Then making coffee is also philosophy. — Frederick KOH

I acknowledge there is a difference between doing science in a self-consciously philosophical way and "shutting up and calculating". My point is only that all human activities are practiced philosophically insofar as human worldviews, involving ethical, aesthetic and metaphysical assumptions, however tacit they may be, are always involved.

What's the difference between

Philosophy only in the sense of what's left after you take out the formal and empirical parts of your area of inquiry. Or to borrow from another phrase, "discipline of the gaps". — Frederick KOH

and

all human activities are practiced philosophically insofar as human worldviews, involving ethical, aesthetic and metaphysical assumptions, however tacit they may be, are always involved. — John

The difference is that you cannot "take out the formal and empirical parts of your enquiry" except in abstracto. And it is the in concreto that really matters.

The difference is that you cannot "take out the formal and empirical parts of your enquiry" except in abstracto. And it is the in concreto that really matters. — John

Yes, I quite agree. This is especially true when the "formal part" of the inquiry is being identified with some abstract and uninterpreted formalism, as the earlier mention to the "shut up and calculate" approach to empirical science suggested. In actual cases of scientific practice -- i.e. "in concreto" -- a specific interpretation always is either tacitly assumed or agreed upon (but always only partially rendered explicit) by scientists who work within a shared theoretical or technological paradigm. Such a background understanding is required if the formalism is to be brought to bear determinately to specific experimental setups or domains of empirical observation.

It is paradoxical that the "shut up and calculate" approach has come to be associated with the so called Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Mechanics while the actual intent of Bohr and Heisenberg was to stress the ineliminability of the background "classical" features of the experimental conditions (and thus also of the agency of the observers) in the definitions of quantum "observables". One thing that the formalism of QM (be it Heisenberg's, Schrödinger's, Dirac's or any other picture) can't achieve on its own is defining the nature of the observables. There is no self-sufficient and uninterpreted use of the formalism of quantum theory that can be of any use in making predictions of empirical observations. The "shut up and calculate" approach to empirical science is a total non-starter.

Postmodernism is not a group of people. It's also of not inherently linked to the increasingly narrowing branches of study in centralized schooling.

It's a distinct branch of philosophy that is derived from and can (with it's unique set of axioms) find itself in direct conflict with existing modernism.

This thread is about determining which methodology (modernism or postmodernism) can be determined most correct.

My proposition would be that modernism imposes a higher standard for relevance to objective reality. That standard is the entire logos which science and mathematics are built upon. Postmodernism, on the other hand, has no standard; it does not even have an ethic, unless the work of the postmodernist clearly states so.

For these reasons I can only conclude that postmodernism is rubbish. The propositions of it, obfuscated by it's complexity, can not stand up to the slightest criticism. Not because the material is untrue, but because it makes no claim of truth. Instead, it imposes the question of whether or not truth can exist upon it's critic. If the critic is (the entire logical embodiment of) modernism, the modernism essentially reduces to state that truth is truth, and begins the introduction of logicism by next explaining how truth is the sum of parts. T=T, but T = T1, T2, so on and so forth until you've invented the foundation of mathematics. The explanation for why objective reality exists is fleshed out in all the splendors of logicism, but why logic works at all is a very exhausting explanation. Irreducible truth must be agreed upon before the interaction between modernism and postmodernism even begins, but this is what never happens in post modernism. To find an irreducible truth, proofs must be found at all levels: reduction, prediction and reproduction. In the absence of this process, you have a nonstarter.

The deceptive thing about postmodernism, is that it so borrows from all true philosophy on a nonstarter. It does not conform to the logos, period. However, the postmodernist inevitably seems right, having provided such a complex and loosely tied collection of modernist ideas. It appears as if the nonstarter is initiated by the critic, but it actually begins with the postmodernist's choice to refuse conformity with an irreducible truth. Without roots in the fundamentals of logicism, or a willingness to adhere to those fundamentals, we can immediately begin analyzing the main axioms of the postmodern philosophy. The next issue inevitably becomes the the lack of an irreducible primary of truth, other than of course an irreducible primary stating that truth is not an irreducible primary. Which is like saying 1 does not equal 1, without saying why.

In my view postmodernism can immediately be seen to say nothing. But that's the thing, people will often ask questions like "who's postmodernism?" or "what postmodernism?"

These questions are from a lacking understanding, in my estimation. It's not about the postmodernism, it's about postmodernism itself.

