So that for me is the meaning of metaphysics. The move from the particular to the universal. From the concrete to the abstract. From that which is true of some things to that which is true of all things. — apokrisis

Well, this has happened in mathematics as specifics have given way to greater and greater generalities, an approach that has brought together various ideas under broad umbrellas, and is certainly a popular trend (with virtually every grad student knowledgeable of category theory), but it leaves lower level intricacies inaccessible - particularly in real and complex analysis, the latter being very important in QT.

I wish I knew more about QT so I could assess how beneficial this has become (beyond Hilbert spaces, etc.) :chin:

but it leaves lower level intricacies inaccessible - particularly in real and complex analysis, the latter being very important in QT. — jgill

In what sense inaccessible? Do you mean that generalisation actually ends up cutting its connection to the particular?

That shouldn’t happen if it is being done right. This would be a reason why I say that the systems view - which is based on the living relation between the general and the particular - is the proper logic of metaphysical inquiry.

Vagueness, dichotomies and hierarchies. They are the triad on which metaphysics was originally founded. Anaximander’s Apeiron was already there with that.

But then of course the value of atomism as an opposing metaphysics took over. Maths, logic and science shifted to an ontology of bottom up construction and “othered” the metaphysics of holism with its talk of downward acting formal and final constraints.

Nature became understood to be a machine. An engineered cosmic device.

No wonder the atomistic view of metaphysics felt so broke that it’s adherents felt the need to reject metaphysics in its entirety. Metaphysics of the original holistic kind was made the unspeakable.

A scientist or mathematician would seem to need no training in holistic reasoning. What would be the point if it made them uncomfortable about their mechanistic worldview that paid the bills?

With category theory, you do have that effort to return mathematics to some kind of holistic metaphysical foundation. Hegel and Peirce get dragged in as systems exponents.

But I just don’t find category theory a success. I think it lacks the third essential ingredient of a logic of vagueness.

The same applies to quantum theory - at least in the discomfort folk have with its interpretation. The maths itself is all about the inability to have literally a nothingness. There is always an indeterminate potential. Or in other words, there is an everythingness that is a nothingness and so the deeper thing of a foundational vagueness. An Apeiron.

So every conversation must circle back to this schism in metaphysics. Holism produced its antithesis of Atomism. And instead of that then demonstrating the triadic or systematic integrity of the full holistic model, it became the argument for simply rejecting downwards causation, and building a world as understood in terms of upwards construction - a world of nothing but material and efficient cause.

That is how we ended up as Homo technologicalus - living mechanised lives in a mechanised world … bemoaning the loss of something that was forever hard to put our finger on. Something organic, authentic, “spiritual”, in the way it spoke to the ontological reality of formal and final cause.

Holism is a theory of how top down constraints shape bottom up degrees of freedom as a virtuous - or at least self-creating and self-maintaining - closed cycle of activity. A cybernetic system. A dynamical balancing act.

In sharpening our epistemic models of the bottom-up construction part, that should have led to a sharper view of the top-down constraints. But the new mechanical view simply shoved all that metaphysics out of sight. Global constraints became laws that floated off to some place transcendent like mathematical Platonia or science’s “mind of God”.

Hence the metaphysical conversation stalled. One room got renovated and vastly enlarged. The other became some kind of attic full of forgotten relics. The basement - the grounding notion of vagueness or pure potentiality - was forgotten even to exist and became unvisited.

This sounds pretty pessimistic. But the realm of human discourse is also vast. The systems view does exist in every field. There is always plenty being said if your ears are attuned to it. It isn’t the mainstream, but it quietly flourishes.

In what sense inaccessible? Do you mean that generalisation actually ends up cutting its connection to the particular? That shouldn’t happen if it is being done right — apokrisis

Mathematical Schemes is an example of current levels of abstraction. If I were an algebraist or topologist I would probably see the values therein. This entity aided in solving Fermat's Last Theorem. But its value in real or complex analysis is debatable. Here's an example that, for me, is vague - which you value. For others that vagueness is merely the ectoplasm of math.

You speak often of systems theory, and in math that begins with dz/dt=f(z,t) in the complex plane. Here the levels of vagueness are low, and chaos may grow out of these scenarios. What scheme theory has to say about this is a question for experts in these areas. But it appears schema theory means something else in biology.

Schema Theory and the Dynamical Systems Theory are the predominant behavior theories that address how the nervous system produces a movement.

The Generalized Motor Program Theory (GMP) or Schema Theory and the Dynamical Systems Theory are the predominant behavior theories that address how the nervous system produces a movement. The debate of movement scientist and the contrasts of these theories centers on whether movement is created through hierarchical control in the nervous system (i.e., cortical control) or if movement control is distributed throughout cortical, subcortical, spinal, and even musculoskeletal levels of the nervous system. While compromise between these two theories may be possible, each theory has its respective adamant supporters who will argue for the support of one over the other. In this assignment, you will evaluate these theories to determine which theory you believe is the more plausible explanation.

