You're missing the point. It is still good to benefit me. It's merely that superficial benefits that entail a high cost for you are not necessary, since that benefit isn't required for me to live a valuable life.

I could still deserve happiness, but this doesn't mean that I need it or you have to give it to me. Again, deserving things is about our innocence.

Again, preventing harms might be more important for those who already exist because most people do not require external interference for being adequately happy as long as they aren't harmed. This doesn't mean that one does not have a reason to benefit others, but this reason can be affected by our own personal limitations and the fact that the good isn't that pertinent for a sufficiently valuable life. But this doesn't apply to those who don't exist.

It's not asymmetrical, since both the joys and the harms do matter. It's only the case that there isn't a need to constantly try to benefit others when they do have fairly decent lives since they would probably not lose much happiness from the lack of intervention as long as there isn't severe harm. However, this framework would not apply when there is no fulfilled state of affairs in the first place.

Again, we do deserve happiness (because that has more to do with moral and immoral actions) just as much as we don't deserve suffering. But this doesn't mean that one would always need that happiness or there wouldn't be other factors to consider (such as the harm you could incur in trying to benefit me).

If it can be good to prevent harm, I do think that it can be bad to not create valuable lives. However, this has to be seen in the larger context of practical limitations and the impact of any universalisation of any idea.

You're missing the point. It is still good to benefit me. — DA671

I explicitly said that it would be good!! To receive a non-deserved benefit is 'good'. Not bad. Good.

To receive an undeserved benefit is 'bad'.

To receive a non-deserved benefit is 'good'.

But some goods generate positive reason to perform the acts that will create them, whereas others do not.

And the point is that non-deserved goods do not generate positive reason to perform the acts that will create them.

So, I have a positive obligation not to hit you. I have no positive obligation to give you $1,000.

Now, on your view, according to which there is no asymmetry and we have as much obligation to benefit as not to harm, I have as much obligation to benefit you as to not harm you. And on your view, I have an obligation to procreate. I could create happy children - so I ought to. That's what your view says. I ought not to create miserable children. But if I know that any child I have will be happy, I have a positive obligation to create that child. Yet by hypothesis I do not. I mean, that's precisely the kind of case that Benatar is appealing to and that I am saying his asymmetry does nothing to explain. So it is not up for grabs - it is a fixed point in this debate that we do not have a positive obligation to create happy children, but we do have a positive obligation 'not' to create miserable ones. The question is how best to explain this, not 'whether' it is true.

That view is not supported by our intuitions. That is, it is not self-evident. It's just a view. But a view that cannot call on support from self-evident truths of reason is just that: a view. We have no reason to think it is true and it explains nothing at all.

I was using good in terms of something being moral and something which we have a reason to do. And no, the good isn't "non-deserving", since ethical people do deserve happiness, in my view. I also have my doubts about the existence of "non-deserving" things, since I believe that saying one doesn't deserve something means they do deserve something better. Otherwise, there isn't much point in talking about what people deserve in the first place. And if suffering is undeserved sans any actual moral deed by a person, then the happiness is deserved.

Receiving an undeserved benefit could still be good for a person (in the sense that it would give them joy), but it obviously won't be moral, so I agree with that.

I think that all goods do give us reason to help others, but the point is that those reasons don't have the same power and can be countered by other reasons, such as the issues the creation of that relatively minor good could cause for you. Since most people don't need constant interference for joy other than a lack of harm, it wouldn't make sense to make others try to benefit people at a higher cost for themselves, since this is likely to lead to more harm than good. However, nonexistent beings are not in any preferable/undesirable state of affairs, which is why we have to view that situation differently.

If you could give my $1000 dollars at a nonexistent cost to yourself (no loss for you, no concerns about trust) and if making this an obligation wouldn't cause more harm for others, I believe that one would indeed have a duty of beneficence. However, as things stand, it simply doesn't make sense to try to cause a small benefit that isn't indispensable for a sufficiently valuable life but could cause more harm for the person trying to give the benefit. However, since nonexistent beings are not in a preferable state, the potential joys matter as much as the potential suffering.

I have said multiple times that just because we have a reason to help someone, it doesn't mean that we have to do it. As I have said before, existing people don't require a flurry of benefits for them to be adequately happy as long as they aren't harmed, which is why it can certainly make sense to focus more on reducing harms for existing beings instead of trying to bring about benefits that would eventually cause more harm for you or society as a whole. However, nonexistent beings are not in a fulfilled situation, which is why we don't have a reason to treat the harms and benefits in an asymmetrical manner.

Just because we believe something, it doesn't mean it's true. If this were the case, then I suppose one could summarily dismiss antinatalism on the basis that most people do believe that having children is good and so is the preservation of the positive aspects of life. As for the "obligation to procreate", I believe that we do have a reason to create positive lives just as we have reasons to not do so. This doesn't mean that it's always possible, and it could be the case that implementing such a view could lead to more harm than good, which would be counterproductive. The idea that no positive lives should be created is as much of a "repugnant conclusion" for many as is the idea that we do need to create too many people (which isn't necessarily required). Intuitions are bound to differ. Still, it's great to see people like you who do want to alleviate suffering and care about others. I hope more people could become compassionate like you.

