The OP is a paragraph drawn from the end of an essay, not really designed to justify everything. Its a conversation starter that doesn't stand alone, you've got to read the entire thread! I'm not being exhibitionistic, merely trying to refine my ideas by eliciting some constructive feedback from a few dudes, and you'll see that my theory did improve because of this discussion.

In this paragraph only I found the following rather exotic philosophical.scientific terms/concepts: pluralistic monism, quantum dynamics, superpositions or blended wavelengths, panpsychism. And then you pretend all this is your opinion and ask from people to tell you what they think! — Alkis Piskas

It's possible for one's own opinion to overlap with that of others. I don't think Enrique is claiming he came up will all this completely by himself. Not that I understand it particularly.

I don't think Enrique is claiming he came up will all this completely by himself. — bert1

My thoughts are probably influenced the most by Johnjoe McFadden's book Life on the Edge: The Coming of Age of Quantum Biology, plus a lot of additional reading about quantum physics.

"A process of integrating information for the purpose of self organization"
— Pop

Is that what you think an experience is? — bert1

This forum format is not ideal for conveying everything that one would like. I try to keep things brief and to the point, and no doubt some clarity, and humanity, is lost in the process.

In my understanding, every moment of consciousness has its feeling. It is the feeling that is responsible for causing us to resolve a moment of consciousness. I agree with Capra's assertion: " cognition is a disturbance in a state". And we are biased to resolve the disturbance, "due to the feeling", by reintegrating the state.

It is important to note, That a self is identical to a body of information, and in the process of cognition, it is disturbed, but we are intimately, and inextricably biased to reintegrate the information, in order to maintain the status quo of the system, as much as possible, and thus maintain self consistency.

It is not always possible to achieve this absolutely, and so potentially every moment of consciousness results in an incremental shift in the state of the system, and thus the self. In this way a self evolves in line with experience, as the result of experience. This is consistent with neuroplasticity.

Hopefully this conveys the gist of my thinking. Does it make sense?

every moment of consciousness has its feeling. — Pop

Yes, we have direct access to it, which is better than any possible definition or theory. Would it be empirical verses a priori or some terms like that?

every moment of consciousness has its feeling.
— Pop
Yes, we have direct access to it, which is better than any possible definition or theory. Would it be empirical verses a priori or some terms like that? — Mark Nyquist

What this feeling is precisely is very difficult to resolve. My thinking, very roughly, is that all systems self organize due to this feeling. That all systems self organize suggests they do so for a common reason. This reason might be the integration of the laws of the universe ( anthropic principle ). The laws of the universe in ordered pockets of the universe converge to cause self organization. I believe we may be feeling these converged forces.

Ok, I'll take that as a counter argument. But we shouldn't get so bogged down in theory that we forget we can examine its workings directly.

↪Pop Ok, I'll take that as a counter argument. But we shouldn't get so bogged down in theory that we forget we can examine its workings directly. — Mark Nyquist

I am very much a phenomenologist, but this is very tricky. What we can examine is a self concept. But, as a monist, what I try to describe is how all these unconscious processes create a body that eventually evolves a self concept.

Our self concept is an emergent quality, thought to occur after language. So, one needs to be vey careful here that one does not mistake ones self concept for the process that actually created it.

When we introspect initially, we introspect upon a self concept. However, central to the self concept is the same mechanism driving all self organization, imo.

What this feeling is precisely is very difficult to resolve. My thinking, very roughly, is that all systems self organize due to this feeling. That all systems self organize suggests they do so for a common reason. This reason might be the integration of the laws of the universe ( anthropic principle ). The laws of the universe in ordered pockets of the universe converge to cause self organization. I believe we may be feeling these converged forces. — Pop

This comment and intuition brings to mind the following passages from Steven Shaviro (after Whitehead) and his conception of "prehension" and "lure for feeling". You may find the below interesting or not but I will post the link and some passages from the longer article for you.
http://www.shaviro.com/Othertexts/Pulse.pdf

According to Alfred North Whitehead, “the basis of experience is emotional”

