Given his thinking about how language develops, viz., that it's not a totally private affair, it's done necessarily with other people
— Sam26
Why does he think it is necessary? — Wheatley

The main problem is rule-following. What does it entail to follow a rule? Imagine a private language, i.e., just one that you're creating. Now try to imagine that you have to remember how to use all the words/concepts involved in your language. Are you remembering the correct use of your words? How would you know if you're making a mistake? Wittgenstein points out that you wouldn't, i.e., what would seem right in the use of your words/concepts, would be right. So, your use of words, in terms of correct and incorrect, would follow any application you deemed correct. Note that this is not how language works, I can't just decide to use the word car to refer to a pencil. Why? Because there is an objective standard (for the most part) that helps us to understand where a mistake has occurred. This, again, is only done with others, in social contexts. This is my take on it, at least partly.

That's funny, but I don't blame you.

Imagine a private language, i.e., just one that you're creating. Now try to imagine that you have to remember how to use all the words/concepts involved in your language. — Sam26

I'm stuck here. It's hard to imagine a language that doesn't rely on any sort of social conventions.

I'm stuck here. It's hard to imagine a language that doesn't rely on any social conventions. — Wheatley

That's the point, you can't. Unless you think you can imagine it, then it's a matter of understanding what Wittgenstein is trying to tell us about language.

Gertie says, "Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject.

My question is, if experiential states are so private, why is he talking about them!

I believe the key to understanding Wittgenstein's PLA is to grasp what he says about a "criterion of identity, 253-255.

253 Consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of "two exactly the same", for example, to say "This chair is not the one you saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same as it"

It is important to acknowledge here that when we speak of "two exactly the same", we are not adhering to the law of identity, which stipulates that only one thing is the same as itself. So when we talk about two things which are the same, this is not "same" according to a strict criterion of identity like the law of identity.

Further, it is in using "same" in this way, which implies that two similar things are "the same", as they are said to be "two exactly the same", when they are really two which are very similar, which allows one to say that my pain is the same as your pain. It isn't really the same if "same" is defined by the law of identity, but since they are said to be "exactly the same" in that other sense of "same", which really means similar, then my pain is the same as your pain.

253 In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain.

This is to use "same" without adherence to the strict criterion of identity, which is the law of identity. But since it is very common to use "same" in this way, and it makes complete sense to us to see it used in this way, because we are accustomed to it, then we can proceed in using it in this way.

Just be aware, when interpreting any supposed private language arguments, that "the same" for Wittgenstein, in the sense of 'the same sensation' really means distinct, but similar, sensations, in the way that we might say two different things are the same.

Imagine a private language, i.e., just one that you're creating. Now try to imagine that you have to remember how to use all the words/concepts involved in your language. Are you remembering the correct use of your words? How would you know if you're making a mistake? — Sam26

Sure, and how would I be sure I conveyed my new langauge to someone else since I apparently can't rely upon my memory for anything?

Imagine i had private thoughts that I formed when hiking alone that consist of the recollections of that hike, the colors, the landscape, the calm, and whatever else goes into the complete internal memory of that experience.

How can i ever be sure I remember the memories correctly if I don't report them to others to verify for me that my recollections are accurate later?

It's not complicated. I remember without employing others because i know my memory works. It always has in the past and it does now.

If i create a new word for cat, how can I be sure that when I report my new word to you that I'm remembering the word I just created and haven't changed to a new word? If words have no meaning until spoken, then what were they before spoken and how did I know to start using it?

If I misuse words and you correct me, how do you know that you've corrected me if I deny you corrected me?

What am i missing here? All this reductio seems to follow if we deny the reliability of personal memory.

I knew Wittgenstein was nuts.

Edited 12/10/21: Actually Hanover brings up an important point, which I never really addressed.

This is Kenny's point. Or rather, Kenny shines light on the answer that is found in PI.

It's not the failure of memory that is central to the argument, it's the failure of meaning.

