• Srap Tasmaner
    3.1k


    Here's another way to think about my story's reliance on our instinct for self-preservation.

    Do people who find themselves to be alive feel wronged by their parents? Overwhelmingly the answer is no, but there are obviously problems with that. Some, perhaps many, might feel that way sometimes, and that's a reminder that feelings are tied to specific events, to specific circumstances. People can have something like a feeling that is present across varying circumstances, but we tend to reach for different words there, something like "attitude" or maybe "outlook" or "mindset", though the latter have a more cognitive ring to me, more to do with expectations than affect.

    I find it plausible that we experience our own instinct for self-preservation largely as an attitude that life is fundamentally a good thing. There are of course extreme experiences when we just want it to stop, and those powerful feelings might trump the general attitude. There's a sort of corollary too, that we may generally have a pretty negative and sour affect but if we find ourselves suddenly in danger (car skidding off the road, that sort of thing) then our instinct for self-preservation will come roaring back as a feeling, a powerful desire not to die in this moment.

    Antinatalism is the claim that a person brought into being has thereby been wronged. Their being wronged might be accompanied by an attitude that they have or have not been wronged, or, more fleetingly, feelings that they have or have not been wronged. In other words, sometimes the antinatalist claim will align with the purported victim's own feelings or attitudes, and sometimes it won't.

    To start with, then, we need to clarify in what sense someone may have been wronged without feeling that they have been wronged. That's certainly possible, but I'm not sure the usual cases are much help. For example, if you steal from me but I don't know it, sure, I've been wronged and don't feel that I have been. But that's a matter of knowledge; if I knew, I would feel wronged. Being alive isn't like that: we know perfectly well that we are, and, past a certain age, we know perfectly well how we came to be. I haven't been able to think of an example that's more like the wrong life is supposed to be.

    Now for the wrong done. Is the wrong intermittent? That is, am I wronged by my parents only at the moments in my life when I am suffering? Taking that option, we could focus on whether, in those moments of suffering, I have feelings of having been wronged by my parents for bringing me into being. (And then, if those feelings are absent, we have to have ready an account of that, along the lines suggested in the previous paragraph.)

    Another option is that the wrong is something like exposure to risk of suffering; in that case, the risk is persistent from the beginning of your life until its end, and you are wronged in this sense every moment you are alive, whether you are suffering at the moment or not. An analogy for this sort of wrong leaps to mind, that of a general who sends troops on a mission based on a preposterously faulty idea. The troops may come to no harm, through luck or their own ability, but they will still feel wronged; they will resent having had to run that risk because of someone else's folly. Here again, we need an account of why people mostly do not feel wronged as the troops sent on this mission do.

    The conception of the wrong done can be strengthened, it seems, by noting that not only are you exposed to risk every moment of your life, but it's a near certainty you won't always escape harm. How should we think of the wrong done here? It's not clear to me. We have, in the first take, actual harmful events; we have, in the second, unjustified risking of harm. This third seems more about establishing culpability: if our general knew a certain sort of mission was risky and sent the troops out not once, when they might have gotten lucky, but over and over and over again, people might feel he was "tempting fate", relying on a faulty view of the chances of no one coming to harm. I'm not sure we even need that calculus here, because there's no question about whether the parents are culpable. (It might have some point if we take parents as a group, and stipulate that some of their offspring will be unlucky, and so on. Not clear then who we take to be the moral agent; when I suffer should I blame all parents, as a group, rather than mine?)

    What's the point of all this? Twofold. On the one hand, insofar as I incline to any theory of morality, it's based in the moral sentiments, but I don't want to make too much of that, because I don't have much of a theory. On the other hand, most successful moral arguments succeed precisely by arousing the moral sentiments. It's no good telling someone that they should think something is wrong that they don't; you change their view by showing it to them in such a way that they feel it is wrong. (And obviously there's just as little point in telling people how they should feel.) I think this is what you are attempting with your favorite analogy lately, the "forced game": you want to elicit from your audience a feeling that placing someone in such a situation is wrong.

    I don't think "optimism bias" is any help here. If it's real, it only explains why people think their lives have been, and will be, overall better than they actually have been and will be. But that's a cognitive issue. If people in moments of suffering, do not feel wronged by their parents, optimism bias doesn't explain that; if they do not feel wronged all the time because they are constantly at risk of being harmed, optimism bias doesn't explain that; and if you fail to arouse the moral sentiments of your audience, to feel that children have been wronged simply by being brought into being, optimism bias doesn't explain that either.

