Would you enjoy playing a game of chess against a grandmaster other than to say you did so? — Outlander

This happened to me once, in an airport lounge. I had hours to wait and the old gentleman next to me in the lounge was reading a chess magazine. I asked him if he wanted to play. He did, though he did not look particularly excited about it, like if playing chess was a bit boring to him... Anyway, I looked around the airport shops for a set, found one, and came back to the lounge with it.

What followed was rather humbling. I could not make it pass 20 moves in any of the six or seven games we played. When I congratulated him, he said he was a grandmaster.

Apologies, by “hedonic zero” I just mean emotionally neutral experience that is perceived as neither good nor bad. Hedonic zero is what utilitarian philosopher Henry Sidgwick called the “natural watershed” between good and bad experience – though it’s complicated by “mixed states” such as bitter-sweet nostalgia.

Chess? I enjoy playing against a super-grandmaster. I lose every time. By contrast, I wouldn’t ever enjoy losing against a human opponent. This is because I’m a typical male human primate. Playing chess against other humans is bound up with primate dominance behaviour of the African savannah. I trust future sentience can outgrow such primitive zero-sum games.

Thank you for the link to The Twilight Zone (cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Nice_Place_to_Visit).
Perhaps see my response to “What if you don’t like it in Heaven?”:
https://www.hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#heaven
In short, if we upgrade our reward circuitry, then all experience will be heavenly by its very nature.

I think it’s an open question whether or not a negative utilitarian should rescue that child — TheHedoMinimalist

Negative utilitarianism (NU) is compassion systematised. NUs aren’t in the habit of letting small children drown any more than we’re plotting Armageddon. I’m as keen on upholding the sanctity of life in law as your average deontologist. Indeed, I think the principle should be extended to the rest of the animal kingdom, so-called “high-tech Jainism”: https://www.hedweb.com/transhumanism/neojainism.html
The reason for such advocacy is that NU is a consequentialist ethic. Valuing and even sanctifying life is vastly more likely to lead to ideal outcome, i.e. the well-being of all sentience, than cheapening life.

In’t it cost plenty of money to implement any sort of technical fix as a means to end the suffering of wild animals? — TheHedoMinimalist

A pan-species welfare state might cost a trillion dollars or more at today’s prices – maybe almost as much as annual global military expenditure. It’s unrealistic, even if humans weren’t systematically harming nonhumans in factory-farms and slaughterhouses. However, human society is on the brink of a cultured meat revolution. Our “circle of compassion” will expand in its wake. The most expensive free-living organisms to help won’t be the small fast-breeders, as one might naively suppose (cf. https://www.gene-drives.com), but large, slow-breeding vertebrates. I did a costed case-study for free-living elephants a few year’s ago: https://www.abolitionist.com/reprogramming/elephantcare.html

Any practically-minded person (they exist even on a philosophy forum) is likely to be exasperated. What’s the point of drawing up blueprints that will never be implemented? Yet the exponential growth of computer power means that the price of such interventions will collapse. So it’s good to have a debate now over the merits of traditional conservation biology versus compassionate conservation. Bioethicists need to inform ourselves of what is – and isn’t – technically feasible. On the latter score, at least, the prospects are stunningly good. Biotech can engineer a happy biosphere. Politically, such a project may take hundreds or even thousands of years. But I can’t think of a more worthwhile goal.

Negative utilitarianism (NU) is compassion systematised. NUs aren’t in the habit of letting small children drown any more than we’re plotting Armageddon. I’m as keen on upholding the sanctity of life in law as your average deontologist. — David Pearce

Wait, so are you like a rule utilitarian then? Also, it seems to me that you can argue that we should uphold the sanctity of life in law without thinking that we should prevent a child from drowning. For one, I think that the notion of preserving the sanctity of life that exists in law mostly has to do with the prohibition against ending lives rather than an obligation that one must prevent the ending of a life. I don’t think it’s usually illegal for someone to refuse to prevent the child from drowning. Given this, I’m not sure why you think that this scenario isn’t even an open question or a tricky judgement call for a NU. After all, aren’t NUs ultimately trying to reduce the amount of the suffering in the world as their primary goal? Wouldn’t preventing the child from drowning have a significant potential to increase the amount of suffering in the world? If the answer to the latter question is yes, then wouldn’t letting the child drown be potentially compatible with the notion that NU is compassion systematized? Also, Wouldn’t you just define compassion as the prevention or alleviation of suffering as a NU?

I’m a strict NU. And it’s precisely because I’m strict NU that I favour upholding the sanctity of human and nonhuman life in law. Humans can’t be trusted. The alternative to such legal protections would most likely be more suffering. Imagine if people thought that NU entailed letting toddlers drown! Being an effective NU involves striking alliances with members of other ethical traditions. It involves winning hearts and minds. Winning people over to the abolitionist project is a daunting enough challenge as it is. Anything that hampers this goal should be discouraged.

