Thats a pretty broad question but I right away thought if logical fallacies.
Fir example, the expression “comparing apples to oranges” is and everyday way of stating a “category error” logical fallacy.

This approach typically involves eschewing philosophical "theories" in favor of close attention to the details of the use of everyday "ordinary" language." — Chaz

I'm not really sure if I understand what is meant by "misunderstandings philosophers develop by distorting or forgetting what words actually mean in everyday use." Is this an example - Philosophers talk about free will, but on an everyday basis I am more likely to talk about whether a person should be held responsible for their actions?

Examples that come to my mind are many of the philosophical problems concerning “nothing” and/or “nothingness”:

If someone asks me if there's something in my room, and I reply: “there ain't nothing in my room”, in ordinary life the phrase has a perfectly clear meaning, and questions about “nothing” or “nothingness” never even arise.

But a logician or metaphysician could be quite puzzled by this, when analyzing the phrase he may think:

1.There ain't nothing in my room= There isn't nothing in my room= There is not(not something) in my room= It is not the case that there is (not something) in my room.

2. Either there is not something in my room, or there is something in my room.

3. Therefore, the phrase “There ain't nothing in my room” means “There is something in my room”, which is exactly the opposite of what I meant to say.

And so the metaphysician could ask: How can a phrase be understood as the exact opposite of what it actually means (according to its logical structure)? And he could then go on by saying that “nothing” is actually “something”, and develop a complex metaphysical system from that premise, or by looking for the “true/correct” analysis of the meaning of that sentence.

In ordinary language philosophy, like I said, questions like that don't even arise, they are “bewitchments by language”.

If we follow the late Wittgenstein's maxim that the meaning of a word (or of a sentence) is its use in a particular language game, then all that matters is that everybody understands what the phrase means in the context of ordinary life activities, and have no need of analyzing the logical structure of the phrase to do so.

What are the "Ordinary Language Philosophy" solutions to common philosophical problems?

It's not something that can be written on the back of an envelope. Here's Austinby way of a start.:

First, words are our tools, and, as a minimum, we should use clean tools: we should know what we mean and what we do not, and we must forearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us. Secondly, words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things: we need therefore to prise them off the world, to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realize their inadequacies and arbitrariness, and can re-look at the world without blinkers. Thirdly, and more hopefully, our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth making, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon—the most favoured alternative method. (Austin, J. L. “A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1957: 181–182)

It's a mode of critique more than a set of solutions. It's basic tenet might be "cut the bullshit".

As noted, the example of nothingness may come to mind. Carnap devoted an essay on the impossibility of metaphysics, it had a strong flavor of "ordinary language philosophy". But it's an open question as to if Carnap succeeded in showing that metaphysics is nonsense.

Today, I'd guess most philosophers would disagree.

One example that comes to mind is in the topic of "reference". There are all these paradoxes as to how can we talk about things that don't exist? Pegasus, Zeus, etc.

But if you think about a it a little, you soon figure out that referring is an act people do, it's not something that a word does. That can be an ordinary language philosophy solution to a problem. But there's bound to be disagreements.

It's a mode of critique more than a set of solutions. It's basic tenet might be "cut the bullshit". — Banno

Do you have any specific examples in mind?

Well, the demise of Hegelianism...

Or the sustained critique of the Vienna Circle.

Or the rejection of referential theories of meaning.

I stumbled upon this:

"[A]t that time the orthodoxy best described as linguistic philosophy, inspired by Wittgenstein, was crystallizing and seemed to me totally and utterly misguided. Wittgenstein's basic idea was that there is no general solution to issues other than the custom of the community. Communities are ultimate. He didn't put it this way, but that was what it amounted to. And this doesn't make sense in a world in which communities are not stable and are not clearly isolated from each other. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein managed to sell this idea, and it was enthusiastically adopted as an unquestionable revelation. It is very hard nowadays for people to understand what the atmosphere was like then. This was the Revelation. It wasn't doubted. But it was quite obvious to me it was wrong. It was obvious to me the moment I came across it, although initially, if your entire environment, and all the bright people in it, hold something to be true, you assume you must be wrong, not understanding it properly, and they must be right. And so I explored it further and finally came to the conclusion that I did understand it right, and it was rubbish, which indeed it is."

