Are you admitting a distinction between subjective and inter-subjective warrant, or rejecting it? We already know that inter-subjective warrant, because it would have to be either empirical or logical, cannot apply to religious belief. The upshot of that is that I can't expect that what convinces me, is a reasonable warrant for me, should be such for you. But since, when it comes to the existence of God or some kind of higher order, we don't and cannot know in the kinds of ways we can know empirical facts, this goes both ways obviously.

I wouldn't use "inter-subjective" - too much wrongheaded baggage. My suspicion is that there is a difference here as to what is involved in "warrant".

SO to you, aslo:

Do you agree that in the article, Kenny is setting faith out as unwarranted belief? — Banno

Nuh. — Banno

It's a shame you apparently are unable to argue for your position!

If the point is moot, why the argument? — Banno

The point is not moot. I have said that we cannot know that religious faith must make a difference to behavior, but I have allowed that it should, and that the difference, if it is to be in accordance with scripture, should be a positive one (otherwise it would not be in accordance with scripture). What is the actual problem or inconsistency you think you see in that?

It's a shame you apparently are unable to argue for your position! — Janus

A useless post. Read the quote.

If some Scott say that a particular belief, for example that porridge should be eaten with salt, is central to the their being a Scott, and some other Scott say it is not central to their being a Scott, then it follows that it is not central to being a Scott, simply because some identify themselves as Scottish and yet do not hold to it. I think it is actually the case that the majority of Scotts don't put salt on their porridge — Janus

I wouldn't use "inter-subjective" - too much wrongheaded baggage. My suspicion is that there is a difference here as to what is involved in "warrant".

SO to you, aslo:

Do you agree that in the article, Kenny is setting faith out as unwarranted belief? — Banno

You do this often. Simply make a pronouncement, and imagine that you are under no obligation to argue for its verity. I think there is a valid distinction between subjective and inter-subjective; between what I am entitled to be personally convinced by and what I am entitled to expect others to be convinced by. If you think that distinction is "wrong-headed" then you should be able to explain why you think that.

It's a poor analogy because one is either a Scot or not by virtue of being born in Scotland or having become a citizen or whatever other criteria might be considered to be appropriate.

With Christianity it is different: one is a Christian merely on account of professing it. To say that is not the case would actually be to commit the True Scotsman fallacy, ironically.

Simply make a pronouncement, and imagine that you are under no obligation to argue for its verity. — Janus

SO go back to the article, and let's see if we can locate the point of difference - because this is getting nowhere.

It is too much to say that faith requires no justification: many religious people offer arguments not just for belief in God but for their particular creed. What is true is that the kinds of arguments they offer cannot be claimed to have anything like the degree of warrant that would justify the irrevocable commitment of faith.

p.395.

Do you agree that in the article, Kenny is setting faith out as unwarranted belief?

That's a bucket that will carry no water.

Do you agree that in the article, Kenny is setting faith out as unwarranted belief? — Banno

Kenny seems to contradict himself, as I already said. In any case, even if I granted that he does seem to set faith out as unwarranted belief, that doesn't mean we are obliged to agree with him. That is precisely what I have been arguing for, the grounds for disagreeing with the idea that faith is irrational and unwarranted tout court.

Of course it is trivially true that from the point of view of inter-subjective warrant, religious faith is irrational and unwarranted, because only empirical and logical judgements can be inter-subjectively tested and evaluated. To expect the situation to be the same with personal faith would be to commit a category error, as I have been arguing.

Do you agree that in the article, Kenny is setting faith out as unwarranted belief? — Banno

The question I raised is, what would be the warrant for religious belief? What makes it different from belief in Russell's orbiting teapot, or the flying spaghetti monster, or fairies at the bottom of the garden, or all the other atheist tropes that are trotted out in this context. What is at stake?

There's a curious, unstated asymettry in all of these discussions. From the atheist viewpoint, all that is at stake a belief, and one that is in all likelihood false, so that in the event of that argument being correct, all your opponent has lost is a belief. But to the believer, what is at stake is the fate of their immortal soul. It's much more than simply a verbal argument or rhetorical joust, from their perspective. It's a matter of life and death - or even more grave than that.

