My hunch is there is no solid reason for the panpsychism hypothesis. It's pure speculation and to that extent is less likely to attract subscribers but that doesn't mean it's not interesting. I suppose these two aspects of the hypothesis will face each other off with a clear winner - it does get our juices flowing.

My hunch is there is no solid reason for the panpsychism hypothesis. — Agent Smith

What would qualify as a 'solid reason'?

If that isn't an explanation, what is missing? — Daemon

Why any of that happens, at all. It's a description of what happens, and as such is useful, if it can be relied upon to repeat in a lawlike way, as presumably it can.

As I mentioned, nature has had billions of years on billions of stars to hit on something like that. It happens by chance. Because it can. There isn't a "why". I mean, you're asking "why is there life?".

As I mentioned, nature has had billions of years on billions of stars to hit on something like that. It happens by chance. Because it can. There isn't a "why". I mean, you're asking "why is there life?". — Daemon

I probably wasn't clear. I'm not disputing chance-driven evolution. I'm not an intelligent design advocate, not do I advocate for teleology on a macro scale in evolution, although I'm not completely ruling it out either. I'm asking why molecules behave they way they do in the same way we might ask why a person behaves the way they do. And normally, with people, we are looking for a psychological explanation. If we give an explanation in terms of neurons firing and muscle movements, we haven't really got the answer we were looking for with human beings. We've just got a fine-grained description of lawlike behaviour. I'm suggesting the same is the case for molecules. We don't need that information in order to predict behaviour and exploit the chemical world, but that doesn't mean that there is no psychological explanation to be had.

I'm conscious that we are encouraged to apply the Principle of Charity in discussions like this. We should "interpret a speaker's statements in the most rational way possible and, in the case of any argument, consider its best, strongest possible interpretation".

I'm sincerely struggling to interpret your last post in a rational way, or to find any argument for the existence of mind in molecules.

Sometimes, with people, we are looking for a psychological explanation of their behaviour. But often we aren't. Why is that person lying on the ground? Well it's because they tripped over a paving stone. We could state that in terms of physics, talking about momentum and the centre of gravity. Or perhaps there is a different explanation in terms of neurons etc. The person had a stroke and their neurons aren't working properly. Or perhaps there is a psychological reason: the person is seeking to avoid detection.

But when we see them trip over the paving stone, we don't say "it was because the centre of gravity was too far forward, but there must also be a psychological explanation". Yet that, as far as I can see, is the structure of your argument.

I wonder, do you put your ideas into practice in real life? Do you attempt to explain the behaviour of inanimate objects in psychological terms? "Why is that stone rolling down the hill?" "Because it wants to".

I'm sincerely struggling to interpret your last post in a rational way, or to find any argument for the existence of mind in molecules. — Daemon

I can offer you an argument more explicitly than I have done so far.

Consciousness does not admit of degree
All process or functions admit of degree
Therefore consciousness cannot be a process or function.

Every emergentist theory of consciousness I have come across associates consciousness with some kind of gradually emergent process or function. I can't improve on that, I can't think of a plausible emergentist theory that finds some binary event in nature and says 'That's where consciousness emerges'. Even if it did, there would still be the question "OK, but why can't that happen without consciousness? What is it about that that necessitates an experience?"

So, if we reject emergentist theories, we're left with either eliminativism (consciousness doesn't exist, at least in the sense given in this argument) or panpsychism (consciousness was around at the start and is likely in everything in some way, if we can make sense of it). Eliminativism is clearly false, therefore we are left with panpsychism.

But when we see them trip over the paving stone, we don't say "it was because the centre of gravity was too far forward, but there must also be a psychological explanation". — Daemon

