I explained those points in detail. You seem to want to reduce my answers to binary 100% yes, 100% no answers. That isn't the case in any complex phenomenon.

As to hiding the war, Putin has to do that to avoid backlash from the public. Currently, many are convinced still that there is no war, no major combat operations: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/06/world/europe/ukraine-russia-families.html

No autocrat is fully immune to public opinion, even one that whose authority is legally absolute. This is apparent in the collapse of the Tsardom.

A choice. But not the only choice. Defend to get a better peace treaty is a possibility also. — ssu

I included that...

Lose more of their young men, armed forces, women and children — Isaac

...or did you think they could defend some more without any more loss of life?

Yes, countries when attacking other countries are weaker and while defending themselves are stronger. — ssu

That's not what's in dispute. This part of the argument started because you claimed Russia had no strategic interests as they were too big to have to ever be concerned about attack. I took issue with the scale of the difference you were claiming, not the mere existence of it, not to mention the more substantive issues (which you're dodging) that if Russia have no such interests, then neither do America.

Myers's The New Tsar is a good biography too.

I explained those points in detail. You seem to want to reduce my answers to binary 100% yes, 100% no answers. That isn't the case in any complex phenomenon. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ukraine has to either say yes or no the the deal. It's a binary question.

Your claim that it is "100% correct" that the only way forward for Ukraine is continued bloodshed. That isn't sounding complex at all.

So which is it. Is Russia such a threat that Ukraine must hold out for NATO membership, even at the cost of it's men women and children, or is Russia so weak that Ukraine has a fighting chance of defeating it. It can't be both, no matter how complex because those are two halves of a binary choice, they must continue the war or not.

The average Russian is poorer than the average Indian. Wow.

You're assuming there is a deal offered. Lavrov and the Russian state just spent months telling bald faced lie after bald faced lie to journalists, diplomats, military attaches, etc., and now they say "here are our generous terms, all they'd have to do is say yes!" and you buy it 100%?

Ukraine denied such terms have be offered. It's propaganda.

They've released no plan. No map demarcating which Ukranian land they are taking, nothing about combat cessation, etc.

If the terms require unlilateral disarment by the Ukrainians to cease hostiles, then it's not a real offer. Obviously, they can't trust that Russia will follow through on its commitments, and so any terms that force them to cede military advantage are ridiculous.

I said the situation in Ukraine is dire, not that they have no chance of winning. The conflict appears to be losing intensity on some fronts, with stalled Russian advances. However, if the Russians keep throwing low effectiveness units into frontal assaults then Ukraine could win.

Sure, Russia can mobilize additional forces long term, but not instantly. If you take mid-high end estimates of Russian losses, 8,000-13,000 KIA, likely 2-3 times that wounded, now over 1,000 vehicle losses, and project that out (i.e., assume they continue to use the same garbage tactics) for another 2-3 weeks, you're looking at the invasion force having lost more than half its combat personnel. If that were to occur, depending on Ukraine's own losses and the strength of its mechanized divisions, I think you could see major counter attacks finally emerging, instead of the defense in depth strategy.

Optimistic, but not impossible.

At that point Putin would have to totally double down, implement a war economy, implement mass conscription, etc. or employ nuclear weapons. I don't see him politically surviving that (hell, I don't see him physically surviving ordering a nuclear strike over this, he'd probably "have an accident and hit his head.")

There's a lot of conversations I haven't had time to continue today, unfortunately.

However, since the Western media insists extremely strongly on the narrative that Ukraine is somehow winning, going to win, can hold indefinitely, I'd like to present here the alternative point of view of the military situation as such.

Of course, deception is a large part of warfare, so the Ukrainians could be planning some brilliant move to rout the enemy that launches at any time. Likewise, stories of Russian moral collapse could be totally true or then riots start breaking out all over Russia at any moment. There's definitely risks on Russia's side and predictions of obviously possible things always have a chance to come true. However, what we can be certain of is that all the retired generals and retired intelligence directors that hammer this impending Ukraine victory home, base that on absolutely nothing. The real experts acknowledge they don't know the situation on the ground for Russia or Ukraine.

