Anomalous Monism is only concerned with third-personal causal analysis of propositional attitudes, and so it isn't really relevant to the "hard problem". Rather, AM concerns the "soft problem" of inter-translating the public ontologies of scientific psychology and the physical sciences.


"Davidson restricts the class of mental events with which Anomalous Monism is concerned to that of the propositional attitudes—states and events with psychological verbs such as ‘believes’, ‘desires’, ‘intends’ and others that subtend ‘that-’ clauses, which relate subjects to propositional contents such as ‘it is raining outside’. Anomalous Monism thus does not address the status of mental events such as pains, tickles and the like—‘conscious’ or sentient mental events. It is concerned exclusively with sapient mental events—thoughts with propositional content that appear to lack any distinctive ‘feel’."

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anomalous-monism/

The "conscious events" that AM doesn't address are those that correspond with our private use of language as indexicals, as in the cry " owww toothache!!" - an occasion that constitutes a bespoke use of language, that in spite of appearances isn't justified by, nor needs to be justified by, a priori established linguistic conventions regarding the public meaning of "toothache"in the referential or functional sense of a noun or verb.

If I cry "owww toothache!!" , although the noun "toothache" has (many) public definitions that a dentist might use to assess the physical state of my mouth, my cry of "toothache!" bears no semantic relation to the dental definition of toothache, for I am privately using "toothache" as an indexical, rather than publicly using it in the dental sense of a noun. So regardless of whether or not I 'actually' have "toothache" in the sense of a dysfunctional dental property, my cry of "toothache!!" still stands as a fact, even if outsiders are puzzled as to what it could relate to from their perspective.

Although indexicals are excluded as objects of Davidson's analysis, given that indexicals a) serve to ground public definitions in the minds of each and every individual and b) that people use the nouns and verbs of their public language as indexicals in an unpredictable bespoke fashion, indexicals contribute to the indeterminancy of translation and reference that Davidson appeals to in the context of the propositional attitudes he analyses.

If someone says they are in pain they are, if they are not lying, referring to a pain that they feel. — Janus

I don't think here is a sensible place to rehash Wittgenstein's arguments. Suffice to say a bland assertion that words do refer doesn't suffice as a counterargument to the claim that they don't.

You agreed that people have pains. — Luke

That's how we use the word. I'm separating out how we use a word from that which needs scientific explanation. I don't see any argument that us using a word somehow automatically means there's an object/event there in need of explanation. How are we always right? Are you claiming we have some kind of deep intuitive insight into the workings of the universe? I'm just not seeing the link.

I use the word 'pain' same as everyone else because I've been taught how to use it. One of the ways to use it is to say (of someone saying "ouch!") "he's in pain". Nothing in that use reifies 'pain'.

Your "agreement" that people have pains seems to be no more than that people know how to use the word "pain"; that there is never any feeling of pain involved. — Luke

That's right.

Is it not scientifically relevant to investigate mental events? — Luke

Investigate, yes. But it's not a problem for the science that it can't find anything which correlates to the folk notion. It's not its job to match everything up. Some things won't match. To suggest that everything will match up is to imply we already know all the fundamental objects of the universe somehow.

As far as I know, anomalous monism does not deny that there are mental events. — Luke

Nor am I.

I use the word 'pain' same as everyone else because I've been taught how to use it. One of the ways to use it is to say (of someone saying "ouch!") "he's in pain". Nothing in that use reifies 'pain'. — Isaac

Sure, one use it to say that he - someone else - is in pain. And Wittgenstein says you can doubt that. But you can't doubt it when you're in pain. Therefore:

I don't see any argument that us using a word somehow automatically means there's an object/event there in need of explanation. How are we always right? Are you claiming we have some kind of deep intuitive insight into the workings of the universe? I'm just not seeing the link. — Isaac

If you agree with Wittgenstein's statement that when you have pain you cannot doubt that you have pain, then it doesn't make any sense to be wrong (or right) about it.

Your "agreement" that people have pains seems to be no more than that people know how to use the word "pain"; that there is never any feeling of pain involved.
— Luke

That's right. — Isaac

If there is never any feeling of pain involved with people's expressions of pain, then in what sense do they have pain(s)? What is the difference between pain-behaviour with pain and pain-behaviour without pain? Or can there be no pretence of pain?

