• Bartricks
    6k
    I often hear talk of possible worlds and am told that this is a way of thinking about necessity and contingency. I do not know what necessity and contingency are, let me be honest. And thinking about possible worlds does not help me. But comparing talk of necessary and contingent truths to talk of hoity and toity truths has helped me.

    I recently read Toity Worlds by Prof. Boule Sheet. It's a very important work, I think.

    Sheet argues that all truths can be sorted into two categories: hoity truths and toity truths. And what he says about them seems to mirror almost perfectly those other two categories that some like to sort truths into - the necessary and the contingent. But the beauty of hoity truths and toity truths is that they give us a simulation, so to speak, of the necessary and the contingent. I will run that simulation now in the hope that it will tell us something about the confused nature of what some people have been saying about contingency and necessity.

    For instance, when asked to define what hoity means, Sheet tells us that a hoity truth is not a toity truth. And he tells us as well that a toity truth is not a hoity truth. Well, that is also true of the necessary and the contingent. For if a truth is necessary, then it is not contingent. And if a truth is contingent, then it is not necessary.

    So, if a truth is hoity, it is not toity. And if a truth is toity, it is not hoity. Clear?

    Sheet also then introduces us to toity worlds to try and give us a handle on matters. Thinking of matters in terms of toity worlds is just supposed to help us grasp the concept, though I have to admit that it is hard to see how this could work for those of us - such as myself - who are starting out unclear on the matter, for surely unless we already understand what toity means, the notion of a toity world is going to be one we are not going to understand, as it is just 'world' with the word 'toity' appended to it, a word we do not yet understand aside from it being 'not hoity'. The whole exercise looks a little suspicious from the get go and likely to appeal to those empty kettles who have nothing to say but like to find a way to say it anyway.

    But anyway, let's go with it. I mean, Professor Boule Sheet is very respected, at least in my mind, so we should at least make some effort to understand what he may be going on about.

    So, when it comes to toity truths, a toity truth is a proposition that is true in at least one toity world. That is, Sheet assures us, just another way of saying that a proposition is toity. (Not really helpful, for it is like saying that another way of saying that something is bread, is to say that it is made of bread).

    But a hoity truth is, well, a proposition that is true in all toity worlds. Now that's a little odd, isn't it? If a proposition is true in all toity worlds, why is that proposition not just, well, toity? What was the point in introducing us to toity worlds if hoity truths are inhabiting them? It's confusing. Is to me.

    Ah, but Sheet says that the actual world is also a toity world. For any truth that is actually true, says Sheet, also a toity truth. So any true proposition - whether hoity or toity - is true in a toity world of some sort. It's just that the ones he calls hoity are true in all of the toity worlds, which includes the actual world.

    But that has really removed none of the confusion, at least not in my case. We want to know what being toity involves. We were introduced to the notion of a toity world precisely in order to do that. And then we are told that toity truths are true in some of these toity worlds. But then we are told that hoity truths are true in all of them. Well how, then, are hoity truths not just a species of toity truth? It seems that if a toity truth is true in enough toity worlds, then it somehow becomes a hoity truth. How does that work, given hoity truths are supposed to be the very opposite of toity truths?

    Ah, well Sheet says that this is just the definition of a hoity truth: a hoity truth is a truth that is true in all toity worlds. Well, that's naughty. We were told that hoity truths are, by definition, 'not' toity truths. That is, that they are the opposite of them. But then we are told that the definition of a hoity truth is that it is a truth in all toity worlds. But that makes being hoity not the opposite of toity, but a kind of toity truth. Again, that's to say white is the opposite of black, but that black is actually a lot of white.

    Here's what Sheet should say to avoid being guilty of substituting one definition of hoity for a different one. He should say that though hoity truths will be true in all toity worlds, it does not follow that a truth that is true in all toity worlds is thereby hoity. Being hoity entails being true in all toity worlds, but being true in all toity worlds does not entail being hoity. If Sheet said that, then though we'd still be no wiser about what hoityness is, we'd at least not be being conned into accepting a definition very different to the one we started with.