Since my view does not entail that we must keep benefitting others at great cost to oneself, it is indeed self-evident. On the other hand, a position that suggests that it's acceptable to prevent all deeply meaningful experiences for the sake of averting harms is neither intuitive nor self-evident. We definitely don't have good reasons for accepting such as position ;)

I have explained why prior non-existence has nothing to do with it. One of the flaws in Benatar's argument is precisely that it makes it all hinge on it - which is absurd. Note too that the miserable child that the couple could create does not exist yet - yet they are obliged not to create it.

Your view is that there is no self-evident asymmetry between what an innocent person deserves, other things being equal. So, your view - for which you have provided not a scintilla of evidence - is that an innocent person is as deserving of benefit from others as they are deserving not to be harmed by others. That is, if act a creates a benefit for another person, and act b creates a harm for another person, I have as much reason to do a as not to do b. That is highly counter-intuitive. That view has the upshot that, other things being equal, I have an obligation to bring into existence a happy person if I know that by procreating I can do so. I have as much obligation to do that as I do not to create a miserable person if I know that by procreating I will do so. That's absurd - that's the very result we're trying 'not' to generate. You're just happily generating it.

Don't - don't - point to other considerations, such as how much sacrifice I would have to make to do one rather than the other. There is an 'other things being equal' clause in there! Stop ignoring those. THey mean something. It means that all those other things - such as the amount of cost it will incur for me or not - are being held 'equal'. So, if the costs to the actor are the same, we have positive reason not to visit harm on others, but no positive reason to provide positive benefit to others. The latter would be 'supererogatory' not 'obligatory'.

Anyway, again: the issue here is how best to explain the asymmetry between our intuitions about these cases. Intuitively, I have no positive obligation to create a happy life, but I do have an obligation not to create a miserable one. Other. Things. Being. Equal. That's in the bank. That's not up for dispute. What's up for dispute is how best to account for it - Benatar's way or another way? You have proffered a view - supported by no intuitions - that implies there is no asymmetry in our obligations in respect of the miserable and happy lives. Thus, your view is false. We need to account for the asymmetry, not deny it.

I have explained why I think Benatar's way of 'explaining' the asymmetry is not a good way (see OP). I have then offered an alternative way of explaining the asymmetry that appeals to apparently self-evident truths and so is intuitive in a way that his way is not.

If other things are equal - don't ignore that clause - an innocent person who has done nothing and had nothing done to them (so again, don't change that and decide they're good or they're bad or whatever) does not positively 'deserve' benefit. They are non-deserving of it. By contrast they are positively deserving of not being harmed. That's an intuitive asymmetry. And it explains why - other things being equal - we have no obligation to create happy lives, yet we do have an obligation not to create miserable ones. And it does so in a way that does not generate the problems I have identified with Benatar's account.

I have said multiple times that just because we have a reason to help someone, it doesn't mean that we have to do it. — DA671

If other things are equal, then it does. Other things are equal in these thought experiments.

Just because we believe something, it doesn't mean it's true. — DA671

Why are you saying that? Where have I said otherwise? I am appealing to rational intuitions - taht is, representations of our reason. That, as I have said before, is what all of philosophy appeals to.

If this were the case, then I suppose one could summarily dismiss antinatalism on the basis that most people do believe that having children is good and so is the preservation of the positive aspects of life. — DA671

That's why a case for antinatalism needs to be made. I accept that most people have the rational intuition that antinatalism is false. And that, I think, is the best - and I think only - apparent evidence that it is false. But it is not cast iron, for the rational intuition that procreation is morally ok is hardly powerfully self-evident in the way that, say, 1+ 1 = 2 is. And furthermore, there is good reason to think it is false, given that it would be selected for by evolutionary forces.

You have described the argument, as did I, but not addressed my criticisms of it. — Bartricks

Your 1^st point: No explanation for Benatar's asymmetry. Suffering has more weightage than joy; people want to get rid of pain more than they want to acquire joy. Put simply the priority, first objective, is to end pain (at all costs); only after that can we discuss pleasure.

This makes sense, oui? How can we think of happiness when we're suffering? First, clear our debts (end suffering) and then and then only are profits (gain happiness) possible.

Your 2^nd point: I mentioned suicide as evidence. People don't mind/even prefer nonexistence to pain and this basically proves Benatar's asymmetry: absence of pain is good even when there's no one to experience it + the absence of pleasure is bad only when there's someone who exists and experiences that absence.

Your 3^rd point: Preexistence nullifies the asymmetery. I'm afraid that isn't correct. Benatar's asymmetry applies to all existence involving suffering and the ability to opt out (suicide).