Is it not scientifically relevant to investigate mental events?
— Luke

Investigate, yes. But it's not a problem for the science that it can't find anything which correlates to the folk notion. It's not its job to match everything up. Some things won't match. To suggest that everything will match up is to imply we already know all the fundamental objects of the universe somehow. — Isaac

I don't know what you mean by "match up" or why we would need to "know all the fundamental objects of the universe" in order to do so.

Even if it isn't a scientific problem, it is a philosophical one.

As far as I know, anomalous monism does not deny that there are mental events.
— Luke

Nor am I. — Isaac

Yet you admit there is never any feeling of pain involved with the use of the word "pain". That sounds like logical behaviourism to me. What feelings or mental events do you allow for then?

If you agree with Wittgenstein's statement that when you have pain you cannot doubt that you have pain, then it doesn't make any sense to be wrong (or right) about it. — Luke

Of course it does, because the thing it makes no sense to doubt is that I'm in pain. The word. I couldn't possibly know I'm in pain unless someone had taught me the word.

If there is never any feeling of pain involved with people's expressions of pain, then in what sense do they have pain(s)? What is the difference between pain-behaviour with pain and pain-behaviour without pain? Or can there be no pretence of pain? — Luke

You keep using the word 'pain' in your discussion of pain. Obviously that whole discussion is going to be internally consistent. We're talking here about the extent to which it ought to match up to the objects of physical science (in this case brains). If you ask "do people have a pain when they say (truthfully) 'I have a pain?" then obviously the answer is yes. That's the definition of 'pain', it's felicitous use.

The question here is whether that use refers to an object of science (here neuroscience) and whether it's odd, in need of explanation, if it doesn't. Is it odd that we can't find a consistent brain function associated with our folk notion 'pain'?

So pressing the issue solely within our folk notions doesn't get us anywhere. Yes, they're pretty consistent internally. They've been around for thousands of years, it would indeed be odd if we found out they weren't.

Yet you admit there is never any feeling of pain involved with the use of the word "pain". — Luke

There is always a feeling of pain associated with the (felicitous use of the) word pain. It's the definition of the word. It has no bearing at all on whether there's an object of scientific enquiry that matches up with it. There need not be any physical manifestation associated with using the term.

The word 'pain' might be associated with some amorphous, family-resemblance collection of physical stimuli - ever-changing with cultural mores and linguistic convention. It might be hanging in space like the word 'ether'. It might be associated one-to-one with some brain state. There's nothing about its use that implies any of these options over any other.

There is always a feeling of pain associated with the (felicitous use of the) word pain. — Isaac

In your previous post you said the opposite:

Your "agreement" that people have pains seems to be no more than that people know how to use the word "pain"; that there is never any feeling of pain involved.
— Luke

That's right. — Isaac

Therefore, it's difficult to get clear on your position.

There is always a feeling of pain associated with the (felicitous use of the) word pain. — Isaac


In your previous post you said the opposite: — Luke

Did I, or did I not use the word 'pain' in the sentence "There is always a feeling of pain associated with the (felicitous use of the) word pain"?

Did I, or did I not use the word 'pain' in the sentence "There is always a feeling of pain associated with the (felicitous use of the) word pain"? — Isaac

You did. And in your previous post you indicated that there is never any feeling of pain involved with the use of the word 'pain', as I quoted.

Is there always a feeling of pain involved or never a feeling of pain involved?

Ah! My apologies. I missed the last bit. I was answering affirmatively to...

Your "agreement" that people have pains seems to be no more than that people know how to use the word "pain" — Isaac

...the last bit ("that there is never any feeling of pain involved") doesn't make sense. There cannot not be a feeling 'pain' associated with the felicitous use of the word 'pain'. It's what the word means. The question here is not about whether people are using the folk notion felicitously. Of course they are. It's whether the folk notion refers to any object of science (or should).

You keep asking the equivalent of "when people say 'pain' do they mean pain?" That has no bearing on the question of the hard problem.