And it’s precisely because I’m strict NU that I favour upholding the sanctity of human and nonhuman life in law. Humans can’t be trusted. The alternative to such legal protections would most likely be more suffering. — David Pearce

So, do you think that it should illegal to let a child drown even under circumstances where you don’t have parental duties for that child and you don’t have a particular job that requires you to prevent that child from drowning like a nanny or a lifeguard?

Imagine if people thought that NU entailed letting toddlers drown! Being an effective NU involves striking alliances with members of other ethical traditions. It involves winning hearts and minds. Winning people over to the abolitionist project is a daunting enough challenge as it is. Anything that hampers this goal should be discouraged. — David Pearce

But, what if a person is a secret NU and he decides to let the child drown? Most of the time, it seems to me that the public wouldn’t know if someone let the child drown because they were a NU since it seems that most NUs only talk about being NUs under an anonymous online identity. Given this, it seems to me that NUs do not actually need to believe that we should prevent people from dying in order to maintain alliances with other ethical theories. Rather, I think they would just need to be collectively dishonest about their willingness to let people die as long as it wouldn’t do anything to worsen the reputation of NU.

So, do you think that it should illegal to let a child drown even under circumstances where you don’t have parental duties for that child and you don’t have a particular job that requires you to prevent that child from drowning like a nanny or a lifeguard? — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes.

But, what if a person is a secret NU and he decides to let the child drown? Most of the time, it seems to me that the public wouldn’t know if someone let the child drown because they were a NU since it seems that most NUs only talk about being NUs under an anonymous online identity. Given this, it seems to me that NUs do not actually need to believe that we should prevent people from dying in order to maintain alliances with other ethical theories. Rather, I think they would just need to be collectively dishonest about their willingness to let people die as long as it wouldn’t do anything to worsen the reputation of NU. — TheHedoMinimalist

Such calculated deceit is probably the recipe for more suffering. So it's not NU. Imagine if Gautama Buddha ("I teach one thing and one thing only: suffering and the end of suffering”) had urged his devotees to practice deception and put vulnerable people out of their misery if the opportunity arose...

Such calculated deceit is probably the recipe for more suffering. So it's not NU. Imagine if Gautama Buddha ("I teach one thing and one thing only: suffering and the end of suffering”) had urged his devotees to practice deception and put vulnerable people out of their misery if the opportunity arose... — David Pearce

I agree with you that it might be best for a fairly high profile NU like yourself to teach your fans and people who might be interested in NU that they should prevent children from drowning. I think you can and kinda have created an implicit double message when describing the reasons for why they should prevent the child from drowning. The main reason that you have stated seems to be related to this being a good PR move for NU. But, I don’t think this genuinely teaches your NU fans that they really shouldn’t allow children to die. Rather, you seem to just be teaching them(in a somewhat indirect and implicit way) to not damage the reputation of NU. Your fans are not stupid though. They know that you seem have your reasons for teaching what you teach and I think they would assume that you might actually want them to let a child die even if you can’t express that sentiment without creating a negative outcome that would lead to more suffering.

In addition, people who believe in other ethical theories are often not stupid either. If you seem to openly state that your main reason for thinking that you should rescue a drowning child has to do with you wanting to appease them, then do you really think that this would work in making people who believe in other ethical theories really think that your views do not really have the anti-life implications that they might think that they have? It seems to me like you would need to come up with another reason for not being anti-life as a NU or I think you would paradoxically end up causing the proponents of other ethical theories to distrust NU even more. I think most people wouldn’t take kindly to someone accepting a particular viewpoint as a means of getting their viewpoint to become less unpopular.

To the best of my knowledge, there is no alternative. The pleasure-pain axis ensnares us all. Genetically phasing out experience below hedonic zero can make the addiction harmless. The future belongs to opioid-addicted life-lovers, not "hard" antinatalists. Amplifying endogenous opioid function will be vital. Whereas taking exogenous opioids typically subverts human values, raising hedonic range and hedonic set-points can potentially sustain and enrich civilisation. — David Pearce