You speak often of systems theory, and in math that begins with dz/dot=f(z,t) in the complex plane. Here the levels of vagueness are low, and chaos may grow out of these scenarios. — jgill

Chaos can grow if divergence ain’t constrained. The real world problem is the maths may have formal exactness, but measurement is informal and thus inherently vague. Change a decimal place and you are on some different computed trajectory. And in practice, all actual computers introduce round up error at every iterative step - Lorenz’s famous realisation.

So maths is infected by vagueness. But further constraints get tacked on - like the shadowing lemma - to limit its impact..

Your mention of scheme theory was useful. It triggered memory of the connection between Mobius transformations and complex number magic. The Mobius ring seems a great way to visualise complex quantum spin as a trapped internal degree of freedom in fermions. :up:

On GMP vs DST, the fact that motor control theory is hung up on this dialectic - is movement variety to be considered error in top down intentionality or plasticity in bottom up motor plan development - surely goes to my systems metaphysics? The answer is that the hierarchy of control relies on both in interaction. Intention is meant to constrain dynamical instability. But without that instability, there would be nothing to constrain.

You’ve stumbled on to another example of science dividing a field into two warring camps because the thesis and antithesis both seem equally true. And also, a balanced stand off between two camps is what allows many papers to be written. It is a good career move that suits both sides.

I last studied motor control in the 1990s. This kind of split already felt anachronistic then.

What would a philosophy of reading or cooking look like? — apokrisis

You must have noticed that I used "philosophy" within quotation marks. This indicates "philosophy-like" or "pseudo-philosophy" or even "actually, not a philosophy". And this because the word "philosophy" (quotation marks have a different meaning here) is quite abused. You just have to think how often you hear or read "My philosophy of/on/for this and that is ..." referring not to life, but to trivial things in life. And I just gave some examples of such trivial things.
So, you don't have to dig philosophical views out of them. Instead, you can just replace the word "philosophy" in these cases with "view", "system", "method", "attitude", etc. whatever fits the case better.
:smile:

Is metaphysics a method of inquiry aimed at some goal, or is it merely a history of intellectual accidents? — apokrisis

I think I'd say neither.

In relation to Aristotle it's hard to say, in my opinion. Was it as literal as an uncreative and tired copy-editor smugly naming it "After physics, cuz it's after the physics"? Is Aristotle's work actually literary, or given his demonstrated understanding of artistic writing, would it not be better to think of these as lecture notes which are as direct as possible so as not to confuse the poor students? Or does it really mean the summation of all things, as we've come to understand it? And did that really drive Aristotle, or is that more what we have come to see value in Aristotle, being obsessed with metaphysics ourselves? Wasn't it Heidegger that began this obsession with metaphysical foundations?

I'm not entirely sure that's all that's there... but for me, anymore, I have fewer opinions on metaphysics now than I have questions. At the most basic metaphysics is just that philosophy which addresses the question "What exists?" -- but even that says too much, because metaphysics is also considered the most general kind of philosophy at times, so that more than what exists is at stake, but rather, the whole kit-and-caboodle: ethics, ontology, aesthetics. . . a sort of Totality that encompasses everything. (and, indeed, I'd say that metaphysics -- especially post-Aristotle -- is more about justifying ethics than it is about truth, though of course truth is still important to both ethical stances so they argue about what is true too. Mostly taking Nussbaum's reading of late antiquity as read here)

And I think that sort of metaphysics is what I'd say Kant does a good number on: speak away, but I don't think it'll become scientific knowledge. So, at that point, what else could metaphysics be other than ethics?

I'd say that metaphysics -- especially post-Aristotle -- is more about justifying ethics than it is about truth, — Moliere

Metaphysics seeks the structure of being in its most general sense. Ethics seeks the structure of human well-being.

One is cosmic in scope. A totalising inquiry into nature. The other is about dispositions within human social relations.

It is clear enough which is genus and which is species.

But metaphysics certainly changed for many folk after Aristotle laid down his hierarchical systems model of how to account for being in general. It went dualistic and reductionist. It became a broken and confused business - bent out of shape by the conflicting ontologies of Christianity and Newtonian mechanics.

Eh, I should say by post-Aristotle, I'm specifically referring to late antiquity -- so before our modern world. I think modern philosophy is pretty much enraptured in the notion of metaphysics as first philosophy -- Descartes, after all, wrote The World, and he's the traditional starting point for modern philosophy.

I'm specifically referring to late antiquity — Moliere

OK. I thought you were replying to my point that metaphysics speaks to a particular logic of being rather than being some kind of unmoored, pluralistic, history of free speculation.