    All of that, it seems to me, could be said just as truly of necessary and possible truths, where necessary truths are the hoity ones and possible truths are the toity ones. Necessary truths are the opposite of contingent truths. But one must not then define necessary truths as a species of contingent truth, which is what one would be doing if one made the very notion of a necessary truth identical to the notion of a truth that is true in all possible worlds. We can accept, perhaps, that a necessary truth will indeed by true in all possible worlds (though we will want an explanation of course). But we should not accept that as the very definition of a necessary truth. For then one is getting necessity out of contingency and not preserving the fact it is supposed to be the exact opposite of contingency. Seems to me, then, that those who think the very definition of a necessary truth is that it is a truth that is true in all possible worlds have made a serious blunder: that is not the definition of the term, it is, at best, a feature of necessary truths. And nothing stops a truth from being true in all possible worlds and also being contingent. To think otherwise is to have thought you can make some white paint black by mixing it with all the other white paint there is.
  • bongo fury
    1.7k
    But one must not then define necessary truths as a species of contingent truth,Bartricks

    I don't think anyone did? ... As a species of possible truth, sure. You see the difference? Contingent is defined as possible but non-necessary.
  • tim wood
    9.3k
    Read, understood (I think), and appreciated! Is this Dr. Jekyll? Anyway, I do not understand the use of the concept of many worlds, either in itself or its supposed efficacy for whatever it is supposed to be for. So why not simplify?

    Wrt a given set of criteria, true is definable. That is, something thereunder is either true, or it is not the case that it is true.

    This rules out could-be and maybe, the contingent and the possible. These a different phylum of animal and playing with them fraught with hazards, an infinite number, actually. God exists? Not by any standard of existence, thus not true. Well, how about non-standard standards of existence, and possible, contingent, and maybe & etc.? And the sound you don't hear is the explosion of the logical world. In which resulting chaos you should murder your father and marry and sleep with your mother. But all of this is an unjustified and unjustifiable step. And only made because of confusion of the true with the maybe, could-be, contingent, possibly true, which however sliced, diced, fricasseed are not true.
  • Bartricks
    6k
    It is commonplace - at least among those who talk of possible worlds - to think that if a proposition is true in all possible worlds, then it is a necessary truth. That is, that being true in all possible worlds is what being necessarily true is, not simply a feature of necessary truths that could be shared with contingent ones.

    Contingent is defined as possible but non-necessary.bongo fury

    A contingent truth is the opposite of a necessary truth. Saying 'possible but non-necessary' is like saying 'possible but possible'.
  • Bartricks
    6k
    God exists? Not by any standard of existence, thus not true.tim wood

    Why did you throw that in? God does exist. Indeed, it is by reflecting on the fact God exists that one can come to the conclusion that there are no necessary truths (whatever one of those may be). For if God exists, then all things are possible, given that God can do anything.

    So, if God exists, then there are just truths. And God does exist, as the canons of reason would not exist otherwise, and their existence is beyond a reasonable doubt.

    What exposing the hoity emptiness of necessity does, is it undermines a certain sort of ontological argument for God. But a) those arguments were not for God anyway, but for a hobbled creature who is unable not to exist and b) few thought there was anything in such arguments anyway.
  • tim wood
    9.3k
    God does exist.Bartricks
    Evidence or criteria, please. Else yours just a claim, as valid as an uncountable infinity of other claims.
  • bongo fury
    1.7k
    But one must not then define necessary truths as a species of contingent truth, which is what one would be doing if one made the very notion of a necessary truth identical to the notion of a truth that is true in all possible worlds.Bartricks

    But one wouldn't be doing the first by doing the second, quite the opposite. One would be defining necessary and contingent truths both, as mutually exclusive (and jointly exhaustive) species of possible truth.

    You might (I don't know) have an argument that such a definition is wrong. Unfaithful to pre-theoretic usage? But you denied having one?
  • bongo fury
    1.7k
    Anyway, you haven't helped yourself by appearing to want 'toity' to correspond to contingent as well as possible, and to worlds as well as truths. Because you end up referring to contingent worlds, which looks like you didn't understand what you're criticising.

    Haha, I just googled "true in all necessary worlds" to see if there isn't some bizarre mathematical dual of the usual possible worlds malarkey, and I'm surprised if (as appears so far) there isn't.
  • Bartricks
    6k
    Well, this is now off topic. But I have presented the argument before and received the standard replies (that is, say, it has the fault of having premises or of actually entailing its conclusion - that kind of thing, standard fare from the internet educated). This is the argument (each premise is either self-evidently true or is implied by self-evident truths):

    1. Imperatives of Reason exist
    2. All of the imperatives of Reason have a unitary source
    3. Existent minds and only existent minds issue existent imperatives
    4. Therefore, there is a single existent mind issuing all of the existent imperatives of Reason.
    5. The existent mind whose imperatives constitute the imperatives of Reason will be omnipotent
    6. The existent mind whose imperatives constitute the imperatives of Reason will be omniscient
    7. The existent mind whose imperatives constitute the imperatives of Reason will be omnibenevolent
    8. Therefore, the single existent mind whose imperatives constitute the imperatives of Reason is God (an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent mind).

