I could only make out virtual world but I don't really know what he means by it or what he's exactly arguing here. — Darkneos

What the author means by virtual world theory seems pretty clear to me. We are, actually I am, the only thing that exists. All of reality is an illusion, my fantasy. There's another name for that - solipsism. I think the consequences of this view of reality are similar to those for the simulation theory of reality, which is the subject of a discussion currently underway on the forum. Here's the original post of that discussion and a link:

How likely do you think this is? What are the major arguments for and against the idea of a simulation? Would you mind personally if it were? And do you think a simulation must be determined (programmed) or could it allow for free will (a sort of self coding open-simulation) ? — Benj96

It means it’s a sign from the universe to read something more interesting.

I skimmed the paper, so I may have missed important details, but, there is a factual claim here which is mistaken. "Irrealism" has been explored, in significant detail, by Nelson Goodman in his Starmaking, but it is not clear to me he would accept a "virtual world" metaphor.

It's also not clear to me what is gained by saying that the world we experience is "virtual" - what does that even mean? As I see it, a virtual world is almost a world, but not quite, several aspects are missing, think of videogames or VR headsets: that is virtual.

Such views tend to leave the interpretation open, that this virtual world is mistaken or skewed. But if we had no "virtual" world, we wouldn't have any world. In order to be able to see or experience anything, it needs come from a perceiver, unless you would bet that the objects in the world are themselves conscious and can experience each other. Something of which we have no evidence.

"Virtual" thinking is OK, I guess, as a heuristic, but not much more than that. I think the more traditional, Schopenhauerian (and Hume, Locke, Descartes, Kant, etc.) view of the world being a representation is more accurate, it's the way we react to the stimulus of the world, without claiming that it is a simulation. It's simply the way things appear to us.

We may postulate - sensibly in my opinion - something "behind" objects that anchors them, but this "behindness" is no more "real" than what we already experience, it's another aspect of the world, which helps us make sense of experience, as I see it.

Actually waaaaaayyyy at the bottom he makes it clear that this is NOT solipsism and explains the problems associated with going in that direction. Not that I understood it but just pointing it out.

Actually waaaaaayyyy at the bottom he makes it clear that this is NOT solipsism and explains the problems associated with going in that direction. Not that I understood it but just pointing it out. — Darkneos

You're right. I didn't read carefully enough.

I found most of Dawkins arguments quoted as irrelevant.

How is that? I'm just asking because I didn't really follow what was being said.

Like I said I'm not that good at this sort of thinking let alone reading.

‘Irrealism’ has its root in Husserlian phenomenology (something people have a hard time grasping). It is not solipsism.

The point of phenomenology was to set aside concerns about what ‘is’ or ‘is not’ so-called ‘real’ or otherwise. Phenomenology is concerned with the ‘experience of’ rather than the ‘experience of something’.

Husserl was concerned about the grounding of science and the manner in which psychology had been absorbed by the physical sciences.

It sounds so much like it though.

Sounds like Solipsism? Again, there is no direct interest within phenomenology when it comes the concern of what is or is not ‘real’. The interest is in the ‘experience of’ as what is ‘real’ is ‘bracketed’ out of the equation as irrelevant to the pursuit of raw experience.

Solipsism is the view that nothing is real. Phenomenology has no concern for the ‘real’. There are certain features that sound alike but in reality (no pun intended) they are almost diametrically opposed.

Sounds like it does have a concern with real since experience is in the mix.

Are you suggesting that what you experience has nothing to do with what is ‘real’. That does not make much sense.

If you believe noumenon ‘exists’ then you have a misunderstanding of Kant. Noumenon (the ‘thing in itself’) only has negative value. Meaning it is a limitation on what we can know not some physical essence.

Knowledge without limit is not knowledge it is nothing.

Some people really struggle to get their head around this but it is quite simple.

1) We know via experience.
2) What we experience is limited.

But experience of what? Experience only is coherent with a corresponding thing of experience.

The ‘what’ is irrelevant. You can have sensory experiences that are not true to the physical world (ie. Dreams or hallucinations). Whether the experience of an apple is a hallucination, dream or lucid and conscious does not really make the experience anything other than that of an apple.

Consciousness is ‘conscious of …’. Phenomenology is not bothered about whether there is or is not an apple it is only concerned with the experience of said apple.