There is no self-sufficient and uninterpreted use of the formalism of quantum theory that can be of any use in making predictions of empirical observations. — Pierre-Normand

Why limit your assertion to formalisms and quantum theory?
Why would your assertion not apply as well to plain prose in a less mathematical endeavor?
In fact why would it not apply to doing washing machine settings based on what the manual says?

That's more or less why you would struggle with postmodernism. It's point is (a) truth is not the sum of its parts at all, but a unique entity, which often co-exists with others, sometimes even to apparent contradiction-- to use your 1 does not equal 1 example: it might be true that 1 is 1 but it is also true that, for example, a person may think: "1 does not equal 1" at the same time.

The modernist account which reduces the world to a single abstracted idea or truth is mistaken, and produces a myth that there is nothing else but that idea.

Where modernism reduces everything to the objective without a viewpoint, the postmodernist points out any instance of (a) truth amounts to a viewpoint. In a sense, subjectivities, viewpoints, are objective and not even contraction or conflict can take them away.

With respect to that, I wouldn't characterize what I have as "my struggle with postmodernism."

I'd characterize it as "the struggle with postmodernism."

The subjective viewpoint of postmodernism is actually therefor the objective viewpoint of all postmodernism. It can be reduced to and equated to a nonstarter. All postmodernism is different, but exactly the same in the fact that it flies in the face of the very concept of an irreducible primary, even despite having one.

That makes it complete and utter nonsense, does it not?

Why limit your assertion to formalisms and quantum theory?
Why would your assertion not apply as well to plain prose in a less mathematical endeavor?
In fact why would it not apply to doing washing machine settings based on what the manual says? — Frederick KOH

My assertion wasn't limited to quantum theory. Quite the contrary, it purports to apply to all domains of empirical discourse, scientific or not. This may have seem to be surprising to early discoverers of QM (or contemporary thinkers who haven't assimilated its lessons) since classical particle mechanics (and classical field theories) would have seem to offer clear paradigms of "uninterpreted" (or "purely objective") mathematical description of fundamental "material" reality. Prior to QM, physics had been viewed as the science of the "primary qualities" of objects, in the sense of Locke (as distinguished from "secondary qualities" that aren't intrinsic to objects but merely characterize their propensities to affect our sense organs and our minds in specific ways).

But QM turned out to display the mechanics of the smallest bits of mere "matter" not to constitute an exceptions to the case of the "high level" sciences that can't abstract from concepts essentially pegged to human interests. The indispensability of human interpretation in the cognitive apprehension of empirical objets turns out to apply across the board, as Kant had already seen it to be the case even concerning Locke's "primary quality" concepts (including, notoriously, spatial and temporal relationships).

The indispensability of human interpretation in the cognitive apprehension of empirical objets turns out to apply across the board, — Pierre-Normand

As long as we don't call all of it (the interpretation) "philosophy", which was my original point.

The point is there is no reduction, no (supposedly) irreducible primary to which everything is reduced.

Truths are beyond a singular primary. Its objectivity is not formed by squishing everything into it, but rather by all sorts of different truths expressing it.

Rather, there are many irreducible primaries, sometimes in conflict, all at once-- it's not an irreducible primary that counts for everything, but merely a truth we might talk about. It's not an all encompassing viewpoint at all. There are viewpoints to which there is no truth at all. There are viewpoints where everything is reduced to an idea.

As long as we don't call all of it (the interpretation) "philosophy", which was my original point. — Frederick KOH

Yes, sure. Scientist sometimes tend to be dogmatic and philistine, especially when they are faithful to the religions of scientism and reductionism. In that case, when they specialize in the science of hammers, they are happy to proclaim that the whole world is made up of nails and nothing else. This needs not hamper their professional abilities so long as they are operating within productive research programs (as often happens within episodes of Kuhnian "normal science") and there is lots of fruitful "puzzle solving" to be accomplished within the prevailing scientific paradigm. When those research programs become "degenerative" (Imre Lakatos), then those scientists often are happy to ignore more productive areas of research, and they keep on hammering screws with a sledgehammer.

The point is there is no reduction, no (supposedly) irreducible primary to which everything is reduced.

Truths are beyond a singular primary. Its objectivity is not formed by squishing everything into it, but rather by all sorts of different truths expressing it.

