Deus Deceptor Maximus Et Veritas, Veritas E Mendaciis

TheMadFool

The evil demon, also known as Descartes' demon, malicious demon[1] and evil genius,[2] is an epistemological concept that features prominently in Cartesian philosophy. In the first of his 1641 Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes imagines that an evil demon, of "utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me." This evil demon is imagined to present a complete illusion of an external world, so that Descartes can say, "I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds and all external things are merely the delusions of dreams which he has devised to ensnare my judgement. I shall consider myself as not having hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses, but as falsely believing that I have all these things." — Wikipedia

Cartesian Doubt

Cartesian doubt is a form of methodological skepticism associated with the writings and methodology of René Descartes (March 31, 1596–Feb 11, 1650).[1][2]:88 Cartesian doubt is also known as Cartesian skepticism, methodic doubt, methodological skepticism, universal doubt, systematic doubt, or hyperbolic doubt — Wikipedia

Radical Skepticism

Radical skepticism (or radical scepticism in British English) is the philosophical position that knowledge is most likely impossible.[1] Radical skeptics hold that doubt exists as to the veracity of every belief and that certainty is therefore never justified. To determine the extent to which it is possible to respond to radical skeptical challenges is the task of epistemology or "the theory of knowledge" — Wikipedia

I hope this makes sense at some level; I'm going to throw it out there for consumption, digestion, hopefully assimilation and if not that, excretion at the earliest opportune moment.

The simple possibility of a deus deceptor has succeeded in doing what's widely recognized as sometimes unethical and at all times psychologically painful (warning! hyperbole) which is, often expressed very disapprovingly, sowing the seeds of doubt. For the moment ignore philosophers who advocate skepticism and regard it as an invaluable asset for the simple reason that they do it only out of utmost necessity - choosing the lesser of two evils.

Now, what is doubt? Take a proposition P. Doubts are about propositions, specifically about not knowing in this case whether P is true/false [P v ~P]. This sums up Cartesian skepticism and also radical skepticism to some extent I believe.

What I want to do, my aim is, to take the notion of a deus deceptor to its logical conclusion. All that it was able to do for René Descartes was to cause him to be unsure, for a given proposition, P, whether P v ~P [is P is true or is P false?].

However, to deceive as the deus deceptor is assumed to intend means that, to max out on deception, if the truth is P, the illusion should be such that the "evidence" should point to ~P and if the truth is ~P, the illusion should contain elements that favor the conclusion P.

Under this formulation, assuming a deus deceptor, we can get to the truth, if not certain ones, at least probable ones.

As a case study let's consider physicalism, firstly because of Descartes and secondly because I know something about it. Almost all the "evidence" points to physicalism. If there's a deus deceptor, that's exactly what fae wants us to think. That means, given the mountain of "evidence" for physicalism, given this is the handiwork of a deus deceptor, the truth, the fact, must be the negation i.e. nonphysicalism is the truth.

Ergo, the deus deceptor, if there is one, can't help but give the game away in a manner of speaking. Fae wants to, intends to deceive and if P is true, he will create an illusion that ~P (P is false).

Of course the deus deceptor might adopt a balanced approach in order to keep us guessing and ensure that, ceteris paribus, the "evidence" for a claim P is more or less equal for the claim ~P. However, that doesn't seem to square with physicalism at least - the "evidence" for nonphysicalism seems scanty.

This relatively easy technique, deus deceptor present, should aid us in ferreting out truths from the universe of possible propositions about our world.