So, that being said, the reasons to assume Ukraine is not going to bust out some brilliant move is that conscripts generally speaking, and especially conscripts that trained sometime in the distant past, are terrible at offensive maneuvers. Conscripts are effective at manning trenches and firing artillery mainly, and doing the logistics, cooking, repairing, medical evacs and nurse work etc.

Furthermore, even manning trenches and doing defensive maneuvers and planning logistics etc. requires professional soldiers and officers to keep things from falling apart. Of course, in a long war conscripts who survive can become professional soldiers through learning by doing, but we're literally 2 weeks into this thing. Keep in mind a big part of being an infantry soldier or even just doing logistics is just carrying stuff around and it takes time to build that strength.

Therefore, how a conscript army is supposed to work is that it's mobilized before there's an invasion and then all those conscripts basically go and dig trenches and sit in those trenches with a bunch of ammo (that even old out-of-shape conscripts can do with enough time). Once a conscript is in a trench, it feels safer to stay in said trench, and shooting randomly into the darkness seems like something to keep one occupied, and everyone else is doing it so seems reasonable to also shoot in the general consensus direction.

Which, as an aside, to me, explains the Russian invasion plan. Russia was in a catch 22 that if they made a better plan, Ukraine is likely to be tipped off and mobilize, so the plan would be better ... but Ukraine maybe way better prepared. And, pretty likely there's Russian soldiers just texting with friends in Ukraine who are asking "if they'll invade" and so on (and if all such chats suddenly went silent for weeks... maybe suspicious too; so you'd actually want your troops to be like "same ol' same ol' and that nothing seems to be going on"), which requires your own troops to be genuinely clueless there's an invasion (even officers would spook their troops by acting differently, if that was possible to keep a secret anyways outside the very top; hence "the plan" was likely Putin and 2 other people, then everything is launched in a week kind of thing). Of course, there's downsides to the total surprise, but there's also upsides. And in Russia, if troops get demoralized: off to Siberia!

The other reason it's difficult for Ukraine to launch some surprise offensive is that it's logistics and armor is far worse than the Russians. Russians also have anti-tank rockets and so on, but armor would still be good to have. The reason armor is so important--tanks, personnel carriers, and armored artillery, is that infantry are extremely easy to kill with explosions just walking around; and, even getting hit with a anti-tank missile doesn't necessarily kill everyone, they can still get out. So, to just get your infantry to the battle without being slaughtered by artillery it's useful to have armor. It may also seem "easy" to pick off a tank that's just sitting there (and maybe a decoy), but with artillery explosions and smoke and bombs and machine gun fire, and total chaos everywhere in an offensive maneuver, a tank is not some sort of liability for your own side.

So, if the above points are true, then it's essentially impossible to take back any significant positions from Russia (i.e. land that Russia is able to dig in and setup artillery and supporting logistics and organize it's defense). There has been push back in the East ... but those can easily be tactical retreat to then slaughter the advancing infantry with artillery.

Hence, if Russia can't easily lose any (important) land once taken, and can gradually take the land it wants by just enough artillery, rocket artillery and bombs to just obliterate whatever is there, then Russia plan seems obvious to me to keep as much of the Ukrainian army in the East as possible (just keep them occupied), and then complete the encirclement of everything East of the Kiev. Seems that position West of Kiev is built up and no going anywhere and, according to maps today anyways, seems to be extending salients now South of Kiev. It's just a matter of time until the North and South join up. Again, the "convoy" seems to me a giant parking lot of vehicles that are unneeded on the front (which is seems obviously well defended and also the air space), to make space for new vehicles in the rear bases (i.e. the vehicles that were intended for an uncontested entry into Kiev ... that Russia may as well have tried, but no longer needed in the current configuration; also, better to have a vehicle tens of kilometres closer if it is needed, than back in Belarus).

Having a line North South to the West of the Dnieper river not only encircles Ukraine but also means Russia can easily secure the River itself as more or less unassailable, so if Ukraine simply never surrenders and keeps harassing the Russian front indefinitely, Russia could always withdraw to the East side of the river and there's little Ukraine could do about that.