— Ernest Gellner, Interview with John Davis, 1991

Amen.

Do you have any specific examples in mind? — T Clark

Or even this: - in which you seek to set out how we might best deal with the word "consciousness", not by making stuff up, but by looking at how it has actually been used. Not a bad example of the ordinary language approach.

Here're some examples of how ordinary language philosophy solves philosophical problems.

Example 1:
Person 1: "I wonder how long the universe has been in existence."
Person 2: "Since time infinite."
Person 3 (supervisor): "Quit slaffin' off; get back to work, the two of you."

Example 2:
Person 1: "I love her so; I would give my life for her. Yet I don't know what love is."
Person 2: "I'd sleep out in the rain if that's what she wanted me to do. And yet I also don't know what love is."
Person 3 (wife): "Shut your clapper! Tell your buddy to take a hike, and then take the trash out already."

This approach typically involves eschewing philosophical "theories" in favor of close attention to the details of the use of everyday "ordinary" language." — Chaz

Responses to your OP seem to be talking about a bunch of different things. Some of these don't seem to have much to do with what I think of as ordinary language philosophy. You're the original poster, but you haven't posted since the OP. You have a responsibility to continue to contribute to the discussions you start. This thread needs some guidance.

What are the "Ordinary Language Philosophy" solutions to common philosophical problems? — Chaz

OLP is not a theory (argument) but a method, though it is working within the analytical tradition (calling it "linguistic" is to dismiss it as not also about our world). Some people say it is a diagnosis, but I resist the conclusive implication of calling it "therapeutic"--that it makes philosophy, or its problems, go away, or treats them as errors or a confusion. It does not pit "ordinary" language ("what words actually mean in everyday use") against philosophical language (though G.E. Moore appears to be a example of that). Moore did want to resolve our skepticism; Austin in a sense ignored it, focusing on the fallout: positivism's rejection of anything but true/false statements. Wittgenstein's later work started with a similar issue (his earlier self) as Austin, in trying to show that there is not one way of how things have meaning, but his "conclusion" is not that language creates skepticism (though its criteria is the means). What he found out, uncovered, learned about us--which is a better way of framing OLP's goal (not a "solution")--is our desire, our weaknesses, our blindness to ourselves (philosophy's and humanity's). That our desire for certainty is a reaction to the threat of skepticism, but that it is situational, possible to investigate, but not always (or forever) resolvable by our knowledge.

The method is not to attend to the "details" of language, but to see or imagine what matters to us when we say "...", for example, "I know..." (in every day situations and in philosophical ones). That this is philosophical data, much as Socrates' questions, that helps deepen and broaden our picture/understanding of our world, our philosophical problems, and our selves.

I did attempt an OP on it Ordinary Language Philosophy but I'm not sure I did a very good job of clearing up the mischaracterizations. Stanley Cavell is a good current example--try any essay in "Must We Mean What We Say".

An example from that OP:

The method is to ask or imagine (as Austin says): what do we ordinarily imply ("mean") when we say…, e.g., “I know”, "I think", "I forget", "I apologize", which also might involve fleshing out the context (situation) that would go along with that case. As an example, when we ordinarily say an action was done accidentally rather than mistakenly, we can imagine a case (a context): that “the gun went off in my hands and killed the donkey” (accidentally), as opposed to: “I did want to kill the cow, but hit the donkey instead” (mistakenly) (this is Austin's example). The example allows us to see what is usually skipped over unexamined: to describe what “actions” are and how they work, e.g., that “intention” does not come up in every circumstance (just when asked about a mistake) and how moral culpability works (Austin will talk of excuses—“The donkey just walked in the way!”).

Wittgenstein's basic idea was that there is no general solution to issues other than the custom of the community. — Hanover

This takes Wittgenstein as solving (or trying to solve) skepticism (or something else) with communal agreement--that "forms of life" are somehow foundational. This is a cliff-note misunderstanding; like that OLP champions "ordinary language"; which will solve philosophy, or make it irrelevant. I'm sorry, but this is just a jealous dismissal without any real understanding, which unfortunately happens more often than not really though.

From Wikipedia: — Chaz

Oh please for all that is good in the world save me from philosophical summaries (even mine).