I am more interested in the truth than what seems to be absurd, and I don't think that talking about absurdity is relevant when someone believes that death brings us to a terrible state of affairs and that life shouldn't exist.

As I said before, just because we have a reason to create positive lives doesn't mean we do not have other considerations which do matter when making the decision. The fact that people would have to sacrifice a lot (for now) and aren't comfortable with the idea of constantly creating new lives certainly plays an important role, and so does the fact that such as society is unlikely to benefit for long.

You've also not provided an iota of evidence that we "deserve" to not be harmed but we don't deserve to benefit. Once again, deserving something has nothing to do with whether or not one needs something to happen, especially when there are other elements to consider. You have continued to ignore this point. We are trying to generate a reasonable position that is comprehensive and nuanced enough to account for the diversity of the sentient experience and our epistemic limitations. Your framework miserably fails to do that, I am afraid.

If there is no significant harm, then I do believe that we should increase happiness for others. Perhaps a way of doing that would not be to live in a world where everybody is obliged to help others and instead focus on not harming others (which usually proves to be sufficient for a valuable life). Once again, this hypothetical world where (all else is equal) is not the one we live in, so it doesn't make sense to refer to it and try to claim that my view is absurd. It's a lot more strange to suggest that preventing all potential happiness for the sake of averting harms is acceptable.

My view does account for this so-called asymmetry by mentioning the fact that this intuition is based upon our lived experiences, wherein there usually is a cost involved in doing too much to make others happy. If one is willing to posit a hypothetical which is divorced from our current reality, they should also understand that the nature of our intuitions could vary in such a situation. Personally, my intuitions do not tell me that it's necessary for me to not create a bad life but it isn't problematic to not do so if all else is truly equal. We need to account for our intuitions in a reasonable manner lest we fall prey to delusions.

Well, I completely disagree with you. You have merely asserted that suffering is undeserving but happiness is non-deserving without truly explaining why. Again, one could deserve something without needing it (if they are already content) or one being required to act (if there is too little good for too much harm involved). Deserving something has to do with whether a good should be given to someone, not with one needing that good or the creation of that good being necessary at a particular point of time. If you say that the suffering that is created is "undeserving", you're presupposing that it's something bad that's happening to innocent people who deserved to not suffer. But if that's the case, then I don't see how one could logically deny the fact that innocent people do deserve to be happy (which is what one is indirectly saying when we claim that they don't deserve to suffer). Your intuition is not shared by most people and it cannot serve as a basis for the alleged asymmetry.

If they truly are, then it certainly would be. But this hypothetical world is clearly so disconnected from our reality that many people are probably not going to even understand how different our intuitions would be in such a situation. The truth, however, transcends personal biases.

Simply resupposing that an intuition is rational is not rational. As I said in the other thread, not all intuitions are equally plausible. Believing that thunder is a punishment from the heavens might have seemed intuitive once upon a time, but later discoveries have shifted our understanding and consequently our intuitions. And as far as the rationality of intuitions is concerned, we should try to pay more heed to the universally shared intuition that the preservation of life and joy can be quite good.

You have not provided any justification for your claim that happiness is "non-deserving" other than resorting to alleged "intuitions" regarding the necessity to prevent harm but not increase happiness. However, you do not grasp the fact that deserving something does not entail that one needs a thing. Most people do intuitively believe that innocent sentient beings deserve to be happy and do not deserve to suffer. But a person could deserve good health even though one does not have an obligation to donate their organs to them if they do not have a need for them in the first place. The point is that connecting what we deserve (which is about our status as a moral sentient being) with an obligation to give something (which involves an actual need for something) is a line of spurious reasoning. I have already addressed the supposed asymmetry regarding our intuitions to avoid causing negatives but not creating positives. Firstly, it would be pertinent to mention that not all intuitions are correct, which is presumably what you would have to acknowledge if you want to defend a position that goes against the intuitions of most people (that reproduction is good). Secondly, this intuition can be explained by the fact that people who already exist do not need constant external interference for the sake of living a pretty decent life as long as serious harm is avoided. But this principle of giving precedence to the avoidance of harms as far as existing beings are concerned does not apply to nonexistent beings, since they are not in a satisfied state of affairs that would be maintained merely by the prevention of harms. Furthermore, actively doing good for others all the time can involve great personal cost and perhaps even a wider degree of harm for others. In light of this, it is quite natural that people would want to focus on mitigating harms. Yet this does not diminish the fact that the positives of life do matter for people and the fear of losing them (in the case of trying to create too much joy) and the joy of having them (in the case of not requiring interminable active effort from others) is what seems to play a major role in forming this so-called "asymmetry" that we possess no reason to apply to procreation. The arguments for universal antinatalism remain unjustified.