As I mentioned previously, if there's a lot of Russian speakers East of the river, then it's in Russia's interest to have the most intense fighting to the West (the exception being Mariupol, which seems to me anyways, a clear collective punishment for Azov brigade that's based there). Hence, Russia wants to tie-up as many Ukrainian troops in the East as possible, but not rampage through Russian speaking areas. So there's both a political and military purpose to advancing West of the river (a lot of commentators before the war were predicting a likely scenario of Russia taking East of the river; and the current strategy seems to be about that, but by creating first a line West of Kiev which also puts obvious pressure to surrendering). On the Eastern front Russia doesn't really have much risk in having inexperienced troops, as there's nothing strategic for Ukrainian forces to advance too. The only forces of strategic concern are the North and South salients West of the river, and it seems these forces are the most professional and well organized (in particular the Southern from coming from Crimea needs to take a lot of ground and key cities on the river if it's going to link up with the North-Western front (which is where defense and counter attacks will be focused to prevent encircling of Kiev which has obvious political consequences), and South-West army seems pretty effective at taking territory, so is presumably the professional offensive maneuver and urban combat battalions with the most experienced commanders--an additional reason for having the experts in the south is the Nuclear reactors on the way).

Now, I'm not saying this was the plan from the start, but seems to me the plan now (and definitely I'm not the only one to point it out, but the Western media seems to keep saying Russia is bogged down due to lack of advance in the East ... and then just casually mentions at the end that ok, south is doing better--maybe the strategy).

In terms of game changing weapons, it seems extremely likely to me that Migs from Poland would just get shot down and not do much (certainly can have a chance of doing some damage before being shot down; but the idea the skies would be safer for Ukrainian pilots than for Russian seems "untenable" to use the word that seems to currently describe that). The reason for the focus on the planes is likely for the simple reason that Ukraine does have the pilots and personnel to put some planes up in the sky.

The real game changing weapons would be a lot of armor. There's a reason that Nato assumed that the Soviet Union could just roll through Europe: a shit ton more armor than Nato had. Turns out that the US wildly overestimated the Soviet capabilities (because they hired a Nazi to run intelligence on the Soviets who realized grossly inflating Soviet capabilities would get him more resources and reason to hire his friends), but the basic principle that only a bunch of armor is actually effective against a bunch of armor at the end of the day is pretty accurate (planes and other things can help, but any large scale offensive or counter offensive maneuver needs a bunch of armor--which is why the conscript mobilization playbook also calls for an insane amount of anti-armor mines everywhere).

Problem with donating these kinds of heavy weapons becomes people need to be trained to use them. So, failing that, Ukraine is basically an infantry force, which can sit in trenches (that will eventually get destroyed by heavy artillery and armor assault) and any maneuvers basically gets everyone killed. Hence, the staying in cities which is basically a system of trenches both above and below the ground.

Obviously, Russia's plan is to simply siege cities and not venture in for the above reason unless strategically necessary.

Of course, things can change overnight and with US intelligence help maybe it's possible to do some surprise super move.

However, if it doesn't happen and Russia simply links up it's forces North South and if that doesn't cause a negotiated peace, it would be a sort of "now what" phase of the war.

Last note, another reason for Russia "going light" at the start of the war is that certainly they can now tell their soldiers that the only people that remain "want to" be there, everyone has had a chance to flee etc.

In terms of the wider military significance, if Russia completes a North-South line West of the river that becomes well dug in and basically immune to any infantry attack and can just sit there indefinitely, it's clearly "won" militarily, even if the war isn't over. For the kind of international relations Russia has, winning through overwhelming force is the advertising they want.

Again, abandoning Afghanistan (which then fell in a few weeks without NATO doing anything) and then cutting Ukraine in half (without NATO being able to stop it) and Russia successfully helping Syria, keeping clients in power in Belarus and Kazakhstan (with quick in and out operation, nothing messy), all sends an important military message: US says their your friend ... think twice if that's true, what's been happening to America's "friends" ... whereas Russia says your their friend, Russia sticks by their friends. CIA threatens to take you out, talk to Assad, he's still there.