Oh please for all that is good in the world save me from philosophical summaries. — Antony Nickles

Philosophical summaries are useful for those who are only getting acquainted with a topic or subject. It's a good starting point, from which one can advance by learning the inherently distinguishable differences that the summary does not mention, and thus proceed to learn about the topic's more intricate details.

In summary, philosophical summaries are not not good as philosophical summaries, but they are good as starting points for the dilettante.

I didn't mean to be condescending, but you are better off diving into the text yourself and making your own mistakes. Especially about a method that is not about arriving at theories or making arguments or explaining. A knee-jerk, superficial, three-sentence takeaway can't be anything but misleading.

OLP is not about knowledge or being told anything; it's about texts, and going through a process; answering the questions, seeing for yourself.

Oh hell, I'll try to provide an example. This is something of Austin's (but it's been quite some time, so I might screw it up).

I assume we're all familiar with the claim made that our senses are unreliable. This is one of the bases on which it's contended that what we perceive isn't what's really there. From it as well comes such wondrous philosophical concepts as sense qualia, or the external world, and more.

Why do we think our senses are unreliable? Well, a pencil when placed for God knows what reason in a glass of water appears crooked, or bent. But it isn't crooked! It isn't bent! See (or don't see)?

How about stars? We seem them as tiny, shiny dots in the sky. But they're not! They're huge, hot gassy things.

As Austin points out, a pencil in a glass of water doesn't seem crooked or bent. We know what something looks like when it's crooked or bent (like a branch or stick) in the ordinary world, and the words "crooked" or "bent" in ordinary language refer to that. The part of a pencil in the water seems located differently than the portion out of the water through refraction--almost separate from it--but doesn't seem bent or crooked.

By saying the pencil appears crooked we distinguish what we see from the reality. In reality, the pencil isn't crooked, but it seems that way to us; therefore, we don't perceive what is in fact. In fact, though, a pencil in a glass of water looks to us just as it should look. It looks like a pencil in a glass of water. We wouldn't expect it to look straight, i.e., like a pencil when not in a glass of water. Nobody, seeing a pencil in a glass of water, shouts out "My God, what happened to the pencil!"

By using ordinary words in an extraordinary manner, we create fictions, problems through extrapolation.

A knee-jerk, superficial, three-sentence {ED: or shorter} takeaway can't be anything but misleading. — Antony Nickles

Thanks for providing an example of your point:

OLP is not about knowledge or being told anything; it's about texts, and going through a process; answering the questions, seeing for yourself. — Antony Nickles

Thanks for providing an example of your point: — god must be atheist

Yeah, right--the irony was not lost on me. Another specific example from Malcolm is coming up with circumstances when we would say: "I know" and then see and describe what those instances imply about our various criteria for that concept (realizing that a concept can have multiple options--"senses" Witt says--ways they make sense, ways they can be used in different contexts.

One sense of "I Know" is that I am certain: "I know when the sun will rise today"; the criteria for this might be that I can give evidence of that certainty, etc. This appears to be philosophy's one and only use and preoccupation. Second, we can say "I know New York", as in: I know my way around; I can show you; Third, I know (knew) that, as in to confirm or agree with what you said; and Fourth, I know, as in to sympathize with you. Cavell uses this last sense to shed light on our knowledge of another's pain--we don't "know it" in the first sense, we acknowledge it, recognize and accept (or ignore or reject) the claim their expression of pain makes on me.

Thanks for writing the above, but I actually don't see how it relates to our argument. My position is that a summary may be a good starting point while not being (or else being) a good summary at all, of philosophical (other other types) of enquiry for the otherwise uninitiated. Your counter point was to decry three-sentence or shorter garment label descriptions (so to speak) of any philosophical trend, particularly the trend of ordinary language philosophy.

Nothing has changed in this stand, as you haven't made an argument against mine yet. I don't know if you wish to continue; I'll be glad to drop the dialogue.

If we follow the late Wittgenstein's maxim that the meaning of a word (or of a sentence) is its use in a particular language game, then all that matters is that everybody understands what the phrase means in the context of ordinary life activities, and have no need of analyzing the logical structure of the phrase to do so. — Amalac

The whole point of OLP is to "analyze the logical structure" of our concepts. Not as a normative authority, or to "make everyone understand", or to come to (uncover) some agreement. It is to shed light on the problems of traditional philosophy, as our language (the criteria for it) reflects our interests, and judgments, and the ways things fall apart, etc. This can be a study, as Austin does, or when we do not know how to continue with a concept, as Wittgenstein examines.

