A common philosophical error is to assume that a grammar implies a state of affairs. In the phone example, the similarity of grammar is taken to imply that pain is some sort of individual, or thing, and so leads to questions of observation and identity and so on, all of them misplaced, all of them the result of not noticing that the grammar hides a distinction. — Banno

True, but that's not the point of §244.

You asked about reference.

He went all the way to saying that

If I went to his place I could, via the senses, directly confirm whether or not there is a tree in his backyard, but not whether or not there is a pain in his toe. — Janus

but then reneged, choosing only to see this as a difference in perspective and not of kind.

The same floppiness occurs throughout philosophical discussions; it's most noticeable in talk of qualia, but it's also there in talk of truth and belief, and in the foundation of mathematics.

So yes, it is a recurring theme. — Banno

OK, from an intersubjective point of view it's a difference in kind of perspective because there are some "views" you can have which I never can and vice versa, and other "views" of yours which I could have if I were in a suitable position (although I could never have exactly the same view as you which is a further wrinkle in the fabric). I have already acknowledged the difference re the possibility of corroboration.

From a subjective perspective the tree is an external object and pain an internal one, but I don't need any further justification to know I am seeing a tree than I do to know I am feeling a pain in my toe. So it really does all come down to perspective, as I see it.

But if you think I've made a mistake somewhere, then please identify it; I'm open to correction if it is precisely targeted; but I'm not interested in vague assertions of misunderstanding.

I did, and I think you are mistaken to read §244 as making a distinction between "I have a pain in my hand" and "I have a phone in my hand". I'll grant you that he might make that point elsewhere.

Ok, I really should go and do some gardening, but let's look at §244.

The question. is posited - how do words refer to sensations?

Now I read §244 as showing that this question is conceptually mistaken. He shows this by addressing the next question - how is the connection between a name and the thing named learned? Perhaps words are connected to the expression - this as conveying that the pain is there to others, not making a thought known - as "Ouch!"

And one learns to use words in the place of "Ouch!"

The verbal expression replaces the "ouch!"

The addenda: we now have a situation in which pain-talk is superficially like phone-talk; but we have seen that this is an error.

Now, where is my mistake?

Do you have an idea of pain? Is it an idea of a bodily feeling or an idea of an expression such as "ouch"?

we now have a situation in which pain-talk is superficially like phone-talk; but we have seen that this is an error. — Banno

“Now”? Following from what?

Meh. Make my time here worthwhile. Give me a decent reply.

I'm going outside.

Likewise.

I also have a problem with the notion of an experiential state; there's a reification there that I find uncomfortable. Experiences are not always sufficiently static to count as individuals; or at least there are issues for consideration in the individuating of sensations. (@Metaphysician Undercover mentioned something along these lines above, but it made no sense.) — Banno

I'd go further than this, to say that experiences are never static things, but neither are physical objects in the world static things. However, this does not change the fact that we talk about both of these as if they are static things. So if there is an error here, in referring to one or the other as a static thing, it is not specific to one or the other.

What I think is that we recognize or apprehend certain aspects of both, experiences or feelings, and physical objects, which appear to be unchanging, and this provides the basis for talking about these as if they are static things. Perhaps it is more difficult to find consistency in experiences and feelings than it is to find consistency in the physical world around us, so this creates the illusion of a big difference between the two.

A common philosophical error is to assume that a grammar implies a state of affairs. In the phone example, the similarity of grammar is taken to imply that pain is some sort of individual, or thing, and so leads to questions of observation and identity and so on, all of them misplaced, all of them the result of not noticing that the grammar hides a distinction.

@Metaphysician Undercover in particular makes this sort of mistake often and repeatedly, but doesn't see it. — Banno

Really, it is simply you who is not following what analysis of the language is showing us, and you are trying to make a distinction which is unwarranted, unsupported by the use of language, and in error. It is not the case that the grammar is hiding something, it is the case that you are not accepting what the grammar is showing you, thereby assuming that there is some other reality inconsistent with the grammar, and hidden beneath the grammar.

The real distinction to be made is between the static and the active. Such a distinction can be carried through. But both, the internal feelings, and also the external physical objects, have each, active and passive elements. So to separate the two, internal feelings from external objects, on the premise that one is active and the other is passive, as the basis of this separation, is a mistake.

try doubting the pain you're having — Sam26

It's perfectly possible to doubt the pain you're having. Nociception is regulated by a descending pain modulatory system which in turn is regulated by cortico-limbic-striatal circuits dealing with attention, emotional response, cognitive appraisal and behaviour. These can not only alter the autonomic response, but, via the descending pain modulatory system can even use the inflammatory mediators to 'switch off' nociceptor neurons.

In all, it's perfectly possible to doubt nociceptive sensations in no different a way to the way one doubts retinal sensation. One can question the level, location and type of pain and, via that re-modelling, alter the nature of both the pain perception and the root signals producing it.

The problem with a lot of these discussions (qualia being the worst culprit) is they they confuse an interesting discussion about grammar with a discussion about the object of that grammar.

Wittgenstein starts by asking an important question. “But could we imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, and the rest—for his private use?” — Sam26

Since when did philosophers become experts on limits of human imagination?

I can imagine it. Prove me wrong.

Okay, give an example of what you're talking about so we can compare (in terms of doubting one's pain). Are you referring to something like phantom limb pains?

Since when did philosophers become experts on limits of human imagination?

I can imagine it. Prove me wrong. — Wheatley

This has nothing to do with limiting human imagination.

All "Prove me wrong" means is that your mind is made up and there is nothing I can say that will change it. Ya, so you're right, I probably can't prove you wrong, the idea of proof here is too subjective.

the idea of proof here is too subjective. — Sam26

Okay.

