If Washington really wanted to push for peace they could, since Ukraine is running entirely on US support.

But peace is not what Washington has been after since this conflict started in 2008.

It seeks to decouple from Europe, while abolishing Ukraine's status as stabilizing neutral buffer, putting the Russians and the Europeans at daggers drawn.

The Europeans and the Russians fight each other to a bloody pulp, while the US takes care of business in the Pacific, this time with China as the big bad instead of Japan. WW2 with colors reversed - the same situation which landed world hegemony in Uncle Sam's lap.

He may be crazy enough to cut off all funding. But even then I can’t see Ukraine agreeing to this plan as it’s written. — Mikie

Cutting off funding and arms and intelligence would not be crazy.

Ukraine cannot win the war, that is clear. The more it goes on the more Russia will want for its trouble.

That's the dynamic that's created when a peace is not agreed swiftly: both sides have a psychological need to "show something" for the additional bloodshed, but the losing side generally never achieves that, requiring more fighting to try to make up for the losses. Who does make battlefield gains and increases their military leverage is the winning side, who then demand more, making it even harder for the losing side to capitulate.

So a tragic process of chasing ever increasing demands: as things get worse, what could have been negotiated even 6 months ago would be totally acceptable but there's now additional demands that are too hard to swallow ... though again in 6 months again they would be acceptable but there is now still more demands to compensate the additional 6 months of fighting.

The losing side never has more leverage, always less (what it means to be losing), and therefore continued fighting always makes things worse and not better. The exception being the intervention of other forces, a la Rohan coming to save Gondor at the last moment, but that is clearly not going to happen for Ukraine.

Losing a war means you have less, not more, say in the peace settlement.

As for Ukraine accepting, it of course depends on what you mean by "Ukraine". If by Ukraine we're talking about Zelensky ... he seems pretty clear to Ukrainians that they may have no other choice but to accept a deal. The straight up Nazi factions and other organized crime groups are presumably less likely to ever accept such a deal, but even they maybe compelled by the disposition of forces on the ground, preferring to rule over the rest of Ukraine rather than lose more territory.

The strategy of the Russians has been to fight in what is essentially one large cauldron in the South-East of Ukraine, maximizing the distance personnel and supplies need to travel and maximizing the distance with NATO radars and other signal processing. As a corollary, minimizing the distance with their own country and logistics.

The farther Ukrainians need to go to reach the front the more likely their movements can be spotted and analyzed as well as interdicted with standoff munitions. The more fuel, vehicles, and time it takes also, effectively reducing the effective quantity of everything.

However, simply because the war has stayed in the South-East Ukraine for so long does not mean it will invariably stay that way, that is just lazy thinking.

Once Ukraine is attritted enough and cannot arrest Russian advances, then Russia can go basically anywhere: keep pushing up from the south but also re-invade from the North or anywhere along the border.

The basic geographic strategic problem Ukraine has, that compounds greatly their capacity problems, is that there are no choke points. Fighting has been mostly in the South-East because that's where Russia has chosen to fight, not due to any geographic necessity.

Manning what is effectively a 3000 km contact line (counting Belarus) simply takes a lot of soldiers. There's no way around that. You need soldiers manning some interval of the contact-line and borders, as at least a "trip wire" warning system, and then you need a lot of soldiers in reserve to then go and stop offences.

Once Ukraine's army is simply below this large amount of soldiers required, then in order to defend against one offensive Ukraine needs to start deprive other parts of the front of essential man power ... so the Russians can just attack there.

It becomes a simple numbers game that Ukraine can't defend everywhere in addition to this process causes efficiency to rapidly degrade, resulting in the consequence is Russia can make large gains in territory at little cost to itself.

Naturally, the problem of no geographical choke point is a problem Ukraine has now, but there is one big exception that is the Dnieper, so Russia may take all of Ukraine East of the Dnieper.

Military planners likely view that as a long term solution to security needs.

Politically, there's not really much international consequence for taking all of Eastern Ukraine (as the West already did max sanctions), but there would remain the political issue of managing all of Eastern Ukraine and how much that would cost (with a lot of unkowns such as the likelihood of an insurgency and how damaging and how long it would last).

It seeks to decouple from Europe, while abolishing Ukraine's status as stabilizing neutral buffer, putting the Russians and the Europeans at daggers drawn.

The Europeans and the Russians fight each other to a bloody pulp, while the US takes care of business in the Pacific, this time with China as the big bad instead of Japan. WW2 with colors reversed - the same situation which landed world hegemony in Uncle Sam's lap. — Tzeentch

While I agree this was definitely the plan when all this started, I think it's less clear now to what extent the US has the capacity and will to continue this plan.

This focus on Venezuela could be indication of even the neocons abandoning the above global ambitions.

Why wouldn't they have the capacity? Eastern Europe is one false flag away from all-out war, and the US + Allies (Anglosphere, Japan, South Korea, etc.) are more than a match for China.

