In Wikipedia Mark A. Bedau observes:
Although strong emergence is logically possible, it is uncomfortably like magic. How does an irreducible but supervenient downward causal power arise, since by definition it cannot be due to the aggregation of the micro-level potentialities?
Downward causation does not occur by direct causal effects from higher to lower levels of system organisation. Instead, downward causation occurs indirectly because the mechanisms at higher levels of organisation fail to accomplish the tasks dictated by the lower levels of organisation. As a result, inputs from the environment signal to the mechanisms at lower levels of organisation that something is wrong and therefore, to act.
Yes. Thomas Metzinger'sQ1. Is it possible to build a theory that starts with fundamental non-consciousness and reaches consciousness without going through the classic weak emergent or strong emergent? — Eugen
I think "functionalism" (e.g. a tangled hierarchy) comes closest.Q2. Does any of the above theories (virtualism, computationalism, functionalism, etc.) manage to bypass emergence (weak or strong)?
I think "functionalism" (e.g. a tangled hierarchy) comes closest. — 180 Proof
Are you guys disputing whether it is possible for something to exhibit fundamental features of consciousness without actually being conscious? — Pantagruel
My question is that if one could create a model of consciousness starting from non-conscious substance AVOIDING the use of emergence (weak or strong). — Eugen
No, it isn't. There's a clear distinction between them.the distinction between weak and strong emergence is really just a question of degree — Pantagruel
What "false accusation" are you falsely accusing me of making? — 180 Proof
- where had I reified it before you mentioned that?As long as you reify "consciousness" (into a humuncular folk concept), — 180 Proof
No, it isn't. There's a clear distinction between them. — Eugen
- No, it doesn't.Your OP conflates two questions into one — Pantagruel
- I don't care what your personal belief is. There is a clear description for both of them: "Weak emergent properties are said to be properties of a large system that can be predicted or derived by computing the interactions of the system's constituent parts. Strong emergent properties of a system are said to be impossible to predict by computing the interactions of its constituents."To be clear, there is a clear distinction amongst people who agree that there is a distinction. I don't agree. — Pantagruel
↪Art48
Thank you a lot! By the way, are you familiar with Bach's theory of mind? Is that weak or strong emergence in your opinion? — Eugen
A direct implication of your OP questions about emergence. Activities are not emergent and you assume that "consciousness" (I prefer minding, or mind) is something more concrete than an activity. Context matters, Eugen. Assumptions of questions (re: OP) matter. My recommended sources do not assume that mind(ing) is anything but an activity (i.e. what a sufficiently complex CNS interacting with its environment does), which probably is what's confusing you about them.As long as you reify "consciousness" (into a humuncular folk concept),
— 180 Proof
- where had I reified it before you mentioned ]th)at? — Eugen
I am referring to phenomenal consciousness, qualia, "what it is like to be"-ness. — Eugen
↪Eugen The "-ness" = reification — 180 Proof
There is a clear description for both of them: "Weak emergent properties are said to be properties of a large system that can be predicted or derived by computing the interactions of the system's constituent parts. Strong emergent properties of a system are said to be impossible to predict by computing the interactions of its constituents." — Eugen
I don't care what your personal belief is — Eugen
"Impossible to predict" equals "currently unable to predict". Which is what I said. — Pantagruel
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