I'm not clear if you're asking for a clarification on what the differences are between Analytic and Continental philosophy, but if you are: I would sum it up as that Analytic philosophy is focused mostly on linguistic and generally abstract aspects of philosophy, with a heavy focus on precision, rigor, and professionalization, while Continental philosophy is focused instead on experiential or phenomenological lived experience and personal applicability to getting through life well, with a comparable focus on breadth and holism rather than narrow isolated problems.

In an old thread of mine someone made another very nice comment summing it up:

The distinction is not just one of subject matter or the overall approach to subject matter, but very importantly, it's a difference of style, of methodological focus, and of expression preferences. Analytic philosophy tends towards tackling things with a relatively narrow focus, one thing at a time, with a preference for a plain, usually rather dry, more or less scientific and/or logical approach. Continental philosophy tends towards a much broader, "holistic" focus, where it tries to tie together many threads at once, with a preference for a far more decorative, looser/playful approach to language. Both sides tend to see the other side as approaching things in a way that doesn't really work/doesn't really accomplish what we're trying to accomplish as philosophers. Those with a continental preference tend to see analytic philosophy as too dry, too boring, too narrow, pointless, mind-numbingly laborious, etc. Those with an analytic preference tend to see continental philosophy as too flowery, inexact, sometimes incoherent, too ready to make unjustified assumptions, etc. — Terrapin Station

Yes, but; aren't these further specific towards a methodology? I'm interested because in another thread I specified that the methodology is nuanced for each analytic and continental category.

Whereas, this tendency for analytic philosophy is running a little dry with the linguistic turn now coming to an end or already over.

What's next might be interesting to talk about?

Probably I going to sound so fool but methodologies remember me about empiricism or better said extreme empiricism. I guess al philosophers have methods to work on because it is impossible having theories without experiencing some methods previously. So yes, they are so influenced about what they as philosophers have experienced back in the day with their “masters”
I guess they will be along their lives perfecting or maybe criticising what methods they used to being taught. So in this point we can say methodology is like a compass to the youngest thinkers.

Nevertheless, it isn’t impossible to change. Probably some of them will end up changing the methodology one day they learned

nobody really cares on describing this rift further. — Shawn

Wrong, there is actually a lot written on this subject. Good starting points: Lee Braver - "A thing of this world" and Simon Critchley - "very short intro to continental philosophy".

It seems to me that a philosophy has to start with ideas, beliefs, and arguments before it can develop a further method with which to build a sculpture of thought

I read that methodological nominalism is the predominant reigning thought about methodologies in philosophy nowadays.

It makes sense though, due to arising typifications in behavior or even abstracts directing the methodology to pursue extra systematic behavior or extrema's.

This essay argues that the split between 'analytical' and 'continental' in philosophy is all due to the early death of R G Collingwood and subsequent appointment of the 'narrow and imperious' Gilbert Ryle to one of the pre-eminent chairs of philosophy.

Interesting. It may as well have inadvertently happened from the perspective of European tradition in France or nearby.

And hereto is the prominent question of mine, wasn't the hopes of pragmaticists or pragmatists in your opinion realized by the analytic tradition?

I was recently reading on the topic of various methodologies in philosophy from Rorty, who seems pretty astute as to say that (with no comment on the Continental tradition) that philosophical methodologies have become more scientific in nature. Nominalism and methodological nominalism have prevailed as to date, and it's interesting that this is true.

Yet, I am saddened by all this proffering from science. As methodological nominalism is scientific in nature. The only piece of science that philosophy has picked up on is related to linguistic empiricism. And, that's quite interesting, due to the nature of linguistic empiricism, which has failed to pick up a universal grammar to adhere analysis by.

On the one hand, you have representationalism pretty much refuted by the linguists and on the other a strife over no universal grammar.

So, what's next for philosophic endeavors?