Venezuela is a small fish, and US involvement there is probably just an expression of the Monroe Doctrine, which is a cornerstone of US geopolitics. (No great powers or great power influence in the western hemisphere)

↪boethius Why wouldn't they have the capacity? Eastern Europe is one false flag away from all-out war, and the US + Allies (Anglosphere, Japan, South Korea, etc.) are more than a match for China. — Tzeentch

Yes, they certainly have the capacity to start these wars, but it's unclear if they have the capacity to end them successfully.

Venezuela is a small fish, and US involvement there is probably just an expression of the Monroe Doctrine, which is a cornerstone of US geopolitics. (No great powers or great power influence in the western hemisphere) — Tzeentch

Agreed, but the sudden escalation could be indication of deescalating elsewhere, consolidate imperial assets in the Western hemisphere.

Europe is already consolidated as vassal states with no independent foreign policy, locked into decades of LNG, social media, AI, and defence purchases ... having European vassals fight Russia could be killing a golden goose that's currently nice and safe in its cage, and wants to be in its cage, delivering golden eggs on a regular basis. There may not be a need to upset that relationship. Golden goose may not even be able to survive outside of her enclosure: it's really scary, even if goose squawks and fusses sometimes like she wants to be free.

Point being the alternative to WWIII is consolidate imperial power over Europe and the Americas, let Russia and China have their corner of the cake. Continue to contest the Middle-East and Africa but in a friendly rivalry sort of way that happens to kill millions of people, but we don't have to talk about that.

If there's no way to start and then win WWIII, appreciating what you have starts to look pretty attractive.

Europe is already consolidated as vassal states with no independent foreign policy, locked into decades of LNG, social media, AI, and defence purchases ... having European vassals fight Russia could be killing a golden goose that's currently nice and safe in its cage delivering golden eggs on a regular basis. There may not be a need to upset that relationship. — boethius

I think the US is operating under the assumption that Europe is already at risk of leaving the US orbit, because US power is waning and Europe is in potential a great power that is being artificially kept weak by US influence. (The famous NATO slogan that ends with "... and keep the Germans down" should have been understood to mean "... all of Europe...")

The European Trans-Atlanticist elite are under heavy pressure from so-called "populists" in a political battle that is essentially between Trans-Atlanticist US puppets and European nationalists. These are the first signs that the aforementioned process is already underway.

This is something that I have been stressing for a while now: Europe is a potential rival to the US, and as Europe shakes the US yoke, the US will start to treat it as such.

What better way to hamstring Europe going forward than to leave it with war on the continent as a parting gift?

That will only increase European dependence on American weapons and goods.

Point being the alternative to WWIII is consolidate imperial power over Europe and the Americas, let Russia and China have their corner of the cake. — boethius

It's a reasonable alternative theory, but I don't see the US giving up their hegemonic empire without a fight.

I think the US has no real reason to let China develop peacefully in a process by which it will almost certainly surpass the US in power. The US is still powerful now, and it has many allies in the Pacific which can easily cut off Chinese access to sea trade (which is the staple of US policy vis-á-vis China).

When that happens, the Chinese economy will all but collapse, leaving it with only a handful of overland trade corridors which would have to run thousands of kilometers, often through unstable regions, to get to foreign markets.

Trade between China and Europe will become almost an impossibility, especially if the Europeans and the Russians are at war.

You can see how vulnerable the Chinese actually are in a hypothetical scenario where its trade cannot flow overland freely. This is of equal importance to why the US wants to see Europe and Russia at war.


If, on the other hand, the Europeans and the Russians kept relations good enough to facilitate trade, Chinese goods could find alternative land routes via Russia.

The Russians through their conservative approach to the war in Ukraine are signaling that they understand this and are trying not to burn all bridges vis-á-vis European-Russian relations, basically meaning to normalize after the conflict in Ukraine simmers down.

The question is, however, whether the Europeans cannot be successfully goaded into some extreme actions that force Russia to act (for example, Kaliningrad), especially when we consider the European Trans-Atlantic elite holds all the levers of power and is basically carrying out American foreign policy no questions asked.

Once the powder barrel is successfully lit and the gears of war start churning, it will be too late for second thoughts and there will be no going back. Like the famous "boiling frog" that doesn't realize it's being cooked before it's already too late. That's what the US is going to be banking on.

For the record, I hope I am wrong.

I think the US is operating under the assumption that Europe is already at risk of leaving the US orbit, because US power is waning and Europe is in potential a great power that is being artificially kept weak by US influence. (The famous NATO slogan that ends with "... and keep the Germans down" should have been understood to mean "... all of Europe down".) — Tzeentch

Agreed that it was the case.

The European Trans-Atlanticist elite are under heavy pressure from so-called "populists" in a political battle that is essentially between Trans-Atlanticist US puppets and European nationalists. — Tzeentch

Agreed that this is the case.