If we follow the late Wittgenstein's maxim that the meaning of a word (or of a sentence) is its use in a particular language game — Amalac

And, again, Wittgenstein examined lots of words (and the different but ordinary criteria there are for judging in which of their sense they have been used, in this context) in finding out there is no one way in which words are meaningful to us--that there is no maxim.

Thanks for writing the above, but I actually don't see how it relates to our argument. My position is that a summary may be a good starting point while not being (or else being) a good summary at all, of philosophical (other other types) of enquiry for the otherwise uninitiated. Your counter point was to decry three-sentence or shorter garment label descriptions (so to speak) of any philosophical trend, particularly the trend of ordinary language philosophy. — god must be atheist

If it wasn't just advice, I would argue that philosophy is not about acquiring knowledge, that your thoughts in reading it are more important than what it is telling you. Thus starting with a summary reduces philosophy to a set of answers people judge and regurgitate or dismiss; it trivializes the point of going through the process of being changed by reading. Not just changing your mind, as in now you hold a different opinion, but changing the actual way in which you think, broadening your sense of the world, realizing a greater version of your self. Wittgenstein does not have a "theory of meaning" anyone (he) can tell you. Even the method of OLP can not be explained by its outcomes (as is being assumed here); there are no conclusions; no "maxim" or answer, e.g., when questions are framed without any sense of the picture itself. Most importantly, the postulations of what is implied when we say ___, are for you to see (come to) for yourself, or they have no force; they are not arguments, not true/false "theories" or statements--what is there to summarize?

It's a mode of critique more than a set of solutions. It's basic tenet might be "cut the bullshit". — Banno

Austin for sure. Then Wittgenstein started to look at how we bullshit ourselves, and what it is about us that we want to bullshit ourselves, drawn out by Cavell into an investigation of our shitty human condition.

Thus starting with a summary reduces philosophy to a set of answers people judge and regurgitate or dismiss; it trivializes the point of going through the process of being changed by reading. — Antony Nickles

You're right, but only in the cases where non-philosophers read. I am in the opinion that although everyone has philosophical thoughts and like to ponder questions, not everyone is a philosopher. Much like not everyone has a sense for physics, for horseback-riding, for parachuting, for etc. etc. It takes a philosopher to think like a philosopher. It can be taught to a non-philosopher how to think like a philosopher, much like creative writing can be taught and uneven parallel bars can be taught. But a natural-born philosopher with no prior reading experience in philosophy would benefit greatly from summaries.

After all: all philosophy textbooks are summaries, albeit a bit more detailed than Wiki.

-------------

When the teacher appears, the student is ready. It does not matter what portal to knowledge one takes; as long as he or she goes through the portal. It could be via summaries, via detailed annotated and discussed readings of the Republic, via learning about the brief history of philosophy, the apt student's ability will make him or her learn quickly and effieciently, no matter what portals one takes to get into the subject matter.

One word of advice, which you can take or leave: If you speak in negatives, for instance how you speak of ordinary language philosophy, the negatives on one hand do not help the student's learning; on the other hand are irritating to the reader; and on the third hand contain no useful information. When you try to introduce new paradigms in knowledge to someone, the negatives are ballast. Speak only in positives, what it IS, not what it is NOT.

For instance:

"A car is a motorized vehicle for transporting two to six people and which runs on four wheels."

V.f.

"A car is not a toy. A car is not a newspaper article. A car is not my grandmother's nose. A car is not a toilet seat."

It's a mode of critique more than a set of solutions. It's basic tenet might be "cut the bullshit". — Banno

Critiques are solutions too. Inasmuch as solutions can be found. In the sense that 5 <> 6 is a solution much like 5=5 is a solution.

A solution can be expressed in two ways: Positively, "X is ____", or negatively, "X is not ____." A criticism expresses the solution in the latter way.

After all, solutions point to a set that satisfy the criteria in question. You can point at a solution within the set; and you can point out the solution by pointing at things NOT in the set and declaring they are not part of the set. The solution is delineated either way.