It's interesting how people can so flawlessly point out the alleged problems with other worldviews but fail to apply the same level of rudimentary critical thinking when it comes to their own belief. Antinatalism remains indefensible, but the arguments that you use to suggest that we should not trust our intuitions regarding the goodness of life (which are self-evident to many people, even if it isn't for you or some others) could also be used against your other claims regarding the inherent badness of death (after all, we do have a strong survival instinct which could help in the propagation of the species, which would be "desirable" in a metaphorical sense for evolution) or the creation of happiness not being necessary, neither of which are anywhere close to being as self-evident as 1+1 = 2. Something being "selected for" doesn't have to make it true or false, but it's certainly good to investigate our intuitions in a thorough manner to ensure that we don't hold flawed views regarding a nonexistent hellish void that we are condemned to post existence ;)

Sometimes we wish to close the door in front of us not only because the room in front of us looks bad, but also because leaving the majestic hall one is in would hardly be desirable ;)

I think that happiness does matter a lot, but for all practical purposes, I believe that we should indeed focus on removing extreme harms before chasing minor pleasures.

It's certainly not a good idea to allow for too many existing resources to be wasted away and fall prey to debt. Fortunately, I don't think that the losses have to outweigh the profits. Hopefully, we can continue to mitigate the former. Stopping thoughtless procreation would definitely go a long way in helping this endeavour.

Suicide is about as much evidence as the love people feel for life is evidence for the claim that the absence of happiness is bad even if nobody needs it (since many people want to keep living for as long as possible) but the absence of pain isn't (since many people don't seem to care about the fact that potential harm would also be averted, which might be the reason why many people want to preserve life even in instances of severe harm). In reality, I don't think that suicide gives us any evidence to believe that the absence of pain is bad but the lack of joy isn't. That same person could still think intuitively that the absence of joy would indeed be bad, but since they don't have it in the first place and the bads outweigh the good in their life, so ending one's life doesn't matter. I hope that fewer and fewer people would have to make this choice in a state of total misery. The right to a dignified exit could be useful as far as this is concerned.

I think that @Batricks is right in saying that a possible pre-existence could change the nature of procreation significantly. If it were the case that there were souls floating around in the void who were being tortured horribly and who were desperate to exist in order to find relief, procreation could become a lot more important. However, since there's no evidence that pre-existence is some sort of heaven/hell, I don't think we need to give too much thought to this possibility. In the end, I believe that the prevention of harms should not come at the cost of the prevention of all joy. We've discussed this before so I won't keep repeating myself. Hope you have a great day!

Sometimes we wish to close the door in front of us not only because the room in front of us looks bad, but also because leaving the majestic hall one is in would hardly be desirable ;) — DA671

Indeed! However, there's little doubt that in the case of life on earth, it's the former (taking into account the givens).

focus on removing extreme harms before chasing minor pleasures. — DA671

:ok:

Stopping thoughtless procreation would definitely go a long way in helping this endeavour. — DA671

:ok:

Suicide is about as much evidence as the love people feel for life is evidence for the claim that the absence of happiness is bad even if nobody needs it (since many people want to keep living for as long as possible) but the absence of pain isn't (since many people don't seem to care about the fact that potential harm would also be averted, which might be the reason why many people want to preserve life even in instances of severe harm). — DA671

The self-preservation instinct is strong, yes, but doesn't help the case for natalism. After all, to not want to die is (a kind of) suffering. This particular strain of suffering could be avoided simply by not being born: no life, no fear of death; no fear of death; no suffering.

Too, the drive to continue to live is not because people are happy, but because people don't want to experience dying (many accounts indicate that it's painful). Back to square one which is the pressing/urgent matter that life and suffering can't seem to be told apart.

I do not think so. I think it is more likely that we have not turned on all the lights. The place could turn bad, sure, but it is not always the case.

It is a desire that exists despite suffering due to the existence of things we may not always pay attention to (but which matter a lot for us), and while it could cause a form of suffering, I do not believe it is a form of suffering in and of itself. It does help the case for natalism because it gives us a reason to think that there is some good that is left that is worth continuing on for numerous people (even if cessation would be painless). The suffering could be avoided (although it is debatable whether that avoidance is exactly "good"), but the prevention of all cherished moments of life would certainly not be desirable. No life-no love for life; no love for life-no joy. I will not be myopic enough to claim that reducing the harms significantly must not be our priority, but I simply think that doing so should not come at the cost of all good.

Anyhow, I hope that you have an awesome day/night!

I do not think so. I think it is more likely that we have not turned on all the lights. The place could turn bad, sure, but it is not always the case. — DA671

:ok:

Antinatalism is not to be taken lightly or glossed over. At the very least it indicates that all is not well with our world. If one is part of a group and a few members want to leave, it should prompt a serious and thorough evaluation of the circumstances of the group, oui?

I'm not advocating for mass antinatalism as such because I can't ignore the fact that there's joy in life and the world. However there's also suffering, to some an inordinate amount of it which is the proverbial fly in the ointment of happy folks. It's a double whammy of sorts: the suffering are suffering, the happiness is tainted (guilty pleasure)

I completely concur. Part of the problem is the inability of most people to realise that shallow consumerism and unbridled selfishness can never lead to a good outcome in the long run. Toxic positivity is a facade that cannot hide the problems we need to address.