"Okay," what kind of response is that? :gasp:

Okay, give an example of what you're talking about so we can compare (in terms of doubting one's pain). Are you referring to something like phantom limb pains? — Sam26

Not necessarily (phantom pain is still a pain). I'm talking about the fine line between what we can reflect on having happened in our minds and what we know actually happened, or what we can 'just catch' actually happening when our attention is drawn to it. Interpretation of pain is like this. When we reflect on what we're feeling, we'll generally say we're in pain, no question. But when our attention is drawn to the assessment process, we can often catch a point where it's not clear (in fact, what we're catching here is the action of the descending pain modulatory system, particularly in the involvement of c-fibre signalling). Just as when I see an aberrant object in my field of view I might 'double take', first doubting that I did indeed see such an oddity; with pain, I can sometimes catch myself doing the same. You've had the experience of 'forgetting' you're in pain whilst distracted, yes? What happens just after that moment - the few milliseconds where you return to feeling in pain after having 'forgotten' about it. Focusing on that moment, I wager, will reveal a conscious 'doubt' that you're in pain.

The grammar of it (I think) is that being 'in pain' is still a public category, we can't simply declare ourselves to be 'in pain' in response to any old feeling. So there's a form of the question "am I in pain?" which makes perfect sense - its "does this sensation I now have meet the public criteria for the category 'pain'?". Most of that questioning is done by subconscious models informed by our experiences to date (and whether that counts a 'doubt' I suppose is debatable), but some of it is conscious - even if only barely - and so excluding it from the definition of 'doubt' would seem question begging.

Could you be in pain and not know it?

When under a local anaesthetic for dental treatment, it is certainly possible to feel ambiguity or uncertainty as to whether or not one is in pain. And self-reinforcing beliefs and observer-effects come into play, where one asks "am I really in pain, or just imagining it?

Recall Wittgenstein's analysis of Moore's proposition later on in the book, namely "It is raining, but I believe it is not raining", which Moore had previously considered to be nonsensical when considered in the present tense. Wittgenstein, if i recall correctly. envisages the possibility of this sentence making sense in a situation in which one finds oneself consciously disbelieving that it is raining whilst observing oneself to be behaving otherwise. Our thoughts can belie our actions.

Could you be in pain and not know it? — Luke

Technically, maybe. The International Association for the Study of Pain defines pain as: “an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.” If a person were to be shown to having sufficient excitation of nociceptor fibres to elicit a report of pain in most humans but for some reason they were oblivious to that state, I don't think it would be nonsensical to describe the situation as their being in pain but without knowing it.

The changes brought about by a greater understanding on how the brain works is where I think this is interesting. The above might have sounded nonsensical 20 years ago, but not so now.

When Wittgenstein rhetorically asks what it would even mean to doubt here is one hand, I don't think he's claiming to have discovered a fact about the world, but rather a fact about our culture. That "I doubt I'm in pain" has no meaning is a cultural artefact, it has no meaning to us, not in general. As our culture changes (with things like advances in neuroscience), expressions which previously had no meaning may start to acquire one.

Okay," what kind of response is that — Sam26

It means that i don't have the proper vocabulary to argue with you.

It's okay Wheatley, argue anyway. We learn by arguing, especially when you have to write out your arguments. We're all learning in here. I'm constantly re-thinking my beliefs. It's the way we advance, hopefully.

I was talking to a friend the other day about investing. In particular, about options, viz., a put, a strike price, etc, etc, I didn't have a clue, so it happens to all of us.

All "Prove me wrong" means is that your mind is made up and there is nothing I can say that will change it — Sam26

I'm not sure exactly what my mind is made up about. :confused:

I'm against the proposition that philosophers can tell you what you can imagine. How's that?

244. How do words refer to sensations?

Whether or not this is a problem depends on the example. If I have a toothache there is no problem understanding what I am referring to. If, however, I say "I have a sensation" then I have not referred to anything, I have not identified the sensation. Giving it a name gets us no further.

Although having a toothache is, like all sensations, private, the sensation is common enough that we can refer to it. It is in this sense public rather than private. But we do not have to have personally experienced toothache; far less likely, we do not even have to have even experienced pain to know what is being referred to and to refer someone having toothache to a dentist.

I'm against the proposition that philosophers can tell you what you can imagine. How's that? — Wheatley

I would be against any philosopher telling me what I can imagine too. Unless the philosopher is telling me I can't imagine a two-sided triangle, then I would think he has a point.

But could we imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences — Sam26

Why does Wittgenstein mention "imagination"?

Why does Wittgenstein mention "imagination"? — Wheatley

It's a kind of thought experiment. Given his thinking about how language develops, viz., that it's not a totally private affair, it's done necessarily with other people. And, given that language is necessarily a rule-following endeavor (implicit and explicit rule-following), he then concludes that this process, being that they are both done with others, cannot be done totally in private. It's almost like trying to think of the two-sided triangle. He wants you to think about it, try to imagine it.

Given his thinking about how language develops, viz., that it's not a totally private affair, it's done necessarily with other people — Sam26

Why does he think it is necessary? Wittgenstein doesn't seem to be very rigorous.

I don't think there are many people who would agree with Gertie's statement ("Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject."), which I used to start this thread. The point that I was trying to make about the statement, is directly connected to much of what Wittgenstein talks about in the PLA. We've been a bit side tracked, but that's okay.

Gertie's statement — Sam26

he statement, is directly connected to much of what Wittgenstein talks about in the PLA. — Sam26

I can't get into this. Thank you for your time. :victory: