• Astro Cat
    29
    Hello, I'm still fairly new to the forum. I'm adding this preface since the rest of my post is colored by my philosophical positions. I'm a moral noncognitivist, so I generally avoid terms like "good" and "evil," though I will sometimes slip into character of assuming them to be meaningful for the sake of argument (e.g., I will put on my moral realist hat to talk about them in order to make the point, "even on this view, this thing we're talking about has a problem"). I generally present the Problem of Evil in terms of suffering as I think that's so parallel to what many people think of when they use the term "evil" that it still gets the point across. Likewise, I think of the ostensible property of omnibenevolence to be something like the state of being never-malevolent, e.g. perfectly choosing never to cause unnecessary suffering (which, again, I think is so parallel to what most people think of when they think of benevolence and goodness that it still gets the point across on either moral realism or nonrealism). I think that either on moral realism or nonrealism, causing gratuitous suffering is not congruent with benevolence.

    Anyway:

    I often find when presenting a Problem of Evil (henceforth PoE) style argument that a common response is some kind of "greater good" theodicy, e.g., that perhaps God allows suffering because it's necessary to enable some sort of greater good. Analogies are usually drawn to enduring the brief pain of an inoculation for the greater good of boosting the immune system, for instance.

    The PoE-giver might respond with something like, "well, what possible greater good could there be for something like child leukemia, or any other form of egregious suffering?" This is usually when the theodicy I'm interested in comes out: the theist might say, "well, as we are mere humans and can't presume to know the mind of God, all that we can know is that God has a good reason to allow child leukemia such that it isn't incongruent with God's benevolence to allow it."

    I think that this line of theodicy is problematic in that it's invincible, and feels very similar to special pleading. It's a kind of trap that -- once accepted -- might never be un-accepted because God could literally do anything at that point, even kicking puppies in the street and laughing maniacally while they fly, and the excuse could still be made: "Maybe He has an unknowable reason for this such that it's good, even though it appears evil."

    We can construct an analogy if we get all of the same pieces that make up this theodicy: all we need is something smarter than us to cause suffering in some way and then the same excuse can be made. But I'll get to that in a moment. First I need to discuss toy worlds (as hinted in the title) because first we must answer the question of what suffering God is even accused of being culpable for.

    I submit that it's possible for an omnipotent and omniscient being to have created a universe where the physics simply doesn't allow for the existence of physical suffering while preserving free will (to pre-empt another common theodicy). An omnipotent and omniscient being should be able to make physics such that everything from natural disasters to debilitating genetic disorders to gunshot wounds to stubbed toes is physically impossible. It's easy to imagine, too; particularly if you've ever used a cheat code in a video game: if physics incapable of harming people can be simulated, it's certainly the case that an omnipotent being could actualize it and an omniscient being could conceptualize it. I will borrow Swinburne's term "toy world" for such a category of world (where physical suffering isn't possible because the physics don't allow it).

    It follows that if an omnipotent and omniscient being created a universe wherein physical suffering is plentiful -- if we look out and we see a world ravaged by heinous amounts of suffering, grotesque possibilities that are able to be actualized, privation, starvation, disease, violence, and so on, all of it preventable if there were simply different physics -- it follows that if the world is that way instead of otherwise, then it has to be because the omnipotent/omniscient being deliberately chose it to be that way. God is culpable for *all* physical suffering, in other words: every last bit of it; even in instances where He didn't pull the proverbial trigger, He had to have set the laws of the universe in such a way that it was possible to happen (and deliberately so: there is no such thing as unforeseen consequences to an omniscient and omnipotent being; it is always "a feature, not a bug" with such beings).

    The question the PoE-giver is asking in this instance is, "if God is omnipotent and omniscient, then He is culpable for the existence of physical suffering in the world." The theist may give the greater good theodicy by responding, "well, maybe God had a good reason for building the universe with physical suffering." The PoE-giver may ask, "ok, what reason?" The theodicy-giver responds, "well, since we are mere humans, we can't know. It's beyond us to know."

    And there it is: the problem. It smells so much like special pleading, and as I've mentioned above, it's an invincible line of argument. God could do anything at all and the excuse would still work: God could torture babies and laugh maniacally and there still may be some reason so inscrutable for why it's actually good and not evil that maybe we can't know it.