This is something that I have been stressing for a while now: Europe is a potential rival to the US, and as Europe shakes the US yoke, the US will start to treat it as such. — Tzeentch

I believe this defeat of Europe as a rival has been now accomplished, for the foreseeable future.

Russian resources were a foundational part of European power and that can't be simply brought back online. The gas will flow to China as well as power Russia's own industry. Likewise with the other long list of resources Russia has.

They blew up the pipelines precisely to make the point that things will never go back to the way they were, with the response from European leaders being "and that's a good thing" and then bowing even lower and kissing the ring even sloppier than ever before.

There's no going back from that. That was the choke point: accept the destruction of your own infrastructure as a chastisement for even daring to have once upon a time thought of independent foreign policy thoughts, or then stand of for yourselves and have a foreign policy. For, if you accept the destruction of your own infrastructure by a foreign power you have no foreign policy (total subjugation being defined in this context as not-a-foreign-policy).

There's no need for a war with Russia.

What better way to hamstring Europe going forward than to leave it with war on the continent as a parting gift?

That will only increase European dependence on American weapons and goods. — Tzeentch

The problem with this is that you can't easily rinse and repeat Ukraine with other European countries as they are all in NATO. So the US would need to exit NATO, which is still part of it's force protection and prestige.

A war with Russia could go nuclear, so that needs to be taken into consideration.

But probably most importantly a proper Russian-European non-nuclear war would still likely be a marginal affair. Neither side has the forces to conquer large parts of the other's territory. Russians can't just march to Berlin, Germans can't just march to Moscow.

So actually starting such a war, with the US walking away, would simply create exactly what you claim the fear is of Europe leaving the US sphere of influence. New leaders would come in representing this fact and simply make peace with Russia and do exactly all the things this plan is supposed to avoid.

The status quo and it's natural progression, however, of a new cold war, of the eternal Russian bogeyman, of constant tensions and sabre rattling while Europe remains starved of resources, floundering economically, domestic and inter-European infighting, nationalism on the small scale, all that would accomplish the goals you layout for the Unites States.

Brexit having been the first step in this process (whether orchestrated or simply a surprise geopolitical gift for the US), and the Ukraine war locking the process in.

For whom the war with Russia is important is the current European technocrats that went all in backing the war and justify the economic sacrifices, geopolitical sacrifices, Ukrainian sacrifices, infrastructure sacrifices by the hand of the US, by reference to a higher calling and set of ideals it's worth sacrificing so much for, that borders shouldn't ever change by force (Europe has always stood for that, it's a long tradition) ... ideals that were ironically also sacrificed during the same period in Gaza and Sudan.

So a lot of sacrifices and if you have nothing to show for your toil the only way to delay the day of reconning is to say you haven't finished toiling yet, being asked a progress report completely disrupts the flow state, you "got this", and so to come back later. We've all been there and now the EU elites are also there.

What better way to hamstring Europe going forward than to leave it with war on the continent as a parting gift?

That will only increase European dependence on American weapons and goods. — Tzeentch

Slow boil yes. But abrupt: fight the Russians alone, we out of NATO, but also keep buying our weapons, may not get the desires response.

The current situation of European moral indignation and outrage and sabre rattling without any EU citizen needing to pay a direct cost of war so the virtue signalling can just keep going and intensifying like lighting off fireworks in a disco, without also these weapons systems ever being tested, is what maximized European purchase of US arms.

An actual war requires high volume commodity production of the basics, such as artillery shells. Why the West didn't provide that for Ukraine is because it's low profit, so just winding down stockpiles without a plan for continued protection is the high-profit, sophisticated Wall Street move.

What creates the need for high-end, high-sophistication, high-profit weapons systems (whether they work or not) is the continuous prospect of a war that never happens (and if that war never arrives then who's to say what weapons actually work).

In terms of arms profiteering we're in a sweet spot right now, no need to go making waves with all this "put bold words in action" immature talk.

It's a reasonable alternative theory, but I don't see the US giving up their hegemonic empire without a fight. — Tzeentch

We agree on the motivations, the question is capacity (and a lucid understanding and response to that capacity).

If China has simply got too powerful and US war planners and elites understand that, then they may in response retrench where they can and strive for a modus vivendi with China, which largely already exists with China.

I think the US has no real reason to let China develop peacefully in a process by which it will almost certainly surpass the US in power. The US is still powerful now, and it has many allies in the Pacific which can easily cut off Chinese access to sea trade (which is the staple of US policy vis-á-vis China). — Tzeentch

The problem is geographical. China is immense and politically consolidated to all its natural borders.

The exception being its border with Russia.

Hence the strategy in the cold war was to maintain tensions between China and the Soviet Union.

However, if there's no way to run that strategy again, mainly because China has way less to fear from Russia than the former Soviet Union (China's way stronger now and Russia isn't the Soviet Union), and Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons and seems clear they are both content to just do business, then the odd-man-out becomes Europe.