    There is, I think, no reasonable way of resisting any of those premises. The weakest premise is 2, though I believe there are numerous arguments that can be provided for it, and it seems self-evidently true, as is reflected in the fact that we do talk of 'Reason' and mean by it the source of all reasons to do and believe things.

    The argument is valid, but it does not have to be. It just is. And the god - God - that it demonstrates to exist, is a person who can do anything precisely because the edicts of Reason are theirs to make or unmake as they choose. And so that being is not in any way bound by them. They express her, but do not constrain her. And as it is only by appeal to Reason that anyone could ever show that there are necessary truths - for the evidence that there are some is that Reason appears to say there are - there are, in fact, none, for anything Reason says she can not say too.
  • Bartricks
    6k
    Yes, google, the great authority on all things academic.

    Explain the difference between a proposition that is contingently true, and a proposition that is possibly true.
  • bongo fury
    1.7k
    Contingent is defined as possible but non-necessary.bongo fury
  • Bartricks
    6k
    And what does non-necessary mean?
  • Bartricks
    6k
    Do you need help? Does it, perhaps, mean 'possibly false'? Such that a contingent truth is a truth that is possibly true and possibly false?

    And doesn't that just mean that the distinction comes down to this: there are truths that are true and possibly false, and those that are true and not possibly false? Yes? Where truths are concerned, there are those two categories - or at least, so it is thought. The true and possibly false. And the true and not possibly false. The contingent and the necessary. The toity and the hoity.
  • arcadian
    1
    Could you link me to the complete text of 'Toity Worlds'? It sounds like a fascinating read
  • Bartricks
    6k
    Unfortunately there is not an online version. Professor Sheet was very eccentric and insisted on hand writing each copy - they're written on rolls of toilet paper and are very fragile and difficult to read - and they're exorbitantly expensive. I could sell you mine if you want? It'll be $2m.

    (To save money, you could just read any book or paper on possible worlds and substitute the word 'possible' with toity and necessary with hoity. And the logical symbol for toity is a chiliagon and the symbol for hoity is a testicle riding a horse into battle - takes a bit of effort to make those substitutions).
  • khaled
    3.5k
    2. All of the imperatives of Reason have a unitary sourceBartricks

    False. There have historically been multiple.

    The existent mind whose imperatives constitute the imperatives of Reason will be omnipotentBartricks

    False because it wouldn’t be able to do anything to someone who chooses to ignore it’s imperatives. Nor would it be able to lift a rock, just make the reasonable believe it was lifted. Last I checked, rocks don’t bow to the edicts of reason.

    6. The existent mind whose imperatives constitute the imperatives of Reason will be omniscientBartricks

    No premise leads to this.

    7. The existent mind whose imperatives constitute the imperatives of Reason will be omnibenevolentBartricks

    Definitely doesn’t follow from the above.
  • Bartricks
    6k
    Bartricks
    2. All of the imperatives of Reason have a unitary source
    — Bartricks

    False. There have historically been multiple.
    khaled

    Oh, okay. Good point. Well argued. Silly me.

    False because it wouldn’t be able to do anything to someone who chooses to ignore it’s imperatives. Nor would it be able to lift a rock, just make the reasonable believe it was lifted. Last I checked, rocks don’t bow to the edicts of reason.khaled

    Truth is constitutively determined by Reason. So Reason determines what's true. Thus Reason would be able to do anything to anyone. Those who choose to ignore Reason's imperatives are doing so because and only because she allows it.

    6. The existent mind whose imperatives constitute the imperatives of Reason will be omniscient
    — Bartricks

    No premise leads to this.
    khaled

    'It' is a premise. And the argument for it is that knowledge is determined by Reason. Why? Because for a proposition to be known is for there to be a reason to believe it. And guess who's in charge of what there's reason to believe? Yes, that's right - Reason. So Reason will be all knowing because knowledge itself is constitutively determined by her will. Like wot truth is.

    7. The existent mind whose imperatives constitute the imperatives of Reason will be omnibenevolent
    — Bartricks

    Definitely doesn’t follow from the above.
    khaled

    Again, it is a premise, not a conclusion. Sheesh. Go to school already. Reason's values constitutively determine what is morally valuable. And Reason is omnipotent. So she won't be any way she doesn't want to be, or so it is reasonable to believe. And thus Reason will fully value herself. And that's what being morally perfect involves.
  • khaled
    3.5k
    Silly me.Bartricks

    First true thing you say in a while.

    Truth is constitutively determined by Reason. So Reason determines what's true.Bartricks

    Sure.

    Thus Reason would be able to do anything to anyone.Bartricks

    Doesn’t follow.