    Is it reasonable to reject a line of argument that's invincible in order to avoid such a trap? Can we reasonably use the evidence of observation -- "this appears incongruent with benevolence" -- and rationally affirm that maybe the being perpetrating whatever act is actually not benevolent? I think that it is. It is true that we're epistemically limited, and technically true that any apparent perception might be false for unknowable reasons beyond our limitation: but it's epistemological chaos to embrace this excuse as a crutch, isn't it? At that point wouldn't we have to throw up our arms and say that anything we think is true might actually be false because we're epistemically limited and there might just be some unknowable reason why we're wrong about it? Isn't this exactly what we see in special pleading fallacy?

    This brings us back to the analogy I wanted to build.

    Suppose that you have a pocket dimension that is a toy world: in this universe, people have free will, but the physics of the universe do not allow for suffering. There is no disease, no privation of resources. If someone tries to stab someone else, the knife loses all inertia (or something, there are any number of ways to build physics without suffering). People still have free will, however: they are able to decide what to do on a given day, whom to spend it with, whether to write a book or watch a film or engage in sports or whatever.

    Now, say there is an alien creature with immense technological power that is truly far more intelligent than humans: it's not just that their civilization has existed longer to research technology longer, it's that they are truly simply mentally superior to humans in that they're able to conceive of things that humans can't even begin to comprehend, even if the creature attempts to teach humans from the ground up.

    Let's say this alien creature uses technology to slide into our toy world pocket dimension and sees that there is no suffering, everyone is bustling about their days just enjoying themselves. "Oh, this won't do at all," the alien says.

    The alien gathers people in the town square and announces that she is much smarter than they are (and is able to prove it, too), and that she is benevolent and wants to give everyone a very important gift. She builds a particle accelerator that changes the vacuum state of the pocket universe (or whatever, just go with it), changing the physics of the pocket universe. Suddenly, earthquakes rock the land! Children start to be born with debilitating physical defects. Disease starts to emerge. People find that they're suddenly able to physically assault and hurt one another (the term "innocent victim" has to be created, as they didn't have it before!)

    "You see?!" The alien asks. "Isn't this so much better, can't you see how benevolent I am?"

    Now, obviously, and it seems to me quite reasonably, a lot of people may suppose that even though the alien is smarter than they are and that it might technically be true they could have some unknowable reason for doing what they did, that maybe the alien simply isn't benevolent regardless of their claim that they are.

    Another group of people, though, develops the greater good theodicy: they accept that the alien is benevolent and they reason "the alien is smarter than us: she says she has a good reason to do this so I guess she must have a good reason." But how does this group ever disabuse themselves of this notion? If the alien starts running through the streets with a ray gun blasting people with a ray that turns them inside out for a horrible death, Mars Attacks style, shouting "do not run, I am your friend," is there ever a point that it's reasonable for people to think, "ok, maybe she isn't actually our friend?"

    If there is such a point where it's more rational to reject the greater good theodicy than it is to accept it, can the theodicist be convinced by the heinous amounts of suffering in the world that the threshold is met?
  • Shawn
    12.6k
    I don't think suffering can be encompassed by physics or toy worlds. What makes you believe that is so?
  • Astro Cat
    29
    I don't think suffering can be encompassed by physics or toy worlds. What makes you believe that is so? — Shawn

    I do mean physical suffering (as opposed to, say, emotional suffering), I should have probably made that more clear. Physical suffering is governed by physics. An omnipotent being could make it such that if you rammed your toe into the doorframe it wouldn't actually hurt your toe. An omnipotent being could make it so fire doesn't hurt you, so that your body doesn't develop diseases or cancers, so on and so forth.

