idea of a physical quantity – a measure of "stuff" or substantial being, such as charge. — apokrisis

:confused:

Francis

↪apokrisis

But it is simply a fact that particles have aspects about them that determine their behavior that are not their shape or location. This is not a weasel argument, its a fact of reality. Why does an upquark behave differently in an electro-magnetic field than an electron? It certainly isn't its location, or shape. Matter has causally relevant "properties" anyway you slice it. Otherwise nothing would happen.

NOS4A2

↪Wayfarer

What am I not grasping?

Like any grammatical modifier the word “conscious” lends us information about another word in the sentence (say, a man) and therefor applies to whatever thing in the world that word signifies (the conscious man). The word “conscious” signifies that thing and must be a direct 1-to-1 ratio with that which the word describes, or else the modifier is false.

Adding the suffix “-ness” to the adjective “conscious” turns the subject of analysis from the conscious man to “the state or quality of being conscious”. What is it that is being conscious? The man, but men are physical, so we abstract out the man. This slight linguistic maneuver might provide us with a new subject of abstract thought to analyze absent what it used to signify, but unmoors us from the world, entering us into the paradox of a state or quality of nothing in particular, and leaving us with a noun which signifies neither person, place, nor thing. Our theory of consciousness has quickly been inflated to include new nouns and new nothings.

It’s all in the grammar. Chalmers almost exclusively uses noun-phrases like “consciousness”, “experience”, “mind”, which grammatically signify a person, place, or thing. He could say “I’m just being abstract about the conscious man”, and that would be the end of it. But that would refute his own theory, men being physical, biological, and all that. Rather, he posits these nouns and whatever it is they signify as fundamental features of the world, ontologically independent of physical properties.

NOS4A2

↪Paine

I suspect Dashiell was a behaviorist, but I suppose he would be eliminativist today.

there is something it is like to be that system

I never liked Nagel’s formulation because it seems to me to apply to any system, conscious or otherwise. There is something it is like to be a football.

Francis

↪NOS4A2

More importantly, it doesn't address how "something it is like" ends up being able to influence the behavior of the particles that make up the brain so that we write about it.

Paine

↪NOS4A2

There is an irony involved in your citing the arbitrary quality of 'being like a football' since it relies upon the commonly received notion that footballs do not experience their being. To that extent, you are using the concept you wish to excise.

The Naive Theory of Consciousness

Welcome to The Philosophy Forum!

Categories

More Discussions