And neither will I ignore the fact that there is immense suffering in the world that has to be alleviated through monumental effort. What does give me hope is the existence of people who, in spite of having seen innumerable tragedies, still continue to see the light of meaning in seemingly insignificant things, such as the company of a loved one. There is humungous power there, and there are also people who gain happiness by helping others (a win-win of sorts) along with individuals like you who are deeply compassionate and often bring attention to that which needs to be done. We must not forget that there can be joy even amidst suffering, and as far as "guilty pleasures" are concerned, I believe that true joy comes through contentment, love, and beauty-none of which, if seen in a balanced way, can solicit guilt as long as one is also trying to help those around them and make the world a better place. Greater goods are a necessity, so that is a separate matter. I hope things will work out for the best.

Why? Do my criticisms of it fail - in what way? — Bartricks

I think the asymmetry is this:

Scenario A. Person exists: Presence of benefit = good, Presence of harm = bad
Scenario B. Person does not exist: Absence of harm = good. Absence of benefit = not bad

By not procreating we can prevent suffering without depriving anyone of good. So there is net benefit.

"The asymmetry cannot be properly explained and it is a special case of a more general asymmetry." Yes, quite possibly. But if he can establish that the asymmetry also exists in the special case then that is enough for the argument to work. The asymmetry does not depend upon an assumption of whether a child will have an over-all happy or miserable life. Any suffering at all - and there will be some - and the asymmetry holds so far.

"Absence of harm is good but it is always good for someone, in the same way as benefit." I think your second problem hits hardest. Benatar would have to show that we have a duty to prevent harm and no duty to promote good.

“While we have a duty to avoid bringing into existence people who would lead miserable lives, we have no duty to bring into existence those who would lead happy lives” — Benatar

He might have this wrong but I'd be prepared to grant it for the sake of argument.

"We might pre-exist and suffer harm from not being brought into existence." True, we might, but it's a big assumption and we have no way of telling whether it's true or false or how happy or unhappy pre-existent persons may be. So it should not figure in our calculus of happiness.

you're not focussing on what this thread is about - which is the credibility of the asymmetry, not the credibility of antinatalism — Bartricks

I gave a reason why the asymmetry, despite being valid in consideration of people as consumers of pain and pleasure, fails when we add their role as producers. The pain of a childless couple can be mitigated in one way only.

My second argument was attacking the asymmetry indirectly. If asymmetry is sound, then nihilism follows. We already reject nihilism. So we can reject the asymmetry without even knowing in detail what might be wrong with it.

You can accuse me of lots of things but being off topic?? Ooh, that hurts.... :broken:

The asymmetry does not really make sense to me. There is nobody suffering from a deprivation of joy and nobody gaining fulfilment from the prevention of harm. Again, if one is not being deprived of happiness if they do not exist, they are also not being saved and brought to a blissful safe zone that would be better than nonexistence either. The evaluations are clearly comparative, and in that sense, if it can be good to prevent harms that no actual person in the void has a need to prevent (and would consequently benefit from their prevention), then it is also problematic to not create joys, irrespective of whether or not someone exists to ask for them themselves. This is just what I think. Anyhow, I hope that you have a brilliant day!

I think whether you accept the axiological asymmetry depends on whether you judge the morality of an action by its consequences.

If you judge non-existence by its consequences, it is neutral - no good or bad experienced. If not, your intuition could tell you that the absence of harm is a good, but the absence of benefit is not bad.

"Neutral" state of affairs might be better than bad ones (such as harm), but they are also worse than good ones (such as happiness). In light of this, I do think that if it can be good to prevent harms, it can also be bad to prevent potential joys. And as far as actions are concerned (in some sort of deontological sense), that would probably have more to do with not intentionally creating harm which harms someone's interests. However, since nonexistent beings don't have an interest in the void, I do think that it can be justifiable to create a person under that framework as long as one cares for them and creates them with the right intentions (them having a good life as opposed to being mere working hands). Even if I judge the morality of an action by something other than the consequences, I probably still won't believe in the asymmetry, because my intuition and inquiry into this matter don't tell me that the absence of harm is good even though it doesn't provide an actual benefit but the lack of joys isn't. The reasons for creating a person might change from happiness (or utility) to the general good of an individual or society, but I don't think that I would be convinced by the arguments for universal AN even if I held that framework. Have a nice day!

"Neutral" state of affairs might be better than bad ones (such as harm), but they are also worse than good ones (such as happiness). In light of this, I do think that if it can be good to prevent harms, it can also be bad to prevent potential joys. — DA671

This makes sense to me. If we use "good" to mean better than the alternative, and "bad" to mean worse than the alternative, the axiological asymmetry must fail.