    If there is a creator-God, then all of physical suffering exists because God set up the universe to work that way deliberately.
  • Shawn
    12.6k


    I read a lot of the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus so I shouldn't bother; yet, at every step of the way one would have to avoid the valence of suffering (suffering itself being 'bad') with negating core features of suffering such as loss of a loved one, death, and pain itself that physics couldn't hope to ever do or even care to do ...
  • Astro Cat
    29
    I read a lot of the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus so I shouldn't bother; yet, at every step of the way one would have to avoid the valence of suffering (suffering itself being 'bad') with negating core features of suffering such as loss of a loved one, death, and pain itself that physics couldn't hope to ever do or even care to do ... — Shawn

    Let us say that I create The Matrix and populate The Matrix with real people with actual consciousness. The rules that govern what happens when an object is thrown is the "physics" of this world. I can amend some code -- change the simulation of gravity -- and make a thrown object follow a different trajectory. All I have to do for instance is change how "G" is defined (as one example of how to do it).

    Now, if you agree that I can change the physics of The Matrix, let's talk about physical suffering. Have you ever played a video game and used a "god mode" cheat code where, no matter how much damage you're supposed to take, you don't take any of the damage? Bullets hit you, but your health doesn't go down, for instance. Well, that is very crude, but isn't it conceivable that I could change this Matrix so that the people in it don't suffer damage from being hit by bullets in the same way?

    Now apply the same logic to any kind of physical suffering. It's easy to conceive how I could simply write some code or change the way things work in The Matrix so that they don't actually experience the physical suffering. Disease? Easy, I can write the code so their body simply does not suffer from disease. Bullets? Easy. Earthquakes and tornadoes? Also easy: again, just turn "god mode" on (in video game terms) and nobody is hurt.

    Well, this is the "physics" of the Matrix. The physics of a world are the way its objects behave. I can write The Matrix so that the real people in it don't experience physical suffering: we don't have to call this the "physics" of the world if it's just that term that's causing problems for you.

    In any case, if something can be simulated (or thought experimented), then an omnipotent/omniscient being could actualize that state of affairs. If we can agree in a thought experiment that a clever programmer can make a universe where the actual minds present in that universe don't experience physical suffering, then we should agree an omnipotent/omniscient being could create the actual world to be that way.
  • Agent Smith
    9.5k
    The pleasure-pain system is, in me humble opinion, our primary guidance system. We're supposed to do what's pleasurable and not do what's painful. That, of course, would require that this guidance system be well-calibrated i.e., ethically, good must be joyful and ethically bad must be sorrwful. This, however, isn't the case - the world's problems can be traced back to defects in this guidance system - and I suspect this is because, at least in part, it's been rigged for maximum selfishness and minimum altruism (just enough good to get along in what's a fragile community of others, people, animals, plants). A fine balance must be maintained between self-interest and other-interest i.e. the Goldilocks zone/aurea mediocritas/sweet spot is a really narrow band between too good and too bad and hence, few of us if ever succeed in walking this tightrope and make it to the other side unscathed.

    Ah, but I digress ...

    Our options
    1. An inept god, the bumbling fool
    2. Si comprehendis non est deus (self-sealing tyres are gonna sell like hot cakes)
    3. Malus deus
    4. Some viewers may find this disturbing
    4. Left to the reader as an exercise.

    @Astro Cat :rofl:
  • universeness
    6.3k

    I think your detailed OP could simply conclude that it's unlikely that any god posit, has an actual existent, that we humans can scapegoat, for all the sufferings that do happen to us. No god exists that can give us absolution for the horrors WE choose to visit on others. No supernatural superhero gives a flying f*** about us but that's not it's fault, as it does not exist. When we huddled at night, inside caves, in the early days of our existence and we heard all the scary animal noises at night from outside the cave and WE invented 'prayer,' we prayed for protection in vain and we would have been better, spending the time to try to quickly invent long sharp spears, control fire and invent a big strong door for the entrance to the cave. No god was ever available to help us, if a big hungry group of bears got into our cave.

    I think the important conclusion for every rational member of the human race to arrive at, asap, is that WE reap what WE sow. No existent, can be scapegoated, for the human civilisation WE have created and only WE can make it better.
    Those who know the most about the physics of the universe, such as yourself, must continue to report on whether or not, they have found any empirical evidence of the existence of anything else, we could blame for the way things are.
    We cannot be blamed for abiogenisis or for evolution or natural selection or the workings and structure of the universe. We can choose to celebrate such however. Again, for me, it always seems to come back to making the choice between choosing to live life as a curse or not. I choose not to live life as a curse and I look to help fix problems, rather than scapegoat nonexistents in the irrational way, theists and theosophists do.
  • Tom Storm
    8.3k
    An omnipotent being could make it so fire doesn't hurt you, so that your body doesn't develop diseases or cancers, so on and so forth.

