• Janus
    Yep. I was asking what those grounds actually are, in this case. I'm aware they will only ever be those grounds which 'seem to one to be grounds' but I haven't had any such grounds yet.

    Saying "it seems to me" only tells me that there exist such grounds (in a rational person), it doesn't tell me what they are.

    Here is the exchange in question:

    . It seems clear to me that many of our perceptions have specific, enduring sources, and that specificity grounds our property concepts. — Dfpolis

    Since when does "it seems to me" constitute grounds?

    The point made by Dfpolis seems reasonable enough. If you disagree with the actual point why not say why? Then you might have a discussion.
  • Ø implies everything
    The answer to the first question is Yes.Ludwig V

    Okay, I suspected this a while ago, but it was just so foreign to me that I dismissed it. Now that I finally understand your stance, I will hopefully not talk past you.

    First, you assume that "justify" means "conclusively justify". That's not obvious and not universally accepted. I waver somewhat on this.Ludwig V

    I guess I got lazy with my writing. Previously in our correspondence, I have been writing (sufficiently) justified to mean that the justification is sufficient to prove truth. Whenever I write justified from now, that is what I mean.

    Now, I think I get what you mean. When I write "he is justified in believing p", all I say is that I have a proof that he has a proof of p". When I write "he is justified in believing p and p is true", I am pointing to the fact that I might have a distinct proof of p. However, the latter proposition is still true even if all I have is a proof that he has a proof of p, meaning the two propositions have both the same truth-values and informational content (given a non-skeptical account of truth, of course). Thus, the truth criterion remains redundant.
  • Ludwig V

    No, I don't think you get what I mean. 1) You are interested in propositions. I do not know what they are. I am interested in statements. I couldn't give a formal definition of those, but they do include the idea of speech-acts as an important part of understanding "he knows that p". 2) you are interested in truth and falsity and "informational content". I am also interested in what a speech-act does or conveys.

    "He is justified in believing that p" does not convey that I have proof that he has a proof. It does not convey that p is true, only that it might be true. It conveys that I have evaluated his justification and believe (but do not know) that his justification is, indeed, a justification, but not necessarily a sufficient justification. "He is justified in believing that p and p is true" nearly conveys that he knows that p, but, by using "believe" rather than "know" I do not commit to his justification being sufficient.

    When one witness says that p, one has evidence. When two witnesses independently say that p, one has more (stronger) evidence. And so on. When the police turn up and provide forensic evidence, the game changes and the evidence gets yet stronger. My endorsement of our subject's claim adds to the evidence (provided that it is independent), even though it does not necessarily change the truth value of p or its informational content; it gives reason for the jury to trust the evidence.
  • Nickolasgaspar
    I don't see how to make sense of this.

    If we decide that something is true on the basis of some observation, and subsequent observations show that it is not true, then we were wrong.
    Our observations do not generally change what is true, but what is believed.

    -Your last statement helps me understand why you can not make sense of my thesis.
    You are committing a fallacy of Ambiguity. You are using "truth" as an ideal (absolute) while
    I am only referring to truth as our every day practical evaluations of our claims/statements in relation to current available facts/observations.
    So you are talking about Absolute/Ultimate truth and I am talking about Practical Truth.
    The first is only useful as an ideal goal but useless in the evaluation of our real life truth statements. The second has an instrumental value(evaluates claims in relation to facts) while acknowledges our inability to have absolute truth statements about reality.

    So our observations can not change the (Ultimate) unknown truth....and its NOT their job after all.
    Our methods and observations are limited and our Ideals can only direct us to a goal but they can never affect our evaluation methods(Logic does that). Whether a true statement can be absolutely true, that can be possible when a statement is descriptive of a simple observation which isn't affected by an underlying, unknown ontology. i.e. The statement "you can't run through a brick wall" is true independent of the actual ontology of reality.That statement is verified every single time we test it.

    So Truth as an ideal value and Truth as an evaluation unit are two different things.
    This is a great example on how abstract ideals derail Philosophical conversations.
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