If Russia-China collaboration cannot be prevented, then the next best thing is to cutoff Europe from Russia and prevent pan-Eurasion economic integration.

Trade between China and Europe will become almost an impossibility, especially if the Europeans and the Russians are at war.

You can see how vulnerable the Chinese actually are in a hypothetical scenario where its trade cannot flow overland freely. This is of equal importance to why the US wants to see Europe and Russia at war. — Tzeentch

Some giant conflagration is possible to achieve these ends. I'm not saying it's impossible, but there's a lot of practical difficulties and the results are not guaranteed. It's a high risk gamble to have Europe fight the Russians and not help, they may just go make peace with the Russians. There's also a geography problem of exactly where this war would be fought.

War in the pacific I would argue is even less predictable.

So it's a high risk gamble with high risk consequences to US business and domestic effects also.

If, on the other hand, the Europeans and the Russians kept relations good enough to facilitate trade, Chinese goods could find alternative land routes via Russia.

The Russians through their conservative approach to the war in Ukraine are signaling that they understand this and are trying not to burn all bridges vis-á-vis European-Russian relations, basically meaning to normalize after the conflict in Ukraine simmers down. — Tzeentch

Agreed that these are the considerations.

The question is, however, whether the Europeans cannot be successfully goaded into some extreme actions that force Russia to act (for example, Kaliningrad), especially when we consider the European Trans-Atlantic elite holds all the levers of power and is basically carrying out American foreign policy no questions asked. — Tzeentch

This is an example of the geographical problems mentioned. Around Kaliningrad you can have of course some skirmish, even major skirmish, but the geography is not setup for extended indefinite warfare as with Ukraine. In addition to the complicating factor of nuclear weapons.

You could have a second Ukraine in Finland, but there's not really anywhere to go from Finland, you just reach the sea so it's not some existential risk to Europe. You could have a new contact line killing a lot of Finns to maintain that doesn't really move. Russia would have their defensive system and Finns would have one facing the Russians and there's not really any need for either side to go on major offensives.

EU leaders need this to happen in order to say they are still working on it, as mentioned above, and maybe the US (as a "faction majority" of US elites and war planners) also prefers it, but it's not a giant all out European and US war. In my model a new Finno-Russian war is optional. It's an enhancement but doesn't fundamentally change the dynamic as Russia can't really invade Western Europe through Finland, so would just be the slow attrition of Finns until they capitulate (which is the reason against having this war, is that eventually Finns would be worn down and capitulate, so you either need to accept that outcome from the start).

To be clear, I find this enhanced version of my model the most likely, as lot's of parties inside Russia also would want continued warfare after the defeat of Ukraine so starting with Finland would be continuation, not a departure, for the status quo. And if there's one thing we know about the status quo is that it likes to be maintained in its current level of comfort.

However, this scenario is very far from WWIII.

Once the powder barrel is successfully lit and the gears of war start churning, it will be too late for second thoughts and there will be no going back. That's what the US is going to be banking on. — Tzeentch

Definitely already happened with Ukraine, but that therefore does not mean all potential wars must be started.

There are forces working against the start of new wars.

For the record, I hope I am wrong. — Tzeentch

Agreed.

To clarify one thing, in the above discussion we are investigating capacity, plans and intentions.

Your model of a large global conflagration to the point of severely constraining world trade, if not a nuclear war, can be started at anytime by accident.

So you can price into your model both dumb luck and incompetence as initiating factors.

My model could only happen with level heads managing the process, which is far from being priced into anything.

I think yours is a perfectly valid view to have. In spirit we agree: the Americans are playing a hidden hand using Europe and Ukraine as pawns.

To avoid this discussion from getting overly lengthy, I'll only respond to certain points where I think our views differ in interesting ways.

1. While Europe looks weak now, it is, in potential, a lot stronger than Russia. In fact, on paper Europe is to Russia what Russia is to Ukraine. When the Europeans get into a direct conflict with Russia, they will be motivated to mobilize all that of potential in ways and with a speed that defies normal peace-time expectations. It may even be able to score initial successes against the Russians, as Napoleon and Hitler did too.

Therefore, I think Europe may be successfully goaded into going to war with Russia on its own (or only with soft promises of US support), especially if some gigantic (potentially false-flag) incident takes place that swings European opinion.


2. China may look very well-established and geographically safe, but the entire question is how China will fare with its sea lanes cut off. The US may not need to land a single soldier on the Chinese mainland to starve the Chinese economy and create an asymmetrical situation not unlike the one which eventually sunk the Soviet Union.

The big question is whether the Chinese economy can stay afloat on only land-based trade and if it is able to strike back at the US in significant ways (apart from nuclear). I am very skeptical of that.

While China as a sovereign country is safe, China as an international rival to the US is not, and that is the dimension which matters in this fight over global dominance.