    It's difficult to keep this discussion distinct from the antinatalism discussions elsewhere. I'm trying to avoid critiquing arguments in favor of antinatalism, and focus on why it's unpersuasive. Maybe this post makes it clearer how closely connected I think our experience of moral life is to what we find persuasive in moral discussion.

    (As philosophers, we'll always be tempted to believe that the class "persuasive" can be identified with the class "coherent and logical", though we know perfectly well that it cannot. I am going to make an effort to connect any criticism I have of antinatalism's coherence to the goal of moral suasion as described above.)
  • baker
    2.9k
    What AN ultimately does is question the project of life itself, and this is scary itself. But it's not much more than Buddhism, just taken to a practical level.schopenhauer1

    I've been waiting for you to mention Buddhism.

    The resemblance between AN and Buddhism is very limited and merely superficial. You formulate that idea nicely -- "What AN ultimately does is question the project of life itself". So does Buddhism. But Buddhism goes about it very differently than AN, and most importantly, Buddhism proposes a way out of suffering -- while alive. Also, the reason why a category of Buddhist practitioners doesn't engage in sex (and thus doesn't produce children) is not motivated by the desire to not cause an injustice to potential future beings, but out of a general committment to not indulge in sensual pleasures. In contrast, AN still pursue sensual pleasures; in fact, they see the whole point of life in them.
  • baker
    2.9k
    It's difficult to keep this discussion distinct from the antinatalism discussions elsewhere. I'm trying to avoid critiquing arguments in favor of antinatalism, and focus on why it's unpersuasive. Maybe this post makes it clearer how closely connected I think our experience of moral life is to what we find persuasive in moral discussion.Srap Tasmaner

    In some ways, antinatalism is, basically, a stunted Buddhism, or even more a stunted Jainism. Both of these religions question the project of life itself and seek or propose an end to it, on account of suffering.

    Antinatalism is putting forward some ideas that can, to some extent, be found in those religions, but antinatalism does away with most of the other ideas and practices of those religions. This is one of the reasons why antinatalism has such a poor persuasive power. It doesn't have its own metaphysics, nor much of a system of ethics, except for that one aspect of not brining new people into the world. Their idea of not bringing new people into this world kind of "floats in the air", only loosely connected to some ideas of injustice, suffering, hardship, but without any concrete underpinnings -- which, however, a theory would need to have if it successfully wants to go against the flow of life as it is usually lived (the way Buddhism and Jainism go against this flow).
  • baker
    2.9k
    Again: Define "suffering".baker
    The general AN position is against 'suffering' which we all understand (no need to redefine the word).I like sushi

    Actually, not having a precise definition of "suffering" is part of the problem. Often, it's understood so broadly that it becomes a meaningless term.

    Either way it's nice to see people thinking about stuff like this even if some of it makes almost no sense to me and what I say makes almost no sense to them

    It's interesting for me to see what people say on this topic. I have some background in Early Buddhism, so it's easy to for me to think about suffering, but I can now better appreciate people who don't have such a background and how they approach the problem of suffering.
  • I like sushi
    2.7k
    Everyone knows what it is to suffer and that doesn't need 'defining'.
  • schopenhauer1
    6.2k
    ; in fact, they see the whole point of life in them.baker

    That has nothing to do with AN.. And the resemblance to Buddhism is the life is suffering aspect. Agreed about the solution to the problem. The AN does not usually need karma, reincarnation or similar ideas, unless some kind of metaphor (which just makes it a Western version something similar to cause/effect/contingency). Buddhism, like Pessimism sees the system suffering of desire.. Schopenhauer had some great parallels he mentions in The World as Will and Representation. You should read passages from Book 4. The 8 fold path and such is interesting, but no such prescription except wholesale asceticism, compassion, and aesthetic contemplation is offered by Schop and I believe he thought that only certain character-types will be able to endure the path of asceticism.
  • schopenhauer1
    6.2k
    I find it plausible that we experience our own instinct for self-preservation largely as an attitude that life is fundamentally a good thing. There are of course extreme experiences when we just want it to stop,Srap Tasmaner

    This seems like you are aiming for why people don't commit suicide.. An AN would argue that the threshold for starting someone else's suffering (whether or not a certain predominant attitude towards life prevails) is wrong. The attitude of the person doesn't make the starting of someone else's suffering thus good. Still goes back to the happy slave in an unjust situation.

    sometimes the antinatalist claim will align with the purported victim's own feelings or attitudes, and sometimes it won't.Srap Tasmaner

    Happy slave.. If I punch you now, and you get enlightenment from it later, that would be crass utilitarian thinking.. Another way to think about it, is I shouldn't punch people, whatever their later feeling on it is. It is wrong to cause suffering, period (when you don't have to in the first place.. no one existed to need the suffering).