The kind of exasperrated presumption that is typical of Dawkins conveys to me that he really has no comprehension of the stakes at all. It's all simply foolishness. Now, my own religiosity, such as it is, is a pretty hybrid model. But I still retain a core of faith - something which I learned from reading Dawkins, which had the exact opposite effect on me to what he intended.

That's a bucket that will carry no water. — Banno

Well, that's a bucket with no contents. You are "pouring from the empty into the void". Try engaging with what I have said and providing actual arguments against it, instead of issuing empty assertions.

Enough. The purpose of the article was to provide something firm from which to work. If you are not interested in leaving a few crumbs to support your interpretation, in the face of my hand-feeding, then all that is being shown is the poverty of philosophy of religion.

But to the believer, what is at stake is the fate of their immortal soul. — Wayfarer

:grin:

Ah - but if the theist is correct, then it is about the immortal soul of the atheist as much as the theist...

The question I raised is, what would be the warrant for religious belief? — Wayfarer

So for me Kenny is saying there is no warrant, and you want he and I to set out what that warrant would be...?

Can you answer your own question for me? If you think there is some sort of warrant, that is...

I take it you think Kenny is setting faith out as unwarranted belief?

You do this often. Simply make a pronouncement, and imagine that you are under no obligation to argue for its verity. — Janus

It's 'cause I get bored with pointing out the the same problems. "intersubjective" presumes the primacy of the subject. That's a basic error, as shown by Wittgenstein's treatment of rules. I'm not going to discuss stuff with you if the only ontology you can accept is your own; I'd rather find common ground.

Try engaging with what I have said and providing actual arguments against it, instead of issuing empty assertions. — Janus

I'd love someone to count ad homs here - who would be winning, you or I??

No ad homs, just pointing out your lack of argument:

Nuh. — Banno

A useless post — Banno

I wouldn't use "inter-subjective" - too much wrongheaded baggage — Banno

That's a bucket that will carry no water. — Banno

Enough. The purpose of the article was to provide something firm from which to work. If you are not interested in leaving a few crumbs to support your interpretation, in the face of my hand-feeding, then all that is being shown is the poverty of philosophy of religion. — Banno

I'd love someone to count ad homs here - who would be winning, you or I?? — Banno

Here's a fairer statement, which still requires explanation:

It's 'cause I get bored with pointing out the the same problems. "intersubjective" presumes the primacy of the subject. That's a basic error, as shown by Wittgenstein's treatment of rules. I'm not going to discuss stuff with you if the only ontology you can accept is your own; I'd rather find common ground. — Banno

Inter-subjective presumes the primacy, not of the subject, but of inter-subjective inquiry and discourse. Of course it is not in question that all discourses are constrained by the nature of the subjects (or objects, if you prefer) of those discourses. How do you think your ontology is different than mine? Tell me that and I'll tell you if you're correct.

Cheers.

Faith frequently does mean unwarranted belief. We all have those.

I'm saying, there's a strong presumption of religious belief being unwarranted. So I'm trying to focus on the question, what would warrant it? I suppose by asking that question, I'm back in 'philosophy of religion', rather than 'religious apologetics'.

I quoted a passage by Josiah Royce recently, from here. The key paragraph, and one that addresses this point, is:

The religious person perceives our present life, or our natural life, as radically deficient, deficient from the root (radix) up, as fundamentally unsatisfactory; he feels it to be, not a mere condition, but a predicament; it strikes him as vain or empty if taken as an end in itself; he sees himself as homo viator, as a wayfarer or pilgrim treading a via dolorosa through a vale that cannot possibly be a final and fitting resting place; he senses or glimpses from time to time the possibility of a Higher Life; he feels himself in danger of missing out on this Higher Life of true happiness. If this doesn't strike a chord in you, then I suggest you do not have a religious disposition. Some people don't, and it cannot be helped. One cannot discuss religion with them, for it cannot be real to them.