We're asking rather "is it odd that our use of the concept 'pain' doesn't have a physical referent. Is it a 'problem' for neuroscience?"

...the last bit doesn't make sense. There cannot not be a feeling 'pain' associated with the felicitous use of the word 'pain'. It's what the word means. — Isaac

I don't follow why there cannot be a feeling of pain associated. What is "what the word means"?

If I tell someone that I'm in pain, there's no feeling involved?

I don't follow why there cannot be a feeling of pain associated. — Luke

The quote was "... cannot not be a feeling of pain associated."

We're not doing well are we?

it's difficult to get clear on your position. — Luke

I'll try and clarify...

All we have is that the word (sound) came out of my mouth (or was formed in my Broca's area, if not actually verbalised). Nothing else.

There's then two options...

1) there's some state of my brain or body which consistently is associated with that word, which is present every time I felicitously use it. We can call this state 'pain' too.

2) I use the word 'pain' for a variety of reasons which might change from day to day, depending on how I'm feeling, what is going on around me. My reasons might differ from yours. Some interocepted signal from my nociception circuits might be involved, but might not. There's no one-to-one correspondence with any state of my body or brain, there's no physical manifestation of the word 'pain'.

I'm arguing something like (2) for both 'pain' and 'consciousness'.

Anomalous Monism is only concerned with third-personal causal analysis of propositional attitudes, and so it isn't really relevant to the "hard problem". Rather, AM concerns the "soft problem" of inter-translating the public ontologies of scientific psychology and the physical sciences. — sime

Except that Davidson’s anomalous monism is a non-reductive physicalism, leaving open an explanatory gap between mental events and the physical properties they depend on.

“… a non-reductionist physicalist like Davidson does not claim that everything is physical; rather she claims that everything depends on the physical. She allows that there are mental properties at a higher level of complexity but mental properties supervene on physical properties at a micro-structural level. Hence, any alterations at the level of mental can be physically explained by some alterations at the level of micro structures.

The difference between a Davidsonian non-reductive physicalist and a Rortyan naturalistic pragmatist is that the former does not deny that there really are physical properties at the micro-structural level, because the efficiency of a physical vocabulary is a sufficient reason to extend its claims to ontology. In contrast, the latter thinks that Davidsonian "physical properties" and "the micro-structural level" are just theoretical suppositions that are meaningful only within a description or vocabulary. They think that it is sufficient for a denial of the existence of physical properties at the level of ontology, precisely because they are still description-dependent.” (ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM ELIMINATED:
RORTY AND DAVIDSON ON THE MIND-WORLD RELATION, Istvan Danka)

I don't follow why there cannot be a feeling of pain associated.
— Luke

The quote was "... cannot not be a feeling of pain associated." — Isaac

My mistake. However, you've been saying for a few pages that the use of the word cannot give us any reified object, but now you say that there is always a feeling of pain associated with the felicitous use of the word?

Incidentally, I don't agree that there is always a feeling of pain associated with felicitous use of the word; perhaps only with felicitous expressions of pain that include the use of the word "pain". Hopefully neither of us are in too much pain while felicitously using the word in this discussion.

there's no physical manifestation of the word 'pain' — Isaac

Then how could we ever learn to use the word?

I'm arguing something like (2) for both 'pain' and 'consciousness'. — Isaac

Yes, and I view your 1) and 2) as basically designating what may sometimes be referred to as "internal" (feeling) and "external" (behavioural) notions of pain, respectively. According to Wittgenstein, linguistic meaning is all 2), while 1) is his beetle in the box: not a something, but not a nothing either.

This is probably why you find 1) scientifically uninteresting, but I find it philosophically interesting.

you've been saying for a few pages that the use of the word cannot give us any reified object, but now you say that there is always a feeling of pain associated with the felicitous use of the word? — Luke

Yes, that's right. The 'feeling of pain' is not a reified object. It's a folk notion. It exists in that sense (like the category 'horses' exists), but there's no physical manifestation of it.

Then how could we ever learn to use the word? — Luke

By trying it out and it's having a useful and predictable effect.