    Another option is that the wrong is something like exposure to risk of suffering; in that case, the risk is persistent from the beginning of your life until its end, and you are wronged in this sense every moment you are alive, whether you are suffering at the moment or not.Srap Tasmaner

    Exactly! Now that is closer to the AN view.

    What's the point of all this? Twofold. On the one hand, insofar as I incline to any theory of morality, it's based in the moral sentiments, but I don't want to make too much of that, because I don't have much of a theory. On the other hand, most successful moral arguments succeed precisely by arousing the moral sentiments. It's no good telling someone that they should think something is wrong that they don't; you change their view by showing it to them in such a way that they feel it is wrong. (And obviously there's just as little point in telling people how they should feel.) I think this is what you are attempting with your favorite analogy lately, the "forced game": you want to elicit from your audience a feeling that placing someone in such a situation is wrong.Srap Tasmaner

    Can moral sentiments be misleading if they lead to bad conclusions? I think you were closer when it comes to cognitive bias, which you seem to dismiss. It is not applying justice in an unbiased way. It is not just to cause X negative experience onto someone else UNLESS it is the time honored practice of Y. Do you see how that could be biased? Every other kind of harm is always justified when the person is born, so it's after the fact (schooling, vaccines, punishment for violating something, etc.). Not so in this case. It would seem in no other case would people's moral sentiment simply say, "Cause unnecessary suffering for someone else".. But it gets clouded in this case because, because, becuase, why?

    Well, you say self-preservation. Self-preservation would be dealing with the self, this is dealing with another, so it's not quite that. I would say it's the sadness of not being able to do X activities related to procreation.. But also because it makes people sad that there would be no X, Y, Z in their future. That seems dystopian.

    There is also a political agenda at play. People want to see the way of life they lived (with minor adjustments for future improvements perhaps) carried out. The injustice is, when it has to be carried out, by someone else. Why should they perpetuate your need to see a political agenda enacted in the world?
  • I like sushi
    2.7k
    I have some background in Early Buddhism, so it's easy to for me to think about suffering, but I can now better appreciate people who don't have such a background and how they approach the problem of suffering.baker

    What do you mean 'some background'. You were brought up as a buddhist? How does that make it easier to think about suffering?
  • khaled
    3.2k
    Still goes back to the happy slave in an unjust situation.schopenhauer1

    You claim that the happiness of the person in the position doesn't have much to do with the justice or injustice of imposing that position. So, what's your definition of an unjust position, without reference to what the person in the position thinks of their position? Is it unjust above a certain number of work hours a week? A certain difficulty of work? What's your standard?

    It would seem in no other case would people's moral sentiment simply say, "Cause unnecessary suffering for someone else"schopenhauer1

    What does "unnecessary" mean here? What is "necessary harm"? I thought an example of "necessary harm" is when it prevents an even larger harm on the person in question (what's what I remember your definition was), but you contradict that here:

    If I punch you now, and you get enlightenment from it later, that would be crass utilitarian thinking.. Another way to think about it, is I shouldn't punch people, whatever their later feeling on it is. It is wrong to cause suffering, periodschopenhauer1

    Wouldn't sending kids to school also fall under this umbrella of wrong impositions then?
  • Srap Tasmaner
    3.1k
    Can moral sentiments be misleading if they lead to bad conclusions?schopenhauer1

    I don't think of the moral sentiments as just a matter of the individual's reaction --- it's more like language: each of us speaks an idiolect, sure, but collectively, in the aggregate, those overlapping idiolects define a speech community, and the practice and intuitions about usage of each of us also carries some authority. There's no Correct English; there's only what English speakers by and large think is correct, and what they say. Each can speak, to some degree, for the entire community on correctness of usage, even though now and then they will disagree. And that authority comes not just from knowledge but from the fact that the practice of each us determines, in part, what counts as correct English.

    As morals go, it's plain that there are differences among individuals, and between communities, but if you think of humanity in the whole as your moral community, then these are just idiolects and dialects. There are commonalities across communities and traditions as well, and they are considerable. I look for the basis of morality in what people feel is praiseworthy and blameworthy, what fills them with admiration, what they resent or find repulsive. I don't see any firmer ground for morality than that.