Every experience of perception involves an “affective tone” (176), and this
tone precedes, and both determines and exceeds, cognition. We do not first per-ceive what is before us, and then respond emotionally to these perceptions. Whitehead
says that the order is rather the reverse. For “the direct information to be derived
from sense-perception wholly concerns the functionings of the animal body”
(215). Perception is first a matter of being-affected bodily. Contact with the outside
world strengthens or weakens the body, stimulates it or inhibits it, furthers or
impairs its various functions. Every perception or prehension thus provokes the
body into “adversion or aversion” – and this is already the “subjective form” of
the prehension (1929/1978, 184). It is only later that (in “high-grade” organisms
such as ourselves, at least) “the qualitative characters of affective tones inherent
in the bodily functionings are transmuted into the characters of regions” in space
(1933/1967, 215), so that sensa can be taken to qualify (or to give us information
about) objects of knowledge in the external world. We respond to things in the
first place by feeling them; it is only afterwards that we identify, and cognize,
what it is we feel.

Whitehead’s account of perception as feeling is a refinement, and an extension, of
William James’ (1983) theory of the emotions. James claims “that we feel sorry
because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that
we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may
be” (1065-1066). Emotions do not cause bodily states; rather, the bodily states
come first, and the emotions arise out of them. Strictly speaking, this is more an
argument about expression than about causality. Our “perception” of an “exciting
fact” takes the form of “bodily changes”; and “our feeling of the same changes as
they occur IS the emotion” (1065). James’ real point is not to reverse the order of
causality, so that (contrary to what we usually think) the bodily state would be the
cause and the metal state the effect. Rather, he asserts the identity of these conditions,
in a radical monism of affect: “whatever moods, affections, and passions I
have are in very truth constituted by, and made up of, those bodily changes which
we ordinarily call their expression or consequence” (1068). There is no separating
body from mind, or the (bodily) expression from what it (mentally) expresses.
Perception is already, immediately,12 action in the form of “bodily changes”; and
the way that I receive a perception, or apprehend its “sensa,” is the way that my
body changes, or has changed. Perception or excitation, action or bodily changes,
and emotion or response, are all one and the same event. It is only in subsequent
reflection that we can separate them from one another (just as, for Whitehead, it isonly in subsequent reflection, and by a process of abstraction, that we can separate
the “subjective form” of a prehension from the datum being prehended, and both
of these from the “actual entity” of which the prehension is a “concrete element”).
James describes emotion as a particular sort of experience. Whitehead radicalizes
this argument, and expands its scope, by describing all experience as emotional.
This includes bare sense-perception; it also includes modes of “experience” that
are not conscious, and not necessarily human. Indeed, Whitehead’s philosophy
“attributes ‘feeling’ throughout the actual world” (1929/1978, 177). For Whitehead,
“feelings” are identical with “positive prehensions” in general, which are
all the ways in which entities interact with one another, or affect one another
(220).13 To feel something means to be affected by that something. And the way
that the feeling entity is affected, or changed, is the very content of what it feels.
Everything that happens in the universe is thus in some sense an episode of feeling:
even the “actual occasions in so-called ‘empty space’ ” discovered by modern
physics (177). Of course, quantum fluctuations in the void do not involve anything
like consciousness or sense-perception. But when we examine these fluctuations,
“the influx of feeling with vague qualitative and ‘vector’ definition is what we
find” (177). Overall, there is “a hierarchy of categories of feeling” (166), from
the “wave-lengths and vibrations” of subatomic physics (163) to the finest subtleties
of human subjective experience. But in every case, phenomena are felt, and
grasped as modes of feeling, before they can be cognized and categorized. In this
way, Whitehead posits feeling as a basic condition of experience, much as Kant
establishes space and time as transcendental conditions of sensibility.

12“Immediately” here means in the same undecomposable present moment. Of course, James
insists that such a “present moment of time,” or what he prefers to call the “specious present,” is
never literally instantaneous, but always possesses a certain thickness of duration (573-574).

According to Alfred North Whitehead, “the basis of experience is emotional” — prothero

Thanks for the link, I'll read it in detail later.

Yes. The basis of experience is emotional. I think the philosophical zombie argument really brings this home, for me at least. Without emotion, there would be no experience, and without experience, there would be no consciousness.

So the question is what is emotion / feeling ?

Like forces, feelings can not be conceptualized, they can only be felt. In mind, reason and feelings are not miscible, they exist side by side like an emulsion (oil and water), where one cannot inhabit the other. The feeling causes affect, and thus affected, we reintegrate. We are always affected to reintegrate. And this way a self evolves as a body of information. A body of information integrating more and more information onto itself, in successive moments of consciousness.