    If there is a creator-God, then all of physical suffering exists because God set up the universe to work that way deliberately.
    Astro Cat

    This is like the argument from poor design that some atheists bring out as a counter to the apologist's argument from design and the miraculous functionality of the natural world. As we all know, if we care to look, most of nature is predicated, not just on suffering but also on cruelty, as predators toy and kill their prey and insects eat each other alive.

    By any reckoning it seems pretty hard to imagine a creator god that was anything other than a cruel thug by most human standards. So we don't just have degenerative diseases and diabetes and psychosis and useless appendixes and the shipwreck that is ageing, it could be said we have an entire 'creation' based around chaos, predation and agony. Still mustn't grumble... looks to be exactly the kind of world you might find if there were no designer or a plan.
  • unenlightened
    8.7k
    Now, if you agree that I can change the physics of The Matrix, let's talk about physical suffering. Have you ever played a video game and used a "god mode" cheat code where, no matter how much damage you're supposed to take, you don't take any of the damage? Bullets hit you, but your health doesn't go down, for instance. Well, that is very crude, but isn't it conceivable that I could change this Matrix so that the people in it don't suffer damage from being hit by bullets in the same way?Astro Cat

    Excellent analogy. A game you cannot lose is a dull game where winning is no achievement and has no value. Games have to have baddies so that they can be overcome. A life without danger and suffering is a life without meaning. Heaven is intolerably dull, and that is why we are all here in this miserable world, trying to imagine heaven, and realise it on Earth. When god makes everything right, it's game over. No point in cooking, everything tastes wonderful, no point climbing mountains, you can never fall off. No point in philosophy, all the answers are available to everyone already.
  • Astro Cat
    29

    Left to the reader as an exercise. — Agent Smith

    As a physics grad student I'm going to need you to put a trigger warning on this please. :lol:
  • Astro Cat
    29
    A game you cannot lose is a dull game where winning is no achievement and has no value. Games have to have baddies so that they can be overcome. A life without danger and suffering is a life without meaning. Heaven is intolerably dull, and that is why we are all here in this miserable world, trying to imagine heaven, and realise it on Earth. When god makes everything right, it's game over. No point in cooking, everything tastes wonderful, no point climbing mountains, you can never fall off. No point in philosophy, all the answers are available to everyone already. — unenlightened"

    Yes, as an ex-Christian I've long harbored these sorts of reservations about the concept of Heaven: wouldn't it be boring? I think there's enough there to merit its own topic, but I'm hoping to stay focused on greater good theodicy here, and I think I'd be shocked if anyone's defense of leukemia is "so we don't get bored."
  • bert1
    1.8k
    Very nice clear OP. It does assume that one horn of the Euthyphro dilemma is accepted, that God wills what is good, because it is good. That's an assumption in the OP. There's a reason all this suffering is good that we can't see but God can.

    Embracing the other horn of the dilemma, that is to say that x is good because God wills it, is much more defensible in terms of intelligibility without recourse to special pleading. However this horn almost certainly involves disagreeing with God. It's all very well for God to will earthquakes and god knows what - it doesn't affect Them (my God is woke). But from our point of view these things are shit, so fuck God, you Divine Cunt. This conclusion should be embraced by theologians, but it's not a message that sounds well from a pulpit, no matter how philosophically satisfactory it is. This conception of the good, as that which is willed by a subject (even if that subject is God), and thus entailing the subjectivity of the good, nicely allows for God to be omnibenevolent (everything They will is good from Their point of view), and for us to violently object, saying that's all very well for God but from my point of view a whole bunch of stiff is shit. The human condition is very much about coming to terms with reality, that is, a world that does not obey our finite will.
  • RogueAI
    2.4k
    It's possible that a universe without the possibility of physical suffering would seem miraculous or a put-up job, and that God has good reasons for not "showing her hand".
  • Moliere
    4k
    If there is such a point where it's more rational to reject the greater good theodicy than it is to accept it, can the theodicist be convinced by the heinous amounts of suffering in the world that the threshold is met?Astro Cat

    I don't think the theodicist can be convinced, no. I'm not sure under what circumstances I'd say it's even a rational argument -- I agree with you that it's special pleading.

