Q1: I don't think it is possible
Q2: Not that I know of.

Thank you a lot! By the way, are you familiar with Bach's theory of mind? Is that weak or strong emergence in your opinion?

Emergence is not well understood in all its varieties.

In Wikipedia Mark A. Bedau observes:

Although strong emergence is logically possible, it is uncomfortably like magic. How does an irreducible but supervenient downward causal power arise, since by definition it cannot be due to the aggregation of the micro-level potentialities?

At its simplest level it is characterized as an automobile, which involves a pattern or arrangement of parts. Under downward causation in Wikipedia:

Downward causation does not occur by direct causal effects from higher to lower levels of system organisation. Instead, downward causation occurs indirectly because the mechanisms at higher levels of organisation fail to accomplish the tasks dictated by the lower levels of organisation. As a result, inputs from the environment signal to the mechanisms at lower levels of organisation that something is wrong and therefore, to act.

Downward causation might be a key to understanding consciousness, but mathematically it is not well understood. The explorations I have done in infinite compositions of functions might eventually play a minor role, especially inner compositions which relate mathematically to the convergence of continued fractions. Don't worry, I won't get started. :nerd:

Q1 - I don't think so. However, the most ground breaking theories tend to overturn long held assumptions in shocking ways, so we may be surprised. Indeed, if such paradigm shifts weren't difficult to conceptualize, they wouldn't go unposited for centuries and be so revolutionary.

I suppose some of the more austere versions of eliminitivism do accomplish this, but at the cost of denying consciousness exists (granted, strawmen of this variety greatly outnumber theories that actually go this far).

Q2 - Yes, in some forms. Some forms of computationalism also embrace panpsychism. If the entire universe is conscious then consciousness doesn't have to emerge from anywhere. Rather, what neuroscience must explain it simply how these conscious parts can cohere into a the experientially unified whole of our first person perspective.

In favor of this argument are observations about split brained individuals (those with the central connections between the two sides of their brain severed). In experiments, if you ask the person questions, they will write down different answers with each hand, e.g. seemingly a different dream job for each side of the brain. The individual is not aware of this difference, evidence that perhaps consciousness can exist as a less unified thing while still possessing some of the complexity we associate with it.

Another oft used example is that of multiple personality disorder, where multiple consciousnesses appear to occupy one body. Unfortunately, some famous hoaxes were attached to this phenomena in the mid-20th century. However, I know of one more recent case study where a woman with a blind alternate personality both acted blind when that personality was in control and had visual cortex activation that was drastically different and similar to someone with vision impairment when this personality was dominant.

Sleep and anesthesia might also be taken as evidence of at least the plausibility of this view. When we are unconscious, we no longer have this same unified consciousness, even if we are experiencing a parasomnia like night terrors or sleep walking and are exhibiting complex behaviors. Indeed, the brain appears to need to take drastic steps to stop us from walking around and doing things while "we" are gone, rather than simply going into some hibernation mode (although the brain also certainly does go into a hibernation mode in many other ways during sleep).

The central idea here is that there is "something that it is like," to be anything in the universe. But what this experience is like is very hard to say. Rocks and rain droplets have no sensory systems or short term memory systems through which to "buffer" whatever experience it is that they have, so any inner life they lead would seem to be so incredibly bare as to defy the concept of first person experience we are looking to explain in the first place.

I oscillate on this view quite a bit. Sometimes I think the fact that people even consider it is a sign of how intractable the hard problem is, because it seems absurd in many ways. Other times it seems at least somewhat plausible, or at least that it could be if the problem of how conscious parts construct more sophisticated mental wholes could be explained.

Of course, many flavors of idealism also avoid emergence too. I think that is a far easier context in which to do so.

Q1. Is it possible to build a theory that starts with fundamental non-consciousness and reaches consciousness without going through the classic weak emergent or strong emergent? — Eugen

Yes. Thomas Metzinger's
self-model theory of subjectivity seems to do the trick. Also, an extrapolation from Metzinger's work is R. Scott Bakker's scientifically-grounded, speculative Blind Brain hypothesis.

Q2. Does any of the above theories (virtualism, computationalism, functionalism, etc.) manage to bypass emergence (weak or strong)?

I think "functionalism" (e.g. a tangled hierarchy) comes closest.

Thank you, man!
So just to make things clearer. I am referring to both weak and strong emergence.
Weak emergence = consciousness just is a configuration of something that is non-conscious/ it is totally reducible to non-consciousness, like water being weakly emergent from H and O, without having new properties,
Strong emergence = consciousness appears from non-consciousness, but it has totally different properties.