The phase you are calling “metaphysics as ethics” is just the application of this style of transcending inquiry to the practical job of forging a new technology of self. Ideas about justice, virtue, balance, etc, were the new universals by which society could start to organise itself and so scale a rational view of being.

OK. I thought you were replying to my point that metaphysics speaks to a particular logic of being rather than being some kind of unmoored, pluralistic, history of free speculation — apokrisis

Heh. I'd say that I'm not being that bad :D -- but I'm also not explaining myself well. I am directly answering your question, though, because I thought that'd be the most fruitful way to develop a discussion.

So in response to whether metaphysics is a method of inquiry, or a series of historical accidents, I think neither still fits the bill -- it's so much that it's honestly hard to define, in general. What metaphysics is depends upon the philosopher. And that's why I was focusing on Aristotle (which, in turn, invokes Kant, and that in turn invokes Heidegger, at least in developing these ideas and engaging with them)

On the whole I take the Aristotelian meta-philosophy, as I understand you to be pursuing, to be indicative of modern institutional philosophy: the quest for the ultimate answers about existence is a question for those informed of the sciences, trained by the institutions of knowledge -- themselves politically aligned to the elite of the world, training the future leaders of tomorrow. It very much fits along the lines of the Ivy League model of philosophy. And, internationally, a state college provides opportunities (hence why people travel internationally to attend them).

And I think that such a story could likely be assembled again. While it's hard to see how it fits together when we poke it, I think we get a sense that Aristotle's way of looking at the world did fit together, and so philosophy is just that practice by which we continue to refine the categories, the ways of knowing, the logics, and all the speculative questions while paying the bills by teaching tomorrow's leaders to be smarter than the the average bear.

The phase you are calling “metaphysics as ethics” is just the application of this style of transcending inquiry to the practical job of forging a new technology of self. Ideas about justice, virtue, balance, etc, were the new universals by which society could start to organise itself and so scale a rational view of being. — apokrisis

Is it a phase? Or is it just another way to do philosophy?

The vagueness is anthropic reification of the indeterminacy of ignorance, of indecision. Out of that unbearable situation grows knowledge: the general and the particular and their logics, this and that and their relations, decision: yes or no, and the realization of complex contextualities and possibilities. It is all anthropogenic: as below, so above from one perspective or as above so below from another onto-theological perspective. As Heidegger says "Language is the house of being".

So the question as to whether metaphysics subsumes ethics or ethics subsumes metaphysics is just another example of the interchangeability of those dualist "above and below" perspectives, and the tension of the hierarchical problem of the aspirational "higher" that so bedevils and illuminates human life.

On the whole I take the Aristotelian meta-philosophy, as I understand you to be pursuing, to be indicative of modern institutional philosophy: the quest for the ultimate answers about existence is a question for those informed of the sciences, trained by the institutions of knowledge -- themselves politically aligned to the elite of the world, training the future leaders of tomorrow. It very much fits along the lines of the Ivy League model of philosophy. And, internationally, a state college provides opportunities (hence why people travel internationally to attend them). — Moliere

I’d like to see a list of all the global elite who trained in metaphysics rather than law, accountancy, engineering, etc.

If metaphysics is the tech of the elite as you claim, then the evidence will be easy to find.

So the question as to whether metaphysics subsumes ethics or ethics subsumes metaphysics is just another example of the interchangeability of those "above and below" perspectives, and the tension of the hierarchical problem of the aspirational "higher" that so bedevils and illuminates human life. — Janus

Well either humans are shaped by living within the constraints of nature, of they are becoming gods who switch places to be the global constraints on that the expression of natural potential.

So yes. Semiosis does enable life and mind to switch places. And with maths and technology, humans really get to fantasise about a complete switch. We can dream about simulating reality, uploading minds to a metaverse, creating new Big Bangs in colliders. All kinds of horseshit.

Formal and final cause can be shifted from nature in general to sit in the minds of humans in particular. It can seem that roles are reversed.

But then … the second law of thermodynamics. Pull back the curtain and once more we see who is boss. :smile:

But then … the second law of thermodynamics. Pull back the curtain and once more we see who is boss. :smile: — apokrisis

Without humans the second law of thermodynamics may be said to be non-existent. Rovelli says as much IIRC. But again this comes down to how "existence" is defined. Of course I am not in any way wanting to claim that we are not constrained by nature. :grin:

As you will be aware, there was once two branches of metaphysics: ontology and cosmology. Ontology studied "the nature of being", cosmology, the nature of the physical universe.

The term "cosmology" was absorbed into physics, leaving ontology for philosophers to play with.

The SEP article on Different conceptions of ontology within Logic and Ontology gives a neat potted overview of the sorts of questions with which ontology, is concerned. It's not the sort of speculative physics that remains so popular in this forum.