For the kind of core international relations Russia has, winning this war (even in a brutal way) is a perfectly good message. If the Kremlins offer is never accepted then the Kremlin can say "they were reasonable, all they wanted was a couple of things" for the rest of history and no one can say otherwise.

So, this would be the alternative situation in Ukraine. Again, it's possible riots are erupting in Russia even now due to sanctions or that multiple fronts are being routed as we speak, but what I describe above is also one possibility.

A short version is that Russia is employing World War II pincer maneuvers all over the place, followed by World War I style trench warfare on the fronts it wants to defend. No doubt they have taken losses, but if they are serious that this is existential for them (granted, in the naked imperialistic sense, not my own anarchist philosophical sense), then accepting losses is a logical extension of that.

Was it possible to do better? The problem with this question is that Ukraine's been financed and helped by US arms and intelligence, so the very cautious approach at the start of the war may have been wariness of any CIA surprise ... like, I don't know, biological research labs, or like, whatever man.

So you're saying that because the Russians are liars, Ukraine (who obviously never told a lie in their lives, and probably are being considered for beatification as we speak) can't negotiate. You're basically saying that the only situation in which two sides can negotiate peace is one in which there's no propaganda. Do you realise what a hawkish position that is? You're basically advocating full on war for every dispute until one side is utterly wasted.

"We will multiply them by zero."

Sure, that's exactly what I was saying... :roll:

Now, I'm not saying this was the plan from the start, but seems to me the plan now (and definitely I'm not the only one to point it out, but the Western media seems to keep saying Russia is bogged down due to lack of advance in the East ... and then just casually mentions at the end that ok, south is doing better--maybe the strategy).

The push south from the Kharkiv axis and North from the Kherson axis, to "cut off the eastern half," as you say, did appear to be the plan until a few days ago.


It appears to have been abandoned, likely due to the perceived inability to secure such long lines of communications.

The 42nd around Kherson is now striking west from Kherson, by passing Mykolaiv, which was assaulted by a small number of forces a few days ago, most likely recon. They appear headed to a crossing in the Southern Bug.

The obvious destination would be Odessa. Satalite images show a large Russian naval force and landing forces arranged for what would almost certainly be an attempt to take Odessa. They haven't been moving though, which is likely because they're waiting on the 42nd to get round the other side of the Southern Bug so it can support.

Then the northern forces projected to go south have instead turned west toward Sumy. Forces have also been withdrawn from Kharkiv back to Russia, probably to support this and because a success counter offensive split the 1st Tank Army, at least temporarily, up to the border.

"Punitive" attacks have not been limited to areas where Azov is operating. Similar attacks were made on Kharkiv, they've just fallen off due to a counter offensive drinking forces west of the city across the border, and other forces being withdrawn (likely for a push on Sumy to Kiev).

The southern forces probably do have better morale. Fewer losses, they did take a city successfully. However, it looks like the most effective units were thrown at Kiev, and to a lesser extent Kharkiv. That's were most of the VDV and Spetsnaz have been.

The difficulty of counter attacks will depend largely on how well Russia is preparing for them.

The push south from the Kharkiv axis and North from the Kherson axis, to "cut off the eastern half," as you say, did appear to be the plan until a few days ago. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I honestly don't feel there's accurate enough information to make these sorts of conclusions on the order of days. If a position is held for a week, then it's probably well defended, but the back and forth during days isn't really revealing of overall strategy and force strength, and there also seems to be intense map propaganda at the moment of minimizing as much as possible Russian areas (could be true, but who knows ... and, I think all that really mattes strategically is the positions West of Kiev in the North and South and they seem pretty solid: no one has broken through to torch the convoy for instance).

However, we really don't know much about the state of the Russian forces and how their generals see things.

We have a huge amount of intelligence self-produced by Ukrainians, such as what just posted, but this will have an extreme survivor and positive spin bias.

And this video basically demonstrates well my explanation above that infantry are terrible at offensive maneuvers against an enemy line. Imagine if an observer spotted these guys and 10-20 shells and/or mortars landed on them (which we obviously wouldn't then get to see on the internet).