That last sentence describes almost everyone, so, reason dictates I should probably leave it at that.

Faith frequently does mean unwarranted belief. We all have those. — frank

I would agree that faith frequently (perhaps always?) does entail empirically unwarranted belief. But isn't that to be expected in the context of religious faith? I've been trying to argue that there can also be, in the case of non-empirical beliefs, in the domains of ethics, aesthetics and religion, personal warrants that motivate one's own belief but should not be taken to be warrants that others ought to be convinced by.

I think this would simply be to acknowledge that faith consists in personal conviction, and that in the absence of inter-subjectively evaluable evidence, one is free to believe what seems most reasonable, with the assessment of the intellectual honesty of what is taken on faith being ultimately left to oneself as it must be in that personal domain.

That last sentence describes almost everyone, so, reason dictates I should probably leave it at that. — Wayfarer

Perhaps not...

I'm saying, there's a strong presumption of religious belief being unwarranted. So I'm trying to focus on the question, what would warrant it? — Wayfarer

My reply is simply that Kenny describes faith in terms of lack or warrant; for the religious belief despite lack of warrant is to be considered a virtue. Further, I agree with that description. Asking what such warrant would look like is tangential to the discussion.

I suspect we do not disagree here.

I've been trying to argue that there can also be, in the case of non-empirical beliefs, in the domains of ethics, aesthetics and religion, personal warrants that motivate one's own belief but should not be taken to be warrants that others ought to be convinced by. — Janus

Sure. A tenet of Protestant Christianity is that there is no intermediary between you and God. You are your own priest.

think this would simply be to acknowledge that faith consists in personal conviction, and that in the absence of inter-subjectively evaluable evidence, one is free to believe what seems most reasonable — Janus

I think the point you're making would be readily accepted by some Christians and rejected as blasphemy by others.

Something must be said about metaphor; so far the only comment was to support Kenny's discussion of the necessity of reading scriptures metaphorically in order to avoid their contradicting one another.

We might proceed by following Davidson in supposing that metaphor has no literal meaning, but has a point or a purpose... a use.

One use might be to ensure uncritical obedience.

Another, more generous use we might see in 's comment; the betterment of the individual.

Faith frequently does mean unwarranted belief. We all have those. — frank

A better rendering might be: Faith frequently does mean unwarranted certainty.

Asking what such warrant would look like is tangential to the discussion. — Banno

Tosh. It’s fundamental. You can’t even talk about a warrant without considering what it is for.

But the point of faith is that there is no warrant. Asking what would warrant faith is like asking the colour of economics.

Kenny's discussion of the necessity of reading scriptures metaphorically in order to avoid their contradicting one another. — Banno

This is a spitball thrown at the Grand Canyon. Can we not have philosophy of religion where the participants know something about religion?

A better rendering might be: Faith frequently does mean unwarranted certainty. — Banno

Yes.

No obvious warrant, or short-term reward. But Christians will talk in terms of their 'heavenly reward'. There's a rationale behind religion, even if it can't be described in other terms. But plain common-sense says there must be a conviction that religious commitment is worthwhile, otherwise, why would anyone ever have committed to it?

There's a Buddhist text in which the goal of the Buddhist path is said to be a 'foothold in the deathless'. It says that 'Those who have not known, seen, penetrated, realized, or attained it by means of discernment would have to take it on conviction...' i.e. 'accept it on faith', but those who really have seen, penetrated, realised, etc, know for themselves.

I think a parallel verse in Christianity would be the parable of 'seeing through a glass darkly'.

So it's not as if faith has no warrant. It has no, shall we say, worldly rationale (although that is obviously torpedoed by the disgustingly materialistic behaviour of many American evangelicals). But the sincere believer is, as it were, playing a long game.

Can we not have philosophy of religion where the participants know something about religion? — frank

I suspect the problem is philosophy of religion where the participants don't know much about philosophy.