Yep. I was asking what those grounds actually are, in this case. I'm aware they will only ever be those grounds which 'seem to one to be grounds' but I haven't had any such grounds yet.

Saying "it seems to me" only tells me that there exist such grounds (in a rational person), it doesn't tell me what they are. — Isaac

Here is the exchange in question:

. It seems clear to me that many of our perceptions have specific, enduring sources, and that specificity grounds our property concepts. — Dfpolis


Since when does "it seems to me" constitute grounds? — Isaac

The point made by Dfpolis seems reasonable enough. If you disagree with the actual point why not say why? Then you might have a discussion.

The answer to the first question is Yes. — Ludwig V

Okay, I suspected this a while ago, but it was just so foreign to me that I dismissed it. Now that I finally understand your stance, I will hopefully not talk past you.

First, you assume that "justify" means "conclusively justify". That's not obvious and not universally accepted. I waver somewhat on this. — Ludwig V

I guess I got lazy with my writing. Previously in our correspondence, I have been writing (sufficiently) justified to mean that the justification is sufficient to prove truth. Whenever I write justified from now, that is what I mean.

Now, I think I get what you mean. When I write "he is justified in believing p", all I say is that I have a proof that he has a proof of p". When I write "he is justified in believing p and p is true", I am pointing to the fact that I might have a distinct proof of p. However, the latter proposition is still true even if all I have is a proof that he has a proof of p, meaning the two propositions have both the same truth-values and informational content (given a non-skeptical account of truth, of course). Thus, the truth criterion remains redundant.

No, I don't think you get what I mean. 1) You are interested in propositions. I do not know what they are. I am interested in statements. I couldn't give a formal definition of those, but they do include the idea of speech-acts as an important part of understanding "he knows that p". 2) you are interested in truth and falsity and "informational content". I am also interested in what a speech-act does or conveys.

"He is justified in believing that p" does not convey that I have proof that he has a proof. It does not convey that p is true, only that it might be true. It conveys that I have evaluated his justification and believe (but do not know) that his justification is, indeed, a justification, but not necessarily a sufficient justification. "He is justified in believing that p and p is true" nearly conveys that he knows that p, but, by using "believe" rather than "know" I do not commit to his justification being sufficient.

When one witness says that p, one has evidence. When two witnesses independently say that p, one has more (stronger) evidence. And so on. When the police turn up and provide forensic evidence, the game changes and the evidence gets yet stronger. My endorsement of our subject's claim adds to the evidence (provided that it is independent), even though it does not necessarily change the truth value of p or its informational content; it gives reason for the jury to trust the evidence.

I don't see how to make sense of this.

If we decide that something is true on the basis of some observation, and subsequent observations show that it is not true, then we were wrong.
Our observations do not generally change what is true, but what is believed. — Banno

-Your last statement helps me understand why you can not make sense of my thesis.
You are committing a fallacy of Ambiguity. You are using "truth" as an ideal (absolute) while
I am only referring to truth as our every day practical evaluations of our claims/statements in relation to current available facts/observations.
So you are talking about Absolute/Ultimate truth and I am talking about Practical Truth.
The first is only useful as an ideal goal but useless in the evaluation of our real life truth statements. The second has an instrumental value(evaluates claims in relation to facts) while acknowledges our inability to have absolute truth statements about reality.

So our observations can not change the (Ultimate) unknown truth....and its NOT their job after all.
Our methods and observations are limited and our Ideals can only direct us to a goal but they can never affect our evaluation methods(Logic does that). Whether a true statement can be absolutely true, that can be possible when a statement is descriptive of a simple observation which isn't affected by an underlying, unknown ontology. i.e. The statement "you can't run through a brick wall" is true independent of the actual ontology of reality.That statement is verified every single time we test it.

So Truth as an ideal value and Truth as an evaluation unit are two different things.
This is a great example on how abstract ideals derail Philosophical conversations.

It conveys that I have evaluated his justification and believe (but do not know) that his justification is, indeed, a justification, but not necessarily a sufficient justification. — Ludwig V

I am not interested here in propositions regarding people with insufficient justification. That's why I said I (from then on) would only use justified as meaning sufficiently justified. I guess I'll stop being lazy and just write sufficiently justified from now on to avoid any and all confusion.