The natural deduction rule we'll use with this method is the Disjunctive Syllogism [DS]
1. p v q
2. ~p
Ergo,
3. q

For physicalism/nonphysicalism, the following will be the argument,

1. A deus deceptor exists [assume]
2. Most of the evidence points to physicalism ["fact"]
3. If a deus deceptor exists then the deus deceptor intends to deceive [by definition]
4. If a deus deceptor intends to deceive and most of the evidence points to physicalism then physicalism is false (at the very least very unlikely to be true) [Magician's misdirection]
5. The deus deceptor intends to deceive [1, 3 MP]
6. A deus deceptor intends to deceive and most of the evidence points to physicalism [2, 5 Conj]
7. Physicalism is false [4, 6 MP]

Now, the endgame,

8. Physicalism is true or nonphysicalism is true [P v ~P]
9. Physicalism is false [from 7 above]
Ergo,
10. Nonphysicalism is true [8, 9 DS]

This method, if it qualifies as one, I shall name Veritas E Mendaciis [truth from lies].

A penny for your thoughts.

180 Proof

↪TheMadFool

Nice.

Proposition 8 is a false dichotomy. Both p & not-p can be false. Both can be true iff p is epistemological and not-p is ontological.

charles ferraro

↪TheMadFool

Leghorn

@TheMadFool

No comment on the philosophy (I know nothing about Descartes), just a comment on the Latin. veritatem mendaciis is poor in a couple ways. Firstly, in a title, there is no need of the accusative case. Better is veritas (the nominative).

Secondly, mendaciis is ambiguous: is it ablative or dative? The former is obviously meant judging by your translation, but it should be made clear by the use of the preposition ex. So we have “veritas e mendaciis”, “the truth out of lies”.

TheMadFool

↪Todd Martin

Google Translate :sweat:

You seem to know Latin, enough at least to find error when others commit them. :up:

veritas e mendaciis”, “the truth out of lies”. — Todd Martin

Will make the required corrections in my post.

TheMadFool

Proposition 8 is a false dichotomy. Both p & not-p can be false. Both can be true iff p is epistemological and not-p is ontological. — 180 Proof

I don't see how that's possible. p v ~p is a tautology and if, as you claim, both can be false as in ~p &~~p, we get the contradiction ~p & p. Again, if you say both can be true, p & ~p, another contradiction.

Leghorn

@TheMadFool

You have honored me and my knowledge, sir.

TheMadFool

You have honored me and my knowledge, sir. — Todd Martin

You deserve the honor then. :smile:

Leghorn

@TheMadFool

You should have punctuated with a question mark in my case. I am not university-taught. I learned to read Latin solely from books, and in a long and desultory manner.

180 Proof

p v ~p is a ~~tautology~~ — TheMadFool

:mask:

p = p is a tautology.
~p = ~p is a tautology.
p = ~p is a contradiction.

"p V ~p" is a bivalence expression, and therefore neither a tautology nor a contradiction.

TheMadFool

p = p is a tautology.
~p = ~p is a tautology.
p = ~p is a contradiction.

"p v ~p" is a bivalence expression, and therefore neither a tautology nor a contradiction. — 180 Proof

p v ~p is always true. That makes it a tautology.

I learned to read Latin solely from books, and in a long and desultory manner. — Todd Martin

And look at how you've turned out! Master, show me the way! :grin:

180 Proof

p V ~p is ~~always true~~. — TheMadFool

Wrong. Only propositions have truth-values.

TheMadFool

Wrong. Only propositions have truth-values. — 180 Proof

I defer to your better judgement.

baker

↪TheMadFool

Why do you tailor your quest by the model of a Catholic proselytizer??

charles ferraro

↪TheMadFool

Descartes wrote, as follows, in Meditation I:

“I shall now suppose … that some malignant genius exceedingly powerful and cunning has devoted all his powers in the deceiving of me; I shall suppose that the sky, the earth, colors, shapes, sounds and all external things are illusions and impostures of which this evil genius has availed himself for the abuse of my credulity; I shall consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any senses, but as falsely opining myself to possess all these things.”

Assume the Evil Genius focuses not so much on deceiving me about “external things” but focuses, instead, on trying to convince me that my Cogito Sum performance, my “When and while I am thinking, I must be existing” is false, rather than true. If this were the case, then what follows is exactly what the Evil Genius would have to accomplish.

If the Evil Genius knows it is true that I am existing when and while I am thinking in the first person, present tense mode, then he must try to deceive me into believing the truth of the exact opposite, namely, that I am not existing when and while I am not thinking in the first person, present tense mode.