Rather, there are many irreducible primaries, sometimes in conflict, all at once-- it's not an irreducible primary that counts for everything, but merely a truth we might talk about. It's not an all encompassing viewpoint at all. There are viewpoints to which there is no truth at all. There are viewpoints where everything is reduced to an idea. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It sounds like you've forgotten that the logos is about reducing itself to the the truth, not being the truth. It's necessary for a representation of truth to do this, otherwise it contains non of that which is seeks to explain.

If postmodernism aims to be beyond a singular primary, it must then be truth -- not be aligned with truth, but be the truth. And that, of course, is not possible for any philosophy. Philosophy can, at best, represent an equivalence to truth. That's what modernism does, and what postmodernism does not.

You're highlighting only the flaws with postmodernism, don't you think?

Scientist sometimes tend to be dogmatic and philistine, especially when they are faithful to the religions of scientism and reductionism. — Pierre-Normand

It would be more accurate to say that most are apathetic to philosophy and too indifferent to care about whether what they do is scientism or reductionism. Those who care slightly more can always call their "ism" methodological and leave the debate to philosophers.

In that case, when they specialize in the science of hammers, they are happy to proclaim that the whole world is made up of nails and nothing else. — Pierre-Normand

I am very sure ornithologists agree with chemists and physicists about what birds are made out of.

When those research programs become "degenerative" (Imre Lakatos), then those scientists often are happy to ignore more productive areas of research, and they keep on hammering screws with a sledgehammer. — Pierre-Normand

The last time things became degenerative, physicists rushed to the new paradigm.

Interesting inference.

I am very sure ornithologists agree with chemists and physicists about what birds are made out of. — Frederick KOH

Physicists can't agree among themselves what atoms are made out of, let alone what birds are. "...Being made out of..." is a relational predicate of restricted scope that has furthermore variable, contextually determined, interpretations. A lump of coal is 'made of' carbon atoms in a different way than a sport team is 'constituted of' individual players (at a given time) or a bird is 'made of' living organs. That's because things that are "made out of" distinctive parts also are characterized by form, and not just matter. Furthermore, what kind of form (or functional organization) they exemplify contributes to the specification of the "...made out of..." relational predicate that relates the whole object to its significant parts (in addition to defining what sort of object it is). Consider also, a computer being 'made out of' elementary logical gates, a governments being 'made out of' agencies, etc. etc.

Even if one conceded that, in a sense, most every "thing" (i.e. broadly "material" things) are made out of atoms (or "physical matter", whatever that turns out to be), material constitution just is one among many of the defining features that most material things have. So, this allegedly broad agreement among different sorts of scientists, regarding the ultimate material composition of empirical entities, would be agreement about very little that is of significance to the understanding of the empirical world (unless one is a rather naive and uncritical reductionist).

So, this allegedly broad agreement among different sorts of scientists, regarding ultimate material composition, would be agreement about very little that is of significance to the understanding of the empirical world (unless one is a rather naive and uncritical reductionist). — Pierre-Normand

What was this broad agreement (if there was one) like in 1000AD (or 1000CE if you like)?
Significance indeed.

The last time things became degenerative, physicists rushed to the new paradigm. — Frederick KOH

It's mostly the young folks with open (and also unformed and naïve) minds who readily embrace emerging paradigms. Scientists who already have been trained, and have been successfully operating within, the older paradigm often stick to it until they die (as Max Planck famously observed). Lorentz came close to develop the special theory of relativity bet never embraced it. Einstein pioneered some key aspects of the new QM but never relinquished the degenerative quest for hidden variables. Fields like biology, medicine, geology, cognitive and social sciences, etc., of course furnish plenty of examples of die hard degenerative research programs that linger on for decades and stubborn advocates of the status quo. Philosophy is, of course, no exception even though is has a built in anti-dogmatic character. I am not lamenting any of this. It seems to be a necessary consequence of the fact that access to uninterpreted empirical reality is impossible.

What was this broad agreement (if there was one) like in 1000AD (or 1000CE if you like)?
Significance indeed. — Frederick KOH

I am not questioning that physics, and the atomic theory of matter, are significant intellectual achievements. They most certainly are. I am rather arguing that such material sciences aren't any different from other sciences in point of reliance on (often merely tacit and uncritical) interpretation of the scope of their claims (e.g. the interpretation of their "laws", and of what would constitute falsification of then, or admissible auxiliary hypotheses, or genuine boundaries of the domain of the specific science, etc.) I am also questioning the reductionist assumption that material composition of the ordinary objects of the human and natural worlds are any more fundamental or determinative than other equally significant (in point both of definition and behavioral determination) formal and relational features of them.

access to uninterpreted empirical reality is impossible. — Pierre-Normand

Isn't that because consciousness of any kind is in some sense interpretive? I think the point of philosophical wisdom is to be aware of the sense in which that is true, in other words, to be critically self-aware.

