"Which side to chose if any" means that one can chose no side. And of course you know that, and deleted it from the quote on purpose, to make it look like I was contradicting myself . Which I didn't.

You are a liar.

And of course you know that, and deleted it from the quote on purpose, to make it look like I was contradicting myself . Which I didn't. — Olivier5

Exactly. But your narcissism prevents you from seeing why.

Because you wanted to score a cheap point on a message board?

Because you wanted to score a cheap point on a message board? — Olivier5

Nice use of irony, but no. To try and get you to see the unpleasant ease with which arguments you think are important can be rendered trivial by some dick on the internet trying to 'catch you out' instead of assuming even the most basic level of charity. But as usual, you are the exception, the true path from which all others stray.

Now you are lying some more.

A liar who complains about propaganda. That's rich.

Okay, it can remain an established fact only for me, no problem. — Olivier5

What you cite are not predictions.

The prediction is that Russia will simply end it's offensives at some point and declare it achieved its objectives; as, the land bridge, which it already achieved at that point, is already a major strategic achievement.

You cite yourself the context of the words that precede and follow "once", which is a conditional word.

I am explaining a potential alternative purpose for the column North of Kiev.

At that time, if you remember 4 weeks ago, the Western narrative was the purpose of that column was to roll into Kiev and start an urban combat offensive to take the city but that it "got stuck" due to Russian incompetence.

An alternative narrative to the Western media narrative, that I present, was that the purpose of the column was not to start an urban combat operation to take Kiev, but to encircle Kiev. I make clear that motivation for Ukraine to avoid that is extremely high so the Russians are being cautious and slow to avoid a counter offensive that routs the whole column. I.e. they weren't just bogged down in incompetence, but protecting the salient and the column which serves as a giant parking lot. The evidence for that being the column is sitting there for days and Ukrainians haven't destroyed it despite the immense motivation to do so.

In my exchanges with @ssu I make it very clear, several times, that I am proposing a different perspective, but that maybe the Western media narrative is right and Russian morale will collapse and the Russians will be routed and revolution will break out in Moscow. That is clearly not "impossible". Likewise, in purely military terms, I make it clear that Ukraine could have some big military surprise and counter offensive (some new weapon or tactic that I don't, and presumably the Russians don't, expect).

Be that as it may, the Russians can be argued to have functionally encircle Kiev with only 1 remaining road for supply, and the remaining south route in range of artillery.

Kiev is arguably under siege. Few sieges in history are "perfect".

Likewise:

Why completing the siege of Kiev will change things considerably is that Putin is not insisting on taking the city, and if Russian lines (once setup around the city) cannot be practically broken from the outside, pressure will be pretty high to accept Russia's conditions of surrender. — boethius

Key word "why". I'm explaining what Russia was attempting to lay siege to the capital.

Media even started to report Kiev as under siege, encircled, shelling everywhere.

So, if you want to argue it's not a "true siege" or "100% encirclement", sure.

What's important, however, is the the military, political and social dynamic did change once Russia more-or-less encircled and laid siege to Kiev.

In the build up to Russia cutting off the West highway, if you're able to remember 4 weeks ago, there was still talk of potential NATO no fly zone or even just accepting Ukraine into NATO spontaneously etc.

After media at least reported Kiev as "basically" encircled and under siege, mood started to change, NATO taken off the table, deescalation.

Since Ukraine not joining NATO was one of the major political objectives, and the purpose of encircling Kiev (in my alternative analysis to the Western media at that time) is to apply political pressure ... then Ukraine taking NATO off the table is reasonable to be met with stopping the encirclement, starting up talks, and pulling back from Kiev (as the major political objective is achieved: no one now talks about or has any belief whatsoever Ukraine will ever join NATO).

It's called "analysis" and, as I've already mentioned, if @ssu and the Western media was arguing my position, and no one arguing Ukraine could achieve anything militarily, I'd argue that, and I'd argue that Ukraines perspective needs to be understood (even if it maybe doesn't make sense to us), as otherwise there would be no debate, no possibility to submit any position to scrutiny if everyone just "agrees" (as @Isaac very succinctly describes is the Western media and social media environment now).

The prediction is that Russia will simply end it's offensives at some point and declare it achieved its objectives; as, the land bridge, which it already achieved at that point, is already a major strategic achievement. — boethius

Achievements have to be measured against the costs. Russia will have wrecked it's economy, become a pariah state, suffered grievous military losses, and united the West against it for a security guarantee it didn't need and small amounts of land it already partially controlled.

What you cite are not predictions. — boethius

You predicted the Russians would encircle and besiege Kyiv. They tried but couldn't. Now they are fleeing. Ha ha ha.

