But the mindscape does have some unintuitive implications. For instance, Shakespeare didn’t create the play Macbeth. Rather, he discovered it in the mindscape where it had been from all eternity. And Albert Einstein didn’t invent the Theory of Relativity. Rather, he found it lying in the mindscape where it, too, had been from all eternity.
And this post has been lying in the mindscape for all eternity, just waiting for someone to read it. — Art48
Can metaphysical questions, in particular, the mindscape hypothesis, give us useful guidance into how to study and make sense of the world? — Art48
"Really exist'? :chin:Does the mindscape really exist? — Art48
I think (post-Kantian) "metaphysical questions" (mostly) make explicit the limits of reason for "making sense of the world".Can metaphysical questions, in particular, the mindscape hypothesis, give us useful guidance into how to study and make sense of the world? — Art48
For instance, if the Earth and everyone on it disappeared tomorrow, if all memory of the play Macbeth vanished, would the play still exist in some form or another? Yes or no? Before answering, consider that the basic question is about all ideas and thoughts. If the Big Bang had never occurred, would the thought “two plus two equals four” exist? Yes or no? — Art48
A person who does mathematical research, writes stories, or meditates is an explorer of the Mindscape in much the same way that Armstrong, Livingstone, or Cousteau are explorers of the physical features of our Universe. The rocks on the Moon were there before the lunar module landed; and all the possible thoughts are already out there in the Mindscape.” — Art48
The contribution from your fellow human beings and the world around us is a better explanation of thoughts/ideas than appealing to introspection of a private world call "Mindscape." — Richard B
We first learn of ideas and how to think not by introspection, but by our fellow human beings, learning a rich intellectual tradition handed down from generation to generation. This picture of "Mindscape" would make you think we could isolate ourselves from others, and tap into the "Mindscape" to learn our ideas, and that there is no need to interact with another human being. It starts first by learning of ideas from other humans, not by private introspection into alternate realities. Do we introspect? Of course, with ideas that are learned in a public world taught by our fellow humans. — Richard B
Good stuff. — Banno
If all humans could access the Mindscape, would it qualify as a "private world"? — Janus
I think it's coherent that we experience thoughts exactly how we experience trees, rocks, and people. In both cases, we experience pre-existent entities. Of course, this doesn't prove the mindscape is true. But it seems coherent.Can anyone coherently explain how this is so? — Richard B
No one said the mindscape is private. Quite the opposite.a private world call "Mindscape." — Richard B
Interesting. I haven't seen that before. Reading Wikipedia now.Art48has rediscovered Popper's World 3 — Banno
I'd say that if God exists, then God is universal mind. But there could exist a universal mind that contains all possible thoughts but is not all-good, all-powerful, etc., as so is not God as usually conceived.It has always seemed to me that this "universal mind" is just another name for God. — T Clark
Just as there is one "landscape" (i.e., the physical world) where anyone can roam, there is one mindscape where any being capable of thought can roam.Do babies enter the Mindscape,? Infants? Children? Adolescents? Adults? A certain IQ level? Cultural background? — Richard B
I think it's coherent that we experience thoughts exactly how we experience trees, rocks, and people. In both cases, we experience pre-existent entities. Of course, this doesn't prove the mindscape is true. But it seems coherent. — Art48
But there could exist a universal mind that contains all possible thoughts but is not all-good, all-powerful, etc., as so is not God as usually conceived. — Art48
It has always seemed to me that this "universal mind" is just another name for
Goda god. — T Clark
This has been argued by philosophers in meaning and objective reality. If you believe in objective reality, then meaning is out there for us to grasp and make sense of. For this to be possible, our mind is equipped with concept formation so that when we encounter something unfamiliar, we can readily make sense of it. We were not bewildered as pre-historic humans that mountains and rivers and trees exist. Our mind has the ability to accommodate new things, and understand them.If all possible thoughts don’t already exist in the mindscape, then where do thoughts come from? How do thoughts and ideas come into existence? It seems the only possible answer is that a thought or idea doesn’t exist until someone thinks it. — Art48
Question: once created, are ideas and thoughts eternal? Can an idea cease to exist? Can an idea “die”? — Art48
Wittgenstein, of course, took a contrary view to Augustin as to how we learn a language, treating it as becoming a participant in the activities of a community. — Banno