According to Wittgenstein, linguistic meaning is all 2), and 1) is his beetle in the box: not a something, but not a nothing either.

This is probably why you find 1) scientifically uninteresting, but I find it philosophically interesting. — Luke

Yes. I find it philosophically interesting too. What I'm arguing against here is there being any kind of 'problem' with the fact that neuroscience (dealing with physically instantiated entities) cannot give a one-to-one correspondence account connecting these entities to the folk notions 'pain' and 'consciousness' (as well as 'feeling', 'it's like...', 'aware', etc).

It's not a problem because it's neither the task, nor expected of science to explain all such folk notions in terms of physically instantiated objects and their interactions.

Basically, because (2) is at least possible, there's no 'hard problem' of consciousness because neuroscience's failure to account for it in terms of one-to-one correspondence with physically instantiated objects may be simply because there is no such correspondence to be found.

I don't think here is a sensible place to rehash Wittgenstein's arguments. Suffice to say a bland assertion that words do refer doesn't suffice as a counterargument to the claim that they don't. — Isaac

Nice cop-out!

But math doesn't depend on objects. — Manuel

It starts with objects, but once you have an abstract symbolic system it, like language, no longer does.

I'm not getting notifications for your posts. Weird.

I mean, you are speaking about objects, things in the world. Mathematics is rather different, I wouldn't say it's an object in any sense of that word. I mean, where are the numbers? Nobody can point them out in the sense an ordinary object could be pointed out, or maybe even a particle or atom.

2+2 and much, much more difficult formulations are still true, absent anything else. Though of course, to make this explicit, you need a conscious agent.

Numbers are concepts, I would say, represented by numerals, just as words are concepts represented by script or sound,

Number is perceived as multiplicity. We also perceive similarity and difference, although none of these are concrete objects, obviously.

Sure - to the extent you describe it, I think that's on track.

But I think we should be cautious in thinking that because they share these similarities, that they are more or less the same thing. Like a mathematician, who doesn't speak Japanese, will perfectly well understand the formula of another mathematician who is Japanese.

What math describes - to the extremely limited sense I understand this - is related to structures of rather simple things. The structure can become quite complex, but easy compared to the complexity of virtually any object in the perceived human world.

Language on the other hand, is used for all sorts of things, "communication" being one among the many things it is used for.

Then there's also the issue of representation. We represent the objects in the world in a human way, knowing of no other way to represent things.

It's not at all clear that mathematics is a representation which would significantly vary from species to species. It could, but I'd be quite skeptical.

I agree with you that mathematics is not the same as an ordinary language insofar as it is a system of strict rule-based operations and calculation.

That said at least the basic operations can be expressed in ordinary language. For example "two time two equals four".

I'm not too sure about your point that languages are human-based whereas math is not. I think the logic of existence, identity, difference, similarity, multiplicity, form, matter and object, just to give a few examples, would be just as universal as the logic of mathematics for any symbolic language competent species

Let's take a few examples. Take a dog for instance, most of the time, they don't pass the "mirror test" of self-awareness, which implies (but does not prove) that they either lack a distinct sense of identity, or the identity they have, is rather different than ours.

Or take the example of the mantis shrimp, they have 16 light cones, as opposed to our three. This suggests they see many, many more colours than what we could even imagine. And it's hard to attribute to them, say, the same capacity of multiplicity we have. Whereas we take a tree to be one object, a mantis shrimp, lacking concepts (most likely), might see several objects.

The point is not so much that math isn't human based, it's that it attaches itself to the universe, in a way language does not - the words we use are arbitrary, the numbers we use, though we can change the symbol 3 to "III", give us the same answer.

And we don't even need to apply numbers to the universe, we can use them "by themselves" to solve a problem internal to math.

The biggest issue is, where are the numbers? And why do they work so well in physics?

That other animals see things differently than us doesn't seem relevant to my point that it seems reasonable to think that any symbolic-language competent species would form concepts of multiplicity, identity and the other examples I gave.

This is because the other animals we are familiar with are not symbolic language users.