I think "functionalism" (e.g. a tangled hierarchy) comes closest. — 180 Proof

Even if I haven't seen emergence being mentioned in functionalist theories, it is hard for me to make sense of this without weak emergence at least. Functionalism states that consciousness is a function of the brain or at least a function of an organism. Firstly, the organism must weakly emerge (let alone the brain). Secondly, consciousness would be a particular configuration of matter satisfying a role in that particular emergent body. So I personally don't see how consciousness wouldn't be a weak emergent phenomenon in functionalism.
But because I haven't seen it mentioned in functionalist theories, I also take into consideration the fact that maybe my logic is wrong. Is that the case?

For me it's important to know if we can avoid emergence (weak or strong) starting from non-consciousness. Panpsychism and idealism start with consciousness.

As long as you reify "consciousness" (into a humuncular folk concept), you will miss the main points of my suggested references.

I am referring to phenomenal consciousness, qualia, "what it is like to be"-ness. I am not referring to self-consciousness.

The "-ness" = reification.

I cannot understand you. I'm not reifying anything here in my opinion.

1. Is a physical body/organism/brain necessary for the existence of consciousness (in the way you define consciousness)? If yes, would you accept that the body/organism/brain is a weakly emergent property of fundamental matter?

2. "The self-model is the central concept in the theory of consciousness called the self-model theory of subjectivity (SMT). This concept comprises experiences of ownership, of first person perspective, and of a long-term unity of beliefs and attitudes. These features are instantiated in the prefrontal cortex" - how is that non-emergence (weak emergence)?

↪180 Proof I cannot understand you. I'm not reifying anything here in my opinion. — Eugen

:ok: Good luck with all that.

You're very confusing. I guess intentionally. My questions are very clear and it seems to me you're the only one complicating things around here.
So... my clear questions demand clear answers. I didn't define consciousness before you accused me of reifying it. I didn't say what consciousness was, everyone has the freedom to define it. I asked if one could come up with an alternative on strong and weak emergence.
You said yes, and gave me two examples. I don't think they avoid weak emergence. Any counter-arguments?

Guys, I need help! Can someone explain to me what wants to say? I am not capable to grasp it. Thank you!

You said yes, and gave me two examples. I don't think they avoid weak emergence. — Eugen

:ok: Maybe someone will else give you better examples or demonstrate to your satisfaction that weak emergence cannot be avoided.

Well, it would be kinda hard for me to take your false accusation as an argument against weak emergence. Making a strawman looks like you're the one in need to believe weak emergence is false because it might be problematic for your deeper little innocent beliefs. I am not biased in any sense.
So I am waiting for you to overcome your personal insecurities and be rational.

Are you guys disputing whether it is possible for something to exhibit fundamental features of consciousness without actually being conscious? If so, this seems question-begging to begin with. And the distinction between weak and strong emergence is really just a question of degree, unless you completely trivialize weak emergence. IMO.

Are you guys disputing whether it is possible for something to exhibit fundamental features of consciousness without actually being conscious? — Pantagruel

No. My question is not about consciousness, it is about emergence. I am not interested if it's possible for something to exhibit consciousness without being conscious.
My question is that if one could create a model of consciousness starting from non-conscious substance AVOIDING the use of emergence (weak or strong).
In this regard, mentioned functionalism and this theory https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self_model?searchToken=aov5trxduudkxcx5rw0f9i9dn

I replied that I don't see how these two theories lack emergence and he then accused me of ''reifying" consciousness. That's the story.

1. I don't understand why accused me of ''reifying" consciousness before me giving any definition of consciousness.
2. I don't understand how come functionalism and Self model don't imply weak emergence.

Help me on these two matters please!

your false accusation — Eugen

What "false accusation" are you falsely accusing me of making?

I'm not engaged in a dispute about "emergence".

My question is that if one could create a model of consciousness starting from non-conscious substance AVOIDING the use of emergence (weak or strong). — Eugen

Sure, it's called reductive materialism.

:up:

Well, reductive entails emergence. Reductive material IS weak emergence. From the fundamental to consciousness = weak emergence; from fundamental to water = weak emergence; from fundamental to chairs = weak emergence. From consciousness, water, chairs to fundamental = reduction.

the distinction between weak and strong emergence is really just a question of degree — Pantagruel

No, it isn't. There's a clear distinction between them.

What "false accusation" are you falsely accusing me of making? — 180 Proof

As long as you reify "consciousness" (into a humuncular folk concept), — 180 Proof

- where had I reified it before you mentioned that?