When a contemporary metaphysician asks what there is, they are more likely to be asking about things like the nature of numbers, or relations, or individuals, than of quarks or energy or information.

All this by way of supporting the notion that metaphysics is not just speculative physics. I suppose this may have been something like 's "To proceed beyond the facts..." quote.

When a contemporary metaphysician asks what there is, they are more likely to be asking about things like the nature of numbers, or relations, or individuals, than of quarks or energy or information. — Banno

Nice go at boundary policing. But ontic structural realism?

Training them how to think, not in metaphysics. Is it really that hard to see how today's leaders went to Ivy League schools a whole lot? I know I say philosophy is useless, but I would contend that it does help people to think, at least.

Maybe you're not pursuing this line of thinking, though. It seemed right to me, but you're acting like it's wrong -- so it must be wrong in some way. But I feel like I'm not being given a fair shake, either.

Aristotle was the metaphysician, and Alexander was the politician. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle makes it pretty clear that abstract pictures of himself as a character and Alexander as a character are the pinnacle of human achievement, and thereby, goodness. (though he sneaks in a quick one to say that the life of the philosopher is actually the best one, which always makes me laugh). Further, the whole idea of the university can be traced back to Plato's academy and Aristotle's Lyceum -- there are definite differences as we live in wholly different economies, have different values, and all that. But that power structure, and the material reason for philosophers, is still there: the institutions of knowledge-production and preservation are given leeway to pursue their studies as a valid economic activity on the basis that they at least teach and train people to think.

So I think you're asking after the wrong evidence -- it's not like Alexander the Great used the four causes to create his empire. But it's not a stretch to think he was tutored in them, too. So it goes for the modern university, though the various principles and foci have changed. (considering we've produced more knowledge since then, I'd hope so!) -- and they'll change again. As they change I'm sure that philosophers will be able to put together a coherent picture of knowledge, at that moment. They've managed to do so many times throughout history, why not again? But it'll be a snapshot of reality at a moment in time -- and sometime down the line it'll seem quaint. And so the project will begin again, to re-assemble another snapshot of reality.


Note how this doesn't even make this kind of speculative physics false. I'm merely noting that there's more to metaphysics than it, that philosophy can be done other ways. Does that seem wrong to you?

Looking back, I've moved from seeing philosophy as serious play towards seeing it as plumbing. They're not mutually exclusive, though. — Banno

I think I'm in that position I get to where I feel like anything I say on the matter looks wrong a moment after saying it -- at least in terms of looking at philosophy. Serious play, plumbing -- yes! and.... :D

For me I think the whole "way of life" rendition of philosophy will always have appeal, even though I recognize that the institutional philosophy isn't really pursuing that. I think my interest in this subject comes from trying to understanding philosophy in these two terms -- because in spite of my relationship to philosophy being different from that, I clearly still benefit from, or at least owe a debt to, institutional philosophy.

I think you are mixing up Greek metaphysics with Roman civics here.

I've been known to make mistakes, and tend to prefer to own them and learn from them. I'm not sure I follow your meaning, though.

Serious play, plumbing -- yes! and.... — Moliere

That ellipsis is the important stuff. It is what can only be shown, and also what cannot be shared at all.

I think you are mixing up Greek metaphysics with Roman civics here. — apokrisis

Boundary policing?

and all, for better or worse, philosophy includes the philosopher improving. That's the part of the nature of philosophy that is lost if philosophy is just speculative physics.

Civics rather than metaphysics looks to be what you describe in lauding an Ivy League education for the US elite.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classical_republicanism

That ellipsis is the important stuff. It is what can only be shown, and also what cannot be shared at all. — Banno

The bug still bites, at times, and I try. Tempted to call the philosophy bug a beetle...

That's not helping my confusion as much as adding to it.

Start over with this question?

Is metaphysics a method of inquiry aimed at some goal, or is it merely a history of intellectual accidents? — apokrisis

Is that the issue at stake? Am I not answering the question in saying it is neither of these things, but something else? Couldn't that be civics?

Couldn't that be civics? — Moliere

So metaphysics is civics? Is that what you want to argue? Be my guest.

No, that sounds like a definition. I was answering what is at stake. Speculative physcis isn't. RIght?

I was answering what is at stake. Speculative physcis isn't. RIght? — Moliere

What? Not even one of the things at stake under the umbrella definition of metaphysics? Is this now your claim?

And what do you mean by speculative physics exactly? Examples?

I'm including speculative physics. I'm saying there's more to metaphysics, not that it's not included.

The examples would be from around here abouts. I've indluged too, and even still do so.

So what’s your point? What’s at stake?

I think emphasis is what's at stake, or at least recognition of emphasis. Rather than philosophy being thought of as only speculation on the nature of reality or the logic of being, it could also be something else.