"He is justified in believing that p" does not convey that I have proof that he has a proof. It does not convey that p is true, only that it might be true. — Ludwig V

If we change it to He is sufficiently justified in believing that p, then it does convey that I have proof that he has proof. That then also conveys that p is true. Thus, the truth criterion is, in cases of sufficient justification, redundant.

Of course, my proposition (1) = He is sufficiently justified in believing that p could be false; however, its truth-value will always be the same as (2) = He is sufficiently justified in believing that p and p is true (2). That is, (1) $\iff$ (2).

I am interested in statements. — Ludwig V

I think that explains a lot of our misunderstanding. The intuitive content of (1) is different from (2), even if they strictly speaking carry the same information. To use an analogy; the propositions He thinks his shoes are cool and He thinks his shoes are cool and someone thinks his shoes are cool have the same informational content, yet the second inspires an imaginative leap; is that someone perhaps someone else than 'him'?. By adding that p is true, that (in normal conversation) inspires one to think that the speaker holds additional knowledge regarding p, outside of their knowledge that the subject knows p.

Do you think that explains our misunderstandings?

Is there even one standard for "sufficient justification"? Consider a physician who is a diagnostic specialist with forty years of experience. He may be able to diagnose a condition where many others have failed, perhaps without even being able to accurately describe all of the contributing evidence. There is an experiential-expertise element to knowledge as well. Especially knowledge that is substantive-performative.

If we change it to He is sufficiently justified in believing that p, then it does convey that I have proof that he has proof. That then also conveys that p is true. Thus, the truth criterion is, in cases of sufficient justification, redundant. — Ø implies everything

"He is sufficiently justified in believing that p" conveys that you believe he has sufficient proof and that you are not convinced that p is true, which suggests that you think that he does not have sufficient proof. So it is self-contradictory. If you really believe that he has sufficient proof, then you will say that he knows that p.

Again, if I say that you believe he has sufficient proof, I am suggesting that the proof is not sufficient. If I believe that his proof is sufficient, I will say you know that he had sufficient proof. It all depends a) on who is speaking and b) whether p is true (and sometimes p = "the proof is sufficient.")

Is there even one standard for "sufficient justification"? — Pantagruel

No, I don't think there is. What counts as proof and what counts as sufficient proof depends on the context - i.e. what kind of proposition you are talking about.

It is also true that there may be an element of what is called judgement that enables people who have the skill and talent to leap over lack of strict deductively complete proof. The proof of the pudding, of course, is in the eating. It is not impossible to spend years making judgements and getting them wrong. So the record of a diagnostician is critical to assessing whether they have good judgement or not.

I'm not clear what you mean by substantive-performative knowledge.

I'm not clear what you mean by substantive-performative knowledge. — Ludwig V

As the diagnostician, empirical-situational and implementable in some way. Instrumental knowledge.

You are committing a fallacy of Ambiguity. You are using "truth" as an ideal (absolute)... — Nickolasgaspar

That made me laugh.

...truth and knowledge are observer relative evaluations, limited by our current observations. — Nickolasgaspar

What is that, if not an absolute definition of truth?

Or this:

So our observations can not change the (Ultimate) unknown truth.... — Nickolasgaspar

Seems to me you have your diagnosis arse-about. Its not I who is working with an "absolute" truth. Pretty unimpressive.

Again you are confusing two different meanings of the word.
In real life ONLY claims and Arguments can be true or not. (Oxford Un.Logic 101). Changes in our observations affect their value.
In your idealistic view of reality you see "truth" existing independent of our claims or limitations in our observations...but you ignore that its only an observer dependent evaluation.
Since you use hindsight (we were wrong about something) to promote an unchangeable nature of "truth"....you bet you are working with the version of an absolute truth.
Take care.

Statements are the things that can be true or false. Arguments are valid or invalid.

I've no idea what the remainder of your post says.

The conclusion of a valid argument can is also be evaluated for Soundness....

But not truth. The assumptions and the conclusions can be true, but not the argument.

Do not attribute to me arguments I have not made. I have written extensively on this forum about the logic of truth, defending Davidson and Tarski and attempting to articulate their approach with WIttgensien's meaning as use. If you wish to continue such discussions, have a look at what I have actually said.

Do not attribute to me arguments I have not made. — Banno

Do you always do as you are told? Old Nick definitely won't.

In real life ONLY claims and Arguments can be true or not. — Nickolasgaspar

Bicycle wheels can be true. Forum posts can be thoroughly buckled.

"He is sufficiently justified in believing that p" conveys that you believe he has sufficient proof and that you are not convinced that p is true, (...) — Ludwig V

As a proposition, the sentence does not convey that I am convinced of anything. As a statement, one could argue that the omission hints at a lack of personal conviction. However, any such argument would be based on subjective experience; i.e. how a person subjectively reads into the omission of details. Personally, I would disagree, but as said, this is subjective.

Mine are for sure! I true them myself!

But not truth. The assumptions and the conclusions can be true, but not the argument. — Banno

...If it is unvalid...

Do not attribute to me arguments I have not made — Banno

Never accused you for an argument. I don't even know what you are arguing about because your responses are short and irrelevant to my points.

I have written extensively on this forum about the logic of truth, defending Davidson and Tarski and attempting to articulate their approach with WIttgensien's meaning as use. If you wish to continue such discussions, have a look at what I have actually said. — Banno

I will need to revisit my critique on you. I am sure I address something different. I give you the benefit of the doubt and I will return by quoting my critique on your specific statement.
I want to be sure we are on the same page...because it doesn't feel that we are now.

As the diagnostician, empirical-situational and implementable in some way. Instrumental knowledge. — Pantagruel

OK. I see.

As a proposition, the sentence does not convey that I am convinced of anything. As a statement, one could argue that the omission hints at a lack of personal conviction. However, any such argument would be based on subjective experience; i.e. how a person subjectively reads into the omission of details. Personally, I would disagree, but as said, this is subjective. — Ø implies everything

I agree that the sentence/proposition/statement "S believes that p" on its own does not convey that you are convinced of anything. But If you have decided that S has sufficient justification, you convey that p is true. By conveying that, you convey that you know that p. That's the point. One can say something false by omission, as well as by assertion.

I want to be sure we are on the same page...because it doesn't feel that we are now. — Nickolasgaspar

Let me help.

My point is that truth and knowledge are observer relative evaluations, limited by our current observations. — Nickolasgaspar

This is your comment with which I took issue, way back. The problems I see:

First, there is a sense in which knowledge is observer-relative but truth isn't. Both knowing and believing something can be represented as a relation between someone and a proposition: Nick knows that Paris is in France; Banno believes that apples are a fruit. But truth does not have this relational characteristic. It's true that Paris is in France and that apples are fruit. Statements of truth differ from statements of knowledge or belief in this important regard: Knowledge and belief are always relative to the one who knows or believes. Truth has no such constraint.

And second, truth is not always fixed by observation. Specific things can be true, or false, regardless of their having been observed. Now to be sure we might only know that something is true as a result of making an observation. The observation can serve as the justification for our claim to know or believe what is observed. But the observation does not generally fix the truth vale.

First, there is a sense in which knowledge is observer-relative but truth isn't. Both knowing and believing something can be represented as a relation between someone and a proposition: Nick knows that Paris is in France; Banno believes that apples are a fruit. But truth does not have this relational characteristic. It's true that Paris is in France and that apples are fruit. Statements of truth differ from statements of knowledge or belief in this important regard: Knowledge and belief are always relative to the one who knows or believes. Truth has no such constraint. — Banno

Truth is an evaluation term of a quality we apply on claims based on our current available epistemology(knowledge). (Do you agree with the definition that Truth is an evaluation term of a specific quality? if not pls provide your definition)

If our claim is with agreement with current facts then we accept it to be true.
If our knowledge changes (i.e. Heliocentrism vs Geocentrism or Pluto as a planet or a dwarf planet) then our truth evaluation has to change too (tentative nature of knowledge and truth).
You are making an argument from Hindsight and you advocate for an idealistic nature of Truth.The Truth is only an ideal goal we strive for. Sure we can apply this version of "truth" on our past claims, but it is useless when we want to know the real truth value of current knowledge.

And second, truth is not always fixed by observation. Specific things can be true, or false, regardless of their having been observed. Now to be sure we might only know that something is true as a result of making an observation. The observation can serve as the justification for our claim to know or believe what is observed. But the observation does not generally fix the truth vale. — Banno

- Of course it is fixed to an observer, any evaluated quality is. Without an observer you don't have an evaluation to begin with...or the actual statement to evaluate.
Maybe your definition of Truth differs. Maybe truth is not an quality value for you!
Pls share your defintion.

***Specific things can be true, or false, regardless of their having been observed.***
Specific statements can be true or not true regardless of their having been observed...So a statement that isn't supported by data can not be an evaluated for its truth value.

In my opinion this is the problem when idealistic thought allows abstract concepts to gain an autonomous presence in our world.

Do you agree with the definition that Truth is an evaluation term of a specific quality? if not pls provide your definition — Nickolasgaspar

I don't think folk can provide a definition of truth, at least not one beyond the simple T-sentence: "P" is true IFF P. This is so because of the special place attributing truth to a statement has in language.

Is "...is true" an evaluation? well, it's a predicate ranging over statements, if that is what you mean.

But if, as it seems from the remainder of your post, "evaluation" is to be understood as a relation between a statement and someone, then as explained, that's not truth, but belief.

So folk apparently used to believe geocentrism. Now they believe heliocentrism, or something more complex still. While the belief has changed, the truth hasn't. Our evaluation changed, but the truth didn't.

idealistic thought — Nickolasgaspar

To be sure, what I am espousing here is not idealism... It is very much realism.

Just for clarity, here's a way one might understand the justified true belief account. For simplicity let's use a fairly direct example. The cup has one handle. Now the sentence "the cup has one handle" will be true if and only if the cup has one handle. And since I specified that, it does.

And some folk will believe that the cup has one handle. What's interesting here is that the truth of "the cup has one handle" is irrelevant to the belief. That is, even if the cup has two handles, some folk may believe that it has one.

They are what we in the trade call "wrong".

So we have truth on the one hand, being ascribed to statements. And we have belief on the other, setting out a relation between a statement and someone.

Bringing these together, we get that some folk believe "the cup has one handle"is true, and some believe "the cup has one handle"is not true. We are close to being able to say that the folk who believe "the cup has one handle" is true know that "the cup has one handle" is true.

The folk who believe that "the cup has two handles" cannot know "the cup has two handles" because the cup does not have two handles.

And here we add the practicality that "the cup has two handles" fits in with the other things we know; that there are cups, that they sometimes have two handles, sometimes one, that we can trust things like our eyes, or my pronouncements, and that if I say the cup has one handle that's a good enough reason to go along with that statements, and so on.

That is, we can justify the belief that the cup has one handle.

So we have a justification, for a belief, that is true. So we can say that we know the cup has one handle.

I don't think folk can provide a definition of truth, at least not one beyond the simple T-sentence: "P" is true IFF P. This is so because of the special place attributing truth to a statement has in language. — Banno

It was Ayn Rand and Wittgenstein who pointed out (I paraphrase) don't attempt anything before your definitions become clear .
The term "truth" is used to identify a specific quality of a statement (t's agreement with current available knowledge/facts.) Nothing more nothing less.
There is a course on logic 101 by Oxford University where the professor highlights the failure of many people to realize the true nature of human evaluations of qualities like truth, knowledge, information, calculation etc (values found in statements). We tend to project them in Nature as if they are intrinsic values of the cosmos when they are only evaluations of a quality we care about.

But if, as it seems from the remainder of your post, "evaluation" is to be understood as a relation between a statement and someone, then as explained, that's not truth, but belief. — Banno

- truth is the evaluation of a specific quality of a statement while a belief is the result after we accept/ being convinced by that specific quality of the statement (to be true).

