There are a number of fun paradoxes which seem assertible despite seemingly lacking any possible truth-maker to really make sense of why they would be true or false. For example, "This proposition is true." Nothing really seems wrong with saying it's true, but if it were false, nothing seems like that would be wrong either, and as it only refers to itself, what resources could we really use to decide between the two. Now, maybe the liar's paradox has made you suspicious of such explicitly self-referential statements, but like the liar's paradox, explicit self-reference isn't really necessary you can get the same effect. For instance, consider the following logical construction: Proposition n: "Proposition n+1 is true" for all n such that n is a natural number. None of the propositions in this construction will refer to themselves, but all of them seemingly could be true, or all of them seemingly could be false. Personally, I think the simplest and possibly most virtuous solution to this paradox by my lights is just to say that the truth-value of such paradoxical propositions is a brute fact, as to whether they are actually are true or false, I think this is most likely unknowable. The question I want to ask is: does this suggest brute facts are logically necessary? I kinda hope it might because it could be a helpful resource to really support a metaphysical view of the world where brute facts place a significant role. The problem I suspect is that paradoxes are notorious for leading to all sorts of unintuitive consequences, so we probably should be cautious resting too much upon, however this does seem like a relatively nice paradox, so maybe we could away with it.