Indeed.

I think the asymmetry is this:

Scenario A. Person exists: Presence of benefit = good, Presence of harm = bad
Scenario B. Person does not exist: Absence of harm = good. Absence of benefit = not bad

By not procreating we can prevent suffering without depriving anyone of good. So there is net benefit. — Cuthbert

I am not disputing what it is. I am arguing that it lacks justification.

"The asymmetry cannot be properly explained and it is a special case of a more general asymmetry." — Cuthbert

That's not a quote from me!! Where did I say that? If you put quote marks around something you're saying it is a quote - but you wrote that sentence, not me!

But if he can establish that the asymmetry also exists in the special case then that is enough for the argument to work. — Cuthbert

No, he is positing his asymmetry as a 'best explanation' of our intuitions about particular cases - the happy life and miserable life cases. So, it is not in dispute that we have a positive obligation not to create the miserable life, other things being equal, and that we have no positive obligation to create the happy life, other things being equal. What he's saying is that the 'best' explanation of those intuitions is the asymmetry he appeals to.

But that asymmetry is 'not' the best explanation. Why? Because a) it isn't an explanation at all, as all he's doing is saying "let's suppose it is an instance of a more general asymmetry" - how's that an explanation of the asymmetry? It is, as I said, like me asking "how is this watch working?" and being told "well, it is just an instance of a working watch".
And b) because Benatar's asymmetry makes it central whether we pre-exist or not - yet whether procreation is moral or immoral should, intuitively, be unaffected by such matters.
And c) because we can explain the asymmetry by appeal to self-evident truths of reason about desert.. The explanation of why we have no positive obligation to create the happy life is that the happiness in question is non-deserved and thus we have no positive reason to perform an action that generates it. By contrast, we have positive obligation not to create the miserable life because the misery is undeserved and we have positive reason not to perform acts that create undeserved harm.

"We might pre-exist and suffer harm from not being brought into existence." — Cuthbert

Where did I say that? If you quote someone, you have to use their actual words (obviously!).

True, we might, but it's a big assumption and we have no way of telling whether it's true or false or how happy or unhappy pre-existent persons may be. So it should not figure in our calculus of happiness. — Cuthbert

That's the point! So, whether we pre-exist or not should have no bearing on the morality of procreation. It would if we knew what pre-existence-here life was like, but we don't. So, given we don't, it should make no difference to the morality of procreation. Benatar's asymmetry makes it matter though. Thus, Benatar's asymmetry is unreal. That's one of my arguments.

1. If Benatar's asymmetry is real, then it makes crucial difference to the morality of procreation whether we exist prior to coming into existence here or not, other things being equal
2. If other things are equal, it makes no difference to the morality of procreation whether we exist prior to coming into existence here.
3. Therefore, Benatar's asymmetry is unreal

I gave a reason why the asymmetry, despite being valid in consideration of people as consumers of pain and pleasure, fails when we add their role as producers. The pain of a childless couple can be mitigated in one way only. — Cuthbert

Irrelevant. That's not a criticism of the asymmetry.

My second argument was attacking the asymmetry indirectly. If asymmetry is sound, then nihilism follows. We already reject nihilism. So we can reject the asymmetry without even knowing in detail what might be wrong with it. — Cuthbert

First, you're misusing words. 'True' or 'real', not 'sound' (soundness is a property of arguments).

And 'nihilism' is the view that there are no norms of reason - that is, that we have no reason to do or believe anything and thus no moral reason to do or believe anything.

An antinatalist thinks we ought not to procreate. Thus an antinatalist thinks it is more important, morally speaking, not to procreate than it is to maintain the species. So all you're doing is saying that the asymmetry must be false becasue it implies the truth of antinatalism.

Your 1st point: No explanation for Benatar's asymmetry. — Agent Smith

I am saying that Benatar's asymmetry is no explanation of the asymmetry between the happy life and miserable life cases, for Benatar's asymmetry has no self-evidence to it.

Suffering has more weightage than joy; people want to get rid of pain more than they want to acquire joy. Put simply the priority, first objective, is to end pain (at all costs); only after that can we discuss pleasure. — Agent Smith

That's not Benatar's asymmetry. Benatar says that absent harm is good even when there is no one for whom it is good, whereas absent benefit is not bad unless there is someone for whom it is a deprivation.

He's not saying 'eradicating pain is more important than promoting pleasure'.

I am saying something similar to that (though not quite that). I am saying that it is intuitively obvious that we have reason not to create undeserved harm, but no positive reason to create non-deserved benefit. And, when someone is innocent and has not yet had anything happen to them, then any harm visited upon them will be undeserved, whereas any benefit that befalls them will be non-deserved. I take these things to be self-evident and thus explanatory. And these self-evident truths 'explain' why we have no positive obligation to create happy lives, yet we do have positive obligation not to create miserable lives.