3. If the US is going to make a renewed bid at global domination, we can only expect them to be willing to take extraordinary risks. Barring a nuclear exchange (which benefits no one, and should thus be avoidable), the US sits high and dry on its island where the chances of fallout are minimal.

At worst, the US will lose and be demoted to secondary power status, isolated on its island in the western hemisphere. This is basically the situation we are already heading towards if several great powers (China, Europe and Russia) are allowed to consolidate in Eurasia.

I wouldn't underestimate whether the cost-benefit analysis from a US point of view can spur it towards extreme risk-taking.

↪boethius I think yours is a perfectly valid view to have. In spirit we agree: the Americans are playing a hidden hand using Europe and Ukraine as pawns. — Tzeentch

Yes, we definitely agree on the fundamentals and the objectives of world domination.

The only issue is what can practically be achieved and what will be attempted (rational or irrational).

1. While Europe looks weak now, it is, in potential, a lot stronger than Russia. In fact, on paper Europe is to Russia what Russia is to Ukraine. When the Europeans get into a direct conflict with Russia, they will be motivated to mobilize all that of potential in ways and with a speed that defies normal peace-time expectations. It may even be able to score initial successes against the Russians, as Napoleon and Hitler did too.

Well yes and no.

There's lot's of practical issues in terms of the geography that such a war would take place, nuclear weapons, Europe's larger economy is not industrial, debts compared to Russias war chest, etc.

However, the two biggest factors are Europe is not a united nation state and China is backing Russia.
— Tzeentch

Therefore, I think Europe may be successfully goaded into going to war with Russia on its own (or only with soft promises of US support), especially if some gigantic (potentially false-flag) incident takes place that swings European opinion. — Tzeentch

Limited war, perhaps ("enhanced cold war" with a limited Finno-Russian war added on top I think is likely, which is of course the pattern of the original cold war with "enhancements" in Korea, Vietnam and so on); however, some sort of total war involving all of Europe seems to me very unlikely due to the lack of unity and the lack of a sensible war plan (such a war would go nuclear, compared to a bunch of Finns dying the forest "standing up" to the Russians wouldn't be much of a bother).

2. China may look very well-established and geographically safe, but the entire question is how China will fare with its sea lanes cut off. The US may not need to land a single soldier on the Chinese mainland to starve the Chinese economy and create an asymmetrical situation not unlike the one which eventually sunk the Soviet Union. — Tzeentch

It is of course an interesting question, but the US also does a lot of trade as well as fabrication in China and the region (which is integrated with China's manufacturing base).

So it would also have immense domestic effects as well as immense consequence to multi-national corporations.

It's unclear to me what the end game would be, as China wouldn't just "go away" in such a scenario, but whether faring better or worse would be fighting back both diplomatically and militarily. So it's unclear to me how long the US could maintain such a force posture of blockading China indefinitely, and once some agreement needs to be reached (like we see is becoming necessary with Russia) then I don't see a reason to assume the whole ordeal would be more costly to China than to the US

While China as a sovereign country is safe, China as an international rival to the US is not, and that is the dimension which matters in this fight over global dominance. — Tzeentch

US may simply not have the capacity for such a move, is my main concern. Would be difficult to sustain and could easily damage the US just as much of pretty much everything, from domestic opposition and chaos to diplomatic standing in the world.

3. If the US is going to make a renewed bid at global domination, we can only expect them to be willing to take extraordinary risks. Barring a nuclear exchange (which benefits no one, and should thus be avoidable), the US sits high and dry on its island where the chances of fallout are minimal. — Tzeentch

But to really do what you're proposing, even if nuclear weapons are avoided somehow, would still require a lot of American soldiers and sailors and aviators fighting and dying.

Too much and that creates intense domestic opposition.

Just like the first cold war, you could have indirect engagements, even quite intense such as Vietnam and analogously Ukraine (in terms of fighting intensity), but still relatively small context on a global scale between the major players.

Trying to war game out some really intense direct conflict between the great powers is really difficult to even plot out a pathway to victory, must less be confident it can be achieved. That's my main issue with such a massive move as you are proposing.

I was going to type a more lengthy reply in response to some of your points, but I think in the 'limited war vs. full-scale conflict' you're defending a reasonable position, and I would like to settle that part of the discussion as follows:

I agree that the plan I am laying out for a potential US strategy to renew its hegemony would be an ambitious and risky one. Therefore, I think there's a reasonable chance for the US to take a more conservative approach in line with your limited war view.

Would you agree then that, considering hegemony is at stake, there is also a reasonable chance the US might steer towards a large escalation?


Since we seem to disagree about China's relative strength and vulnerability, and its capacity to strike back, giving us different ideas of the cost-benefit situation, I think this is the more interesting place towards which to steer our discussion.