I second that motion but a word of caution. Although anyone who claims not to be a hedonist is lying through faer teeth, I've always been doubtful in re the status of happiness (pleasure & suffering) in a means-ends context. Hedonic ideas tend to treat happiness as an end in itself, as something of intrinsic worth but happiness can also be viewed as a means to some other end. Consider for example the rather "mundane" example of sex - its pleasure rating is off the charts - and I contend that's because of the how important sex is to survival and adaptation. Put simply, in the case of sex, pleasure is a means - a reward system - put in place by evolution to keep us hooked, as it were, to the two-backed beast i.e. pleasure is simply a means to ensure an end which is continued procreation. Ergo, hedonism could be a case of conflating means and ends and it's my suspicion that the more important something is for evolutionary success, usually interpreted as continued existence/survival, the more pleasurable it is and conversely, the more detrimental to evolutionary success (existence/survival) something is, the more painful it is. In very no-nonsense terms, life makes an offer we can't refuse - pleasure is just too damned irresistible for us to reject anything that has it as part of the deal and thereby hangs a tale, a tale of diabolical deception (kindly excuse the hyperbole but somehow it doesn't feel wrong to describe it as such). The story of hedonism and all things allied to it can be adapted to films. Picture a crime boss (life, evolution) whose evil plan is to make people addicted to a highly potent drug (happiness) and use the addicts to do his bidding in return for a "fix" (a dose of that drug). He could even manipulate the dose of the drug in such a way that the junkies who manage to do what he wants most gets a bigger dose of the drug. That this film adaptation of hedonism is going to be a crime thriller is telling, no?

Ergo, hedonism could be a case of conflating means and ends — TheMadFool

I think this is right. I think pain/pleasure are indicators for what is good or bad, not what is good or bad itself.

Consider the following analogy, smokedetectors serve the function of alerting us when there is a fire. The bad thing is not the smokedetector going of, it's the fire it signals that is bad.

Analogously pain signals us that something bad is happening, for example that your skin is getting burned when you have your hand on a hot stove.

Negative utilitarianism or hedonism is akin to saying that the solution to the problem is getting rid of smokedetection. It just doesn't make sense to me from the get-go.

Negative utilitarianism or hedonism is akin to saying that the solution to the problem is getting rid of smokedetection. It just doesn't make sense to me from the get-go. — ChatteringMonkey

Agony and despair are inherently bad, whether they serve a signaling purpose (e.g. a noxious stimulus) or otherwise (e.g. neuropathic pain or lifelong depression).

Almost no one disputes subjectively nasty states can play a signalling role in biological animals. What's controversial is whether they are computationally indispensable or whether they can be functionally replaced by a more civilised signalling system. The development of ever more versatile inorganic robots that lack the ghastly "raw feels" of agony and despair shows an alternative signalling system is feasible. "Cyborgisation" (smart prostheses, etc) and hedonic recalibration aren't mutually exclusive options for tomorrow's (trans)humans. A good start will be ensuring via preimplantation genetic screening and soon gene-editing that all new humans are blessed with the hyperthymia and elevated pain-tolerance ("But pain is just a useful signaling system!") of the luckiest 1% (or 0.1%) of people alive today:
https://www.hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#physical

More futuristic transhuman options, i.e. an architecture of mind based entirely on gradients of bliss, can be explored later this century and beyond. But let's tackle the most morally urgent challenges first.

In very no-nonsense terms, life makes an offer we can't refuse - pleasure is just too damned irresistible for us to reject anything that has it as part of the deal and thereby hangs a tale, a tale of diabolical deception — TheMadFool

Yes, well put. In their different ways, pain and pleasure alike are coercive. Any parallel between heroin addicts and the drug naïve is apt to sound strained, but endogenous opioid addiction is just as insidious at corrupting our judgement.

The good news is that thanks to biotech, the substrates of bliss won't need to be rationed. If mankind opts for a genetically-driven biohappiness revolution, then, in principle at least, everyone's a "winner". Contrast the winners and losers of conventional social reforms.

Agony and despair are inherently bad, whether they serve a signaling purpose (e.g. a noxious stimulus) or otherwise (e.g. neuropathic pain or lifelong depression). — David Pearce

I don't think anything is really 'inherent'. If they serve a signalizing purpose than they themselves are not bad, but the circumstances that lead to agony and despair are. I'll grant you that yes, in the case of chronic pain and depression, the agony and despair are bad themselves without any signaling or other purpose... But if you permit me using the same analogy I made in my previous post, this seems to be a case of malfunctioning smokedetectors. If they go off all the time without cause, then yes they needs fixing. But some malfunctioning smokedetectors are not a reason to get rid of all smokedetection, nor does it make getting rid of smokedetection an end in itself. So by all means yes, we should try to find a solution for chronic pain and depression... I just don't think those specific cases are necessarily representative or to be generalized to all pain and pleasure.

Almost no one disputes subjectively nasty states can play a signalling role in biological animals. What's controversial is whether they are computationally indispensable or whether they can be functionally replaced by a more civilised signalling system. — David Pearce

Maybe they can be replaced or maybe they cannot, that's a technical question. What's also controversial I'd say is whether we 'should' replace them by a more 'civilised' signaling system. What is deemed more civilized no doubt depends on the perspective you are evaluating it from.