Many philosophers have taken ‘I remember the connection right’ to mean ‘I use “S” when and only when I really have S’. They then take Wittgenstein’s argument to be based on scepticism about memory: how can you be sure that you have remembered aright when next you call a sensation ‘S’? …

Critics of Wittgenstein have found the argument, so interpreted, quite unconvincing. Surely, they say, the untrustworthiness of memory presents no more and no less a problem for the user of a private language than for the user of a public one. No, Wittgenstein’s defenders have said, for memory-mistakes about public objects may be corrected, memory-mistakes about private sensations cannot; and where correction is impossible, talk of correctness is out of place. At this point critics of Wittgenstein have either denied that truth demands corrigibility, or have sought to show that checking is possible in the private case too. (Kenny[ 1973] pp. 191–2)

(SEP Article)

then:

If we look closely at §258, we see that ‘I remember the connection correctly’ refers to remembering a meaning, namely, the meaning of the sign ‘S’, not to making sure that I infallibly apply ‘S’ only to S’s in the future.

Hence the generalisation of the argument to all rule-following, which I think @Sam26 is moving towards.

A private linguist, each time they make use of a sign to represent a sensation, would be engaging in an act of ostensive definition. Each use would be novel. Hence, there is no rule being followed.

If we look closely at §258, we see that ‘I remember the connection correctly’ refers to remembering a meaning, namely, the meaning of the sign ‘S’, not to making sure that I infallibly apply ‘S’ only to S’s in the future. — Banno

Ya, I agree, I've mentioned this several times. Maybe I should have emphasized it more in the post Hanover is talking about.

A private linguist, each time they make use of a sign to represent a sensation, would be engaging in an act of ostensive definition. Each use would be novel. Hence, there is no rule being followed. — Banno

Each use of the sign "S" is a novel use, because each instance of sensation is a new sensation. These sensations are only said to be "the same" through that sloppy use of "same", which follows from the absence of a criterion of identity. This sloppy use of "same" which says that two identical things are the same, is an illness which pervades mathematics, requiring philosophical treatment.

254. The substitution of "identical" for "the same" (for instance)
is another typical expedient in philosophy. As if we were talking about
shades of meaning and all that were in question were to find words
to hit on the correct nuance. That is in question in philosophy only
wherewe have to give a psychologically exact account of the temptation
to use a particular kind of expression. What we 'are tempted to say'
in such a case is, of course, not philosophy; but it is its raw material.
Thus, for example, what a mathematician is inclined to say about the
objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy of
mathematics, but something for philosophical treatment.
255 . The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment
of an illness.

As you say Banno, there is no rule being followed, because there is no criteria as to what constitutes an S, because each S, as a particular individual is different from every other S. But that's simply the way language is, it does not consist of rules. Each person decides, based on one's own experience, what to call any different object, or any different feeling. We don't follow rules, each one of us follows one's own personal inclinations. Who, (unless there is a God), has the power of authority to say one is correct and another incorrect?

What happens just after that moment - the few milliseconds where you return to feeling in pain after having 'forgotten' about it. Focusing on that moment, I wager, will reveal a conscious 'doubt' that you're in pain. — Isaac

Interesting. So....

In that millisecond you are supposedly making a judgement - "Does that count as a pain?"

But do you want to go further and doubt that?


Where that is a act of pointing.

It might be considered cheating to a phenomenologist, but a useful short-cut to clarifying Wittgenstein's ideas is to read Quine's Word and Object, The Two Dogmas of Empiricism, and Truth by Convention. A scientific analysis of semantics helps to dispel the same myths that Wittgenstein dispelled through phenomenological investigation, including the myth that meaning is founded upon either convention or upon 'stimulus-synonymy' as envisaged by the logical postivists and the earlier Wittgenstein. It is generally believed among the academic community, that the later Wittgenstein's so-called "Anthropological Holism" isn't reducible to either social or personal convention or to 'Tractatarian names'. Yet people insist on jumping to conclusions through quote mining , and then attributing nonsensical views to the author.

Wittgenstein as a phenomenologist. Presumably not of the Heideggerian school?

Wittgenstein was not promulgating coherentism. But I have an interest in reconciling Davidson - Quine's intellectual son - and Wittgenstein, so I'm interested, if confused.

Wittgenstein's so-called "Anthropological Holism" — sime

Start there. What is it? Who called it that?

Technically, maybe. The International Association for the Study of Pain defines pain as: “an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.” If a person were to be shown to having sufficient excitation of nociceptor fibres to elicit a report of pain in most humans but for some reason they were oblivious to that state, I don't think it would be nonsensical to describe the situation as their being in pain but without knowing it. — Isaac

You would say that they were in pain even if they had no "unpleasant experience"?