I'm happy with mechanical explanations with regard to medium sized objects, where those explanations are useful and give us the information we want, as in your example. We don't need to question the exact nature of gravity for the explanation (or description) to be useful. But if we want to know what gravity is, or the nuclear forces, or magnetism, then we don't have mechanistic explanations for these field-like influences, because they do not have internal parts that mesh with each other, we can't break them down further, as far as I know anyway. We just say, well, these forces describe how matter behaves when in their influence. Some physicists might be realist about these forces, and say that they are more than just descriptions of how stuff behaves, I don't know. Anyway, the panpsychist has a problem. What role does consciousness play in the behaviour of matter at this foundational level, if any? Are we going to be epiphenomenalist about the consciousness of an atom or molecule, but not when it comes to humans and other brainy animals? Where exactly does consciousness start being causal? And when is it just a added extra that doesn't do anything (epiphenomenalism)? My talk of the consciousness of non-brainy things is an attempt to make sense of this. I'm trying to be a responsible panpsychist and actually try to tackle these questions. So the panpsychist has to attach consciousness somewhere, and the best fit seems to be at the fundamental level of field forces, it seems to me. (Tononi and Koch attach it to systems that integrate information, which makes them panpsychist, but that doesn't commit them to will in the same way that I am committed to will.) I'm suggesting, for maximum consistency, that consciousness is causal from humans all the way down to atoms and field forces. That's the simpler theoretical approach to take, and that's what I am exploring. The reason I have to do this is because panpsychism must be true in some way or another, because we know (I suggest) that eliminativism and emergentism is false, and these are the only alternatives. Am I entirely comfortable talking about the will of atoms? No, not really. It's a bit weird, I grant you, but necessary. I have to follow the logic. And it's not actually incoherent, at least to my mind.

So back to the paving slab (good example by the way), I agree with you that we are not looking for a psychological explanation in this case. What I'm trying to do is resolve arguments about the causal closure of the physical. The way I do it here, and the way I inject psychological causes in is not at the macro level, but at the level of fields, perhaps. The mechanistic explanation is still correct enough at the macro level, but it is reducible, I suggest, to psychological explanations at the micro level. We have a reduction of the mechanical to the psychological. By analogy, we could look at the behaviour of whole populations. Individuals do what they do because of how they feel. But on aggregate, we can describe their behaviour in quantitative terms perfectly accurately, without ever mentioning their psychological motivations, and forget that psychology was ever a part of the explanation. Nevertheless, the psychology is there in the background driving the macro-level behaviour on aggregate. With the paving slab example, I'm suggesting that psychology makes a difference at the fundamental level. Without consciousness causing things to happen at the micro-level, nothing would happen at the macro level, I suggest. Indeed the macro-level would not exist at all, if we consider that particles are persistent behaviours of fields.

But the ultimate motivation for panpsychism, as @I like sushi has correctly explained, is that it is the result of a struggle with the question of the place of consciousness in nature, and the conclusion is (rightly or wrongly) that it is everywhere, in some sense. For me, this is by process of elimination - it's the only theory of consciousness that doesn't have fatal objections.

wonder, do you put your ideas into practice in real life? Do you attempt to explain the behaviour of inanimate objects in psychological terms? "Why is that stone rolling down the hill?" "Because it wants to". — Daemon

Not at the macro level, no. There's no need, mechanical explanations (even if they are ultimately incomplete) are often what we want.

For me, this is by process of elimination - it's the only theory of consciousness that doesn't have fatal objections. — bert1

However, essential questions are not answered. What does panpsychism say about the consciousness of plants? What about subsets of consciousness, e.g. do the two hemispheres of the brain each have their own consciousness? Then there would already be three of me, my two brain hemispheres and both together.

We are pattern seeking creatures and we project agency in nature. We get mad with a hammer when it banged our finger, we curse an agent called " luck" in unfortunate situations, we give names and suffer with our bike and car issues, we share feelings for inanimate objects etc.
So the answer is quite simple. What motivates panpsychism is a heuristic called Superstition.
It played a huge role in the survival of our 'young" species and our modern populations carry this trait.

Panpsychism can not provide any answers. Its a superstitious worldview not a Philosophical conclusion based on credible epistemology. Its more like an opinion of "how things appear to me", then "this is what knowledge and reason suggests".
About your question about having two hemispheres and each having their own consciousness, Vilayanur Ramachandran has some amazing studies on split brain patients who had the connections(corpus callosum) between their two hemispheres terminated (as a treatment for epileptic seizures). Long story short it is possible the same individual with disconnected hemispheres to hold two conflicting positions (atheist and theist).