Achievements have to be measured against the costs. Russia will have wrecked it's economy, become a pariah state, suffered grievous military losses, and united the West against it for a security guarantee it didn't need and small amounts of land it already nominally controlled. — RogueAI

In this context I am using achievement simply to mean what was accomplished. I.e. what is there to show for the costs, which I make clear many times I agree are very real (military, economic and political).

The prediction, 4 weeks ago, was simply that given Russia already achieved its land bridge at that time it has a decent accomplishment and could stop there if it wanted to and be able to sell it as "mission accomplished", at least to the home audience which is what matters most (to the Kremlin).

Now, to evaluate if, even in purely military or purely imperialistic terms, the war was "worth it". Yes, I totally agree we need to compare the achievements against the costs.

However, right now we don't really know how many Russians have died, we don't really know how many would be too many for ordinary Russians, and we don't really know the outcome of all the economic sanctions and geo-political consequences.

We have evidence of a lot of tank losses (more tanks than many decent armies have total); however, it's not completely clear to me what Russian generals think of their tank losses. There's lot's of reports of abandonment of vehicles (which are then lit on fire).

Since the Kremlin wants to minimise losses of soldiers and has a lot of tanks, orders could be to just light vehicles on fire, run away and get a new tank.

Since the ATGM's are clearly proving the vulnerability to at least T-72 era of tanks, Russian generals may not care much about them (there are becoming obsolete and so may as well use them while there still effective, and if you have a lot to spare in such a context, then survivability of the tank doesn't matter much, but rather survivability of the crew; and this is not at all clear to me from Tank loss pictures, even video of ATGM hits, if the crew survived or not).

For, it's not as simple as saying tank costs 10 million Euro and is destroyed by a 100 000 Euro missile. Equipment depreciates in value, so if something was purchased decades ago at 10 million Euro, it may have a present value of 100 000 Euros or less, and so generals order them to be abandoned easily rather than protected as an important asset.

Other reason I pause for thought about the tanks, is that the same situation happened in Syria of significant tanks losses (social media flooded with ATGM hits and burned out tanks), and same vibe that it must be unsustainable amount of losses of equipment and tank crews going by the social media ... but the Russians kept advancing anyways. So, it was certainly rumoured something wasn't as it seemed, and there were a lot of decoys.

Of course, even if some tanks were abandoned and had little value to the Russian military, no disputing there are significant amount of losses of all kinds of equipment, including fighter aircraft.

But, I think we can all agree it is the soldier deaths that are most important, and we don't really know this number.

However, we also need to know Ukrainian soldier deaths as well. Even if Russians have lost a lot, if they can point to having killed twice or three time, etc., as many Ukrainians, then this can be some form of "military performance" measure (US uses this metric all the time to evaluate performance).

For the economic and geo-political costs we don't really know.

However, right now Kremlin has kept China as a close supporter and also has kept good terms with India, who are at best neutral if not supporting Russia. Idea of no-fly zone has been abandoned, Ukraine in NATO has been abandoned, the economic sanctions did not go as far as to oil and gas and minerals.

The newest sanction tension is Russia demanding Roubles. However, at the end of the day that really doesn't matter, and the Europeans panicking about it may already be political useful in several ways.

However, we also need to know Ukrainian soldier deaths as well. Even if Russians have lost a lot, if they can point to having killed twice or three time, etc., as many Ukrainians, then this can be some form of "military performance" measure (US uses this metric all the time to evaluate performance). — boethius

The ratio of Ukrainian soldiers killed per Russians killed would matter if Ukraine was actually any kind of threat to Russia and diminishing Ukraine's military capability somehow benefitted Russia. Since Ukraine is not a threat to Russia and never was (and is a much smaller country punching "above its weight class"), the fact that Ukraine might have lose 2 or 3 or 5 for every Russian killed isn't an "achievement" for Russia. Russia is on the hook for those deaths, since the war was not necessary and based on deceitful reasons.

In the war in Iraq, America killed tons of Iraqi's for every American killed, but since that too was an unnecessary war, it just made America look even more like a bully picking on a much smaller non-nuclear country for dishonest reasons.

The ratio of Ukrainian soldiers killed per Russians killed would matter if Ukraine was actually any kind of threat to Russia and diminishing Ukraine's military capability somehow benefitted Russia. — RogueAI

I agree from the perspective you are talking about.

However, just as the US mentions 100 to 1 kill ratios to explain military performance was great in Afghanistan, I am simply pointing out Russian military can use the same metric.

I have mostly been analysing the Russian perspective, so the cost-benefit from the Russian perspective maybe "worth it" if the casualties aren't too high and military performance was good in terms of ratios of things destroyed: yes you destroyed a bunch of our shit, but we also destroyed a bunch of your shit.