I think, and we touched on this a few pages back, a lot of this discussion comes down to the basic assumption of negative utilitarianism, and whether you buy into it or not. If you don't, the rest of the story doesn't necessarily follow because it builds on that basic assumption.

I agree with you that it might be best for a fairly high profile NU like yourself to teach your fans and people who might be interested in NU that they should prevent children from drowning. I think you can and kinda have created an implicit double message when describing the reasons for why they should prevent the child from drowning. The main reason that you have stated seems to be related to this being a good PR move for NU. But, I don’t think this genuinely teaches your NU fans that they really shouldn’t allow children to die. Rather, you seem to just be teaching them(in a somewhat indirect and implicit way) to not damage the reputation of NU. Your fans are not stupid though. They know that you seem have your reasons for teaching what you teach and I think they would assume that you might actually want them to let a child die even if you can’t express that sentiment without creating a negative outcome that would lead to more suffering. — TheHedoMinimalist

Thanks, you raise some astute but uncomfortable points. Asphyxiation is a ghastly way to die, but even if death were instantaneous, there is something rather chilling about an ethic that seems to say pain-ridden Darwinian humans would be better off not existing. Classical utilitarianism says the same, albeit for different reasons; ideally our matter and energy should be converted into pure, undifferentiated bliss (hedonium).

However, if some version of the abolitionist project ever comes to pass – whether decades, centuries or millennia hence – its completion will presumably owe little to utilitarian ethicists. Maybe the end of suffering will owe as little to utilitarianism as pain-free surgery. I believe that transhuman life based on gradients of bliss will one day seem to be common sense – and in no more need of ideological rationalisation than breathing.

I don't think anything is really 'inherent'. — ChatteringMonkey

An ontic structural realist (cf.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/#OntStrReaOSR) might agree with you. But if someone has no place in their ontology for the inherent ghastliness of my pain, so much the worse for their theory of the world. And I fear I'm typical.

If they serve a signalizing purpose than they themselves are not bad, but the circumstances that lead to agony and despair are — ChatteringMonkey

But their signalling "purpose" is to help our genes leave more copies of themselves. Agony and despair are still terrible even when they fulfil the functional role of maximizing the inclusive fitness of our DNA.

But some malfunctioning smokedetectors are not a reason to get rid of all smokedetection, nor does it make getting rid of smokedetection an end in itself. — ChatteringMonkey

Recall transhumanists / radical abolitionists don't call for abolishing smoke-detection, so to speak. Nociception is vital; the "raw feels" of pain are optional. Or rather, they soon will be...

What's also controversial I'd say is whether we 'should' replace them by a more 'civilised' signaling system. What is deemed more civilized no doubt depends on the perspective you are evaluating it from. — ChatteringMonkey

Perhaps the same might be said of medicine pre- and post-surgical anesthesia. However, a discussion of meta-ethics and the nature of value judgements would take us far afield.

I think, and we touched on this a few pages back, a lot of this discussion comes down to the basic assumption of negative utilitarianism, and whether you buy into it or not. If you don't, the rest of the story doesn't necessarily follow because it builds on that basic assumption. — ChatteringMonkey

I happen to be a negative utilitarian. NU is a relatively unusual ethic of limited influence. An immense range of ethical traditions besides NU can agree, in principle, that a world without suffering would be good. Alas, the devil is in the details...

Yes, well put. In their different ways, pain and pleasure alike are coercive. Any parallel between heroin addicts and the drug naïve is apt to sound strained, but endogenous opioid addiction is just as insidious at corrupting our judgement.

The good news is that thanks to biotech the substrates of bliss won't need to be rationed. If mankind opts for a genetically-driven biohappiness revolution, then, in principle at least, everyone's a "winner". Contrast the winners and losers of conventional social reforms. — David Pearce

I like the idea of transhumanism. Happiness (pleasure & suffering) is something that's close to my heart but I'm guessing I'm not alone in this regard.

I want to run something by you though. A while back, on another thread, I voiced the opinion that pleasure and pain were like those LED light indicators on the many contraptions you can buy at a store. So a green light (pleasure) turns on when the contraption (we) is working well and a red light (pain) flashes when the contraption is malfunctioning. It appears that for some reason this system for tracking the wellbeing of a person, unlike that for contraptions (machines), has acquired the qualities of being pleasant (pleasure) and unpleasant (pain). I suggested that what we could do, if feasible, is sever that link between pleasure and the pleasant feeling that comes with it and similarly between pain and unpleasantness. In other words, I envision a state, a future state, in which injury/harm to mind and body would simply cause a red light to flash and when something good happens to us, all that does is turn on a green light, the unpleasantness of pain or the pleasantness of pleasure will be taken out of the equation as it were. I suppose this, again, is just another version of my position that pleasure and pain can be construed as means to ensure our wellbeing and to treat them as ends might just indicate that we've missed the point. It seems I've run out of ideas. Will get back to you if anything catches my eye. Thank you. Have a good day.