I'd really like to know your rough ideas for a Chinese strategy in a war as described, in light of some of the thoughts I describe below:

It's unclear to me what the end game would be, as China wouldn't just "go away" in such a scenario, but whether faring better or worse would be fighting back both diplomatically and militarily. So it's unclear to me how long the US could maintain such a force posture of blockading China indefinitely, and once some agreement needs to be reached (like we see is becoming necessary with Russia) then I don't see a reason to assume the whole ordeal would be more costly to China than to the US — boethius

I think you underestimate what a sea blockade (and accompanying disruption of land-based alternatives) would do to China.

China's economy would implode, and its international trade network and ties with its overseas partners would be severed. It would essentially cease to be a great power overnight, leaving it with only its land-based military power to do what - invade a neighbor?

Meanwhile, its ability to incur costs on the US and allies would be very limited. It has the capability to create some freedom of movement close to its shores due to its missile arsenal, but that won't get its trade ships out of (mostly US-aligned) Asia.

A sea blockade would not be overly costly for the US, since it's the natural application of its oversized navy, not to mention the fact that it has various allies that would share in the costs.

South-Korea would probably be the place where China would seek to strike back, but even a total victory on the Korean peninsula would not solve China's fundamental issues.


Keep in mind, I will readily concede that much of this is speculative.

However, I am basing it on concrete actions by the US, and their parallels to geopolitical theory and the historical precedent of strategic planning during WW2.

Note also that I am not necessarily saying the US will be successful.

I was going to type a more lengthy reply in response to some of your points, but I think in the 'limited war vs. full-scale conflict' you're defending a reasonable position, and I would like to settle that part of the discussion as follows: — Tzeentch

In addition, this particular thread is focused on Ukraine so I haven't wanted to go too far off topic. I had intended to make a new thread focused on geopolitics on the global level, where the overall US strategy would be more suited to discussion.

Unfortunately I have not yet had the time, though Ukraine seems winding down now so perhaps suitable to now expand to it's roll / function in the global geopolitical struggle.

I agree that the plan I am laying out for a potential US strategy to renew its hegemony would be an ambitious and risky one. Therefore, I think there's a reasonable chance for the US to take a more conservative approach in line with your limited war view. — Tzeentch

Likewise, I do not find your proposal of a large scale and high intensity war implausible in the least. We've had world wars before in similar tense situations.

My criticism has been more in the form of a challenge precisely to get into details of how such a confrontation would play out and what the aims would be.

For, although things have stayed the same, in terms of great power rivalry, things have also changed in terms of nuclear weapons, global supply chains and also trains.

Since we seem to disagree about China's relative strength and vulnerability, and its capacity to strike back, giving us different ideas of the cost-benefit situation, I think this is the more interesting place towards which to steer our discussion. — Tzeentch

I'm not sure we disagree on capabilities.

The difference in comparing to WWI and WWII is that in those conflicts the situation was such that the losing side could be entirely conquered or forcing a capitulation.

The US has no means of actually conquering china and forcing a capitulation would require nuclear weapons. So the situation is similar to that of the cold war where the tensions were quite high and possibility of direct confrontation always present, but neither side was willing to risk nuclear war.

So this is the dynamic that I think is the best reference frame, in that proxy wars can be fought all over the place but pushing too directly and too forcefully may solicit nuclear escalation and so there's is extreme reticence.

For example, that is a central hypothesis to my analysis of the Ukraine conflict, that US / NATO could have supplied far more damaging systems and equipment far earlier that could have had a far greater chance of actually pushing the Russians back to their borders, but wargaming that out super duper probably results in the use of nuclear weapons. For, US / NATO could have provided all the cruise missiles, longer range air defences to strike aircraft, even F-35 and F-22's and diesel submarines and so on, if they "really, really, wanted", and most importantly a massive scale up of drone production and supply using that larger economic power even only of the US, Ukraine to win.

So my basic contention is that it would be a similar "not too much" stable point for US-Chinese relations.

I think you underestimate what a sea blockade (and accompanying disruption of land-based alternatives) would do to China.

China's economy would implode, and its international trade network and ties with its overseas partners would be severed. It would essentially cease to be a great power overnight, leaving it with only its land-based military power to do what - invade a neighbor? — Tzeentch

Implode is a strong term.

Obviously China would still be there with enormous production capacity and problem solving capacity, so China would then work on getting around the blockade.

There's also a lot of political complexity to a blockade due to massive problems for global supply chains.

Other neighbouring countries can be traded with by train but also China can send ships into neighbouring territorial waters and the US would need to then commit acts of war on those countries also.

I also don't have enough time at the moment to go to details, but these are the kinds of concerns I have with the prospect of a US blockade with China.

Assuming it does not go nuclear but China sort of "take it" they could anyways inflict costs on the US due to the lethality of missiles, China can keep US ships fairly far from the Chinese coast, certainly outside Chinese territorial waters, and then continuously run the blockade with a civilian ship and an escort. Chinese would be then within it's right both morally (for most people in the world) and also in international law to run the blockade with escort and then return fire. These ships could be unmanned.