When Wittgenstein rhetorically asks what it would even mean to doubt here is one hand, I don't think he's claiming to have discovered a fact about the world, but rather a fact about our culture. That "I doubt I'm in pain" has no meaning is a cultural artefact, it has no meaning to us, not in general. As our culture changes (with things like advances in neuroscience), expressions which previously had no meaning may start to acquire one. — Isaac

I think Wittgenstein's point is that having a pain (or other sensation) is not something that one can come to know or to learn of, and so it does not constitute knowledge. In order for it to be (learned) knowledge, one would need to be able to guess or speculate whether one was in pain and then be able to confirm or disconfirm it. If it makes no sense to doubt whether you are having pain (when you are having pain), then it makes no sense to be certain of it, either.

It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I’m in pain. What
is it supposed to mean — except perhaps that I am in pain?
Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour — for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.
This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself. — PI 246

“A thing is identical with itself.” — There is no finer example of a useless sentence, which nevertheless is connected with a certain play of the imagination. It is as if in our imagination we put a thing into its own shape and saw that it fitted. — PI 216

I think Wittgenstein's point is that having a pain (or other sensation) is not something that one can come to know or to learn of, and so it does not constitute knowledge. In order for it to be (learned) knowledge, one would need to be able to guess or speculate whether one was in pain and then be able to confirm or disconfirm it. If it makes no sense to doubt whether you are having pain (when you are having pain), then it makes no sense to be certain of it, either. — Luke

Agreed, and this is the whole point of this thread.

But that's simply the way language is, it does not consist of rules. Each person decides, based on one's own experience, what to call any different object, or any different feeling — Metaphysician Undercover

Wow, that's some statement. Now I understand how it is that you can make some of the statements you put forth.

Wow, that's some statement. Now I understand how it is that you can make some of the statements you put forth. — Sam26

If you saw some of my discussions with Luke, you'd see that I've been arguing this for a long time. Wittgenstein is the person who gave me this idea. Look at what is said in 253-255. There is no criterion of identity (rule) by which we say that two things are the same. Luke supports this above with the quote from 216, the law of identity is a useless statement.

Bear this in mind when you read 257-264. There is no rule followed when the person in the example names a sensation with "S" To be named S requires that the sensation be judged as "the same" as the prior one named by S. But the person has no criterion of identity by which to make that judgement. Furthermore, as explained in 253 -255, there is no criterion of identity in language use in general, by which people in general might judge two things to be the same, thereby justifying the use of the same word for two distinct things. So, the example presented at 258 is a representation, or description by analogy, of language use in general. We have no rule, no criterion of identity, by which we say that this object (which we are inclined to name as a "phone" for example) is the same as the last object which someone used the same name on, as these two are clearly different objects, not the same object, therefore using the same name is unjustified.

So, we proceed to 261, the use of a word stands in need of justification. This refers not simply to the private language, which serves as the example by analogy, but language in general. And this is where we turn to others, the public, to derive justification for our private acts of word use. The point we are at now, is that word use itself is not necessarily public, it may be something private, but justification of that use is something public. This is the premise which Wittgenstein will proceed to argue in the next section, that justification is necessarily public. He is not arguing that language use is necessarily public, because he's already demonstrated that private use is exactly the same as public use, by showing that neither employs a criterion of identity. (Notice the twist here, "demonstrated that private use is exactly the same as public use", when there is no criterion of identity.)

However, this exposes a much deeper philosophical problem. If a criterion of identity is not employed when we name two distinct things by the same name, (or designate them as "exactly the same"), then how is one's use of words justified? So justification becomes a very deep problem with no immediate solution.

There is no criterion of identity (rule) by which we say that two things are the same. Luke supports this above with the quote from 216, the law of identity is a useless statement. — Metaphysician Undercover

You agree with Wittgenstein that the law of identity is - as you call it - "a useless statement"?

Then why do you also say things like this:

These sensations are only said to be "the same" through that sloppy use of "same", which follows from the absence of a criterion of identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

On the one hand you agree that the law of identity is useless, but on the other hand you complain about "sloppy" uses of the word "same" that do not conform to the law of identity.

You definitely have a unique way of interpreting Wittgenstein.