-"What would qualify as a 'solid reason'? "
-An objective verification of mind properties existing independent of biological brains.
Like any other claim or worldview, panpsychism has a burden of proof. Its burden is quite high since it is in direct conflict with the current establish paradigm of Science!
That conflict alone qualifies as solid reason to reject panpsychism until objective evidence can falsify our initial rejection of course(Null Hypothesis).

-"Consciousness does not admit of degree
All process or functions admit of degree
Therefore consciousness cannot be a process or function."
-First of all can you pls explain to me what do you mean by the phrase "Consciousness doesn't admit of degree"?
Then can you tell me how do you know that?

I can offer you an argument more explicitly than I have done so far.

Consciousness does not admit of degree
All process or functions admit of degree
Therefore consciousness cannot be a process or function.

Every emergentist theory of consciousness I have come across associates consciousness with some kind of gradually emergent process or function. I can't improve on that, I can't think of a plausible emergentist theory that finds some binary event in nature and says 'That's where consciousness emerges'. Even if it did, there would still be the question "OK, but why can't that happen without consciousness? What is it about that that necessitates an experience?" — bert1

Thanks Bert1. Lots to think about there. I'm going to read up a bit about Emergentism, and I'll come back to you about your ideas.

As you said, this is a discussion about Panpsychism, but I've introduced my own ideas about "life" as a precondition for consciousness, as an alternative to Panpsych. So I'm wondering:

Does "life" admit of degree?

-"Every emergentist theory of consciousness I have come across associates consciousness with some kind of gradually emergent process or function. I can't improve on that, I can't think of a plausible emergentist theory that finds some binary event in nature and says 'That's where consciousness emerges'. Even if it did, there would still be the question "OK, but why can't that happen without consciousness? What is it about that that necessitates an experience?""
-Are you aware of the Ascending Reticular Activating System (ARAS) and the role of the Central Lateral Thalamus in the introduction of "context" in our conscious states?
Are you aware of the quantification methods of our conscious states described by Anil Seth?
Conscious states, are not the product of an on -off process. They are different degrees of conscious states throughout our day.
In Neuroscience there isn't a debate on the nature of consciousness or the main mechanisms responsible for this brain state. In addition to that Science can not verify mind properties emerging independent of brain. This is something that needs to be demonstrated not assumed.

-"As I mentioned, nature has had billions of years on billions of stars to hit on something like that. It happens by chance. Because it can. There isn't a "why". I mean, you're asking "why is there life?".
-Correct, Assuming teleology in natural processes is a fallacy. Purpose need to be demonstrated, not assumed, plus the properties we find in nature are Necessary and Sufficient to explain the emergence of complex functions and properties.

I can offer you an argument more explicitly than I have done so far.

Consciousness does not admit of degree
All process or functions admit of degree
Therefore consciousness cannot be a process or function.

Every emergentist theory of consciousness I have come across associates consciousness with some kind of gradually emergent process or function. I can't improve on that, I can't think of a plausible emergentist theory that finds some binary event in nature and says 'That's where consciousness emerges'. — bert1

The mechanisms responsible developed in your foetus until at some moment you were able to feel something. We can see that the process of development of the mechanisms is gradual, but it's in the nature of consciousness that to the user it can only appear to be instantaneous.

Researchers trained mice to push a bar to get a reward when they saw a grey line moving across a screen. They identified neurons firing in synchrony with the appearance of the grey line. Then they made the line more faint, until the mouse couldn't see it and didn't press the bar. But the researchers could still see neuronal activity synchronised with the line the mouse no longer saw.

There is degree in the process.

I've very much enjoyed thinking about this.