    If God's thoughts are beyond our thoughts, then "suffering" is already too human, too meaningful to count. So God would certainly not have a reason which is a greater good -- that's a very human way of looking at the world, and his thoughts are beyond ours, so these are not his thoughts. These are our thoughts: and a thoughtless no-thought at the end of a question is the most human position: most of our beliefs we don't bother justifying, after all. We just believe them while they work. And the theodicy, to my mind, is just a way to paper over where the belief won't work -- a time when the belief is really of low consequence (in a philosophical argument) so the paper argument works for some.
  • Banno
    23.1k


    It's an all-and-some; for any evil there is a corresponding good, an existential statement nestled in a universal statement rendering it both unprovable and unfalsifiable.

    U(x)∃(y)(y is the good produced by x).

    An act of faith. The good produced could be anywhere, and so failure to find it does not imply that it does not exist.

    Recall Confirmable and influential Metaphysics
  • Agent Smith
    9.5k
    Left to the reader as an exercise.
    — Agent Smith

    As a physics grad student I'm going to need you to put a trigger warning on this please
    Astro Cat

    :smile:
  • Astro Cat
    29
    Very nice clear OP. It does assume that one horn of the Euthyphro dilemma is accepted, that God wills what is good, because it is good. That's an assumption in the OP. There's a reason all this suffering is good that we can't see but God can.

    Embracing the other horn of the dilemma, that is to say that x is good because God wills it, is much more defensible in terms of intelligibility without recourse to special pleading. However this horn almost certainly involves disagreeing with God. It's all very well for God to will earthquakes and god knows what - it doesn't affect Them (my God is woke). But from our point of view these things are shit, so fuck God, you Divine Cunt. This conclusion should be embraced by theologians, but it's not a message that sounds well from a pulpit, no matter how philosophically satisfactory it is. This conception of the good, as that which is willed by a subject (even if that subject is God), and thus entailing the subjectivity of the good, nicely allows for God to be omnibenevolent (everything They will is good from Their point of view), and for us to violently object, saying that's all very well for God but from my point of view a whole bunch of stiff is shit. The human condition is very much about coming to terms with reality, that is, a world that does not obey our finite will.
    — bert

    You're right, I did only consider one horn of Euthyphro. Though as you note, the PoE isn't really a problem on Divine Command Theory since by definition, anything at all that God does on DCT, even torture for torture's sake alone, is "good." So, I guess I grabbed hold of the only Euthyphro horn where the PoE even matters.
  • Astro Cat
    29
    It's possible that a universe without the possibility of physical suffering would seem miraculous or a put-up job, and that God has good reasons for not "showing her hand". — RogueAI

    Interesting: so you propose that Divine Hiddenness isn't only a question (e.g., it is typically presented as a question: why, if there is a God, does it seem hidden?) but a means to some end (e.g., God obtains some purpose from being hidden) that's so overwhelmingly good that all the physical suffering in the world is worth it to have it?
  • Agent Smith
    9.5k
    @Astro Cat, does pain make sense to you in evolutionary terms? Why did we evolve to feel pain and why is pain so damn unpleasant?
  • Agent Smith
    9.5k
    Plants don't have a nervous system i.e. it's impossible for plants to feel either Algos or Thanatos. Instead of modifying the laws of physics, God made adjustments to plant biology. May be God created the universe with plants in mind and not us. Remember Moses and The Burning Bush. God is a plant! :lol: That make us ... (bad) gardeners. :lol: Re: Garden of Eden.
  • jorndoe
    3.2k
    There's something weird or off about the greater good theodicy.
    If it's for the greater good, then what business have doctors/researchers/psychiatrists/etc trying to fix it?
    Shouldn't it be left for that (presumably planned, trusted) greater good?
    Mentioned good folks have managed to cure/relieve some maladies over time, others not so much.
  • Astro Cat
    29
    does pain make sense to you in evolutionary terms? Why did we evolve to feel pain and why is pain so damn unpleasant? — Agent Smith

    Sure, it makes lots of sense in evolutionary terms. I think we understand that we feel pain when we touch something hot as a way to quickly learn not to touch hot things.