The importance of the the cost-benefit analysis from the Russian perspective is that it's the Russian perspective that will influence the ordinary Russian's opinion and whether they are for or against the war medium and long term (and military cost-benefit will tie into whether the economic sanctions were worth it etc.).

However, I agree that from the perspective of humanity the war is completely unnecessary.

Analysis pointing out the Kremlin can point to to the land bridge as an achievement, is relevant in evaluating if the Kremlin can convince normal Russians the war was worth it, which (regardless of what we think) has immense political repercussions (just like public opinion changing about the Iraq and Afghanistan wars being worth it had immense political repercussions regardless of what we may think, regardless of what is true).

Russia Will End Cooperation on International Space Station Citing Sanctions (Newsweek; Apr 2, 2022)

As an anarchist the root cause of this war and the wars you mention is the sovereign nation state system as we currently know it, from my point of view.

As a geopolitical realist, insofar as we have this system of nation states, these sorts of wars are essentially inevitable.

Everything is complicated and the process of contextualising why things happen, to try to really be sure who's to blame, is essentially an endless task.

In the current Western narrative Putin is essentially the only moral agent on the planet at the moment responsible for any outcome whatsoever, and everyone else involved is Putin's personal victim.

For example, Zelenskyy is certainly an agent in this narrative, indeed a hero and blameless, yet not morally responsible for anything that happens whatsoever. Indeed, if you have no responsibility you are by definition blameless.

NATO has the right to send arms, indeed the duty to do so, but likewise zero responsibility for the actual outcome of doing so.

@StreetlightX, you should whip up a new thread, e.g. "The victims of capitalism", something like that.
Could easily be both historical and ongoing.
Pretty sure I could learn a thing or two anyway.

The NY Times says it would be very difficult for any army to conquer Kiev, but an inexperienced group like the present Russian army would require a long drawn out seige.

I mean I would imagine this depends on strategy. I don't believe (but lack evidence here, because info on the state of the Russian military is highly unreliable now) they have used all there might (not meaning nukes) - for instance they could, use the airforce and flatten Kiev.

But maybe not.

I guess they could. It's a big city, though. It's bigger than New York. That's a lot of bombs. And to just inherit a pile of blood and rubble?

They could bomb government institutions and try to spare "civilian areas" - unlike what they did in Mariupol. Then again, they'd lose plenty of aircraft.

Well, to be honest - besides capturing those two "separatist areas", everything else is diminishing returns. Just rubble and death. Unless they're doing this to extract a lot from Ukraine.

It's not worth the price. So, you have a point.

Worth it? The number of people killed in the 911 WTC attacks and the number of soldiers sent over to Iraq so that the enemy could conveniently kill them on home soil were roughly the same as I recall.

911 attacks 2,977 people were killed,

As of July 19, 2021, according to the U.S. Department of Defense casualty website, there were 4,431 total deaths (including both killed in action and non-hostile) and 31,994 wounded in action (WIA) as a result of the Iraq War. — Wikipedia

Worth it for whom? We have to distinguish between sub-sections of society that benefit from wars and those that do not, and the continued well-being of these sub-sections, not to mention a colossal rise in their happiness and well being indices.

Estimating losses is part of the battle plan I would think.

Media even started to report Kiev as under siege, encircled, shelling everywhere. — boethius

Let's fact check that at least:

Newspaper headlines: Kyiv faces siege and UK under fire over refugees
By BBC News
Staff

Published 12 March

https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-the-papers-60716208

FOX NEWS FIRST

Published February 25, 2022 4:02am EST

Kyiv under siege as Russian forces overrun Ukraine

https://www.foxnews.com/us/kyiv-under-siege-as-russian-forces-overrun-ukraine

Here is a prediction, something to work with:

Deaths will range from—

Now (March 11, 2022):

5-10,000 Ukranian troops; 10-20,000 civilians; 5-10,000 Russian troops

If fighting goes three months:

30-50,00 Ukranian troops; 50-500,000 civilians; 30-50,000 Russian troops

Prediction of Putin's remaining in power:

By March 11, he is certainly significantly weakened, no way back. Chances of losing power within 3 years, now 50%.

I agree with the last prediction, for the sake of Russia, he may step down, if I understand him correctly.
The fall guy I think it is called.

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/3/10/2085116/-Ukraine-War-Predictions-March-11-2022

This instance of tiresome propaganda needs highlighting:

Ukraine says its troops have retaken more than 30 towns and villages since Russia pulled back from the area this week. — Al Jazeera

I guess they could report that the Ukrainian troops met 'little resistance'

Another predictive piece:

Interesting:

These pressures could set conditions for what we assess to be Putin’s preferred course of action, which focuses on undermining Zelensky and the current Ukrainian political environment in advance of Ukrainian parliamentary and presidential elections in 2023 and 2024 respectively.