    Happy slave.schopenhauer1

    That's an interesting example, and it's apparently pretty important to your view, so maybe we should spend some time on that. I'll just note, to start with, that my case doesn't rest on every individual slave feeling wronged by his master. It is true that slavery has been a common practice throughout the bulk of human history, in a variety of forms; but the fact that all of the modern world officially disapproves of slavery doesn't support either of us more than the other. If you compare, say, ancient attitudes toward slavery and modern ones, the fact of change shows that human beings can be brought, en masse, to finding slavery repellent. There's room for you to think of yourself as one of the first abolitionists, if you like, but it doesn't undermine my view of the task you face, to move us to find life itself repugnant, as we find slavery repugnant, and hold blameworthy those who place another in that situation.

    I shouldn't punch people, whatever their later feeling on it is. It is wrong to cause suffering, periodschopenhauer1

    But of course you can't mean this. A boxer does not feel wronged when their opponent punches them, even if it hurts. On the other hand, if you punch me after the bell has wrung and I've dropped my guard, I will feel wronged. There's an issue of consent here, which is important to your case as well. But there is a further counterexample: sometimes young men are in the habit of playfully punching each other on the bicep, and it's supposed to hurt, just not much. Whether anyone consents to that isn't quite clear. What is clear is that there will be cases where the punched party does not feel wronged, but cases, if the punch was in anger and hard enough to raise a bruise, where they might. Intention matters as well, and plays almost no role in your account of our being wronged by our parents. If someone takes a swing at your buddy, who's standing next to you at a drunken party, but hits you instead, do you feel wronged? Maybe, maybe not. If you feel very wronged and pull a knife, those around you will (one hopes) try to de-escalate the situation by getting you to feel differently about it -- he's just drunk, he didn't mean it, you're not even bleeding, it's just a party, shit happens. None of that is a denial of the bare facts that A caused harm to B, but it's an invitation to see it in a different light so that you feel differently about it.
  • schopenhauer1
    6.2k
    You claim that the happiness of the person in the position doesn't have much to do with the justice or injustice of imposing that position. So, what's your definition of an unjust position, without reference to what the person in the position thinks of their position? Is it unjust above a certain number of work hours a week? A certain difficulty of work? What's your standard?khaled

    If snapping fingers was equal to today's situation, then certainly that would count.. Are there aspects of the world you would not have wanted to be the case, or are you just doing what is necessary? Of course we de facto do what's necessary.. We must follow the rules. Can you make your own rules? Can you have designed it from the first place nd then played it, tweak it, reverse it? Of course not. Then it's not just..
    I can't give you a complete list, but I can give you a sufficient one:
    1) Can't create your own rule for the game..
    2) We can judge the game (unlike say an animal that kind of just lives out the game).. Our layer of rationalization/language etc. allows judgement etc.
    3)
    It is not applying justice in an unbiased way. It is not just to cause X negative experience onto someone else UNLESS it is the time honored practice of Y. Do you see how that could be biased? Every other kind of harm is always justified when the person is born, so it's after the fact (schooling, vaccines, punishment for violating something, etc.). Not so in this case. It would seem in no other case would people's moral sentiment simply say, "Cause unnecessary suffering for someone else".. But it gets clouded in this case because, because, becuase, why?schopenhauer1

    What does "unnecessary" mean here? What is "necessary harm"? I thought an example of "necessary harm" is when it prevents an even larger harm on the person in question (what's what I remember your definition was), but you contradict that here:khaled

    Right, but I am talking more about the idea that anything is justified if somehow your feelings about it lead to a positive experience (whether you know it or not). So, sure maybe putting you in crutches makes you feel enlightened down the line, doesn't mean I should put you in crutches.. I am just showing cases where it is clear that ones personal feelings don't align with the injustice.
  • khaled
    3.2k

    We must follow the rules. Can you make your own rules? Can you have designed it from the first place nd then played it, tweak it, reverse it? Of course not. Then it's not just..schopenhauer1

    Not a very good standard considering this is also the case in the utopia and you find it ok to impose life there.