    However, this is unnecessary in a toy world. You don't need to experience pain when you touch a stove burner to learn not to do that if a stone burner would never hurt you in the first place.
  • Astro Cat
    29
    Congenital Analgesia. A curse/a gift, both, neither? — Agent Smith

    In the world that exists as it exists, this can be bad because pain does serve the purpose of letting us know something is wrong: we wouldn't get the warning that we've rested our hand accidentally on a hot burner for instance.

    Since there are physical dangers, physical pain servers an evolutionary purpose and is useful for that purpose.

    However, again, none of this is necessary in a world without physical dangers.

    So if we ask, "why does physical suffering exist?" the answer isn't "because it lets us know that we've put our hand on the hot burner so we can pull our hand away." It misses the point that in a toy world, the burner could never hurt us anyway.

    In other words the question could be posed, "why does the world have dangers to which pain alerts us to?"

    (Though there are obviously some pains that don't serve such a purpose, they are just pains; such as some genetic defects. In any case, I hope this answers the question.)
  • Agent Smith
    9.5k
    Well, what about pain & pleasure as a guidance system? Axiology 101.
  • bert1
    1.8k
    Though as you note, the PoE isn't really a problem on Divine Command Theory since by definition, anything at all that God does on DCT, even torture for torture's sake alone, is "good."Astro Cat

    Sure, although adopting this horn of the dilemma does not commit us to DCT. DCT says that what God wills is Good. Period (full stop). One could, instead, simply say that what God wills is good for God. This leaves human beings with the interesting and burdensome problem of what is good for us, or for me in a world of finite opposing wills. Meta-ethical relativism is maintained, which is good.
  • Jack Cummins
    5.1k

    Having read your outpost again here, I am wondering to what extent you see 'God' as a metaphorical construct for thinking about imaginary worlds. In that way, your perspective about 'toy worlds' for thinking about the nature of objective ways for viewing the wider perspective of moral evil. Or, I am I wrong in my interpretation of your critique and the thought experiment which you describe?
  • Astro Cat
    29
    A guidance system isn’t required if there is no danger. So physical suffering still demands an explanation on the 3-omni sort of theism.
  • Astro Cat
    29
    Sure, although adopting this horn of the dilemma does not commit us to DCT. DCT says that what God wills is Good. Period (full stop). One could, instead, simply say that what God wills is good for God. This leaves human beings with the interesting and burdensome problem of what is good for us, or for me in a world of finite opposing wills. Meta-ethical relativism is maintained, which is good. — “bert”

    Though if God acts in the interest of Himself and not for us in general, I’d argue that isn’t what we intuitively grasp as benevolence. This would simply be ceding that God is not omnibenevolent and the PoE “wins.”
  • Astro Cat
    29
    Having read your outpost again here, I am wondering to what extent you see 'God' as a metaphorical construct for thinking about imaginary worlds. In that way, your perspective about 'toy worlds' for thinking about the nature of objective ways for viewing the wider perspective of moral evil. Or, I am I wrong in my interpretation of your critique and the thought experiment which you describe? — “Jack Cummins”

    I’m unsure how to respond to this. Possible world/modal semantics is certainly useful for talking about the capabilities of an omnipotent/omniscient being, but I don’t think that’s the same as treating God as a “metaphorical construct for thinking about” modal possibilities.

    I myself am an atheist, I doubt that a god exists; but when giving the PoE, God’s existence (and certain properties) are taken for the sake of argument to demonstrate reductio ad absurdum.
  • Jack Cummins
    5.1k

    We may come from conflicting angles, because while I am not a theist I have an interest in comparative religion and points of view, in trying to understand evil and suffering. In particular, I am find the Buddhist perspective useful and the ideas of Carl Jung. I did study religious studies as my third topic on my undergraduate course. It involved looking at the problem of evil in Christianity. I find theology extremely different to read but read one writer, J Hick who wrote on the idea of evil in relation to human free will. Also, J Mackie wrote on the idea of omnipotence and evil. You may find these writers interesting to look at and critique.
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