If the Evil Genius knows it is true that I am not existing when and while I am thinking in the first person, present tense mode, then he must try to deceive me into believing the truth of the exact opposite, namely, that I am existing when and while I am not thinking in the first person, present tense mode.

If the Evil Genius knows it is true that I am existing when and while I am not thinking in the first person, present tense mode, then he must try to deceive me into believing the truth of the exact opposite, namely, that I am not existing when and while I am thinking in the first person, present tense mode.

If the Evil Genius knows it is true that I am not existing when and while I am not thinking in the first person, present tense mode, then he must try to deceive me into believing the truth of the exact opposite, namely, that I am existing when and while I am thinking in the first person, present tense mode.

Descartes wrote, as follows, in Meditation III:

“. . . it occurred to me that a God might perhaps have endowed me with a nature such that I may be deceived even in respect of the things which seem to me the most manifest of all. For whenever this supposition of God’s omnipotence comes up in my mind, I cannot but confess that it is easy for Him, if He so wishes, to cause me to err, even in those matters which I regard myself as intuiting with the eyes of the mind in the most evident manner.”

In other words, my Defective Cognitive Nature could deceive me by always spontaneously and simultaneously replacing that which is existentially consistent and existentially self-verifying when I perform it in the first person, present tense mode (the true), with that which is existentially inconsistent and existentially self-defeating when I try to perform it in the first person, present tense mode (the false).

The “When and while I am thinking, I must be existing” is an existentially consistent and existentially self-verifying Cogito Sum performance when I execute it in the first person, present tense mode.

However, I must conclude that I do not have a Defective Cognitive Nature, or that it does not work the way it was intended, because the existentially consistent and existentially self-verifying (true) version of my Cogito Sum performance has not been, cannot be, and will never be replaced, spontaneously and simultaneously, by a version that is existentially inconsistent and existentially self-defeating (false).

The following are the three possible existentially inconsistent and existentially self-defeating (false) versions of the Cogito Sum performance:

"When and while I am not thinking, I must be existing” is existentially inconsistent and existentially self-defeating (false), when I try to perform it in the first person, preset tense mode.

"When and while I am thinking, I must not be existing” is existentially inconsistent and existentially self-defeating (false), when I try to perform it in the first person, preset tense mode.

"When and while I am not thinking, I must not be existing” is existentially inconsistent and existentially self-defeating (false), when I try to perform it in the first person, preset tense mode.

Also, this hypothetical omnipotent deceiver God mentioned by Descartes in Meditation III is not the same as the Malicious Demon he mentions in Meditations I & II.

In fact, Descartes, in Meditation III, has his omnipotent deceiver God transform the Malicious Demon, who operated from without to try to deceive the subject about the world, into a Defective Cognitive Nature, which will now operate from within to try to deceive the subject about itself.

However, I submit that both the Evil Genius and the Omnipotent Deceiver God, the latter via the Defective Cognitive Nature, fail to accomplish their goal.

I think that doubts are not always only about the truth or falsity of propositions, but can also be about intuiting the truth or falsity of the existential consistency and existential self-verification of the cognitive performance (Cogito Sum) in the first person, present tense mode.

1, When and while I am thinking in the first person, present-tense mode, I must be existing. TRUE

2. When and while I am thinking in the first person, present-tense mode, I must not be existing. FALSE

3. When and while I am not thinking in the first person, present-tense mode, I must be existing. FALSE

4. When and while I am not thinking in the first person, present tense mode, I must not be existing.
FALSE

Only the first statement refers to an existentially consistent and existentially self-validating (possible) Cogito Sum performance which I can execute in the first person, present tense mode.

The second, third, and fourth statements refer to existentially inconsistent and existentially self-defeating (impossible) Cogito Sum performances which I cannot execute in the first person, present-tense mode.

Deus Deceptor Maximus Et Veritas, Veritas E Mendaciis

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