    1) Can't create your own rule for the game..
    2) We can judge the game (unlike say an animal that kind of just lives out the game).. Our layer of rationalization/language etc. allows judgement etc.
    schopenhauer1

    These are both true in a utopia and IRL, so the real difference maker must be (3)

    Every other kind of harm is always justified when the person is born, so it's after the fact (schooling, vaccines, punishment for violating something, etc.). Not so in this case.schopenhauer1

    But I'm just confused what (3) actually means. This bit seems to just be begging the question. "Impositions are fine after you're born, but if it's before you're born they're not fine". Isn't that exactly what we're debating?

    That's very inconsistent for your line of argument. You try to find ethical "rules" that people abide by, that they don't abide by in the case of having children, for no justifiable reason, hence showing an inconsistency, like here for example:

    in no other case would people's moral sentiment simply say, "Cause unnecessary suffering for someone else"schopenhauer1

    It's also what I'm trying to do to you, show an inconsistency in beliefs which I believe is there. But point is, this:

    Every other kind of harm is always justified when the person is born, so it's after the fact (schooling, vaccines, punishment for violating something, etc.). Not so in this case.schopenhauer1

    Separates the "laws for imposing" into two categories. "Laws of imposing after you're born" and "laws of imposing before you're born". This completely destroys your project. You are trying to show that people's "laws of imposing" would preclude birth if applied rigorously. By separating it into two categories you open the door for someone to say: "Every other kind of harm needs justification when the person is born. Not so in this case. Since the person is not born, no justification is needed to do something that could harm them, so yes I am justified in genetically modifyin ma kid to be blind!" With exactly as much validity as your claim above.

    Right, but I am talking more about the idea that anything is justified if somehow your feelings about it lead to a positive experience (whether you know it or not).schopenhauer1

    Important question is: What about cases where you know that they'll appreciate the imposition later down the line? In other words, it's not what you feel about it, but what they feel about it. Supposedly neither of these matter when it comes to whether or not an imposition is wrong (happy slave and all) so again I ask the question (this is probably the 10th or so time):

    So, what's your definition of an unjust position, without reference to what the person in the position thinks of their position? Is it unjust above a certain number of work hours a week? A certain difficulty of work? What's your standard?khaled

    And you still haven't actually explained what you mean by "unnecessary". I get what you were doing with the original quote, I'm asking for clarification on what you mean by "unnecessary".

    So just to be extra clear, if you respond to nothing else:

    What is "unnecessary suffering" as opposed to "necessary suffering"?
    What is an "unjust position" as opposed to a "just position"?
  • Srap Tasmaner
    3.1k
    What about cases where you know that they'll appreciate the imposition later down the line?khaled

    That was more or less the starting point for this discussion, not with a claim that we know it for a fact in the case before us, but that we assume it and it's reasonable to assume it.
  • baker
    2.9k
    ; in fact, they see the whole point of life in them.
    — baker

    That has nothing to do with AN..
    schopenhauer1

    Did you not speak of pursuing other pleasures, apart from having children?

    And the resemblance to Buddhism is the life is suffering aspect. Agreed about the solution to the problem.

    The AN does not usually need karma, reincarnation or similar ideas,

    Which is why antinatalism is so impotent. ha.

    unless some kind of metaphor (which just makes it a Western version something similar to cause/effect/contingency). Buddhism, like Pessimism sees the system suffering of desire.. Schopenhauer had some great parallels he mentions in The World as Will and Representation. You should read passages from Book 4. The 8 fold path and such is interesting, but no such prescription except wholesale asceticism, compassion, and aesthetic contemplation is offered by Schop and I believe he thought that only certain character-types will be able to endure the path of asceticism.

    Yes, character-types like these:

    2fd1c79780d6651e7ee1984ee81c45c5.jpg
  • baker
    2.9k
    What do you mean 'some background'. You were brought up as a buddhist? How does that make it easier to think about suffering?I like sushi

    I've been around Buddhism in one way or another for more than twenty years. I've studied some of the Pali Suttas, and I can find my way around Theravada doctrine, and also in roundabout other Buddhist schools.

    Especially in the context of Early Buddhism, it is often said that the Buddha taught only one thing: Suffering and the end of suffering. With all this talk about suffering, one becomes comfortable enough to think and talk about it.
  • I like sushi
    2.7k
    Nihilists and buddhists have a lot in common.
  • schopenhauer1
    6.2k
    Not a very good standard considering this is also the case in the utopia and you find it ok to impose life there.khaled

    The main argument is thus:
    in no other case would people's moral sentiment simply say, "Cause unnecessary suffering for someone else"schopenhauer1

    What is "unnecessary suffering" as opposed to "necessary suffering"?khaled

    Unnecessary is not ameliorating greater harms with lesser harms, but simply causing harm to someone for no reason other than you want to see an outcome take place.