What scientific methods do offer is a way to discover, measure and describe those elements of experience that are common to all observers, thereby zeroing out, as much as possible, the merely idiosyncratic or subjective. However, in so doing, they're not necessarily disclosing an absolute truth, as scientific hypotheses don't general operate at that level of universality; they're useful precisely because they're very specific in some sense (even though they might have very wide application).

I think where postmodernism fails is that it takes this limitation to be a warrant for a kind of indiscriminate relativism, that as there are no absolutes, in the traditional sense, and as science is a matter of falliballistic hypotheses, then all manner of truths are 'in the eye of the beholder', so to speak.

...

I think where postmodernism fails is that it takes this limitation to be a warrant for a kind of indiscriminate relativism, that as there are no absolutes, in the traditional sense, and as science is a matter of falliballistic hypotheses, then all manner of truths are 'in the eye of the beholder', so to speak. — Wayfarer

Absolutism (dogmatic metaphysics, as Kant would call it, metaphysical realism, as Putnam would call it) ignores the constitutive role of human concepts in the disclosure of the empirical world. Indiscriminate relativism ignores constraints that are internal to conceptualized empirical reality. Putnam has proposed an alternative to both a naive conception of objectivity (embodied in scientific modernity) and the unqualified rejection of objectivity. He advocated this alternative under the label Realism with a Human Face. John McDowell and David Wiggins also have advocated forms of naturalized Kantianism that appeal to both Wittgenstein and Aristotle in order to demystify the role of human concepts in the constitution of empirical reality (while also bridging the gap between practical and theoretical reason). If post-modernism is correct in its criticism of absolutist metaphysics, thinkers like Putnam, McDowell and Wiggins have suggested that this criticism can be acknowledged while a suitably pragmatized Kantian concept of objectivity (which Wiggins also called 'A Sensible Subjectivism' -- see Chapter 5 in his Needs, Value, Truth) can be salvaged.

thank you again Pierre Normand, a fount of interesting references as always. :-)

You're welcome. Since the OUP link for Wiggin's book now seems dead (at least on my end) here is another one: Needs, Value, Truth.

Have you read Mark Wilson's Wandering Significance? He's a college of Brandom I think (who wrote a glowing review of the book) and it's been cited in a few 'continental' circles that I know, so I'm pretty keen to get onto it.

It has been on my Amazon wish list for a while, and this list has 850 items currently! Thanks for remembering me of it. I may move this title nearer to the top since it is quite intriguing.

Let me know if you do end up getting on it, I'm hoping to read it sometime this year maybe, it'd be good to have a reading partner : )

Oddly enough, in the arts, my view has always been that modernism did the opposite to your claim; rather, it problematized 'truth'. If you take 'The waste land', Eliot presented a diverse range of voices with no clear overarching 'truth' at all (although later he became a Christian). If you take the novel, Woolf or Joyce or Dos Passos presented us with a plurality of subjective voices as against the Victorian era novel where you always knew what the author would think. If you take painting and sculpture, the Impressionists, Picasso and the Cubists inaugurated devastating assaults on old ways of truth-telling. Take 'The rites of Spring' and Schoenberg...where is the sanctuary of truth in all this?

I have an interest in postmodernism in the arts, also I see a parallel process going on to that which is going on in philosophy.

I would say that postmodernism in the arts has had to find/establish/invent its own foundations/feet. This is a reaction to the crisis of identity brought about by the breaking of the foundational mould by modernism. It was left realing for a number of decades with a nebulous expression of personal reactions to this crisis of identity. In the visual arts there was an acute degeneration into shite, quite literally with Chris Offili's Turner Prize winning piece. Other fields in the arts went in various and interesting directions.

The result of all this is that art is now becoming creatively diverse with individual artists following their own personal path of creativity, free of subjective restraints. There doesn't appear to be a new grand movement coalescing at the moment. But there are many interesting developments, or movements on the small scale.

As to the value(read truth) in art these days, there are no rules anymore. A favourite quote of mine is what Grayson Perry said about the value of art. He called it the skip test. Put your work in a skip and see how long it is before someone walks off with it. If it doesn't leave the skip, it has no value and may not be art.