Russians need to establish forward operating bases; so "pauses" in the North and South main pincers seem more to do with that than they have been stopped. If they are stopped for a week, that would be one thing, but slow progress can just represent sorting out logistics and digging in on the flanks, installing artillery, and taking care of a bunch of details.

There's this narrative that Russian forces are "falling apart", but Russia can rotate in fresh troops, has a massive inventory of vehicles and artillery, and isn't going to run out of ammunition or diesel anytime soon.

Of course, doing the unexpected has strategic value, but the value of setting up a line North South seems so high, and the only way to end all the chaotic ambushes and anti-tank pick-offs, etc. in the East, that is the downside of having a super long front in the east (the advantage is that it ties up Ukrainian troops that can be cutoff on mass). Conventional warfare like this takes massive amounts of ammunition, so once units are cutoff their calculus changes pretty radically; they are for sure unlikely to go anywhere.

Sure, that's exactly what I was saying... :roll: — Count Timothy von Icarus

You're arguing that Ukraine should not accept terms because...

Lavrov and the Russian state just spent months telling bald faced lie after bald faced lie to journalists, diplomats, military attaches, etc., and now they say "here are our generous terms, all they'd have to do is say yes!" — Count Timothy von Icarus

I mean I'm literally quoting you here, I can't get any closer to what you're saying than actually quoting you. If there's more there than "Ukraine can't negotiate because Russia are liars" then you'll have to add it, because it's clearly not in the quote.

People that are against negotiation on principle can maybe consider police negotiators as a useful framework.

Do police negotiators just show up and call a hostage taker a crazy madman, and when the hostage taker denies it they just call him a liar too, and then leave?

And the reason Ukraine government doesn't take the deal (even if they see no way of winning; could be a lot of losses on the Ukrainian side and no functioning logistics) ... is that it would make the entire war effort make zero sense.

Which is pretty clever by Putin offering the status quo before the war.

It's both impossible to accept (as literally makes the whole war pointless, and Ukraine is obviously not being rescued by NATO nor ever going to be let in the club, so "fighting for that right" clearly makes zero sense also) and also absurd not to accept.

If Putin was actually worried about the military situation, he'd start high and then settle low, maybe offer some symbolic reparations etc. to sweeten the status quo deal.

Instead, Zelenskyy finds himself fighting an existential war with a foe that keeps repeating they just want the exact same situation as before the war, just de jure instead of de facto.

You are misreading. Sure, you are quoting, but you are quoting just part of a paragraph and splitting a sentence. I was referring to your credulity regarding Russian public facing statements, not commenting on Ukraine's diplomatic position.

Zelenskyy finds himself fighting an existential war with a foe that keeps repeating they just want the exact same situation as a before the war, just de jure instead of de facto. — boethius

Indeed. There was talk before the war of Putin wanting to be recognised as a proper player on the world stage. A war to make official that which was true but disputed seems aligned with that ideal, especially if the whole thing can be glossed with a shiny coat of anti-Nazism.

In keeping with this general trend of schizophrenic analysis here (Fumbling lunatic one minute, iron-fisted dictator the next) I think there's a sense among some people here that the war in Russia will be judged on the terms that we in Europe believe it to be really about. As if Putin will have to go back to Russia, tail between his legs and say "well, I didn't manage to capture all of Ukraine for Russia, sorry", but there's no reason to think there's any large group in Russia who are supportive enough of Putin to be behind the war in the first place, but also savvy enough to see that it wasn't a 'special operation' at all. I just don't see any evidence of such a demographic at all.

I think Putin is, as you say, in quite a strong position really. If the war goes his way, then it's obviously a win. If it doesn't then, well, it was only an 'operation'. It's not that nothing could count as a failure, but he's certainly hedged his bets.

you are quoting just part of a paragraph and splitting a sentence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I see so...

You're assuming there is a deal offered. Lavrov and the Russian state just spent months telling bald faced lie after bald faced lie to journalists, diplomats, military attaches, etc., and now they say "here are our generous terms, all they'd have to do is say yes!" and you buy it 100%? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Says what, in addition to "Ukraine can't negotiate with Russia because they're liars"? That there isn't really a deal? Well Russia have certainly said there is a deal, so there seems to be nothing more here than just the 'liar' issue. And "...and you buy it". Well, again there seems to be nothing more there than saying I shouldn't 'buy it' because Russia are liars.