In other words, I envision a state, a future state, in which injury/harm to mind and body would simply cause a red light to flash and when something good happens to us, all that does is turn on a green light, the unpleasantness of pain or the pleasantness of pleasure will be taken out of the equation as it were. — TheMadFool

Complete "cyborgisation", i.e. offloading all today's nasty stuff onto smart prostheses, is one option. A manual override is presumably desirable so no one feels they have permanently lost control of their body. But abandoning the signalling role of information-sensitive gradients of well-being too would be an even more revolutionary step: the prospect evokes a more sophisticated version of wireheading rather than full-spectrum superintelligence. At least in my own work, I've never explored what lies beyond a supercivilisation with a hedonic range of, say, +90 to +100. A hedonium / utilitronium shockwave in some guise? Should the abundance of empirical value in the cosmos be maximised as classical utilitarianism dictates? Maximisation is not mandatory by the lights of negative utilitarianism; but I don't rule out that posthumans will view negative utilitarianism as an ancient depressive psychosis, if they even contemplate that perspective at all.

If they serve a signalizing purpose than they themselves are not bad, but the circumstances that lead to agony and despair are
— ChatteringMonkey
But their signalling "purpose" is to help our genes leave more copies of themselves. Agony and despair are still terrible even when they fulfil the functional role of maximizing the inclusive fitness of our DNA. — David Pearce

I think this more or less brings us back the original point of our exchange.

One of biological life's defining features is making more copies of the genes it is build out of.

Biological life is the origin, and so far as we know, the only thing that evaluates in this universe.

How then can one come to a conclusion that more life is bad?

Without life in the universe nothing matters either way right?

I happen to be a negative utilitarian. NU is a relatively unusual ethic of limited influence. An immense range of ethical traditions besides NU can agree, in principle, that a world without suffering would be good. The devil is in the details... — David Pearce

The devil is in the details indeed, I don't think many traditions would agree that sterilization of our forward light-cone is the most moral course of action for instance...

Anyway, I enjoyed the discussion, thanks for that.

The devil is in the details indeed, I don't think many traditions would agree that sterilization of our forward light-cone is the most moral course of action for instance... — ChatteringMonkey

Indeed so. Programming a happy biosphere is technically harder than sterilizing the Earth. But I can't see the problem of suffering is soluble in any other way.

Complete "cyborgisation", i.e. offloading all today's nasty stuff onto smart prostheses, is one option. A manual override is presumably desirable so no one feels they have permanently lost control of their body. — David Pearce

Indeed! We love choices don't we? even if it's the case that one of them is foolish/mad/both. Something worth exploring but outside the scope of this discussion (or not???) I suppose. I'm trying to consider the scenario in which people might opt out of transhumanism even though it promises so much and has the means to keep those promises. What if transhumanism becomes a reality but people use it only for recreational purposes, you know like going to Disney land? I'm fairly certain that transhumanism would be just too much "fun" to be thought of as a much-deserved break from reality - it would become, no sooner than all its major features become available in the market, a way of life with global appeal - an offer we don't have it in us to refuse. Yet, we seem to be so concerned by choice, would we insist on having an off switch to transhumanist super states? I wonder.

Maximisation is not mandatory by the lights of negative utilitarianism; but I don't rule out that posthumans will view negative utilitarianism as an ancient depressive psychosis, if they even contemplate that perspective at all — David Pearce

I'm inclined to agree. Though we want to remove the thorn in our side (suffering), let's face it, what we really want is the rose (happiness). G'day.

Asphyxiation is a ghastly way to die, but even if death were instantaneous, there is something rather chilling about an ethic that seems to say pain-ridden Darwinian humans would be better off not existing. — David Pearce

I would speculate that Asphyxiation is actually probably more peaceful than the ways that most people die today from natural causes. I would much rather have someone drown me to death when I’m around 60 than to have my body slowly get ravaged by cancer or some other common life ending illness. Though, I’ll grant you that NUs are not required to believe that you should allow children to drown. I just think that it’s not implausible for a NU to think that he would be benefiting the child by allowing her to die since life offers plenty of future opportunities for suffering and it’s not clear whether this suffering is outweighed by the suffering caused by the drowning.

but even if death were instantaneous, there is something rather chilling about an ethic that seems to say pain-ridden Darwinian humans would be better off not existing. — David Pearce

Well, it is chilling to most people but there are some people like me that don’t seem to think that these implications are problematic. Also, it seems that the idea of genetically modifying humans to be incapable of suffering is chilling and disturbing to most people as well. You probably wouldn’t think that this is much of an argument against transhumanism though.