So even if China cannot entirely break the blockade and defeat the US navy it can in this iterative process inflict costs with continuous improvement to the strategy.

So it becomes a case of how long can US maintain the blockade, to what extent it could contain blowback in the rest of the world for a clearly illegal blockade. Other countries may send their merchant ships to China, daring the US to sink them.

All of these factors would make things very messy and very quickly so my main issue is not so much that such a blockade could not be started but what is the endgame?

Navy ships are expensive and if the US is blockading China and China is regularly running the blockade and manages to sink ships, even a really nice ship ... the response can't just be nuclear (otherwise the correct strategy is just to nuke China to begin with), and once the US starts losing ships it's very difficult to engage in a war of attrition at sea (you sort of need either overwhelming control or then to leave, as we saw recently in the Red Sea even moderate costs inflicted by the Houthis caused the "Coalition of the whatever" to leave).

Now, without nuclear weapons then it would certainly be within the realm of possibility, if not super likely at this point, for the US et. al. to galvanize their populations into total war and go on a world conquest campaign and truly physically contain China. I'm not entirely confident what would actually happen in such a hypothetical but certainly conceivable.

However, with nuclear weapons, push too much on a nuclear armed state and at some point their going to resort to nuclear weapons use.

I'm not sure we disagree on capabilities.

The difference in comparing to WWI and WWII is that in those conflicts the situation was such that the losing side could be entirely conquered or forcing a capitulation.

The US has no means of actually conquering china and forcing a capitulation would require nuclear weapons. So the situation is similar to that of the cold war where the tensions were quite high and possibility of direct confrontation always present, but neither side was willing to risk nuclear war.

So this is the dynamic that I think is the best reference frame, in that proxy wars can be fought all over the place but pushing too directly and too forcefully may solicit nuclear escalation and so there's is extreme reticence.

For example, that is a central hypothesis to my analysis of the Ukraine conflict, that US / NATO could have supplied far more damaging systems and equipment far earlier that could have had a far greater chance of actually pushing the Russians back to their borders, but wargaming that out super duper probably results in the use of nuclear weapons. For, US / NATO could have provided all the cruise missiles, longer range air defences to strike aircraft, even F-35 and F-22's and diesel submarines and so on, if they "really, really, wanted", and most importantly a massive scale up of drone production and supply using that larger economic power even only of the US, Ukraine to win.

So my basic contention is that it would be a similar "not too much" stable point for US-Chinese relations. — boethius

This is mostly tying back to subjects of "limited war vs. full-scale war" which I think enough has been said about.

I instead wish to focus my reply on the more concrete aspects of a US-China conflict, as per the other portion of your post:

Implode is a strong term.

Obviously China would still be there with enormous production capacity and problem solving capacity, so China would then work on getting around the blockade. — boethius

Other neighbouring countries can be traded with by train [...] — boethius

The Chinese may be able to produce food, power and manufacture enough goods to maintain a non-critical standard of living, but modern economies cannot run on their own, not to mention the fact that China has a huge overseas trade network which would be severed overnight, together with all its foreign and domestic dependencies.

What I'm missing in your post is the fact that China's land access to foreign markets is very limited under the conditions we have discussed.

Trade with Russia is in all likelihood safe through Kazakhstan, Mongolia and (if all else fails) a corridor near Vladivostok.

Then it could probably maintain trade with some South-East Asian countries, though this region will likely be in chaos if this scenario were to come to pass.

But this is small fry - a fraction of what China has access to now, and a fraction of what China needs to stay a geopolitical contender.

Overland trade to India must pass through Pakistan or Bangladesh.

Trade to the Middle-East and Africa must pass through several unstable Central Asian countries and then pass through Iran, which will likely be at war with the US and Israel.

Trade to Europe must pass through Russia.

[...] China can send ships into neighbouring territorial waters and the US would need to then commit acts of war on those countries also. — boethius

These are not wartime considerations, in my opinion. What power does Vietnam have that it's going to enforce its territorial waters against a US coalition?

The US is already bombing neutral shipping for carrying Russian oil, and I believe the most recent attacks took place in Turkish waters.

Assuming it does not go nuclear but China sort of "take it" they could anyways inflict costs on the US due to the lethality of missiles, China can keep US ships fairly far from the Chinese coast, certainly outside Chinese territorial waters, and then continuously run the blockade with a civilian ship and an escort. Chinese would be then within it's right both morally (for most people in the world) and also in international law to run the blockade with escort and then return fire. These ships could be unmanned.

So even if China cannot entirely break the blockade and defeat the US navy it can in this iterative process inflict costs with continuous improvement to the strategy.

So it becomes a case of how long can US maintain the blockade, to what extent it could contain blowback in the rest of the world for a clearly illegal blockade. Other countries may send their merchant ships to China, daring the US to sink them.