Unless you're writing some seriously cryptic metaphors, I'm not seeing anything in the rest of the paragraph that says anything more than Russia are liars so no-one can negotiate with them.

I was referring to your credulity regarding Russian public facing statements, not commenting on Ukraine's diplomatic position. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well that's odd seeing as my question, not to mention my entire conversation for the last few pages, was about Ukraine agreeing to the terms rather than continuing war - as you say they "100%" have to do.

So perhaps, having got the important task of berating my credulity out of the way, you could say something about Ukraine's diplomatic situation. Why do think they 100% have to continue fighting rather than accept the terms?

I think there's a sense among some people here that the war in Russia will be judged on the terms that we in Europe believe it to be really about — Isaac

For here a bit certainly, but the Western mainstream media basically take this idea as the gospel truth.

I think Putin is, as you say, in quite a strong position really. If the war goes his way, then it's obviously a win. If it doesn't then, well, it was only an 'operation'. It's not that nothing could count as a failure, but he's certainly hedged his bets. — Isaac

Yes, definitely Putin could stop at any moment and says he's achieved whatever he set out to achieve.

Fighting neo-Nazi's: shelled Mariupol to oblivion and decimated the Azov battalion base (I don't know where it is, but I assume it's something can blow up if they haven't already).

Russian core strategic interest: it's pretty clear to me Ukraine isn't in NATO, and Ukraine won't be building back buddy-buddy with the CIA anytime soon in my opinion.

Calling the Wests bluff and creating schism in NATO: don't see any sanctions on that sweet, sweet Russian gas (in the EU) and this whole thing about the jets is comical (US: we're working on getting Ukrainians jets! Poland: ok, we'll give them to you, you give them to Ukraine ... US: not tenable)

Key land captures to show for the blood spilled: land bridge to Crimea.

And that's just today.

If his forces can link up in the middle of Ukraine, then he can easily take everything East of the Dnieper river and passify largely Russian speaking areas with zero easy ways to smuggle in arms for an insurgency into that part of Ukraine (unlike the Western part) and proclaim protection from neo-Nazi's achieved for Russian speakers, for ever basically (and better protection of Russia for the next hundred years at least).

By offering throughout the whole war, the de jure status quo before the war, Putin can easily explain his good faith and good intentions (certainly to most Russians) to the end of his days, as all he wanted the whole time is just the fighting in the Dombas to end and a neutral Ukraine (to have peace and not nuclear war) and to blow up some neo-Nazi's; just a simple man really.

As soon as the war ends, the discussion will switch to how it started in the first place and how was anyone crazy enough to reject Russia offer to end it. It makes "emotional sense" now, but will make zero rational sense as soon as the War is over and the extreme damages to Ukraine and people's lives contended with.

We only hear the pro-war almost kamikaze level fanaticism side of Ukrainians (as you point out) but we'll hear other voices as soon as the war ends: and the viscous partisan fighting has only just begun.

I'd also like to point out that the video posted also demonstrates a crap ton of those weapons these "volunteers" are holding: for sure going to organized crime, as we speak.

As well as even more advanced captured Russian equipment: straight to organized crime you go!

If you don't think people are making fucking bank ... you don't know people.

are you averse to including evidence/sources with your posts?

It's the same issue again. I have serious doubts concerning Western coverage of the war, certainly Russia has committed serious war crimes in Ukraine, but in so far as the advance to Kiev or how the Russian army is doing - I believe not too well - I'm unclear.

Of course, RT and Pravda are pure propaganda now, very easy for all to see.

Anyone here recommend a source for this?

Putin seems to be a realist, an immensely practical man and a very forthright in this speech: typically European in outlook. Did he start a war and get people killed? No leader of any country can avoid that taking on that responsibility, to use military force, they cannot be and should not be put in that position. There are no pacifist presidents or prime ministers. Not among the powerful nations which rely on force.