The ‘of what?’ question you pose was dealt with by Kant. The ‘thing in itself’ is called noumenon. There is no ‘noumenon’ though in any Positive sense only in the Negative as a limiting boundary for knowledge.

I do not have my copy of Critique of Pure Reason to give you the direct quote sadly. Maybe someone else can.

Note: Manuel above gave a simple version here:

We may postulate - sensibly in my opinion - something "behind" objects that anchors them, but this "behindness" is no more "real" than what we already experience, it's another aspect of the world, which helps us make sense of experience, as I see it. — Manuel

If you want to really get into this subject matter more intensely you will pretty much have to read Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason … but that is no easy task and will take the better part of a year at least.

If you want to really get into this subject matter more intensely you will pretty much have to read Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason … but that is no easy task and will take the better part of a year at least. — I like sushi

I read it this year. Took me about 4 months or so. But I had a lot of preparation. I think Lucy Allais' Manifest Reality does an excellent job presenting an up-to-date account of Kant, defending it against misinterpretations.

Still, it is very dense and obscure in many areas. Will have to read again some other time. But he was clearly anticipated, in exactly the same words in some instances and a richer set of ideas (not in theoretical construction though) by the Cambridge Platonists such as Henry More and especially Ralph Cudworth. None are easy, but extremely insightful, in my opinion.

Whether the experience of an apple is a hallucination, dream or lucid and conscious does not really make the experience anything other than that of an apple. — I like sushi

Well no, if it's not real then it's not really an experience of an apple but just what looks like an apple. A dream wouldn't really be much of an experience either, especially since a dream doesn't quite feel like reality and nothing in there truly can affect you. So it's not an experience in the sense that it can impact you in any meaningful way.

Consciousness is ‘conscious of …’. Phenomenology is not bothered about whether there is or is not an apple it is only concerned with the experience of said apple.

The ‘of what?’ question you pose was dealt with by Kant. The ‘thing in itself’ is called noumenon. There is no ‘noumenon’ though in any Positive sense only in the Negative as a limiting boundary for knowledge. — I like sushi

Which again only makes sense if there is a corresponding thing of experience otherwise it's incoherent or leads to solipsism. If you want to argue there is "no thing" behind the experience then you fall into solipsism, that's it. So congrats Kant's logic slides into solipsism.

I think I started a thread in regards to whether Quantum mechanics has any affect on this, maybe that might have some insight.

But what you are describing is essentially solipsism or at the very least goes directly to it.

I am telling you flat out you are wrong. You made the OP asking about irrealism (which stems from phenomenology).

I have read Kant and Husserl so you telling me it is solipsism repeatedly, when I know it is not, makes me believe you do not really have any serious interest in this subject at all. I guess I should have figured this from the OP so my bad.

Bye

Whether the experience of an apple is a hallucination, dream or lucid and conscious does not really make the experience anything other than that of an apple.
— I like sushi

Well no, if it's not real then it's not really an experience of an apple but just what looks like an apple. A dream wouldn't really be much of an experience either, especially since a dream doesn't quite feel like reality and nothing in there truly can affect you. So it's not an experience in the sense that it can impact you in any meaningful way. — Darkneos

We use terms such as ‘really’ and ‘truly’ to make distinctions in a discussion between what we experience and what we accept. Have a go at rephrasing your argument without using these qualifiers. Dismissing what looks like an apple, or even a dream as ‘not an experience’ is an attempt to ignore/isolate/exclude aspects of what is based on how we define ‘reality’.

I have to agree with I like sushi here - it’s not solipsism at all. An experience exists whether or not it’s deemed ‘real’, and absolutely CAN impact in a meaningful way. What looks like an apple is still the experience of an apple, even if it’s an hallucination, or a prediction error. We make mistakes all the time - we jump to conclusions, we react too soon, we dismiss ideas prematurely - all based on a consensus understanding of what is real, tangible, evident, etc.

It's by Jan Westerhoff who subscribes to Irrealism, but as someone who can't really read philosophy without going to sleep I was wondering if folks could tell me what he's saying. I could only make out virtual world but I don't really know what he means by it or what he's exactly arguing here. — Darkneos

From what I’ve read, he seems to be saying that the mind’s functional existence is virtual: we employ an interface of sorts which enables us to interact at a level of understanding beyond what this interface defines as ‘real’.

A basic three-dimensional system is required to recognise a two-dimensional object, such as a square, which is then rendered in linear or one-dimensional form. Recognising three dimensional objects as such requires a four-dimensional system, and this understanding is rendered in two-dimensional form. A still-life painting of a vase is not the vase, no matter how accurate a rendition it may seem.

