:snicker:

Do you know what you gave as your reference? Just look at what the ISW issue says:

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 26, 2022!

It's been done the same month! The whole goddam battle for Kiyv wasn't even going on!!! Just started. Quite good intel if you have good insight on the attacking formation in a couple of days.

How about something done perhaps with little more hindsight (from November 2022): RUSI: Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022

The northern axis was the main effort, focused on the encirclement and capture of Kyiv. For this purpose, the Russians formed two groups of forces commanded from the Eastern Military District Command Post. One group was formed in the Gomel region of Belarus and used the tactical sign ‘V’ with orders to attack Kyiv along the right (western) bank of the Dnipro River. The second group was formed in the Bryansk region of Russia and used the tactical sign ‘O’ with orders to surround Kyiv from the left (eastern) bank.

And this wouldn't be the only reference. I could have several Finnish Military studies saying basically the same issues and other and going deeper in just what these groups of forces consisted. The operational objectives are quite clear and obvious now in hindsight.

And those who are curious just were the "Z" came from (continued RUSI article):

The Southern Military District Command Post commanded units with the tactical symbol ‘Z in a square’, ordered to attack from occupied Crimea to establish control over the North Crimean Water Canal, Energodar and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, surround Mariupol, take control of the bridges over the Dnipro and advance along the right bank to Voznesensk with the aim of seizing the South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant.

The Southern MD has been seeing most of the fighting in the near history (Russo-Georgian war and earlier the Chechen wars), hence it seems to have been the best Russia MD as it gained it's primary objectives.

The whole goddam battle for Kiyv wasn't even going on!!! — ssu

What a curious remark, coming from someone who keeps referencing the battle of Hostomel Airport (24th - 25th of February by the way, when "the goddamn battle of Kiev wasn't even going on").


Anyway, your source provides nothing in the way of troop counts, so I'm not sure what you believe it proves.

Also, what losses are you talking about here?

If this would have been a feint, then obviously it would have been totally different. The forces wouldn't have been committed to face such losses. — ssu

Sources, or no bueno.

In the absence of a critical media that challenges the policies of the government, the average distracted citizen, in any given land, becomes a vessel of prescribed thoughts. Western perceptions of Russia, tainted by decades of motion pictures portraying Russians as routine villains, infect the collective consciousness. — yebiga

There's a fair amount of critique of the US, coming from the US, documentaries, movies, interviews, whatever. Some were posted in the thread.

The West is envious of Russia? — Jabberwock

Might be the other way around? Or is that politically incorrect to say?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/06/06/nord-stream-pipeline-explosion-ukraine-russia/ — neomac

For some reason, this doesn't really seem that surprising. (Ukrainian Floating Operatives.)

A diversion, most likely. — Tzeentch

How many troops did Putin need to take Crimea? — ssu

I'm experiencing déjà vu. :)

Zelensky asks for proof of invasion of Ukraine allegedly planned for February 16
^{— TASS · Feb 12, 2022}
Washington’s warnings that Russia is about to invade frustrate Ukrainians
^{— Matt Bradley, Veronika Melkozerova · NBC News · Feb 15, 2022}
EU 'did not believe' US warnings of Russian war
^{— John Silk · Deutsche Welle · Oct 11, 2022}

What a curious remark, coming from someone who keeps referencing the battle of Hostomel Airport (24th - 25th of February by the way, when "the goddamn battle of Kiev wasn't even going on"). — Tzeentch

Wrong. Trying to misrepresent what I said is silly. I said "To assume that the fight of Hostomel/Antonov Airport and the whole fight for Kyiv". Notice the word and.

Besides @Tzeentch, it is you who is referring to a document given two days after the attack to claim how much there were troops of a battle that went at least to April, the next month.

Also, what losses are you talking about here? — Tzeentch

Oh right, you don't believe that Russia has experienced any meaningful losses.

Sources, or no bueno. — Tzeentch

Why don't you start with your own. Like try to give some credibility to your argument that how RUSI among military observers are wrong when they state "The northern axis was the main effort, focused on the encirclement and capture of Kyiv."

Still no sources. I've already given you mine.

What tells about the pre-attack confidence of the Russians in their abilities (and their assumption on the weakness of the Ukrainians) is that when the Western intelligence sources gave out publicly a fairly correct estimate on what Russian plans were, Putin didn't change them, but went with the same plans anyway.

Who needs strategic surprise when the target is a weak state that is artificial?

I've already given you mine. — Tzeentch

How can a report done in February tell about facts that happened in April? :chin:

Just at first answer that.