What if transhumanism becomes a reality but people use it only for recreational purposes, you know like going to Disney land? — TheMadFool

Consider the core transhumanist "supers", i.e. superintelligence, superlongevity and superhappiness.
If you became a full-spectrum superintelligence, would you want to regress to being a simpleton for the rest of the week?
If you enjoyed quasi-eternal youth, would you want to crumble away with the progeroid syndrome we call aging?
If you upgraded your reward circuitry and tasted life based on gradients of superhuman bliss, would you want to revert to the misery and malaise of Darwinian life?
Humans may be prone to nostalgia. Transhumans – if they contemplate Darwinian life at all – won't miss it for a moment.
Pitfalls?
I can think of a few...
https://www.hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#downsides

Also, it seems that the idea of genetically modifying humans to be incapable of suffering is chilling and disturbing to most people as well. — TheHedoMinimalist

I wonder to what extent hesitancy stems from principled opposition, and how much from mere status quo bias?
People tend to be keener on the idea of Heaven than the tools to get there.
Some suspicion is well motivated. The history of utopian experiments is not encouraging.
"But this time it's different!" say transhumanists. But then it always is.
That said, life based on gradients of intelligent bliss is still my tentative prediction for the long-term future of sentience. Suffering isn't just vile; it's pointless.

Consider the core transhumanist "supers", i.e. superintelligence, superlongevity and superhappiness.
If you could become a full-spectrum superintelligence, would you want to regress to being a simpleton for the rest of the week?
If you could enjoy quasi-eternal youth, would you want to crumble away with the progeroid syndrome we call aging?
If you upgraded your reward circuitry and tasted life based on gradients of superhuman bliss, would you want to revert to the misery and malaise of Darwinian life?
Humans may be prone to nostalgia. Transhumans – if they contemplate Darwinian life at all – won't miss it for a moment.
Pitfalls?
I can think of a few...
https://www.hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#downsides — David Pearce

I see no good reason to disagree with what you say. Darwinian life, as you put it, can't even hold a candle to Transhumanist existence as and when it becomes a reality. Who in her right mind will turn down super-anything let alone superintelligence, superlongevity, and superhappiness.

Correct me if I'm wrong but transhumanism envisions the triad of supers (superintelligence, superlongevity, and superhappiness) to work synergistically, complementing each other as it were to produce an ideal state for humans or even other animals. What if that assumption turns out to be false? What if, for instance, superintelligence, after carefully considering the matter, comes to the conclusion that neither (super)longevity nor (super)happiness deserves as much attention as they're getting in transhumanist circles and recommends these supers be scrapped. I'm not sure if similar arguments can be made based on the other supers but you get the idea, right?

Compared to the superintelligent state transhumanism will one day help us achieve, we, as of this moment, are downright simpletons and thus there's a high likelihood that any claims we make now with regard to what superintelligent transhumans in the distant future might aspire towards is going to be way off the mark. In short, there seems to be significant risk to transhumanism's core ideals from superintelligence. Perhaps this is old news to you.

Correct me if I'm wrong but transhumanism envisions the triad of supers (superintelligence, superlongevity, and superhappiness) to work synergistically, complementing each other as it were to produce an ideal state for humans or even other animals. What if that assumption turns out to be false? — TheMadFool

Yes, talk of a "triple S" civilisation is a useful mnemonic and a snappy slogan for introducing people to transhumanism. But are the "three supers" in tension? After all, a quasi-immortal human is scarcely a full-spectrum superintelligence. A constitutionally superhappy human is arguably a walking oxymoron too. For what it's worth, I'm sceptical this lack of enduring identity matters. Archaic humans don't have enduring metaphysical egos either. "Superlongevity" is best conceived as an allusion to how death, decrepitude and aging won't be a feature of post-Darwinian life. A more serious tension is between superintelligence and superhappiness. I suspect that at some stage, posthumans will opt for selective ignorance of the nature of Darwinian life – maybe even total ignorance. A limited amnesia is probably wise even now. There are some states so inexpressibly awful that no one should try to understand them in any deep sense, just prevent their existence.