    What is an "unjust position" as opposed to a "just position"?khaled

    Unjust = not based on or behaving according to what is morally right and fair. In this case, making someone else play a game they had no hand in creating, cannot escape from without dire consequences, etc. I see life, what is already setup from historical contingency, and specifically in this thread, the economic aspect of it, as unjust to make others play.

    All I have to show is THIS world is sufficiently unfair to make others play..
    We can say that much of the day must be taken up by this particular game..
    That it is not guaranteed that people will like all aspects of this game...
    That one cannot just escape the game EASILY (see dire consequences).

    You see, my case doesn't have to be X hours, of precision, only show that this game is sufficiently NOT a utopia.

    Let's first make this criteria.. What to you makes a utopia.. Then we can move from there. If you don't answer that question, I am not going to move forward.

    Separates the "laws for imposing" into two categories. "Laws of imposing after you're born" and "laws of imposing before you're born". This completely destroys your project. You are trying to show that people's "laws of imposing" would preclude birth if applied rigorously. By separating it into two categories you open the door for someone to say: "Every other kind of harm needs justification when the person is born. Not so in this case. Since the person is not born, no justification is needed to do something that could harm them, so yes I am justified in genetically modifyin ma kid to be blind!" With exactly as much validity as your claim above.khaled

    No no.. how do you get that from what I said? Prior to birth you can prevent harm, period. Once birth happens, you have to immediately start ameliorating greater harms with lesser harms.. You don't want to harm the person more than necessary, but to harm them in the first place, is unnecessary.
  • khaled
    3.2k
    Unnecessary is not ameliorating greater harms with lesser harms, but simply causing harm to someone for no reason other than you want to see an outcome take place.schopenhauer1

    But, when you do this:

    If I punch you now, and you get enlightenment from it laterschopenhauer1

    That would be ameliorating greater harm with lesser harm clearly, so is this wrong or not?

    Also, importantly, is this "greater harm" you're ameliorating just a general measure of utility, or must you ameliorate greater harm from the person in question with lesser harm? So would it be wrong to punch someone so that someone else gains enlightenment? Because depending on your answer this:

    Prior to birth you can prevent harm, period. Once birth happens, you have to immediately start ameliorating greater harms with lesser harmsschopenhauer1

    May or may not follow. If you think it's fine to harm someone to ameliorate greater harm from someone else, you can argue that having children is already ameliorating greater harms with lesser harms.

    Unjust = not based on or behaving according to what is morally right and fair.schopenhauer1

    This is just pushing the definition backwards. What is "morally right and fair"?

    In this case, making someone else play a game they had no hand in creating, cannot escape from without dire consequences, etc.schopenhauer1

    So doing this is not morally right and fair? But this also applies to having children in a utopia, which you said you're fine with. So which is it?

    All I have to show is THIS world is sufficiently unfair to make others play..schopenhauer1

    Agreed, but I don't see where you did so. All you do is cite specific features of life, that are also present in a utopia, or in other impositions you think are fine.

    Let's first make this criteria.. What to you makes a utopia.. Then we can move from there. If you don't answer that question, I am not going to move forward.schopenhauer1

    HA, nice switch. First off, I don't see how it's significant what I think counts as a utopia and what doesn't, I'm pretty sure what you mean to ask is: "What to you makes it ok to impose". Answer: "It's fine to impose something on someone when it is very likely they will find it worthwhile (among other cases that are irrelevant here)". You don't like this standard, clearly. And you try to convince me that it's bad somehow.

    I don't use my standard when arguing with you, I try to get you to spell out a standard that doesn't lead to ridiculous consequences. So far, every time you've said "Life is X, and X is wrong", X is in common with utopias, or gifts, or other things you consider moral to impose, meaning X isn't a good standard for you. You did this in the last comment too:

    In this case, making someone else play a game they had no hand in creating, cannot escape from without dire consequences, etc.

    -You

    So doing this is not morally right and fair? But this also applies to having children in a utopia, which you said you're fine with. So which is it?
    khaled

    And when you say "Life is too much X" you fail to show why it is. In order to do this you'd need to, for example, find an imposition that is "lighter" than life that we think is wrong to impose. Then you'd have a case for why life is too heavy of an imposition. But you haven’t done so.
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