So, Benatar does not 'explain' the asymmetry between our intuitions about creating happy lives versus creating miserable ones. All he does is posit an asymmetry! That's no explanation at all. By contrast, I have 'explained' the asymmetry, because I have shown how our intuitions reflect some more self-evident truths. To use my watch example, the question is 'why does this watch work?'. Benatar's answer is 'it is a working watch'. My answer is 'look - if we take the back off we can see how the hands' movement is a function of the movement of these cogs'.

I mentioned suicide as evidence. People don't mind/even prefer nonexistence to pain and this basically proves Benatar's asymmetry: absence of pain is good even when there's no one to experience it + the absence of pleasure is bad only when there's someone who exists and experiences that absence. — Agent Smith

Benatar's asymmetry does not imply that suicide is rational. Indeed, he himself emphasizes this. If it did, that would be a highly counter-intuitive implication.

Because the antinatalist conclusion is itself counter-intuitive, it is important that the case for antinatalism should not have other counter-intuitive implications. A case for antinatalism that implied suicide was rational under most circumstances would be a weak case. I am an antinatalist, but I would argue that suicide is irrational under most circumstances and that nothing in my case for antinatalism implies otherwise.

Your 3rd point: Preexistence nullifies the asymmetery. I'm afraid that isn't correct. Benatar's asymmetry applies to all existence involving suffering and the ability to opt out (suicide). — Agent Smith

No, that's simply incorrect. Benatar's whole point is that non-existence is better than existence! (Unless you already exist, that is) That's precisely why he thinks that procreation is wrong. So, if procreation does not create us but simply transfers us from elsewhere - as well it might - then Benatar's case would be beside the point: it would not apply to our situation. Now, I would say that's implausible.

I am saying that Benatar's asymmetry is no explanation of the asymmetry between the happy life and miserable life cases, for Benatar's asymmetry has no self-evidence to it. — Bartricks

I don't think Benatar is/has to explaining/explain the asymmetry. He's only making an observation that people don't mind nonexistence if it means liberation from pain and that the deprivation of joy only matters if there exists someone who is so deprived (Benatar's asymmetry).

That said, good point! Why is there this asymmetry in the first place?

My hunch is that suicide holds the answer, can explain the asymmetry (vide farmers neck-deep in debt commit suicide in India). A debt is, in a sense, settled once the person in debt ceases to exist. What about the profits this now dead person would've made had he lived? No matter since, again, he no longer exists.

Preexistence doesn't affect Benatar's asymmetry. The same argument applies to all instances of existence.

If you put quote marks around something you're saying it is a quote — Bartricks

Sorry - the quote marks meant it was a summary of the point I was addressing. The lack of your name afterwards meant that they were not your words. If it was an innacurate summary, then I must try harder.

Irrelevant. That's not a criticism of the asymmetry. — Bartricks

In my defence, it's a reductio. If the asymmetry entails antinatalism and antinatalism entails nihilism, and not-nihilism, then not-asymmetry. The 'nihilism' I mean is the view that the world would be a better place if the human race did not exist. The 'soundess' I referred to is the argument that the asymmetry entails antinatalism.

...we can explain the asymmetry by appeal to self-evident truths of reason about desert.. The explanation of why we have no positive obligation to create the happy life is that the happiness in question is non-deserved and thus we have no positive reason to perform an action that generates it. By contrast, we have positive obligation not to create the miserable life because the misery is undeserved and we have positive reason not to perform acts that create undeserved harm. — Bartricks

That is interesting particularly because Benatar makes the same (I think) point:

“While we have a duty to avoid bringing into existence people who would lead miserable lives, we have no duty to bring into existence those who would lead happy lives” — Benatar

He makes the point to support his view and justify the asymmetry that underpins it. You make the point to attack the asymmetry. It seems to be quite tricky.

We may or may not "mind" many things, but that does not necessarily make them intrinsically bad/good (vide supra my earlier comments regarding the purported inherent badness of the state of being dead).

People do mind cessation if it leads to (what we perceive to be) an eternal loss of a valuable life. Also, if a deprivation only matters for one who exists to be deprived, then a prevention/liberation from harm also only matters for one who actually benefits from it, not the void. Benatar's pseudo-asymmetry does not seem logical to me.

A basic understanding can lead to erroneous conclusions ;)

And my hunch is that the widespread rejection of suicide (or dying as a whole, even though it remains an inevitability) points to the fact that the asymmetry is fundamentally flawed (though I have many other reasons as well, such as the fact that absence of the positives being significant if the lack of the harms matters). Vide the farmers in India spending hundreds of days to protest against oppressive laws even in the face of a lack of resources. There are some gains that can be subtle to spot and which are ineffably stronger than material wealth. If a debt is "settled" once a person ceases to exist, the profit of joy is also lost when it happens. And yet if the profits do not matter since the person does not exist, then neither does the absence of debts since their absence would not give them a positive balance and the opportunity to gain something truly valuable.

If pre-existence is a worse state of affairs than existence, it wouldn't make sense to not bring relief to people.