Yes, talk of a "triple S" civilisation is a useful mnemonic and a snappy slogan for introducing people to transhumanism. But are the "three supers" in tension? After all, a quasi-immortal human is scarcely a full-spectrum superintelligence. (1)A constitutionally superhappy human is arguably a walking oxymoron too. For what it's worth, (2)I'm sceptical this lack of enduring identity matters. Archaic humans don't have enduring metaphysical egos either. "Superlongevity" is best conceived as an allusion to how death, decrepitude and aging won't be a feature of post-Darwinian life. A more serious tension is between superintelligence and superhappiness. (3)I suspect that at some stage, posthumans will opt for selective ignorance of the nature of Darwinian life – maybe even total ignorance. A limited amnesia is probably wise even now. There are some states so inexpressibly awful that no one should try to understand them in any deep sense, just prevent their existence. — David Pearce

1. Why is a constitutionally superhappy human "...arguably a walking oxymoron"? Do you mean to say that such a state has to be, in a sense, made complete with the other 2 supers?

2. The way it seems to me, an "...enduring identity..." is the cornerstone of any hedonic philosophy and for that reason applies to transhumanism too. It's my hunch that we care so much about suffering and happiness precisely because of an "...enduring identity..." that, true or not, we possess. "Suffer" and "Happy" are meaningful only when they become "I suffer" and "I'm happy" i.e. there must be a sense of "...enduring identity..." for hedonism to matter in any sense at all.

By way of bolstering my point that an "...enduring identity..." is key to hedonism I'd like to relate an argument made by William Lane Craig which boils down to the claim that human suffering is, as per him, orders of magnitude greater than animal suffering for the reason that people have an "...enduring identity..." I suppose he means to say that being self-aware (enduring identity) there's an added layer to suffering. Granted that William Lane Craig may not be the best authority to cite, I still feel that he makes the case for why hedonism is such a big deal for us humans and by extension to transhumanism.

3. I suppose you have good reasons for recommending (selective) amnesia in re Darwinian life but wouldn't that be counterproductive? Once bitten, twice shy seems to be the adage transhumanism is about - suffering is too much to bear (and happiness is just too irresistable) - and transhumanists have calibrated their response to the problems of Darwinian life accordingly. To forget Darwinian life would be akin to forgetting an important albeit excruciatingly painful lesson which might be detrimental to the transhumanist cause.

Why is a constitutionally superhappy human "...arguably a walking oxymoron"? — TheMadFool

Sorry, I should clarify. Even extreme hyperthymics today are still recognisably human. But future beings whose reward circuitry is so enriched that their "darkest depths" are more exalted than our "peak experiences" are not human as ordinarily understood – even if they could produce viable offspring via sexual reproduction with archaic humans, i.e. if they fulfil the normal biological definition of species membership. A similar point could be made if hedonic uplift continues. There may be more than one biohappiness revolution. Members of a civilisation with a hedonic range of, say, +20 to +30 have no real insight into the nature of life in a supercivilisation with a range that extends from a hedonic low of, say, +90 to an ultra-sublime +100. With pleasure, as with pain, "more is different" – qualitatively different.

By way of bolstering my point that an "...enduring identity..." is key to hedonism I'd like to relate an argument made by William Lane Craig which boils down to the claim that human suffering is, as per him, orders of magnitude greater than animal suffering for the reason that people have an "...enduring identity..." I suppose he means to say that being self-aware (enduring identity) there's an added layer to suffering. Granted that William Lane Craig may not be the best authority to cite, I still feel that he makes the case for why hedonism is such a big deal to us humans and by extension to transhumanism. — TheMadFool

As a point of human psychology, you may be right. However, I'd beg to differ with William Lane Craig. The suffering of some larger-brained nonhuman animals may exceed the upper bounds of human suffering (cf. https://www.hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#feelpain) – and not on account of their conception of enduring identity (cf. https://www.hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#parfit). This is another reason for compassionate stewardship of Nature rather than traditional conservation biology.

I suppose you have good reasons for recommending (selective) amnesia in re Darwinian life but wouldn't that be counterproductive? Once bitten, twice shy seems to be the adage transhumanism is about - suffering is too much to bear (and happiness is just too irresistible) - and transhumanists have calibrated their response to the problems of Darwinian life accordingly. To forget Darwinian life would be akin to forgetting an important albeit excruciatingly painful lesson which might be detrimental to the transhumanist cause. — TheMadFool

I agree about potential risks. Presumably our successors will recognise too that premature amnesia about Darwinian life could be ethically catastrophic. If so, they will weigh the risks accordingly. But there is a tension between becoming superintelligent and superhappy, just as there is a tension today between being even modestly intelligent and modestly happy. What now passes for mental health depends on partially shutting out empathetic understanding of the suffering of others – even if one dedicates one's life to making the world a better place. Compare how mirror-touch synesthetes may feel your pain as their own. Imagine such understanding generalised. If one could understand even a fraction of the suffering in the world in anything but some abstract, formal sense, then one would go insane. Possibly, there is something that humans understand about reality that our otherwise immensely smarter successors won't grasp.