However, essential questions are not answered. What does panpsychism say about the consciousness of plants? What about subsets of consciousness, e.g. do the two hemispheres of the brain each have their own consciousness? Then there would already be three of me, my two brain hemispheres and both together. — SolarWind

These are very good questions, and difficult for the panpsychist. There is no single answer to any of these questions - panpsychists differ radically. Some might say plants have no unified consciousness as plants, but their constituent particles do. Others (like me) think that any object or entity or whatever, however arbitrarily defined (and so includes plants) is likely a centre of consciousness. However what that object experiences depends on its structure, functions and processes. So the vast majority of conscious things in the universe do not experience anything of any real interest or complexity (by human standards). Perhaps this might be a good place to wheel in the Intergrated Information Theory. While the IIT is not a good theory of consciousness IMO, it fits rather nicely as a possible way to quantify the richness of experience that any given object has. The more information it integrates, the richer its experience. The vast majority of systems integrate very little information. Another way to delineate individuals is to invoke some other functionalist theory. @apokrisis suggests that the ability to model one's environment to make predictions and adapt behaviour accordingly is a hallmark of the conscious. Perhaps that is another way to measure individual identity, and pick out those systems that are conscious in an interesting, perhaps living, way, as opposed to those that are dead but still with the light on, if you see what I mean. Being a mineral sounds depressing to me. Don't really like to think about it. Maybe it's OK if you actually are one.

A consequence of this is that there may be a myriad of selves associated with a single brain, as you point out. It's weird, Jim. But is it false? I don't know.

So in short, I don't know what the relationship between consciousness and identity is. As Searle asked of me when criticising panpsychism, "What are the units supposed to be?" And you raise the same issue. I'm sorry I don't have a very well developed answer for you. It's a central question, perhaps the central question of panpsychism. It's linked to the combination problem - how do experiences sum? Or do they sum at all? The solution to these questions depend perhaps on whether one is a microsphyschist (bottom-up) or macropsychist (top-down). Personally, I lean towards the latter.

So the answer is quite simple. What motivates panpsychism is a heuristic called Superstition — Nickolasgaspar

That's not true of modern educated panpsychist philosophers, physicists and neuroscientists.

An objective verification of mind properties existing independent of biological brains — Nickolasgaspar

Asking for objective verification of subjectivity may be asking for a square circle, an ore of nonexistium, a bucket of pure being.

Like any other claim or worldview, panpsychism has a burden of proof. Its burden is quite high since it is in direct conflict with the current establish paradigm of Science! — Nickolasgaspar

It does have a burden of proof. But so does every other theory of consciousness. We look at them all and pick the least problematic. I reckon it's panpsychism.

I don't see that it is in direct conflict with any established scientific knowledge. Can you give an example?

First of all can you pls explain to me what do you mean by the phrase "Consciousness doesn't admit of degree"? — Nickolasgaspar

I'll try. I mean there are no intermediate states between x not being conscious at all, and x being conscious. As soon as x has the faintest vaguest shimmer of experience, then x is having an experience, and that meets the definition of consciousness. It doesn't matter how far we turn the volume down on this experience, it's still experience. It has to click off completely to be non-conscious.

Contrast this with other properties, such as being bald, or being a heap (classic often discussed examples). With these we can think of intermediate states which are neither bald or not-bald. Even when we try to arbitrarily sharpen up these concepts, we find that the sharpenings can always be sharpened yet further, until we get down to single jerky quantum changes in an atom.

I know this about the concept of consciousness is by examination of the concept, how we use it in language, and by having conversation like this about it, and reflecting on the concept of vagueness.

That's not true of modern educated panpsychist philosophers, physicists and neuroscientists. — bert1

-Educations plays no role in superstitious beliefs. We know from neuroscience that decision in our brain are taken and they we reason them to our selves.
We can make a patients hand to jerk by using electrodes in his brain and he will provide a reason why "He did" what he did.
This is how Heuristics work.

Does "life" admit of degree? — Daemon

Very good question. If you take modern biological definitions, then it would very much appear so, yes. But if you mean by 'life' (as some do) a centre of experience, then I think the answer is 'no'.

Educations plays no role in superstitious beliefs. We know from neuroscience that decision in our brain are taken and they we reason them to our selves. — Nickolasgaspar

Sure, but I don't think that proves anything about panpsychism. Could you spell it out?

We can make a patients hand to jerk by using electrodes in his brain and he will provide a reason why "He did" what he did. — Nickolasgaspar

Sure, brains cause behaviour. What does that imply about panpsychism?