    Those who choose to ignore Reason's imperatives are doing so because and only because she allows it.Bartricks

    How exactly would she go about disallowing it? The only power she has is the ability to determine the imperatives of reason. So what can she do to those who don’t listen to those such as yourself?

    'It' is a premise.Bartricks

    Again, it is a premise, not a conclusion. Sheesh. Go to school already.Bartricks

    Can’t tell with the quality of reasoning you’re displaying. I thought they were intended as a consequence of omnipotence. And I was right for the last one…. So it’s not even a premise, but leave it to Bart to tell someone to go to school while being unable to tell apart premise and conclusion in his own argument….

    Because for a proposition to be known is for there to be a reason to believe it. And guess who's in charge of what there's reason to believe? Yes, that's right - Reason. So Reason will be all knowingBartricks

    “If you know something -> You have reason to believe it”. Sure I’ll take that, but it is NOT the same as, and doesn’t lead to: “If you decide what counts as a reason to believe -> You know something/everything”.

    Reason is not in charge of “what there is reasonable to believe” but “what is a valid reason to believe something” (imperatives of reason). That’s what we established. She dictates the imperatives of reason, that doesn’t mean she knows what is reasonable to believe. Just like the dictator who decided the laws of a country doesn’t know who all the criminals are.

    Reason's values constitutively determine what is morally valuable.Bartricks

    Evidence? In this instance we can very much doubt our moral intuitions if we believe they are being dictated by someone else. Whereas we can’t doubt our logical intuitions without a logical argument, making it stupid to do so, doubting our moral intuitions producers no such contradictions.

    So, what reason do you have to trust your moral intuitions? What if your God is an evil deceiver? What if she values chaos, carnage and lies so she lies to us about what’s virtuous and tells us that the great evils of charity, tolerance and honesty are actually virtues! How dare she!

    And Reason is omnipotent. So she won't be any way she doesn't want to be, or so it is reasonable to believeBartricks

    Based on someone being omnipotent, with no further knowledge of their personality, there is no reason to conclude they won’t be any way they don’t want to be. Maybe she values effort and hates getting things for free and so doesn’t give herself the values she values, as that would he against her values due to its ease. (This is assuming she’s omnipotent, which she isn’t)

    And this is another instance where you confuse the standard meaning of omnipotence with what your god is actually able to do. Let’s go back to the source shall we? What your God can do, is determine the imperatives of reason. How can determining the imperatives of reason, allow God to change herself, or give herself certain virtues?

    And thus Reason will fully value herself. And that's what being morally perfect involves.Bartricks

    I value myself. Guess I’m morally perfect?

    What does this word salad even mean? No, being morally perfect is about being the “best” morally. The most charitable, the most chivalrous, etc (assuming those are actual virtues, not vices that we’ve been tricked into thinking are virtues because of an evil deceiver)
  • Bartricks
    6k
    Thus Reason would be able to do anything to anyone.
    — Bartricks

    Doesn’t follow.
    khaled

    Does.

    How exactly would she go about disallowing it? The only power she has is the ability to determine the imperatives of reason. So what can she do to those who don’t listen to those such as yourself?khaled

    See previous post - she's the arbiter of truth. So, for instance, it is true that you can't follow an argument. She could make that false. She hasn't. She could.

    Can’t tell with the quality of reasoning you’re displaying.khaled

    Yet I'm paid to do it.

    “If you know something -> You have reason to believe it”. Sure I’ll take that, but it is NOT the same as, and doesn’t lead to: “If you decide what counts as a reason to believe -> You know something/everything”.khaled

    Does.

    Reason's values constitutively determine what is morally valuable.
    — Bartricks

    Evidence? In this instance we can very much doubt our moral intuitions if we believe they are being dictated by someone else. Whereas we can’t doubt our logical intuitions without a logical argument, making it stupid to do so, doubting our moral intuitions producers no such contradictions.
    khaled

    I don't know what you're talking about. Moral norms are norms of Reason. So her attitudes - including her values - constitutively determine what's right and good. Jeez. How many times? She's all powerful. She's not going to make herself a way she doesn't value, is she? So she values herself. That makes her morally perfect.

    Let’s go back to the source shall we? What your God can do, is determine the imperatives of reason. How can determining the imperatives of reason, allow God to change herself, or give herself certain virtues?khaled

    Because she determines what's true. You're not really following this are you? You're lucky i'm a very fast typist and don't mind typing it all out again and again.

    I value myself. Guess I’m morally perfect?khaled

    Yeah, that definitely follows from what I've argued. Good job. A+.
  • Bartricks
    6k
    Thanks! Do you write greetings cards?
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