I hope more people can find real fulfillment in their lives and avoid deserts of misery and irrationality. May you and everybody else here have a wonderful day!

I don't think Benatar is/has to explaining/explain the asymmetry. — Agent Smith

He is - his justification for the asymmetry he is positing is that it is the best explanation of our asymmetrical intuitions about the happy life and miserable life case (and some other similar cases) (see p. 31 of Better Never to Have Been).

It is no explanation of why my watch works to say "it is an instance of a working watch". And it is no explanation of the asymmetry in our moral intuitions about the happy life and miserable life cases to say "this is an instance of an asymmetry between benefit and harm". Yet that is precisely what Benatar is doing.

An explanation has to show how that which we want explained - the explanandum - is an implication of something self-evidently true. Otherwise we have not really gotten anywhere.

That's what my explanation does. It is self-evident that undeserved harm is harm we have positive moral reason not to create. And it is self-evident that non-deserved benefit is benefit we have no positive moral reason to create. I have moral reason not to hurt you, other things being equal. But I do not have moral reason to benefit you - it would be generous, kind, nice, supererogatory of me to benefit you, but the mere fact that I can benefit you, does not generate positive moral reason for me to do so, other things being equal. And even if someone disputes this and insists that we have 'some' moral reason to benefit others if we can, it is clear that we have much, much, stronger moral reason 'not' to create undeserved harm. If, for instance, I can only benefit you by doing some undeserved harm, then it is more important that I not create the undeserved harm than that I promote the non-deserved benefit.

Futhermore, it is also self-evident that someone who has done nothing and has had nothing done to them, would be suffering undeserved harm if they suffered any harm. And if they received benefit, the benefit would be non-deserved.

That explains why we have positive obligation not to bring into existence the suffering life, but no positive obligation to create the happy life. That's a real explanation. Benatar's is a pseudo explanation. He posits an asymmetry that has no self-evidence to it - that really is like saying "the watch is working because watches work" or some such.

Preexistence doesn't affect Benatar's asymmetry. The same argument applies to all instances of existence. — Agent Smith

I do not follow you. If we pre-exist, then procreative acts do not create us. Benatar reaches his antinatalist conclusion from the asymmetry he posits because in assessing the morality of procreation we should compare existence with non-existence. But if we pre-exist then we would have to assess it by comparing how much benefit and harm it would be reasonable to suppose the pre-existence life to contain versus life here. Suppose that the reasonable supposition is that pre-existence lives contain none of either, we would not get to the antinatalist conclusion if lives here contain more benefit than harm - for then it would be better to exist here than not.

So it makes a world of difference if we pre-exist or not (implausibly). It shouldn't, of course - it is immoral to procreate regardless of whether we pre-exist or not, other things being equal.

That is interesting particularly because Benatar makes the same (I think) point:

“While we have a duty to avoid bringing into existence people who would lead miserable lives, we have no duty to bring into existence those who would lead happy lives”
— Benatar — Cuthbert

I know! As I said in the OP, Benatar seeks to justify his asymmetry as the best explanation of our intuitions about the happy life and miserable life cases.

I then argued that he fails. For his asymmetry is no explanation of the asymmetry - as his asymmetry (unlike the one it is supposed to explain) has no independent intuitive appeal and so explains nothing. And it gets worse: Benatar's asymmetry has positively counter-intutive implications, such as making the ethics of procreation turn crucially on whether we pre-exist or not. Finally, we can explain the asymmetry between the happy life and miserable life by appeal to some self-evident truths.

Not all things that appear to be self-evident (which, by the way, does not include the idea that reproduction is always wrong) are true ;)

It's self-evident that:
A. Innocent sentient beings deserve happiness and deserve to not suffer.

B. To deserve something is not the same as one having an obligation to help an individual. This is not self-evident at all, and neither does this have any reasonable basis.

What appears to be self-evident is the fact that people (who deserve happiness) do not have to be incessantly helped if that isn't required for them to have a sufficiently valuable life, particularly if that support includes great personal cost to oneself. All things are not equal as of now, so it's obvious that our intuitions would differ. But it's certainly "self-evident" to the majority of people that life can be worth it. As I have explained before, nonexistent beings are not in any preferable state of affairs, so this intuition that harms have greater significance becomes irrelevant. And, once again, if suffering is "undeserved", then the joys are definitely deserved. Generally, what we don't deserve leads us to what we do. Those who don't deserve slavery deserve freedom. Considering that happiness is the opposite of joys, it's obvious that innocent sentient beings who don't deserve to suffer deserve to be happy. The term "non-deserving" is a strange and arbitrary one which isn't applicable to reality. The allegedly asymmetrical nature of our intuitions regarding harms/benefits can be explained by conditions relevant to existence (greater harm, interference being unnecessary) that don't completely apply to nonexistence, so the asymmetry, and consequently universal antinatalism, remain flawed.