-

Asking for objective verification of subjectivity may be asking for a square circle, an ore of nonexistium, a bucket of pure being. — bert1

-No no no.....I didn't ask anything about that abstract concept/ quality of subjectivity . I was clear. The claim is that mental properties can emerge non contingent to a biological brain. I didn't demand to demonstrate the subjective content of them. I only want you to point to a phenomenon where Reasoning, Intention,purpose, conscious realization, symbolic thinking, intelligence, pattern recognition, problem solving etc are properties that can be displayed by a brainless agent.
Can you point to a headless organism that can practice the above mental qualities?

No no no.....I didn't ask anything about that abstract concept/ quality of subjectivity . I was clear. The claim is that mental properties can emerge non contingent to a biological brain. I didn't demand to demonstrate the subjective content of them. I only want you to point to a phenomenon where Reasoning, Intention,purpose, conscious realization, symbolic thinking, intelligence, pattern recognition, problem solving etc are properties that can be displayed by a brainless agent.
Can you point to a headless organism that can practice the above mental qualities? — Nickolasgaspar

Thank you for the clarification. We were talking at cross-purposes. Indeed, most of these I suppose only occur in brainy animals, perhaps some of them exist in some computer systems, maybe some of them exist in a rudimentary form in unicellular organisms, I don't know for certain. But I take your point. I do not assert that all of these mental capacities, functions, abilities, occur in everything. I only assert that subjectivity does, and that is all I mean by 'consciousness'.

Regarding the other functions you mention, I am interested if you think these could happen without any subjectivity. Could a complex entity, a cybernetic brain or something, could do all these things, but without actually experiencing anything?

We can see that the process of development of the mechanisms is gradual, but it's in the nature of consciousness that to the user it can only appear to be instantaneous. — Daemon

I agree! When people disagree with me they usually say that consciousness does admit of degree. It's interesting and gratifying that you share my intuition that it doesn't. We're not the only ones by the way. Goff, Antony, and even one or two emergentists agree with us I think, last time I looked.

-:It does have a burden of proof. But so does every other theory of consciousness. We look at them all and pick the least problematic. I reckon it's panpsychism.

I don't see that it is in direct conflict with any established scientific knowledge. Can you give an example?
-No no, all theories of consciousness need to be a narrative of FACTS and a description of observable mechanisms. Panpsychism only makes unflasifiable declarations. It doesn't describe how conscious states arise and how they gain their mental content.It just states consciousness exists....everywhere.
That is not a theory of consciousness...that is a theory of anything.
Consciousness is used like Phlogiston or Miasma or Orgone energy to explain phenomena by making up magical substances.

-"I don't see that it is in direct conflict with any established scientific knowledge. Can you give an example? "
-Its in direct conflict with the establish Scientific Paradigm. Advanced properties are the product of structures with complex structures. This is what we observe in Nature. Claiming something different just makes it supernatural.
IT's also in conflict with the null hypothesis. The rejection of correlations between A(existence) and b(ghost of consciousness) until significant observations falsify that rejection should be your default position.
Karl Popper's Demarcation principle. The problem is not that it is wrong, its not Even wrong! It can not be falsified, verified or tested. IT can not be used to produce accurate predictions or to use its principles in technical applications.
This is what All scientific theories provide to us....so panpsychism is not a theory.not even close.
I wish it was in conflict with objective observations.....that would render it falsifiable.
Now ..its just theology in a really vague suit.

I'll try. I mean there are no intermediate states between x not being conscious at all, and x being conscious. — bert1

-wait......is this a serious argument? like there isn't an intermediate state being dead and not dead?being eating and not eating. Those are true dichotomies sir!!! What would an intermeditate state would be like for you? Conscious, semiconscious, non conscious?
Are you denying degrees of consciousness?

So you have never being asleep? light sleep, heavy sleep, sleep with dreams,sleep with environmental stimuli intruding in your dream,nightmare, sleepwalking, drunk, intoxicated,under anesthesia, brain injury(I hope not) concision, head ache, tooth ache, memory issues,Defuse thinking, focus thinking,preoccupied, terribly tired etc et.all those states that affect and even limit the quality of our ability to be conscious of our thoughts,mental abilities and environment.

I see my examples take care the rest of your arguments about baldness etc.
btw baldness is not a label we use to describe a condition not a biological property of matter.