Besides, the RUSI article used captured plans to make out what the plans were. And they show just how wrong the Russians were right from the start:

For mechanised forces, the intent was often to rapidly occupy and thereafter isolate and screen key objectives. On the axis from Gomel to Kyiv, for example, the force was divided into a screening force that was to establish positions facing west to cut off Kyiv from western Ukraine, and units responsible for pushing into the city. Very little consideration appears to have been given to Ukrainian reserves or the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). The assertion in Russian planning that Ukraine could generate only 40,000 additional troops appears to be premised on the anticipated speed of the operation rather than an appreciation of Ukraine’s capacity for mobilisation. This emphasis on speed led to units being ordered to advance in administrative column by road and to attempt to bypass any initial resistance. The assumption was that by D+10, Russian units would transition to stabilisation operations. The synchronisation matrix of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District), for example, captured near Kyiv in March 2022, stated that by D+10 the force would ‘proceed to the blocking and destruction of individual scattered units of the Armed Forces and the remnants of nationalist resistance units’.

The reason why columns of armour were destroyed is that basically Russians were trying something similar to the US invasion of Iraq or more likely, their most successful military operation post WW2 operation, Operation Danube.

Besides, the RUSI article used captured plans to make out what the plans were. — ssu

'Captured plans' - sure. Show them to me.

Ironically, RUSI seems to use ISW's daily reports as its main source, most of which I've actually read, and I wasn't terribly impressed with them.

The reports provide very little hard evidence. The 31 BTG figure is one of the more concrete numbers they give, and it's retracable directly to its source, coming from the people directly involved.

Until you can give me a hard figure that shows something different, all your arguments are just conjecture. And so are RUSI's, or ISW's for that matter. No data, no bueno.

It was reported directly by the Ukrainian general staff.

31 BTGs, each comprised of roughly 600 - 800 officers and soldiers, amounts to roughly 21,000 troops. — Tzeentch

This is the number engaged on 26th of February, which does not comprise the whole northern force. As you seem to accept Wikipedia as credible, here is the article on the whole northern campaign:
[url=http://]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyiv_offensive_(2022)[/url]

It gives the number of the Russian troops involved in the northern campaign at 70 thousand (and defenders at less than 40 thousand, half of it irregulars, which seems a bit less than your 60). So your claim is basically that Russia has committed one third of its troops in Ukraine to a 'diversion'.

The 31 BTGs, roughly equivalent to 21,000 troops, comes from an ISW report, which in turn gets the figure directly from communications by the Ukrainian General Staff on the days of the invasion.

The 70,000 figure comes from an off-hand comment by Ukrainian Defense official Oleksandr Pavliuk which was made several months after the fact. There's no mention in the ISW reports of 70,000 troops.

That of course doesn't add up.

If the Russians really wanted to occupy Kiev, why is there no mention of these extra 50,000 troops anywhere else, including in any of the ISW reports? To take a city with several million inhabitants they would have needed every soldier they had. If you want to argue they participated, show it to me.

One would expect these forces on the frontline, attempting to punch through Ukrainian defensive lines with massed firepower in a classic blitz.

We saw nothing of the sort.

Casualty figures surrounding the Kiev and Kharkiv offensives (as far as those are known) do not reflect prolonged high-intensity combat, with casualties over a two-and-a-half-month period ranging in the hundreds up to perhaps a few thousand for both battles respectively.

Compare this to the casualty figures of the battle of Bakhmut, and you will see the story doesn't add up.

The sources you quote list 31 BTGs ona single salient. I am talking about the total number of troops involved in the northern campaign. It is estimated that the Kiyv Convoy itself might have up to 15 thousand troops, that would leave 5 far all other salients, reserves, GLOC etc. That is simply absurd. The number of troops involved just in the battle of Chernihiv is estimated at 20 thousand.

As for the massive casualties - Russians were not massacred in the north, their offensive stalled mostly to unexpected resistance and catastrophic logistics. They expected a blitz and failed. They stood in a column for a week, a fine diversionary maneuver... The majority of the troops was not even close to the battle.

I have looked at other sources and indeed the number of thirty plus BTGs might refer to the northern campaign (without Kharkiv). Given that the initial number of Russian BTGs for the whole invasion is estimated at 80-110 BTGs (depending on the source), that is still one third of the force. Do you think it is reasonable to use one third of invasion forces for a diversion?

They expected a blitz and failed. — Jabberwock

A blitz means punching through defensive lines with massed numbers and firepower. In a blitz operation one doesn't stop at the first sign of resistance, but will attempt to overpower the defensive lines with maximum force to keep the momentum going.