Everything can be described as a body of information accumulating more information onto itself.

That is roughly how it has come together for me, how about yourself?

It's possible for one's own opinion to overlap with that of others. I don't think Enrique is claiming he came up will all this completely by himself. Not that I understand it particularly. — bert1

This is true. But the main point of my reply was that all that is gibberish and pretentious.

The OP is a paragraph drawn from the end of an essay, not really designed to justify everything. Its a conversation starter that doesn't stand alone, you've got to read the entire thread! I'm not being exhibitionistic, merely trying to refine my ideas by eliciting some constructive feedback from a few dudes, and you'll see that my theory did improve because of this discussion. — Enrique

How can you expect someone to read more of the topic if you start it with a whole paragraph that sounds like gibberish? This is "suicidal" (for your post). If you really want to get sensible responses, you have to start with something also sensible and undestandable. Isn't this obvious?

To anyone who has the answer. @180 Proof??? Care to weigh in?

No doubt the nature of mind is uncertain. Is the mind physical or not? Why else the debate between physicalists and nonphysicalists?

Put simply, we aren't sure that the mind is physical but then nonphysicalists have to explain why? i.e. what (good) reasons are there that the mind could be nonphysical?

The Unicorn Problem For Nonphysicalism.

One very potent argument in favor of nonphysicalism is the mind can produce mental objects that aren't physically instantiated e.g. unicorns and that's just one example, there are numerous other objects that exist only in the mind. Is this a good reason to doubt the physicality of the mind?

Not so fast. A unicorn (physically nonexistent) = Horse (physically exists) + Horn (physically exists). In other words, a pure nonphysical object can be and is reducible to physical objects.

Is the mind a unicorn? Let's grant that the mind is nonphysical like a unicorn but just like the unicorn can be expressed in physical terms - horse & horn - the mind too can be expressed (reduced) to the physical.

Put simply, we aren't sure that the mind is physical but then nonphysicalists have to explain why? i.e. what (good) reasons are there that the mind could be nonphysical? — TheMadFool

There are not just two choices here, the mind being physical or non-physical. A third choice is "do brains have the ability to contain the non-physical?". So this is not a singular form but is irreducible. We deal with mental content all the time and it's never separate from our physical brain so why not acknowledge this two part form?

One very potent argument in favor of nonphysicalism is the mind can produce mental objects that aren't physically instantiated e.g. unicorns and that's just one example, there are numerous other objects that exist only in the mind. Is this a good reason to doubt the physicality of the mind? — TheMadFool

The Unicorn can exist physically as patterns of matter and energy ( information ) in your mind, just like all other thoughts, as neuroplasticity would suggest.

The (mind)ing is what the brain does. The brain is physical. However else it might be conceived of, it follows that (mind)ing can also be conceived of as physical. Like digestion, seeing, dancing, respirating ... physical processes (activities), not things. (Mind)ing is a verb, not a noun.

it follows that (mind)ing can also conceived of as physical. — 180 Proof

It's good to hear someone uttering these words. I say this frequently and I fully believe experience exists. But it's physical. This is not a contradiction in terms.

:up:

This "Minding" (verb) is worth looking at.
So as a process:
Brain state (1) --->Minding process ---> Brain state (2).
Also,
Brain state (1) is Mental content (1),
Brain state (2) is Mental content (2).
Example,
I have three dollars to spend on a used book --->Minding process --->
I own a used book.

The Unicorn can exist physically as patterns of matter and energy ( information ) in your mind, just like all other thoughts, as neuroplasticity would suggest. — Pop

I see but I meant to stress on the mind's ability to transcend the physical by being able to conceive of stuff (like unicorns) that don't exist in the physical world. Even if the thought of unicorns are patterns of matter & energy that still doesn't diminsh the significance of unicorns as pure thought even after conceding the fact that unicorns are horses with horns (both physically instantiated).

The (mind)ing is what the brain does. The brain is physical. However else it might be conceived of, it follows that (mind)ing can also be conceived of as physical. Like digestion, seeing, dancing, respirating ... physical processes (activities), not things. (Mind)ing is a verb, not a noun. — 180 Proof

Yes, I get where you're coming from. (Mind)ing is simply the function the brain just as physical as digestion, the function of the gut. Indeed a function isn't a thing, at least not in the sense the thing that functions is - digestion lacks the thingness of the gut.

