Observational sentence?

My question to. Do you mean propositions?

You might be interested in Quine's critique of the analytical/synthetic distinction.

It's unclear if there are analytical truths. Or rather, even if there are, there is no clear way to distinguish then from arbitrary dogmatic beliefs.

Kant would have had it that facts about triangles could be established a priori. That a triangles angles add up to 180 degrees was an analytical truth. Except that non-euclidean geometries were later developed where triangles' angles don't add up to 180 degrees (e.g. in curved space they can be greater or lesser than 180 degrees depending on if the space is curved inward like a saddle or rounded like a ball.)

A=A statements may still work, but it's unclear if these do any analytical work at all.

For further reference: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/#QuiMeaLin

Much more worrisome is a challenge raised by Quine (CLT, §II): even if certain logical truths seemed undeniable, how does claiming them to be analytic differ from claiming them to be simply “obvious”?[8]

Consider…the logical truth “Everything is self-identical”, “(x)(x = x)”. We can say that it depends for its truth on traits of the language (specifically on the usage of “=”), and not on traits of its subject matter; but we can also say, alternatively, that it depends on an obvious trait, viz., self-identity, of its subject matter, viz., everything. The tendency of [my] present reflections is that there is no difference. (CLT, p. 113)

Pressing the point more deeply:

I have been using the vaguely psychological word “obvious” non-technically, assigning it no explanatory value. My suggestion is merely that the linguistic doctrine of elementary logical truth likewise leaves explanation unbegun. I do not suggest that the linguistic doctrine is false and some doctrine of ultimate and inexplicable insight into the obvious trait of reality is true, but only that there is no real difference between these two pseudo-doctrines. (CLT, p. 113)

Hasn't the OP got it ass-backwards? :rofl:

Observations make propositions true/false (through verification).

Yeah....I don’t know what an observational sentence would be, except maybe sentences regarding observations. I hope it’s not that, because that has nothing to do with what Kant split.

That a triangles angles add up to 180 degrees was an analytical truth. — Count Timothy von Icarus

“.....Mathematical judgements are always synthetical....”
(CPR.....referential pagination unavailable, cuz I’m not at home. Sorry)

Except that non-euclidean geometries were later developed where triangles' angles don't add up to 180 degrees — Count Timothy von Icarus

Kant knew of spheres, and knew triangles could be drawn on spheres, and surely would have noticed the difference with respect to planar triangles. Doesn’t matter if he didn’t, and does nothing to negate his proofs, insofar as his exposition respecting triangles stipulates straight lines. In fact, to even arrive at the truth that interior angles on a sphere sum to more than 180 degrees, involves exactly the same synthetic a priori deductive judgements as demonstrated in the text.

It's unclear if there are analytical truths. Or rather, even if there are, there is no clear way to distinguish then from arbitrary dogmatic beliefs. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Doesn’t matter. The only reason for analytic truths in Kant, is to set the stage for the possibility of what isn’t that, but at the same time, uses the LNC for its logical validity. Even if it’s a dogmatic belief, albeit hardly arbitrary I should think, while still susceptible to the LNC, it is a valid dogmatic belief, therefore useful for subsequent hypotheses, particularly in regard to the determination of principles.

As far as Quine is concerned, you were probably directing that to the Josh, I already know it, so I’ll leave it alone.

Deductions, such as: Photosynthesis is what takes place in plants. The content of the proposition is it contains something that is a direct result of observation, hence observational statements. Are they true because the words reference something that has the potential to be observed? (I ask this follow up, because I have been pondering this and developing my understanding of this most of today).

Observation > statement rather than statement > observation? 1. I see the table. 2. The table exists so I see it. Very simple example of the two. I don't know. I am just trying to make sense of this, how sentences relate to observations.

What is the approved process of verification? Can I demonstrate x,y,z? If yes to any than x,y,z are verified to exist. In such an example as, x's are blue, as x has been recorded to emit blue light (I am remind of science lab we were using spectro-analysis). Anything blue would be equilvant to x. x=blue things. So I could say the x is blue upon observing that blue was a quality of x.

I don't know. I have a poor understanding of the scientific method and deductive logic, and pointedly here how they relate to propositions.

I am aware of positive and negative correspondance, in that x=x or x doesn't eqial y. In such a model of truth determining, what is true is what reference corresponds to a thing, and what is false is what doesn't correspond. This "equalness" is some kind of ratio between sentence content/references and things themselves.

Observation > statement rather than statement > observation? 1. I see the table. 2. The table exists so I see it. Very simple example of the two. I don't know. I am just trying to make sense of this, how sentences relate to observations.