The biggest issue is, where are the numbers? And why do they work so well in physics? — Manuel

Why should we think that numbers must be somewhere? As to why they work so well in physics, who knows? How could we ever know the answer to a question like that? We do know that nature appears to possess quantity and multiplicity, but does that say anything about nature beyond how it appears to us?

Pleasure isnt such a simple concept from an enactivist perspective. What constitutes a reinforcement is not determinable independently of the normative sense-making goals of the organism.
[...]
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1810.04535.pdf — Joshs

Thank you for the reference to the article. They manage to describe in a few pages what Thompson fails to decribe in many. The enactive approach still looks like a more or less incompetent attempt at RL, but of course the decision-making of biological organisms might be just that. We will not, however, find the solution to the hard problem in our inefficiencies.

I do not understand "normative sense-making goals", but I'm not very interested in what it might mean.

We will not, however, find the solution to the hard problem in our inefficiencies.

I do not understand "normative sense-making goals", but I'm not very interested in what it might mean. — GrahamJ

You should be if you want to understand feelings and the dissolution of the hard problem.

That other animals see things differently than us doesn't seem relevant to my point that it seems reasonable to think that any symbolic-language competent species would form concepts of multiplicity, identity and the other examples I gave. — Janus

With a sample of one, it's hard to say. Some things may be the same, others not. The identity we ascribe say, to bodies of water, or trees, could be quite different - they may conceptualize such things to encompass far more (or less) than we do. It's a reasonable possibility.

I mean, having an intelligent symbolic creature like us, possessing exactly the same cognitive framework would be pretty wild. Which doesn't imply that it would be impossible.

Why should we think that numbers must be somewhere? As to why they work so well in physics, who knows? How could we ever know the answer to a question like that? We do know that nature appears to possess quantity and multiplicity, but does that say anything about nature beyond how it appears to us? — Janus

Are they nowhere? Language is in us, that's true. Numbers too, otherwise, we wouldn't know about them. The difference here being that math applies to the nature of things - physics, chemistry and so forth - which suggests strong elements of mind independence. We can't say the same thing about language use, I don't think.

Multiplicity and numbers are different, though they have some elements in common.

As to nature, agreed: nothing beyond what it appear to us, of course. Attaching to mind independent aspects of the world, does not imply something being beyond us, it implies mind independence.

I mean, having an intelligent symbolic creature like us, possessing exactly the same cognitive framework would be pretty wild. Which doesn't imply that it would be impossible. — Manuel

Apart from anthropology showing that intra-species diversity even regarding ontology is going strong, sociology shows this intra-nation. -religion, -etc. Just think of the ontology of gender/sex

Between human beings? Maybe, but the differences are superficial. Like some tribes may believe in an extreme form of animism, while another tribe believes in one true God. But the general themes are not too different: the good, evil, the bountiful, the beautiful and so on, with different specifications.

Between species, the differences are quite pronounced. They likely have very different ontologies, although lacking language, it would be impossible to say what form such an ontology may look like.

Between human beings? Maybe, but the differences are superficial. Like some tribes may believe in an extreme form of animism, while another tribe believes in one true God. But the general themes are not too different: the good, evil, the bountiful, the beautiful and so on, with different specifications. — Manuel

You have quite different versions of time, identity, afterlife, objects. In the Maori what we might call a gift includes both some thing and part of the giver's soul. The gift is both a subject and an object. Even the range of deities is enormous, I mean in terms of kind. You have people ridden by gods. You have cultures where assemblages and networks replace out subjects and objects and they are not the same kinds of 'things'. You mention animism which is radically different from both the secular West and the religious West. You have very different ideas about causation. You have cultures where dreams are considered more real than waking life.

I mean, having an intelligent symbolic creature like us, possessing exactly the same cognitive framework would be pretty wild. Which doesn't imply that it would be impossible. — Manuel

It would be pretty wild and I agree it may not be impossible. The thing is that I was suggesting that any intelligent symbolic creature would think in terms of identity, materiality, multiplicity, diversity, number, form, pattern, similarity, difference and so on, not that they would see, for example, the same entities we do, or describe them as having exactly the same boundaries. (We are not that definite if we are asked to define the exact boundaries of things, in any case).