I can't help feel that both Ukraine and Putin have been provoked, manipulated by the 'cunning' and perhaps unprincipled other parties. — FreeEmotion

I would put that all in past tense.

There simply is no way around this: Putin made huge gambles, made huge victories (2014 annexation of Crimea), or at least he could think so if getting territory with poor economy is that, and basically had punched way over his weight class. And now he lost it in the gamble. Made a catastrophic error on starting this war. It puts the Soviet leadership that went to Afghanistan to seem far more intelligent, far more cautious. Perhaps nobody dared to say it to him or whatever. Before Putin heard different opinions, but after 2012, the people around him have come smaller and smaller.

There are too many reports on how this came as a surprise to the whole Russian system. And just think about one thing: how could the US intel be in the end so accurate? Usually US Intel blunders at nearly everything. I think the issue is that they actually got informants inside the Kremlin because people there were worried what was happening. That the US intel assumed that Kyiv would fall in 90 hours tells how Putin wasn't the only one overestimating the Russian army and underestimating the Ukrainians.

Putin has now thrown such bad dice that there are dramatic long term consequences.

↪boethius are you averse to including evidence/sources with your posts? — Changeling

I'm not averse to it, but the whole point of my post is that we don't really know what's going on. Western media continuously say one unsourced thing, so seems appropriate to say the alternative scenario.

But the main source is just the maps of what territory Russia is holding / contesting, which clearly do advance everyday on the West-North and West-South main pincers. There's really no way to know about the state of those pincers in terms of soldiers, equipment, logistics, and likewise the state of Ukrainian resistance to those pincers.

There's also a whole bunch of maps made by different people with different biases and sourcing, none of which are "authoritative", but I assume anyone interested in this topic we're discussing checks on one map or another (or sees on TV).

What we can know is that if the pincers meet then the entire East of Ukraine will be encircled and that will certainly change the dynamic of the war (but not necessarily end it, as the West Ukraine can keep harassing and attacking from time to time ... potentially for years).

In terms of infantry being extremely poor at attacking maneuvers (without armor against dug-in positions supported by armor, mortars, artillery, planes and attack helicopters), this is based on my personal experience training for this sort of warfare. Never been in a war, but live fire exercises of this kind make it pretty clear that exiting the trench is extremely hazardous ... even to run away, much more so to run towards the enemy line.

It's not really in dispute that Russia has far more armor than Ukraine, and NATO could supply armor but then that needs training, logistics ... and Russia has plenty anti-armor weapons.

Hence, focus on sending Ukraine anti-tank guided missiles and manpads. These are extremely dangerous weapons for sure, but you can't really assault and take a dug-in position with these weapons; certainly harass supply lines and lay ambushes but they don't really help defend against a concentrated offensive. So, if Russia digs in on the sides of a pincer and has a concentrated offensive to move forward, there's not much Ukraine can do about it with ATGM's and manpads.

However, as I mention, deception is a large part of warfare, so if there's some game changing weapon or tactic ... maybe we don't know about it.

But if you want sources, feel free to ask which factual statement you want sourced and I provide more information.

All the commentary on Putin is simply arguments he could say to play things at home (his main audience), doesn't need to make sense to Westerners (just as what Trump said didn't make sense to us Europeans), and, of course, Putin may say something different. But @Isaac was simply pointing out that Putin hasn't stated more than extremely minimal objectives, so he can easily just set the bar at whatever has been achieved at any moment.

Anyone here recommend a source for this? — Manuel

In the US, it seems to me the NYT has not succumbed to the sirens of alarmism and dramatism. These things sell well; wars make for good click bait I guess... so commercial media are naturally tempted to dramatize. But Biden is intent on not escalation and the NYT, well, I guess they love their children too so they understand the risk of going gung-ho here. That would be my sense anyway.

Another solid, professional and ethical journalist source is Reuters. It's pretty neutral from what I can see.

English Al Jazeera have a good daily dispatch at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/10/russia-ukraine-war-military-dispatch-march-10-2022
They can't be suspect of being pro-West... nor are they pro-Russian.