What Westerhoff seems to be referring to is a five-dimensional system, by which we understand four-dimensional experience, and describe this with reference to three-dimensional ‘reality’. Information is always transferred from one system to another in this way, utilising three different dimensional structures.

This is how it makes sense to me, anyway.

I have to agree with I like sushi here - it’s not solipsism at all. An experience exists whether or not it’s deemed ‘real’, and absolutely CAN impact in a meaningful way. What looks like an apple is still the experience of an apple, even if it’s an hallucination, or a prediction error. We make mistakes all the time - we jump to conclusions, we react too soon, we dismiss ideas prematurely - all based on a consensus understanding of what is real, tangible, evident, etc. — Possibility

Well no. Color doesn't exist even though it is an "experience" in our heads. Phantom limb isn't a real experience and neither are hallucinations either. Which is why the terror from such things can be dismissed. What looks like an apple isn't an experience of an apple, especially if it's wax.

We use terms such as ‘really’ and ‘truly’ to make distinctions in a discussion between what we experience and what we accept. Have a go at rephrasing your argument without using these qualifiers. Dismissing what looks like an apple, or even a dream as ‘not an experience’ is an attempt to ignore/isolate/exclude aspects of what is based on how we define ‘reality’. — Possibility

But it's not a matter of what you accept, these things can be tested. That's how dreams can be known to not be real. Just because it's an experience doesn't make it real and if there is nothing behind the experience creating it then solipsism would have to be true.

You keep trying to get around it but Kant's logic flows there every time.

Well no. Color doesn't exist even though it is an "experience" in our heads. Phantom limb isn't a real experience and neither are hallucinations either. Which is why the terror from such things can be dismissed. What looks like an apple isn't an experience of an apple, especially if it's wax. — Darkneos

.

Colour does exist as a relative value. And ‘phantom limb’ refers to an experience of pain - although any resultant terror can be dismissed as unjustifiable, the pain nevertheless exists. I’m not arguing that an experience is ‘real’, only that it exists. The qualifier of ‘real’ refers to a mode or level of existence that enables one to ignore, isolate or exclude uncertainty and prediction error as meaningful aspects of experience.

These words are not ‘real’ either, and yet they exist. ‘Phantom limb’ refers to an experience we agree is almost or nearly as described, but not completely or according to strict definition. This is the definition of VIRTUAL. It isn’t the limb that exists, but an incomplete experience of pain, almost as if a limb exists. You could use ‘virtual limb’, and it would make more sense in this discussion, but ‘phantom’ certainly lends it a quality of terror.

But it's not a matter of what you accept, these things can be tested. That's how dreams can be known to not be real. Just because it's an experience doesn't make it real and if there is nothing behind the experience creating it then solipsism would have to be true.

You keep trying to get around it but Kant's logic flows there every time. — Darkneos

It IS a matter of what you accept, if you want to have a discussion about what is ‘virtual’. Just because an experience isn’t real, doesn’t preclude its existence. The thing about phenomenology is that the discussion occurs at a different level to what you’re probably used to. Experience is not just what really happens, but is inclusive of variability in perception, reasoning and intentionality - our internal process structures. Kant points out the limitations of pure reason or logic as a means to accurately understand the world based on experience. But it seems most won’t venture beyond his first critique, preferring to limit understanding to only what ‘can be tested’. This leads to a fundamental misunderstanding of what he was trying to do, and of our capacity to more accurately understand the world as consisting of reason (logic), quality/ideal and energy/affect.

I think I started a thread in regards to whether Quantum mechanics has any affect on this, maybe that might have some insight. — Darkneos

Personally, I think quantum mechanics is relevant here, but most would disagree - or at least are dubious about discussing the quantum realm in relation to conscious experience. The language use is very different - like the difference between ‘phantom’ and ‘virtual’ - but we really need to be more charitable about language use at this level, as it, too, is a construct of perception, reasoning and intentionality. Why do you think there are so many different interpretations of what is essentially indisputable?

It is the value or quality of existence that is missing or indeterminate in quantum physics, the logical basis or reason that is missing from hallucinations and other ‘virtual’ experiences, and it is energy or affect that is missing from any explanation or interpretation of either using language. This judgement of ‘solipsism’ seems to be just a way of clambering for certainty where there is none.