So folk apparently used to believe geocentrism. Now they believe heliocentrism, or something more complex still. While the belief has changed, the truth hasn't. Our evaluation changed, but the truth didn't. — Banno

Of course it changed. The claim for Geocentrism is no longer accepted as true. What also changed was our available data (knowledge) which in turn changed the truth value of that specific claim.
What doesn't change is the nature and condition of the phenomenon (unknown tonus) that we are trying to describe with these statements. Sure, only one specific statement can be true but without the data we can't evaluate it.
I think it's a classic fallacy of confusing the map for the territory. The map(statement)can be precise or not (true or not true) but we can never call the territory "precise". That is a quality of a map(statement) can have.
So true or not true...only a statement can be...but never the phenomenon in question.
Sure , by using ideal values we tend to project those qualities on to anything...but this is a slippery slope because this is how we end up with new age theologies arguing in favor of energy and information and minds etc etc in addition to Nature (bad language mode).

Of course it changed. — Nickolasgaspar

So you are saying that the Sun used to go around the Earth, and now the Earth goes around the sun?

Νο obviously I don't. Evaluations of truth aren't defined by the ideal of absolute knowledge but by whatever facts you currently have access to.
Again, what we are able to say about something (map/ statement) it only describes our current view of it (current knowledge) and it doesn't change the actual thing in question (territory/ Actual condition).
Most of our evaluations on the quality of Truth are limited by our observations. Hindsight might trick you to believe that because we corrected our previous statement the current must surely be the right one (ultimate one).
As I already stated the quality of "precision" can only evaluate a specific aspect of a map but not the depicted territory . In the same way "truth" is only relevant to a specific claim based on our current epistemology.

Νο obviously I don't. Evaluations of truth aren't defined by the ideal of absolute knowledge but by whatever facts you currently have access to. — Nickolasgaspar

Hang on. The fact changed? So the fact was that the Sun went around the earth, and now the Earth goes around the sun?

I put it to you that the Earth has always gone around the sun, that this was true even when we believed that the Sun went around the Earth, and that the fact, the truth, has not changed. That our evaluation of the truth of a statement is not the very same as the truth of a statement. That belief is different to truth.

Hang on. The fact changed? So the fact was that the Sun went around the earth, and now the Earth goes around the sun? — Banno

-The facts/data available to us changed.Advances in technology improve our observations which in turn allow us to gather more data .

I put it to you that the Earth ahs always gone around the sun, that this was true even when we believed that the Sun went around the Earth, and that the fact, the truth, has not changed. — Banno

Hindsight, sure. Unfortunately our evaluation on the quality of Truth is limited by our ability to observe the whole picture.

That our evaluation of the truth of a statement is not the very same as the truth of a statement. That belief is different to truth. — Banno

Again you are confusing the act of accepting/believing in a claim because it is true with the abstract ideal value of truth.
We are justified to accept a statement true/not true when our epistemology supports it.
The quality of truth only renders out belief in a statement rational or irrational.

Again you are confusing the act of accepting/believing in a claim because it is true with the abstract ideal value of truth. — Nickolasgaspar

Actually I am explicitly differentiating these. I have pointed out that truth is a unary predicate, taking a statement, while both belief and knowledge are binary predicates, taking both a statement and a person - the one doing the knowing or believing.

You are apparently espousing some pragmatic theory of truth. You are changing "...is true" into a binary predication. So you apparently want to be able to say things like "It was true for medieval folk that the Sun moved around the Earth, but when better data was found, it became true for renaissance folk that the Earth moved around the sun"

Now part of my argument against pragmatist approaches to truth is that this locution misuses "...is true", in the place of the perfectly sensible, standard use of "believed". That is, we can say the very same thing as was said in the somewhat constipated phrase above, by saying "Medieval folk believed the Sun moved around the Earth, but Renaissance folk believed the Earth moves around the sun".

The teaching point here is to show some of the inadequacies of the pragmatic account of truth, in the hope of inciting an interest in other approaches. The substantive theories of truth – correspondence, coherence, and pragmatism – each have inadequacies. Philosophical accounts moved beyond these, especially after Tarski, into much more fertile ground. See the SEP article for a potted overview.

Anyway, I hope it clear that a merely pragmatic view of truth is inadequate. It is inconsistent with our actual use of the words "true" and "believe", hence not informing them, and it is inadequate for many of the things we do with those words - such as claiming that it is true this sentence is in English.