One of the best tracker sites for live news is Bellingcat - https://www.bellingcat.com/
These sites use tweets and other social media fed by (mostly Ukrainian) cell phone users on the ground. The bias is that you tend to see the victories more than the defeats of the Ukrainians.

I rely also on my national TV channel. They have a good team of war reporters, all female for some reason, and they do a great job. They are not "embedded", so they report from behind the frontline, on the effects on the civilians. This coverage is naturally sympathetic to the Ukrainian side but they try and maintain some professionalism.

So you're saying that because the Russians are liars, Ukraine (who obviously never told a lie in their lives, and probably are being considered for beatification as we speak) can't negotiate. You're basically saying that the only situation in which two sides can negotiate peace is one in which there's no propaganda. Do you realise what a hawkish position that is? You're basically advocating full on war for every dispute until one side is utterly wasted. — Isaac

Hardly a new attitude in the human scope. In the discourse of this recent crisis there is plenty of textbook cases of psychological defense mechanisms ... Or maybe it's all just about what people really want.

This part of the argument started because you claimed Russia had no strategic interests as they were too big to have to ever be concerned about attack. — Isaac

As Russia has the most nuclear weapons, it can be pretty sure that any country won't attack it. That should be obvious. Or let's say the US response to the war in Ukraine makes this obvious.

I'm bit confused why you really seem not to get that having strategic interests doesn't mean a country can invade another one country whenever feeling like it. There's multitude ways to try to influence things, but annexing parts of another countries simply isn't one.

Just think of the US and Mexico. The US has naturally strategic interests at it's southern neighbor. But does it have the option to invade & occupy the country? Actually not. Same thing with Brazil, Argentina and the Southern American countries. Basically it can use military force freely in the Caribbean, invading islands like Grenada or then make incursions to Haiti.

they report from behind the frontline, on the effects on the civilians. — Olivier5

Democracy comes with a price.

Only under a dictator would civilians be innocent. Under a democratically elected leader, they are all accountable.

I have been seeing Al-Jazeera for this reason, but you've given me a few more.

I wish I could access different channels, my country offers CNN, FOX and BBC.

The BBC has really gone downhill quality wise these last two decades or so, a real shame.

Thanks!

As Russia has the most nuclear weapons, it can be pretty sure that any country won't attack it. That should be obvious. Or let's say the US response to the war in Ukraine makes this obvious. — ssu

Or maybe the US is just waiting to make a grand entrance and be the one who gets declared the victor?

I'm bit confused why you really seem not to get that having strategic interests doesn't mean a country can invade another one country whenever feeling like it. There's multitude ways to try to influence things, but annexing parts of another countries simply isn't one.

Bad faith always wins. Always.

Hence, focus on sending Ukraine anti-tank guided missiles and manpads. These are extremely dangerous weapons for sure, but you can't really assault and take a dug-in position with these weapons; certainly harass supply lines and lay ambushes but they don't really help defend against a concentrated offensive. So, if Russia digs in on the sides of a pincer and has a concentrated offensive to move forward, there's not much Ukraine can do about it with ATGM's and manpads. — boethius

The basic problem is that for Ukrainians being on the defensive works. But wars are not won just by being on the defensive. Ukraine should make counterattacks and here might be their weak point: to counterattack they should concentrate their forces and firepower and destroy the Russian units. If those Russian units are in a long column in the middle of an urban area, that's easy. If they are in defensive positions, that's hard. And with the concentration the Russian artillery has targets. Likely Ukraine will try to avoid a battle of attrition. Yet the material support coming from NATO countries is substantial. But they would need more than just those ATGMs, but also artillery and medium range Surface-to-Air missile systems. Stingers cannot defend attack from high altitude. And if you are Putin, you don't care about if you hit something else also when destroying the Ukrainian army.

When Russians declare cease-fires or humanitarian corridors, I assume they take the time to get their defences up. Already you can see that they are throwing their reserves and second tier forces into the battle as there starts to be a lot of civilian trucks in the columns. This means that the army trucks are already in use. Likely the war is going to the next phase.


But still, it's not going well for the Russians.