Had this been the Russians' intention, we would have seen a lot more casualties and intense fighting.

Do you think it is reasonable to use one third of invasion forces for a diversion? — Jabberwock

Yes, I think that's perfectly reasonable.

A threat must be credible in order to serve as a diversion. Consider also that the threatening of Kiev may have had an additional objective, namely that of getting Ukraine and NATO to the negotiating table.

Russia and Ukraine in fact entered negotiations shortly after the invasion, and we have accounts that claim there was a peace accord being written up before the negotiations were blocked by the US.

'Captured plans' - sure. Show them to me. — Tzeentch

Ok, now you're just trolling.

First of all, you haven't given ANY reasoning for your idea (here ) a that two of the main groups attacking Kyiv were doing some kind of faint. Then even the link that you gave yourself states done in February 26th states:

Kyiv axis: Russia’s likely main effort to rapidly isolate Kyiv and force the Ukrainian
government to capitulate has failed as of February 26.

Had this been the Russians' intention, we would have seen a lot more casualties and intense fighting. — Tzeentch

Operation Danube didn't see more casualties and intense fighting, but did see large columns of tanks suddenly on the streets of the target Capital after a rapid drive from the border. Great military operation.



Hence Russians advancing in long columns close together is an obvious irrefutable proof that they weren't suspecting a fierce fight from the Ukrainians.

First of all, you haven't given ANY reasoning for your idea (here ↪Tzeentch) — ssu

I have provided my reasoning, in our current discussion and the many we have had before.

But in case it was unclear, my reasoning is:

- 21,000 troops are completely insufficient to capture Kiev. It doesn't even come close.
- The behavior of the Russian forces does not suggest a blitz.
- The casualty figures do not suggest intense fighting.

Then even the link that you gave yourself states done in February 26th states: — ssu

Kyiv axis: Russia’s likely main effort to rapidly isolate Kyiv and force the Ukrainian
government to capitulate has failed as of February 26.

As I said, I'm not particularly impressed by the ISW's analysis and I disagree with most of it. But they do provide hard data - 31 BTGs. That's why I referenced it.

Hence Russians advancing in long columns close together is an obvious irrefutable proof that they weren't suspecting a fierce fight from the Ukrainians. — ssu

You'll find long columns during virtually any large-scale military operation, so I don't share your point of view this is 'obvious and irrefutable proof'. It's nowhere close.

A blitz means punching through defensive lines with massed numbers and firepower. In a blitz operation one doesn't stop at the first sign of resistance, but will attempt to overpower the defensive lines with maximum force to keep the momentum going. — Tzeentch

But obviously Russians DID try to commit more forces, that is why they moved their 60 km column. The fact that it was unable to sustain its movements shows their embarassingly bad execution, not lack of trying. In a hit-and-run operation such move would make even less sense.

Had this been the Russians' intention, we would have seen a lot more casualties and intense fighting. — Tzeentch

In general, columns standing idly without fuel do not engage in intense fighting. They were lucky that Ukrainians were spread so thin that they could not move on them (and that their airforce was suppressed), otherwise they would all be massacred.

Yes, I think that's perfectly reasonable.

A threat must be credible in order to serve as a diversion. Consider also that the threatening of Kiev may have had an additional objective, namely that of getting Ukraine and NATO to the negotiating table. — Tzeentch

No, committing one third of forces to a diversion is not reasonable, it is absurd. It is even more absurd if you take the actual order of the battle – beside the 30 BTGs committed in the North there were 15 BTGs in the Kharkiv direction, 4 in Sumy and about 4 as a general reserve for the northern axis. That leaves less than 40 in the South, for the 'real' offensive.

And again, the progress of the northern campaign has no indications of a successful hit-and-run attack, it has all indications of a failed effort.

Russia and Ukraine in fact entered negotiations shortly after the invasion, and we have accounts that claim there was a peace accord being written up before the negotiations were blocked by the US. — Tzeentch

So now you are claiming that the 'diversion' at Kiev was meant to reach an agreement where Russia would willingly give up what you claim were its aims in the war, i.e. the territorial gains. That would actually mean its defeat, right?

The fact that it was unable to sustain its movements shows their embarassingly bad execution, not lack of trying. — Jabberwock

I think the casualty figures clearly imply said lack of trying.

No, committing one third of forces to a diversion is not reasonable, it is absurd. — Jabberwock

That leaves less than 40 in the South, for the 'real' offensive. — Jabberwock

And the southern operations were successful, weren't they?

So now you are claiming [...] — Jabberwock

I'm hypothesizing.

I suggest you read up on the peace negotiations that took place during March / April 2022.