No, it isn't. There's a clear distinction between them. — Eugen

To be clear, there is a clear distinction amongst people who agree that there is a distinction. I don't agree. Strong emergence is characterized by a much greater degree of autonomy between the emergent property and the source domain. This can be attributed to either a greater or lesser degree of understanding. So whatever appears to be a case of strong emergence can be understood in the same way that cases of weak emergence are understood, given a sufficient adequation of knowledge.

Your OP conflates two questions into one, which can be reduced to simple logical truths. Either consciousness is an emergent property or it is not. Either there are emergent properties or there are not.

Emergent properties seem to be trivially empirically evident (the universal phenomenon of evolution, for example). Ergo, it seems highly likely that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon. The alternative, as mentioned, would be reductive materialism.

1. So you've changed your mind. There is no way to avoid emergence.

2.

Your OP conflates two questions into one — Pantagruel

- No, it doesn't.

3.

To be clear, there is a clear distinction amongst people who agree that there is a distinction. I don't agree. — Pantagruel

- I don't care what your personal belief is. There is a clear description for both of them: "Weak emergent properties are said to be properties of a large system that can be predicted or derived by computing the interactions of the system's constituent parts. Strong emergent properties of a system are said to be impossible to predict by computing the interactions of its constituents."

4. How come reductive materialism avoids emergence at all? You have the freedom to define emergence as you like. So define emergence and then show me that reductive materialism does not imply emergence. Thank you!

↪Art48
Thank you a lot! By the way, are you familiar with Bach's theory of mind? Is that weak or strong emergence in your opinion? — Eugen

I’m not familiar with Joscha Bach but I’m looking at some web pages about him now. What I’ve read so far reminds me of Bernardo Kastrup’s theories.

As to consciousness and emergence, I think much depends on if we regard consciousness as something that is, or something that the brain does.

If we regard consciousness as something that is (perhaps what 180 Proof means by reification), then it seems difficult to me to understand how any type of emergence could explain consciousness as emerging from fundamental entities (electrons, quarks) which themselves do not possess consciousness. Thus, the hard problem of consciousness. One solution is panpsychism, i.e., that the elementary particles possess some form of consciousness or proto-consciousness, but then we have the problem of how trillions of proto-conscious entities unite to form my single, united consciousness. Another solution is that consciousness is fundamental and universal (per Kastrup and others). Then we have what has been called “the hard problem of matter”, i.e., how/why a single consciousness appears as separate, individual consciousnesses in an external world of what is apparently matter.

If we regard consciousness as something the brain does, then emergence may work, just as individual water molecules can unite to form waves. Waves don’t exist at the molecular level but only emerge in large bodies of water. But this is only a vague explanation of how consciousness could emerge from non-consciousness fundamental entities. Waves are merely the motion of large collections of water molecules and water molecules exist in space so their motion doesn’t seem mysterious. But how the “motion” (i.e., physical, chemical, and biological brain processes) can produce consciousness still seems mysterious to me. The hard problem of consciousness returns.

As long as you reify "consciousness" (into a humuncular folk concept),
— 180 Proof
- where had I reified it before you mentioned ]th)at? — Eugen

A direct implication of your OP questions about emergence. Activities are not emergent and you assume that "consciousness" (I prefer minding, or mind) is something more concrete than an activity. Context matters, Eugen. Assumptions of questions (re: OP) matter. My recommended sources do not assume that mind(ing) is anything but an activity (i.e. what a sufficiently complex CNS interacting with its environment does), which probably is what's confusing you about them.

I am referring to phenomenal consciousness, qualia, "what it is like to be"-ness. — Eugen

↪Eugen The "-ness" = reification — 180 Proof

There is a clear description for both of them: "Weak emergent properties are said to be properties of a large system that can be predicted or derived by computing the interactions of the system's constituent parts. Strong emergent properties of a system are said to be impossible to predict by computing the interactions of its constituents." — Eugen

Spoken like someone who relies on internet synopses for information. "Impossible to predict" equals "currently unable to predict". Which is what I said.

I don't care what your personal belief is — Eugen

Question for 180 Proof: Are you taking as axiomatic that consciousness is a process ? Isn't that the basis of the reification criticism? After all, if consciousness is not a process but in fact an entity in its own right, then the reification criticism is unjustified, is it not?

I'd believe whether consciousness is a process or an entity is an open question. Agree?

1.

"Impossible to predict" equals "currently unable to predict". Which is what I said. — Pantagruel

Can you provide me with reliable sources on that one? Thank you!

2. How come reductive materialism avoids emergence at all? ↪Pantagruel You have the freedom to define emergence as you like. So define emergence and then show me that reductive materialism does not imply emergence. Thank you!

Activities are not emergen — 180 Proof

Who says?