Sorry, I should clarify. Even extreme hyperthymics today are still recognisably human. But future beings whose reward circuitry is so enriched that their darkest depths are more exalted than our "peak experiences" are not human as ordinarily understood – even if they could produce viable offspring via sexual reproduction with archaic humans, i.e. if they fulfil the normal biological definition of species membership. A similar point could be made if hedonic uplift continues. There may be more than one biohappiness revolution. Members of a civilisation with a hedonic range of, say, +20 to +30 have no real insight into the nature of life in a supercivilisation with a range that extends from a hedonic low of, say, +90 to an ultra-sublime +100. With pleasure as with pain, "more is different" – qualitatively different. — David Pearce

:ok: :up:

So posthumans, as the name suggests, wouldn't exactly be "humans." Posthumans would be so advanced - mentally and physically - that we humans wouldn't be able to relate to them amd vice versa. It would be as if we were replaced by posthumans instead of having evolved into them.

This is another reason for compassionate stewardship of Nature rather than traditional conservation biology,. — David Pearce

Bravo! I sympathize with that sentiment. Sometimes it takes a whole lot of unflagging effort to see the light and this for me is one such instance of deep significance to me.

I agree about potential risks. Presumably our successors will recognise too that premature amnesia about Darwinian life could be ethically catastrophic. If so, they will weigh the risks accordingly. But there is a tension between becoming superintelligent and superhappy, just as there is a tension today between being even modestly intelligent and modestly happy. What now passes for mental health depends on partially shutting out empathetic understanding of the suffering of others – even if one dedicates one's life to making the world a better place. Compare how mirror-touch synesthetes may feel your pain as their own. Imagine such understanding generalised. If one could understand even a fraction of the suffering in the world in anything but some abstract, formal sense, then one would go insane. Possibly, there is something that humans understand about reality that our otherwise immensely smarter successors won't grasp. — David Pearce

I absolutely agree. My own thoughts on this are quite similar. I once made the assertion that the truly psychologically normal humans are those who are clinically depressed for they see the world as it really is - overflowing with pain, suffering, and all manners of abject misery. Who, in faer "right mind", wouldn't be depressed, right? On this view what's passed off as "normal" - contentment and if not that a happy disposition - is actually what real insanity is. In short, psychiatry has completely missed the point which, quite interestingly, some religions like Buddhism, whose central doctrine is that life is suffering, have clearly succeeded in sussing out.

So posthumans, as the name suggests, wouldn't exactly be "humans." Posthumans would be so advanced - mentally and physically - that we humans wouldn't be able to relate to them amd vice versa. It would be as if we were replaced by posthumans instead of having evolved into them. — TheMadFool

Yes. Just as a pinprick has something tenuously in common with agony, posthuman well-being will have something even more tenuously in common with human peak experiences. But mastery of the pleasure-pain axis promises a hedonic revolution; some kind of phase change in hedonic tone beyond human comprehension.

Bravo! I sympathize with that sentiment. Sometimes it takes a whole lot of unflagging effort to see the light and this for me is one such instance of deep significance to me. — TheMadFool

After decades of obscurity and fringe status, a policy agenda of compassionate conservation may even be ready to go mainstream. Here is the latest Vox:
https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/22325435/animal-welfare-wild-animals-movement

I absolutely agree. My own thoughts on this are quite similar. I once made the assertion that the truly psychologically normal humans are those who are clinically depressed for they see the world as it really is - overflowing with pain, suffering, and all manners of abject misery. Who, in faer "right mind", wouldn't be depressed, right? On this view what's passed off as "normal" - contentment and if not that a happy disposition – is actually what real insanity is. In short, psychiatry has completely missed the point which, quite interestingly, some religions like Buddhism, whose central doctrine is that life is suffering, have clearly succeeded in sussing out. — TheMadFool

Well said. In contrast to depressive realism, what passes for mental health is a form of affective psychosis. Yet perhaps we can use biotech and IT to build a world fit for euphoric realism – a world where reality itself seems conspiring to help us.

Yet perhaps we can use biotech and IT to build a world fit for euphoric realism – a world where reality itself seems conspiring to help you. — David Pearce

Does the transhumanist vision ultimately lead to something of a morgue where bodies are stored side-by-side and atop on another in a state of unconsciousness (or even cold storage) offering an identical experience to reality, say a new world to explore the size of ten Earths with geographic features only found on other planets along with personal indestructibility? Would we even require bodies anymore, perhaps it will become a requirement to give one's up?

Wouldn't shrinking people (an old myth that perhaps may be a crypto-technological metaphor) make more sense for human well being? An entire metropolitan city of 1 million people - each and every denizen - would now be able to live in their own private three-story mansion with 20 bedrooms, an Olympic sized swimming pool, and their own private petting zoo and race track (or something) in no more combined space and area than an average strip mall. Fancy that eh?