Consciousness: a hallucination of an illusion

hypericin

A perception is illusory to the degree that its reality does not match its appearance. Qualia are completely illusory. Qualia presents a world of red, fragrant roses and buzzing bees. But there is no red in light, at all. No fragrance in molecules, at all. No buzzing in air perturbance, at all. These are all illusions.

A hallucination is that which has no stable reality outside of subjective manifestation. Consciousness, as the set of qualia we are attending to at any given moment, is completely private, and so has no reality outside of our subjective experience of it. It is hallucinatory.

It is true that we are similar beings, and so may be undergoing hallucinations of a similar character. But they have no reality outside of our collective subjectivity.

Further, consciousness is valuable because it is a stable mapping of reality onto an imaginary plane. But there are an infinite number of such stable mappings. And the choice of mapping is functionally irrelevant. Any random variation in this mapping will go unnoticed, in terms of evolutionary fitness. Therefore I think it is likely we all experience wildly different private hallucinations.

Manuel

A perception is illusory to the degree that its reality does not match its appearance — hypericin

How do particles resemble how they appear? Or DNA?

A hallucination is that which has no stable reality outside of subjective manifestation. — hypericin

But this raises more questions, what has a "stable reality"? It looks to me as if we should be thinking in terms of processes instead of objects. It's fine to speak of "stable things", while keeping in mind that everything is constantly changing.

is completely private, and so has no reality outside of our subjective experience of it. It is hallucinatory. — hypericin

Sure, qualia are private, I agree. I'm really not intending to reply with questions, but I just would like clarification. If all our subjective experiences are hallucinations, what do we do with what we ordinarily take to be hallucination? We'd have to say that it is a hallucination within a hallucination or something along these lines.

But there are an infinite number of such stable mappings. And the choice of mapping is functionally irrelevant. — hypericin

Yes, I think you're correct in terms of having an "infinite number of... mappings". Nevertheless the choice of mapping has to matter in some fundamental respect. If we're on some mountains and don't map a cliff, we'd die. So at some points our mapping converges in some crucial areas.

Therefore I think it is likely we all experience wildly different private hallucinations. — hypericin

I'd just call them experiences. But in terms of the variety involved and the subtlety found in them, it's unlikely two people would have the exact same experience. But in some cases, they have to be "similar enough."

Joshs

↪hypericin

A perception is illusory to the degree that its reality does not match its appearance — hypericin

Its reality does not match its appearance because its reality IS its appearance, and the hallucination here is the belief that there is a reality separate from the subjective appearance of the world to an individual, and the intersubjective coordination of appearances within a language community.
A perception can be deemed illusory if a subsequent perception does not validate what has been anticipated based on a previous perception , but this invalidation takes place relative to the subject’s own prior experience , not in comparison to some presumed Cartesian ‘real’ world entirely independent of the subject.

bongo fury

Neither would it carry any Imputation of Falshood to our simple Ideas, if by the different Structure of our Organs, it were so ordered, That the same Object should produce in several Men’s Minds different Ideas at the same time; v.g. if the Idea, that a Violet produced in one Man’s Mind by his Eyes, were the same that a Marigold produces in another Man’s, and vice versâ. — Locke: Of True and False Ideas

original2

And the choice of mapping is functionally irrelevant. — hypericin

No, it is relevant. Some mappings will be more useful to an individual, because of selective accuracy or speed of processing. Similar mappings will allow better communication between individuals possessing them using the same computational resources.

↪hypericin

Therefore I think it is likely we all experience wildly different private hallucinations. — hypericin

If qualia map the reality then I think calling them hallucinations is really confusing. Our qualia are different, what do you mean by wildly different?

hypericin

Their appearance is certainly an illusion as well cannot perceive them at all without "projecting them onto an imaginary plane"

But this raises more questions, what has a "stable reality"? — Manuel

Both objects and processes exist independently of anything that may or may not perceive them, this is what I meant by "stable reality"

We'd have to say that it is a hallucination within a hallucination or something along these lines. — Manuel

I don't have a problem with this.

So at some points our mapping converges in some crucial areas. — Manuel

I'm not sure if you are understanding me here. The only requirement is that there is some stable mapping from a sensory constellation to "cliff". But the form that mapping takes is irrelevant. Trivially, my red might be your green. Or my color might be your sound, or it might be some other form you can't conceive of. As long as qualia masks reality in some stable manner, it can take any form at all and be functional.

Jack Cummins

↪hypericin

I am having a bit of difficulty understanding your question, but find it to be extremely interesting. We have internal states and states which are connected to qualia. In most instances, hallucinations are distinct from usual experience because they are based on perceptions not evident to others. For example, if I swallow LSD or a packet of morning glory seeds I may experience a reality different from other people. However, I am not sure if this is altered perception or a new experience, in terms of qualia.

It is complicated, as evident in Huxley's writings, which are based on Bergson's ideas about 'mind at large.' It is involves qualia, but probably also involves questiona about the whole way in which consciousness works.

skyblack

A hallucination is that which has no stable reality outside of subjective manifestation. Consciousness, as the set of qualia we are attending to at any given moment, is completely private, and so has no reality outside of our subjective experience of it. It is hallucinatory. — hypericin

So is the entire world 'you' perceive. You can doubt everything but you cannot doubt the doubter. Which proves the primacy of a conscious presence (the doubter), and of consciousnesses as being THE fundamental reality. The rest may be doubted.

Manuel

Their appearance is certainly an illusion as well cannot perceive them at all without "projecting them onto an imaginary plane" — hypericin

We'd only be left with the equations that lead us to believe particles exist and behave in such a manner. So mathematics would be exempt from illusions, somehow. If, however, you'd say that even math is illusory then we just make everything up. There'd be no external world.

Both objects and processes exist independently of anything that may or may not perceive them, this is what I meant by "stable reality" — hypericin

I don't think this is true of objects. Processes, yes, I'd agree.

I don't have a problem with this. — hypericin

Why not use "representations" or "presentations"? These words seem to me to be less loaded, as illusion tends to be associated with something false.

Or my color might be your sound, or it might be some other form you can't conceive of. As long as qualia masks reality in some stable manner, it can take any form at all and be functional — hypericin

Yeah, that's possible.

Consciousness: a hallucination of an illusion

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