Putin’s preferred course of action, which focuses on undermining Zelensky and the current Ukrainian political environment in advance of Ukrainian parliamentary and presidential elections in 2023 and 2024 — FreeEmotion

Zelensky is now seen as a hero the world over and quite probably in Ukraine as well. Good job Vlad!

Zelensky is now seen as a hero the world over and quite probably in Ukraine as well. Good job Vlad! — Olivier5

If you bother to read the context, the article predicts Russia is unlikely to undertake a full scale invasion - and if so, super limited incursions such as only in Dombas - and in that context the Russian buildup or then very limited incursions is to undermine Zelenskyy.

However, what the article gets right is:

The operation to establish a land bridge from Rostov to Crimea is likely the most attractive to Putin in this respect. It solves a real problem for him by giving him control of the Dnepr-Crimea canal ,which he badly needs to get fresh water to occupied Crimea. It would do fearful damage to the Ukrainian economy by disrupting key transportation routes from eastern Ukraine to the west. He could halt operations upon obtaining an important gain, such as seizing the canal and the area around it or after taking the strategic city of Mariupol just beyond the boundary of occupied Donbas. — PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS

Likewise, article also gets right:

Likely Ukrainian Initial Responses to Full-Scale Invasion

The Ukrainian military will almost certainly fight against such an invasion, for which it is now preparing.19 Whatever doubts and reservations military personnel might have about their leaders or their prospects, the appearance of enemy mechanized columns driving into one’s country tends to concentrate thought and galvanize initial resistance. It collapses complexities and creates binary choices. Military officers and personnel are conditioned to choose to fight in such circumstances, and usually do, at least at first. There is no reason to think the Ukrainian military will perform differently in this case. — PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS

However, what the article gets wrong is that a full scale invasion for the purposes - not of occupation and dealing with insurgency in major cities - but for securing the land bridge and solve "a real problem", is one way to do it.

That being said, the article does go over the possibility of multiple parallel incursions, what it calls "Course of Actions subordinate to Course of Action I" (sub-COA's; COA I is the full scale invasion).

But he might also execute several of these sub-COAs on their own to achieve independent objectives without intending to go all the way to full-scale invasion. We will consider the major sub-COAs here ordered by the likelihood we assess for each and laying out the separate objectives each might pursue beyond setting conditions for the full-scale invasion. — PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS

So, correct analysis after all, only fails to mention the Russians could choose to have so many of the parallel "sub-COA's" that it appears to be a full scale invasion, but it's not.

The reason for doing so is more-or-less presented in the article, in that Western reaction is likely to be fairly strong (at least sanction wise) and a limited incursion to test Ukrainian and Western resolve and then pulling back has a lot of drawbacks (but the article mistakingly concludes that's more likely than major incursions anyways).

As for Zelenskyy, what would major incursions cause?

It would cause panic and crisis in Kyiv and drive Zelensky to plead for NATO help that would be unlikely to come — PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS

Correct.

It was written last year. I didn't bother reading it.

Spring sowing forecast

The Ukrainian Ministry of Agriculture has given its forecasts for the sowing of crops that farmers will be able to carry out this spring: a total of about 13.4 million hectares could be sown, including cereals, maize, beet and sunflower, which is 3.5 million fewer than in 2021. Ukraine, known for its highly fertile black soils, was the world's fourth largest exporter of corn and wheat before the war.

Kiev is arguably under siege. Few sieges in history are "perfect" — boethius

You mean ***was*** under siege? Ukrainian troops have retaken the entire Kyiv oblast.

You mean ***was*** under siege? Ukrainian troops have retaken the entire Kyiv oblast. — Olivier5

Read the context:

Be that as it may, the Russians can be argued to have functionally encircle Kiev with only 1 remaining road for supply, and the remaining south route in range of artillery.

Kiev is arguably under siege. Few sieges in history are "perfect". — boethius

"Can be argued to have"

Key word "why". I'm explaining what Russia was attempting to lay siege to the capital.

Media even started to report Kiev as under siege, encircled, shelling everywhere.

So, if you want to argue it's not a "true siege" or "100% encirclement", sure.

What's important, however, is the the military, political and social dynamic did change once Russia more-or-less encircled and laid siege to Kiev.

In the build up to Russia cutting off the West highway, if you're able to remember 4 weeks ago, there was still talk of potential NATO no fly zone or even just accepting Ukraine into NATO spontaneously etc.

After media at least reported Kiev as "basically" encircled and under siege, mood started to change, NATO taken off the table, deescalation. — boethius

I am explaining analysis that was about the present when it was written, but in the past now.

The context of what I am explaining is clear, and in English present tense can be indefinite (not clear what time you're talking about, hence context matters.

So you meant "was". Okay.