What is the approved process of verification? Can I demonstrate x,y,z? If yes to any than x,y,z are verified to exist. In such an example as, x's are blue, as x has been recorded to emit blue light (I am remind of science lab we were using spectro-analysis). Anything blue would be equilvant to x. x=blue things. So I could say the x is blue upon observing that blue was a quality of x.

I don't know. I have a poor understanding of the scientific method and deductive logic, and pointedly here how they relate to propositions. — Josh Alfred

Well, it all begins with, as usual, definitions. The moment I define the words "the", "cat", "is", "on" "mat", it's true that the cat is on the mat when the cat is on the mat.

Ahhh, yes, thanks. Both my guess that’s what you meant, and my assertion observational statements are not what Kant is “splitting” between analytic and synthetic, is validated.

You may have a valid argument in its own right, just not with respect to Kant. Something more modern than Enlightened, more analytic than continental, more conventional than metaphysic.....

What makes an observation true? — Josh Alfred

I take you to mean a 'basic' observation statement (such as a measurement), as opposed to a theory? This is a deep question. My general advice is to read Karl Popper. Here's a sample.

The acceptance of basic statements is compared by Popper to trial by jury: the verdict of the jury will be an agreement in accordance with the prevailing legal code and on the basis of the evidence presented, and is analogous to the acceptance of a basic statement by the research community:

By its decision, the jury accepts, by agreement, a statement about a factual occurrence—a basic statement, as it were. (2002: 92)

The jury’s verdict is conventional in arising out of a procedure governed by clear rules, and is an application of the legal system as a whole as it applies to the case in question. The verdict is accordingly represented as a true statement of fact, but, as miscarriages of justice demonstrate all too clearly,

the statement need not be true merely because the jury has accepted it. This … is acknowledged in the rule allowing a verdict to be quashed or revised. (2002: 92)

This is comparable, he argues, to the case of basic statements: their acceptance-as-true is also by agreement and, as such, it also constitutes an application of a theoretical system, and

it is only this application which makes any further applications of the theoretical system possible. (2002: 93)

However, the agreed acceptance of basic statements, like that of judicial verdicts, remain perennially susceptible to the requirement for further interrogation. Popper terms this “the relativity of basic statements” (2002: 86), which is reflective of the provisional nature of the entire corpus of scientific knowledge itself. Science does not, he maintains, rest upon any foundational bedrock. Rather, the theoretical systems of science are akin to buildings in swampy ground constructed with the support of piles:

The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or “given” base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being. (2002: 94)

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/#BasiStatFalsConv

Roughly speaking, a basic statement is relatively noncontroversial. We can reason 'from' such statements and check that the implications of our theories 'against' them.

This "equalness" is some kind of ratio between sentence content/references and things themselves. — Josh Alfred

The correspondence theory of truth has some serious problems. How are concepts/words 'equal' to or 'representative of' some kind of non-word stuff ? I prefer thinking of the truth as what an ideal observer would say about the situation. That way we are comparing words to words, what was said to what should have been said. This is a tricky issue, so I'm just offering one of the more plausible approaches I'm aware of.

What makes an observation true? — Josh Alfred

"Photosynthesis is what takes place in plants" is true only if photosynthesis is what takes place in plants.

And generally, "P" (note the quote marks) will be true only if P. This is called a T-sentence. T-statements set out the general form of all true sentences. Although T-sentences appear uninformative, they make a few things clear. For example, for "P" to be true nothing further is needed than that P. Including being observed.

In logical form,

"P" is true IFF P

That is, "Photosynthesis is what takes place in plants" will be true regardless of whether or not it is observed to be true.

Now no doubt all this is trite and obvious, but it may help in dissolving all sorts of philosophical conundrums, especially the one were folk think that a statement can only be true if it sits in some relation to a mind; that in order that a statement be true it must be believed, known, or as some folk suppose, observed. Views of this sort are often grouped together under the heading "idealism".

The take away here is that being observed, or not being observed, is generally irrelevant to the truth of an observation.

Now there is another way that the question "What makes an observation true?" might be understood: it might be asking under what circumstances ought we accept that an observation statement is true. This is a very different question to whether the sentence is true or not. It is not asking about the truth of the sentence as such, so much as about a relation between the sentence and ourselves. The exact nature of that relation is subject to some ambiguity, because of differing levels of acceptance, from an acknowledgement of the mere possibility that it is true through to thinking it indubitable.

The salient difference is that we are talking now about the attitude we might adopt to the statement. Should we assert the sentence? Should we believe it? Do we know that it is true?

And again, I apologise for spending so much time explaining that what makes an observation true is a very different question to whether we should assert, believe or claim to know that it is true. But in the Philosophy Forum, such simple things quickly become lost.

Watch.