I see but I meant to stress on the mind's ability to transcend the physical by being able to conceive of stuff (like unicorns) that don't exist in the physical world. — TheMadFool

You mean the mind can create a world beyond the world in itself? Yes indeed! And if you accept that every consciousness is unique in the absolute sense, then you might also accept that every world view is also unique in the absolute sense, which might make you wonder what the world is, given we live in slightly different ones, depending upon our consciousness. :chin: FYI

You mean the mind can create a world beyond the world in itself? Yes indeed! And if you accept that every consciousness is unique in the absolute sense, then you might also accept that every world view is also unique in the absolute sense, which might make you wonder what the world is, given we live in slightly different ones, depending upon our consciousness. :chin: FYI — Pop

:ok: :up:

How can you expect someone to read more of the topic if you start it with a whole paragraph that sounds like gibberish? — Alkis Piskas

Hate to break it to you, but I think its pretty damn easy to understand lol

What I like about a consciousness model built up from the neuron level is there are known events such as the firing of neurons that correlate to mental activity and you can have active and inactive states.
Can you identify anything at the quantum level that always correlates to mental activity, can be turned off and on, or is some kind of switching device that could play a role in decision making? And why would these capabilities exist only in the brains of biological organisms? Has our genetic code found some way to exploit quantum phenomenon? And what quantum phenomenon would there be at the temperature our brains function?

I'm a little skeptical and even paranoid that the authors of books on quantum consciousness were either told by their publishers or figured out on their own to push their theories to the extreme to sell more books.

Hate to break it to you, but I think its pretty damn easy to understand lol — Enrique

Of course you think. But "lol"? What are you? 12?

Of course you think. But "lol"? What are you? 12? — Alkis Piskas

Giving me crap for my lol's? That is neither philosophically relevant nor intellectually sound, and is unequivocally incorrigible.

Giving me crap for my lol's? That is neither philosophically relevant nor intellectually sound, and is unequivocally incorrigible. — Enrique

By "12", I meant intellecutal age, not physical. And in fact your expression "giving me crap" proves it. Anyway, maybe I should also mention your hypocrisy (re: "it's pretty damn easy")

philosophy throwdown! lol

What I like about a consciousness model built up from the neuron level is there are known events such as the firing of neurons that correlate to mental activity and you can have active and inactive states. Can you identify anything at the quantum level that always correlates to mental activity, can be turned off and on, or is some kind of switching device that could play a role in decision making? And why would these capabilities exist only in the brains of biological organisms? Has our genetic code found some way to exploit quantum phenomenon? And what quantum phenomenon would there be at the temperature our brains function? — Mark Nyquist

I've been informed that the phosphates of ATP (adenosine triphosphate), a primary energy storage molecule in organisms, may be able to sustain superpositions for almost a second, so human body temperature is close to being proven conducive. I assume the mechanism would be a sort of cyclical pulsing between coherence states and "wave function collapse" or decoherence.

If you have enough of these molecular superpositions in close proximity, even if they only last a second, biochemical pathways might be generated that are effectively always in an "on" state of superposition, responsible for the fact that particular percepts are sustained for long periods during certain kinds of conscious awareness.

The steady state holism of consciousness would be due to the brain's electromagnetic field creating a global substrate within which these particular percepts are lodged, blended into this field by electric charge, which is a force capable of influencing the behavior of photons and electrons by moving them about and inducing them to cohere. Of course neuronal connections play a role in producing the electromagnetic field among additional functions, but the substance of subjective particularity would be these quantum biochemical pathways within cells.

This is all still speculative, but its the only explanation I've encountered that can get past the philosophical complications of consciousness theory. Dualism doesn't technically work, physicalism also, but a panprotopsychism based on quantum theory makes mechanistic sense. It's the only option so far that has any possibility of explaining how mind and matter coexist, all of its facets are falsifiable, and it makes intuitive sense.

An aspect of this theory is that percepts are unconstrained to biological form as thus far modeled. It allows for the possibility that beings exist with a structural design not dependent on genes, membranes, carbon, or any substances that the human body is based around. So the kinds of consciousness that can potentially be accounted for expands greatly.

Some further implications have already been mentioned, such as building elements of subjectivity into electronic devices and devising medical treatments and enhancements for organic processes that have traditionally been regarded as subjective.

You might be able to think of some objections, and if so I'd like to read them.