The northern axis was the main effort, focused on the encirclement and capture of Kyiv. For this purpose, the Russians formed two groups of forces commanded from the Eastern Military District Command Post. One group was formed in the Gomel region of Belarus and used the tactical sign ‘V’ with orders to attack Kyiv along the right (western) bank of the Dnipro River. The second group was formed in the Bryansk region of Russia and used the tactical sign ‘O’ with orders to surround Kyiv from the left (eastern) bank.
The Southern MD has been seeing most of the fighting in the near history (Russo-Georgian war and earlier the Chechen wars), hence it seems to have been the best Russia MD as it gained it's primary objectives.The Southern Military District Command Post commanded units with the tactical symbol ‘Z in a square’, ordered to attack from occupied Crimea to establish control over the North Crimean Water Canal, Energodar and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, surround Mariupol, take control of the bridges over the Dnipro and advance along the right bank to Voznesensk with the aim of seizing the South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant.
The whole goddam battle for Kiyv wasn't even going on!!! — ssu
In the absence of a critical media that challenges the policies of the government, the average distracted citizen, in any given land, becomes a vessel of prescribed thoughts. Western perceptions of Russia, tainted by decades of motion pictures portraying Russians as routine villains, infect the collective consciousness. — yebiga
The West is envious of Russia? — Jabberwock
A diversion, most likely. — Tzeentch
How many troops did Putin need to take Crimea? — ssu
Zelensky asks for proof of invasion of Ukraine allegedly planned for February 16
— TASS · Feb 12, 2022
Washington’s warnings that Russia is about to invade frustrate Ukrainians
— Matt Bradley, Veronika Melkozerova · NBC News · Feb 15, 2022
EU 'did not believe' US warnings of Russian war
— John Silk · Deutsche Welle · Oct 11, 2022
Wrong. Trying to misrepresent what I said is silly. I said "To assume that the fight of Hostomel/Antonov Airport and the whole fight for Kyiv". Notice the word and.What a curious remark, coming from someone who keeps referencing the battle of Hostomel Airport (24th - 25th of February by the way, when "the goddamn battle of Kiev wasn't even going on"). — Tzeentch
Also, what losses are you talking about here? — Tzeentch
Sources, or no bueno. — Tzeentch
How can a report done in February tell about facts that happened in April? :chin:I've already given you mine. — Tzeentch
For mechanised forces, the intent was often to rapidly occupy and thereafter isolate and screen key objectives. On the axis from Gomel to Kyiv, for example, the force was divided into a screening force that was to establish positions facing west to cut off Kyiv from western Ukraine, and units responsible for pushing into the city. Very little consideration appears to have been given to Ukrainian reserves or the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). The assertion in Russian planning that Ukraine could generate only 40,000 additional troops appears to be premised on the anticipated speed of the operation rather than an appreciation of Ukraine’s capacity for mobilisation. This emphasis on speed led to units being ordered to advance in administrative column by road and to attempt to bypass any initial resistance. The assumption was that by D+10, Russian units would transition to stabilisation operations. The synchronisation matrix of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District), for example, captured near Kyiv in March 2022, stated that by D+10 the force would ‘proceed to the blocking and destruction of individual scattered units of the Armed Forces and the remnants of nationalist resistance units’.
Besides, the RUSI article used captured plans to make out what the plans were. — ssu
It was reported directly by the Ukrainian general staff.
31 BTGs, each comprised of roughly 600 - 800 officers and soldiers, amounts to roughly 21,000 troops. — Tzeentch
They expected a blitz and failed. — Jabberwock
Do you think it is reasonable to use one third of invasion forces for a diversion? — Jabberwock
Ok, now you're just trolling.'Captured plans' - sure. Show them to me. — Tzeentch
Kyiv axis: Russia’s likely main effort to rapidly isolate Kyiv and force the Ukrainian
government to capitulate has failed as of February 26.
Operation Danube didn't see more casualties and intense fighting, but did see large columns of tanks suddenly on the streets of the target Capital after a rapid drive from the border. Great military operation.Had this been the Russians' intention, we would have seen a lot more casualties and intense fighting. — Tzeentch
First of all, you haven't given ANY reasoning for your idea (here ↪Tzeentch) — ssu
Then even the link that you gave yourself states done in February 26th states: — ssu
Kyiv axis: Russia’s likely main effort to rapidly isolate Kyiv and force the Ukrainian
government to capitulate has failed as of February 26.
Hence Russians advancing in long columns close together is an obvious irrefutable proof that they weren't suspecting a fierce fight from the Ukrainians. — ssu
A blitz means punching through defensive lines with massed numbers and firepower. In a blitz operation one doesn't stop at the first sign of resistance, but will attempt to overpower the defensive lines with maximum force to keep the momentum going. — Tzeentch
Had this been the Russians' intention, we would have seen a lot more casualties and intense fighting. — Tzeentch
Yes, I think that's perfectly reasonable.
A threat must be credible in order to serve as a diversion. Consider also that the threatening of Kiev may have had an additional objective, namely that of getting Ukraine and NATO to the negotiating table. — Tzeentch
Russia and Ukraine in fact entered negotiations shortly after the invasion, and we have accounts that claim there was a peace accord being written up before the negotiations were blocked by the US. — Tzeentch
The fact that it was unable to sustain its movements shows their embarassingly bad execution, not lack of trying. — Jabberwock
No, committing one third of forces to a diversion is not reasonable, it is absurd. — Jabberwock
That leaves less than 40 in the South, for the 'real' offensive. — Jabberwock
So now you are claiming [...] — Jabberwock
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