All of these factors would make things very messy and very quickly so my main issue is not so much that such a blockade could not be started but what is the endgame?

Navy ships are expensive and if the US is blockading China and China is regularly running the blockade and manages to sink ships, even a really nice ship ... the response can't just be nuclear (otherwise the correct strategy is just to nuke China to begin with), and once the US starts losing ships it's very difficult to engage in a war of attrition at sea (you sort of need either overwhelming control or then to leave, as we saw recently in the Red Sea even moderate costs inflicted by the Houthis caused the "Coalition of the whatever" to leave).

Now, without nuclear weapons then it would certainly be within the realm of possibility, if not super likely at this point, for the US et. al. to galvanize their populations into total war and go on a world conquest campaign and truly physically contain China. I'm not entirely confident what would actually happen in such a hypothetical but certainly conceivable.

However, with nuclear weapons, push too much on a nuclear armed state and at some point their going to resort to nuclear weapons use. — boethius

Apologies for being blunt, but I think your idea of what a naval war in the Pacific would look like is not very realistic, and I understand now why you believe China is less vulnerable than it actually is.

To illustrate my point, I'm going to describe to you the path a Chinese merchant (or naval) vessel would have to take, in order to do anything.

1. A ship must leave port, which under a blockade will be mined and surveilled by submarines.

2. If a ship manages to leave port, it will then be subjected to submarine interdiction and long-range US fires from naval bases all over the area.

3. If the Chinese use their missile arsenal to keep US fleets at bay, and a large naval escort to counter submarine threats and intercept missiles, they can try to make a dash for the open ocean.

(Note that chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca, other Indonesian straits or the Sea of Japan will be essentially insurpassable due to mines, submarines and naval sea and air assets, in addition to land-based installations.)

4. To get to the open ocean, the Chinese fleet must then pass through TWO island chains which will provide similar obstacles as the previously mentioned sea straits. The fleet will also have to leave the Chinese missile umbrella as it travels further from the Chinese mainland.

5. In the unlikely event that the Chinese fleet survives the gauntlet, it has now reached the open Pacific, where it will be no match for the US navy.

6. But where would they even go from there? Would they cross the Pacific to do trade in South America? Would they sail around Cape Horn towards Europe and Africa? Would they sail around Australia? Hopefully you start to see the problem.


And this strategy is not overly costly for the US at all. All of the capabilities and assets have been in the region for decades, neatly stashed away in US bases waiting for a job. The US also has several allies in the region, and they are strategically very well situated.


I don't see a concrete plan for how the Chinese can counteract these massive threats.

It can use its missile arsenal to impose costs on the US when it sails close to Chinese shores, but there is no onus on the US to do so.

At best, the Chinese can try to achieve something on the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan, but at that point we're probably already talking several years of full-scale war, the primary cost of which would not be borne by the United States.


Meanwhile, this base-line scenario already seems to me catastrophic for China as a great power, and in my view would already suffice to achieve US strategic goals of re-establishing global primacy by knocking down China.

The nuclear dimension is of course more difficult to predict, but ultimately nuclear war is something neither the Chinese nor the Americans benefit from.

I also think China is unlikely to resort to nuclear weapons if the Americans do not threaten mainland China with an invasion, which, as discussed, they really don't need to do.

Right now I'm travelling and gotta do a lot of things, so I can't do full justice to your post right now, but hopefully in a few days.

However, I'd like to address what I think is the heart of the matter.

Apologies for being blunt, but I think your idea of what a naval war in the Pacific would look like is not very realistic, and I understand now why you believe China is less vulnerable than it actually is. — Tzeentch

I'm taking your premise as given that the US simply wins in the pacific. Of course there's plenty of details that could be debated, given China's immense industrial capability and perhaps their own secret weapons and all that.

However, assuming the US wins the initial engagement, what I'm talking about is the time span of like 10 years.

Even without nuclear weapons, China is obviously going to develop a counter strategy and seek every way to break the blockade.

So my central question to the proposal is can the US just keep this up for a decade or even more? What exactly is the end game?

There would be immense industrial and political blowback to implementing a blockade. Substituting China completely in all industrial processes is a tall task. The blockade would be clearly viewed as illegal and illegitimate for the entire world so other countries may protest, sending their own merchant ships to China while also potentially refusing to trade with the US. There could be continuous industrial and political crisis after crisis to maintain such a policy.

So what's the long term strategy. Do you consider the US et. al. more industrially self sufficient than Russia + China and co. ?

The costs mentioned in my previous post of running the blockade and optimizing a strategy to inflict costs on the US (causing casualties) is over this 10 year period of consideration. Is your premise that the US would have no casualties in such an intense conflict with China over the long term? Or then the casualties are acceptable and supported domestically?

So these are the kinds of end game issues I have a hard time seeing how they can be dealt with by the US over the long term.