Well expressed, interesting link. Wittgenstein, of course, took a contrary view to Augustin as to how we learn a language, treating it as becoming a participant in the activities of a community. It's not apparent hat this account could not be used here, that those "intelligible objects" are grasped as one becomes acquainted with the way they are used in a community. So learning what "2" is consists in learning how it is used by those around you, and using it within that community. — Banno
There seems to be a difference. The mindscape exists independent of the physical but Popper's World 3 seems to be dependent on it.Art48 has rediscovered Popper's World 3 — Banno
How so? "Reification is when you think of or treat something abstract as a physical thing." I'm not suggesting thoughts are physical; merely, that they are pre-existent. And picturing the mindscape as a place is merely metaphor. The claim is all thoughts are pre-existent (just as the trees we encounter when we walk in a forest are pre-existent). "Mindscape" is the phrase for the collection of all thoughts, just like "Black Forest" is a phrase for the collection of all trees in "a large forested mountain range in the state of Baden-Württemberg in southwest Germany, bounded by the Rhine Valley to the west and south and close to the borders with France and Switzerland."The illicit reification in ↪Art48's post is pretty clear. — Banno
Just as there is one "landscape" (i.e., the physical world) where anyone can roam, there is one mindscape where any being capable of thought can roam. — Art48
The claim is all thoughts are pre-existent (just as the trees we encounter when we walk in a forest are pre-existent). — Art48
...as you treat thoughts as a landscape. But more, the use of "exists" in a way that is analogous to it's application to rocks and hills and stuff - that was there before we mapped things out, as it were. Or describing thoughts in terms of the German countryside. The analogy can only go so far."Reification is when you think of or treat something abstract as a physical thing." — Art48
Reification is when you think of or treat something abstract as a physical thing." I'm not suggesting thoughts are physical; merely, that they are pre-existent. And picturing the mindscape as a place is merely metaphor. The claim is all thoughts are pre-existent (just as the trees we encounter when we walk in a forest are pre-existent). — Art48
In addition to our acquaintance with particular existing things, we also have acquaintance with what we shall call universals, that is to say, general ideas, such as whiteness, diversity, brotherhood, and so on. Every complete sentence must contain at least one word which stands for a universal, since all verbs have a meaning which is universal.
Consider such a proposition as 'Edinburgh is north of London'. Here we have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our knowledge of it. When we come to know that Edinburgh is north of London, we come to know something which has to do only with Edinburgh and London: we do not cause the truth of the proposition by coming to know it, on the contrary we merely apprehend a fact which was there before we knew it. The part of the earth's surface where Edinburgh stands would be north of the part where London stands, even if there were no human being to know about north and south, and even if there were no minds at all in the universe. ...We may therefore now assume it to be true that nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of London. But this fact involves the relation 'north of', which is a universal; and it would be impossible for the whole fact to involve nothing mental if the relation 'north of', which is a constituent part of the fact, did involve anything mental. Hence we must admit that the relation, like the terms it relates, is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create.
This conclusion, however, is met by the difficulty that the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something.
It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of whiteness. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'. ... In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness. The connected ambiguity in the word 'idea', which we noted at the same time, also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense in which it denotes the object of an act of thought, whiteness is an 'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental. But in so thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality. One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.
We shall find it convenient only to speak of things existing when they are in time, that is to say, when we can point to some time at which they exist (not excluding the possibility of their existing at all times). Thus thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects exist. But universals do not exist in this sense; we shall say that they subsist or have being, where 'being' is opposed to 'existence' as being timeless. — Bertrand Russell
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