Most people like to think of this in terms that criticism leads to a solution, but it is not the solution itself.

Carnap devoted an essay on the impossibility of metaphysics, it had a strong flavor of "ordinary language philosophy". But it's an open question as to if Carnap succeeded in showing that metaphysics is nonsense. — Manuel

I don't know Carnap, but Wittgenstein literally embodies (with the interlocutor) our tendency for something certain (like a Platonic form, or positivist logic), and Cavell explores what that means for us, our struggle to overcome the fear of our responsibility.

referring is an act people do, it's not something that a word does. — Manuel

Let's try this OLP style: "Referring"--as is promising, indicating, distinguishing--is a concept ("knowing" "intending", say, practices). I would offer that one ordinary criteria of referring is that it is something words can do, that you actually can do it (get the referring done) using only words, that the words are the doing of it--"I refer you to Exhibit A". With those words, the act of referring is accomplished. Well, yes, you said it, but you can (or not) acknowledge that saying: "I convince you" does not make one convinced (but we can talk about what/how words convinced us). And I even do something to you; I have referred you to something, as in: given notice. There is no now avoiding being referred, even if you don't, thereafter, actual refer to whatever someone has referred you to.

That can be an ordinary language philosophy solution to a problem. But there's bound to be disagreements. — Manuel

My claim is that these are the workings, the criteria for identity, the terms of correctness, of referring; if you disagree (on the features), there may be examples or counter-examples, after which I might: see and grant that something is an important distinction, admit I was thinking of something else, point towards the concept in different contexts, etc.--but we have a process for coming to agreement, call it rational--even if only to learn how we/to disagree. Now can we learn anything from this, or from looking more into this, about the philosophical idea of reference?

Also, the desire to never have a disagreement, fueled by skepticism, creates the opposite of the kind of "ordinariness" that language has.

Critiques are solutions too. Inasmuch as solutions can be found. In the sense that 5 <> 6 is a solution much like 5=5 is a solution.
***
After all, solutions point to a set that satisfy the criteria in question — god must be atheist

OLP does not point to a set that satisfies (and, again, notice the skeptical fear of inconclusiveness); it uncovers the criteria of how we even are satisfied (here), or not. And it is not a "solution", say, on the terms/grounds of mathematics. See The Mathematical and the Ordinary.

OLP does not point to a set that satisfies (and, again, notice the skeptical fear of inconclusiveness); it uncovers the criteria of how we even are satisfied (here), or not. — Antony Nickles

I wonder if you could provide a simple, tangible example. Not a complicated one at all. A simple one. How a OLP uncovers criteria that makes us satisfied (in what sense satisfied?).

OLP does not point to a set that satisfies (and, again, notice the skeptical fear of inconclusiveness); it uncovers the criteria of how we even are satisfied (here), or not. And it is not a "solution", say, on the terms/grounds of mathematics. — Antony Nickles

I see, you did not take my advice on how NOT to explain things with negatives - how not to explain a thing by saying what it is not. You used two negatives with one blurred, muddled, ineffectual, vague positive claim. So... I don't know your point, until you state it in oridnary language. Simple, ordinary, common language. You seem to be the worse user and disciple of the very thing you advocate. You advocate ordinary langauge; and you use vague concpets expressed by negatives (in saying what it is not) when I have shown you that is not at all a good way of expressing your opinion.

What are the "Ordinary Language Philosophy" solutions to common philosophical problems? — Chaz

At best: sublime readability, and a mission to dig as deep as possible (though not deeper).

At worst: bluff, imperiousness, charlatanism, guruism, preistliness, laziness, sophistry, prejudice, mysticism, ism-ism, tribalism.

There are all these paradoxes as to how can we talk about things that don't exist? Pegasus, Zeus, etc. — Manuel

Only one, really, and it soon straightens out. Usually, the speaker equivocated between denying that the reference was (directly or indirectly) to words, pictures or other symbols,

When I use the name "Frodo" I am referring to the hobbit, not to the word "Frodo" or my idea of Frodo. — Michael

... and admitting as much,

Does this entail realism regarding Frodo? Of course not. Frodo is not ontologically-independent of our language and our ideas. — Michael

(6 years old, but recently exhibited.)

Frodo is a hobbit, "Frodo" is a word. Clearly there are two different referents.