I think Wittgenstein's point is that having a pain (or other sensation) is not something that one can come to know or to learn of, and so it does not constitute knowledge. In order for it to be (learned) knowledge, one would need to be able to guess or speculate whether one was in pain and then be able to confirm or disconfirm it. If it makes no sense to doubt whether you are having pain (when you are having pain), then it makes no sense to be certain of it, either. — Luke

Agreed, and this is the whole point of this thread. — Sam26

There is such a thing as knowledge by acquaintance: knowledge of what one is familiar with strictly via direct experience. Others can doubt your knowledge by acquaintance (you could be fibbing). You can, with some extensive effort, come to doubt that your knowledge by acquaintance is not illusory (is it a hallucination?). But one can never doubt that one is acquainted with that which one is acquainted with (that I see a pink tree might be a trick of the mind but the pink tree momentarily seen is seen by me all the same, and I know what it looks like: pink, for starters; in this example, one knows of the pink tree strictly by acquaintance).

Just as it makes sense to say when someone else doubts, “I know what I saw”, so too can it make sense in some such cases to affirm, “I know I’m in pain”. For instance, “I get you want to move the sofa, but are you forgetting that your sciatic nerves went out and that you’ve been in a lot of pain,” retorted with, “I know I’m in pain, but I’m going to move the sofa anyway.”

And this knowledge of “being in pain” isn’t JTB or some variant but, instead, one’s direct awareness of oneself being in pain; hence, a variant of knowledge by acquaintance.

And this knowledge of “being in pain” isn’t JTB or some variant but, instead, one’s direct awareness of oneself being in pain; hence, a variant of knowledge by acquaintance. — javra

I'm familiar with knowledge by acquaintance, and I do believe that it falls under the umbrella of JTB. For me, JTB has a variety of uses, as seen in particular kinds of language-games. My view is that we justify our beliefs in a variety of ways, including sensory experiences, which directly relates to knowledge by acquaintance. For example, you might ask me after I say the orange juice is sweet, "How do you know the orange juice is sweet?" my justification is, "I tasted it." I think it's clear that we use sensory experience as a justification for many of our beliefs. Similarly, we can justify our knowledge (knowledge by acquaintance) of certain people, because of our direct sensory experiences with them, but justifying the belief that one is in pain seems way out of place. Why? For the various reasons just given in this thread.

My view is that we justify our beliefs in a variety of ways, including sensory experiences, which directly relates to knowledge by acquaintance. For example, you might ask me after I say the orange juice is sweet, "How do you know the orange juice is sweet?" my justification is, "I tasted it." I think it's clear that we use sensory experience as a justification for many of our beliefs. — Sam26

Right, we can use knowledge by acquaintance to justify our beliefs, but that which we know by acquaintance is not of itself a belief - that in turn needs to be justified. That one sees a pink tree - be it illusory or not - is not a belief at the moment experienced. Hence:

but justifying the belief that one is in pain seems way out of place. Why? — Sam26

Awareness of being in pain is not of itself a belief. Its a datum, for lack of better words.

Haven't read the entire thread, so excuse me if I've overlooked where the case was made for the contrary, if it was.

Right, we can use knowledge by acquaintance to justify our beliefs, but that which we know by acquaintance is not of itself a belief - that in turn needs to be justified. That one sees a pink tree - be it illusory or not - is not a belief at the moment experienced. Hence: — javra

Well, I would take issue with "that which we know by acquaintance is not of itself a belief - that in turn needs to be justified," because if we know it, then by definition it's a belief, viz., one that's true and also justified. And, why wouldn't something be a belief the moment I experience it? If for example someone pulled a gun on me, and surprised me with that gun, my reaction would probably be immediate based on my knowledge (the belief) that they have a gun.

I don't discover my pains. I have my pains. Knowledge is something I learn. How would I learn of my pain?

TMK, a belief is primarily understood as either a mental acceptance of a claim as true or, else, faith or trust in the reality of something. Add to this if you're thinking of something different.

That I see a red cup is neither contingent on claims that I might make nor is it a reality I need to place my faith or trust in. It simply is. That I see a red cup is a datum, a fact, one that remains such irrespective of whether it is a hallucination or not, etc. If doubting whether what is seen is in fact real, then belief is involved. But that what is seen is seen is, again, a brute fact - that I neither express as a claim nor that I place faith or trust in in order for it to so be.