Are they nowhere? Language is in us, that's true. Numbers too, otherwise, we wouldn't know about them. The difference here being that math applies to the nature of things - physics, chemistry and so forth - which suggests strong elements of mind independence. We can't say the same thing about language use, I don't think.

Multiplicity and numbers are different, though they have some elements in common. — Manuel

We think in and of numbers, just as we think in and of words, but both numbers and words are collective phenomena. As you seem to suggest the difference is that numbers enjoy a rule-based relationship with phenomena, whereas words do no obviously do so. On the other hand nouns, for example, denote entities of various kinds, and I think that grammar reflects the logic of experience. The obvious ostensible difference is that numbers can be used to calculate, but language can also be used to deduce. Things may not be as straightforward as they seem and there's maybe a huge subject there to inquire into.

Multiplicity and numbers are different, but is multiplicity and number different? We can say the world consists in a multiplicity of things or in a number of things; is there a difference in the two statements? We can talk about specific numbers. I guess.

Attaching to mind independent aspects of the world, does not imply something being beyond us, it implies mind independence. — Manuel

I'm not quite sure what you mean here.

Even the range of deities is enormous, I mean in terms of kind. You have people ridden by gods. You have cultures where assemblages and networks replace out subjects and objects and they are not the same kinds of 'things' — Bylaw

What the god(s) command may be quite different, say requiring sacrifice of some kind, maybe even murder in certain cults or we can metaphorically speak of Westen culture under the guise of the god of money.

Although the commands and rules may be different, the resultant actions and moral intuitions will be shared by all human beings. Any person can understand what it means to be exploited, even if they don't work in a factory setting.

You mention animism which is radically different from both the secular West and the religious West. You have very different ideas about causation. You have cultures where dreams are considered more real than waking life. — Bylaw

I'm not denying there are differences between cultures, and to us as a species, they do look radically different. It's kind of like when we look at a whole range of dogs, we tend to notice they are different in terms of skill, sociability, loyalty and so forth. At the end of the day though, they are dogs - one species.

A theoretically "smarter" - in terms of having more powerful cognitive capacities than we do, would look at people at consider us as we consider other creatures, we are by and large the same, but the differences we see between us, look considerable.

So the fact that some cultures take dreams to be more real than a culture which doesn't focus on dreams isn't as drastic as it looks, in my opinion.

intelligent symbolic creature would think in terms of identity, materiality, multiplicity, diversity, number, form, pattern, similarity, difference and so on — Janus

I don't know. I think that identity makes sense as does similarity and of course, number, but materiality or form are a bit more dubious. I don't see why a thinking being must have these specific terms: some are more plausible than others.

On the other hand nouns, for example, denote entities of various kinds, and I think that grammar reflects the logic of experience. The obvious ostensible difference is that numbers can be used to calculate, but language can also be used to deduce. Things may not be as straightforward as they seem and there's maybe a huge subject there to inquire into. — Janus

I'm not clear on that. You can say that we use nouns to loosely denote what, say, a city or a house is, or who is a teacher or a plumber - but I don't see a necessity. I don't see why, say, a city would have to be a part of the cognitive architecture of another creature. A house? Maybe - at least territory, based on examples we see here on Earth.

We can say the world consists in a multiplicity of things or in a number of things; is there a difference in the two statements? We can talk about specific numbers. I guess. — Janus

Take a look out your window, or next time you're out in a park, with plenty of trees and bushes around. Ask yourself, "how many objects are there here?" It soon becomes evident that we have a problem, we have a multiplicity of objects, but do we know how many?

Is a tree necessarily the root along with the trunk up to the stem and then the leaves? Do we count the leaves as one object or one by one? What about the branches, how many are there? I don't think you'll get a clear cut answer.

I'm not quite sure what you mean here. — Janus

The universe is 13.7 billion years old. Even when we all die, that fact will remain. That's the age of the universe, before we arose (maybe new theories will change this estimate or render it obsolete).

The Sun is 93 million miles away from Earth, the distance remains a fact, irrespective of us.

Now the colour of the sun, us seeing it rising in the East and setting in the West, the warmth we feel form it, and so on, these things will not hold up, absent us.