A belief might then be that the cup has a backside that is also red. Yes. But this does not dispel the datum on which this belief is based.

Where do we disagree with this?

Well, I would take issue with "that which we know by acquaintance is not of itself a belief - that in turn needs to be justified," because if we know it, then by definition it's a belief ... — Sam26

This is what I am contesting.

"Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject." — Sam26

State: "The particular condition that someone or something is in at a specific time."
Knowledge: "Facts, information and skills acquired through experience or education."

How can a state exist as knowledge? These two things are totally incompatible.

Then, what does "private certain knowledge" mean? It can't stand either grammatically or semantically. "Private" cannot be an attribute of "certain". On the other hand, "certain private knowledge" could stand, since "certain" can be an attribute of "private".

With my above remarks I want to show that even if Wittgenstein seems to care a lot about language, he doesn't actually care about it. The above is a good example and proof of that. And it is even worse than his statement "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world", which at least stands grammatically, but the words in it are used too loosely, with the reault of making the statement shallow.

So, I am sorry not to respond to the rest of your description of your topic.

A private linguist, each time they make use of a sign to represent a sensation, would be engaging in an act of ostensive definition. Each use would be novel. Hence, there is no rule being followed. — Banno

First, thanks for the explanation. This Wittgenstein stuff baffles me, and I teeter between thinking I'm missing something terribly to the emperor wears no clothes.

If you'll hang in there with me, let me know if I have this right:

I see a dog and I name it "dog," yet I tell no one and that private word exists for me. I then see another dog and I recall it is called "dog," and I say to myself "there is a dog," but the fact that I cannot be corrected as to my use of the term "dog" means I'm not playing a language game with agreed upon rules and therefore the idea of correctness fails to have meaning in this private language context. Since there were no rules created by other players, the second time I called the dog a "dog" was not based upon any rule, but was a new, arbitrary word creation. That is, had I declared the existence of the dog aloud to where others agreed, then I'm forced to follow those rules and the word "dog" retains its meaning. That I kept it to myself allows me to call a dog a "cat" and it would be called "cat" because I'm not compelled to follow any rules. There being no rules, there is no correct and no incorrect, and I'm no longer using language.

Do I have this right?

If I do, and I realize I might not, I'm still at a loss as to why I have to accept this whole notion that I cannot be forced into a particular word usage game even when I am the only person who knows the word I'm using.

Language formation occurs as the result of a priori rules hard wired into our DNA. It's not like we're blank slates able to modify the most basic ways we form, retain, and use language. There are cultures of all different sorts, but none constantly put the names of objects into flux as part of their language scheme. The reason they don't isn't because they just don't like that sort of game, but it's because they can't. They're human beings and that's not what human beings do

This is to say I consistently keep calling a dog a "dog" in public not because of the correction that would occur if I publicly called it a "cat." I keep calling a dog a "dog" because my brain recognizes it as such and my internal language rule structure would auto-correct me even if I privately called it a "cat."

Edit:

At this point critics of Wittgenstein have either denied that truth demands corrigibility, or have sought to show that checking is possible in the private case too.](Kenny[ 1973] pp. 191–2)

I see this is tack I have taken. Do you find it persuasive?

Language formation occurs as the result of a priori rules hard wired into our DNA. I — Hanover

There are plenty of approaches within psycholinguistics that offer alternatives to this Chomskyesque view of language. Embodied and enactivist models embrace the later Wittgenstein while rejecting innatist and representationalist theoreis of language.

A private linguist, each time they make use of a sign to represent a sensation, would be engaging in an act of ostensive definition. Each use would be novel. Hence, there is no rule being followed. — Banno

I don't think the problem is that a rule is not being followed, but that ostensibly he is not pointing to anything at all. He may have this sensation but he is not pointing to anything that would allow us to know what that sensation is.

I see a dog and I name it "dog," yet I tell no one and that private word exists for me. — Hanover

You could, however, make that information public. There is an object that is pointed to. The thing about a private language is that it cannot be made public. It is not simply that it would then no longer be private. His examples are of sensations that cannot be conveyed, because they are not specific enough to allow for anyone else, or, for that matter, even the person who has the sensation, to identify it, to give it a determination or, as he calls it, a post or a marker by which we can say it is this and not that.