There's a burden of proof to discharge. One mind is the default, not multiple minds. — Bartricks

You assume there is a set of imperatives called “the imperatives of reason” that has been issued to us by some mind or other (again, I don’t have any memory of God telling me about the law of non contradiction) and yet we somehow are still trying to figure them out? Why are their contents debatable if there were issued to all of us individually by God himself?

On the other hand I think the set of “imperatives of reason” is issued by people. Because that’s a simpler explanation than suggesting a complete set, that had already been issued, that we still for some reason have to try to figure out and argue about its contents.

Maybe we’re not “arguing about” so much as creating the contents of this set? That makes it a lot easier to explain why these imperatives of reason change over time and get updated and why we argue about them so much. Example: Occam’s razor is not an immediately obvious imperative, and one that was not widely used for the longest time even.

It also side tracks the problem of when exactly God gave us this imperative, as again, I have no memory of this and doubt you do either. I bet you learned about the imperatives of reason through people and their books like the rest of us, not through some divine inspiration.

Our reason is a faculty. It brings us an awareness of the imperatives and other norms of Reason. That is, it gives us an awareness of what Reason - which my argument demonstrates to be God - wants us to do and believe. But that does not mean that Reason himself is bound by what he wants us to do and believe. And that itself is something our reason reveals to us (that is, our reason reveals to us that Reason is not bound by what he tells us). As I said, it is the same as fallaciously inferring that what we can see by sight is thereby limited by our sight, as if our sight determines what's there. — Bartricks

Okay, so now your just dancing around the main problem at this point, which is unfortunate, as I expected a little bit more in terms of actually reading what I said and doing your due diligence given that I have explained to you how this only brings me to further the same tired point over and over again. But, if this is what you insist, I shall as well :)

As to forward the idea of any entity or reality that can exercise the power to bring about self contradictory state of affairs would itself rely on consistency, cohesivness, intelligibility in order to be forwarded. However, that these things can be undermined results in the idea or argument which leads to such a conclusion to be defeated, as what supports the theisis that reason can reveal any truth if reality maybe unintelligible and thus "outside" the scope of reason? Indeed, any justification through rationality would itself beg the question. Of course, the only option left then is to reject the premise that leads to such result, for there is no gain for either Ockhamist, nor Scotist, nor Cartesian or even atheist in entertaining this idea, except of course the most extreme of skepticisms — Questio

Emphasis on the

However, that these things can be undermined results in the idea or argument which leads to such a conclusion to be defeated, as what supports the theisis that reason can reveal any truth if reality maybe unintelligible and thus "outside" the scope of reason? — Questio

If you argue that x is reasonable yet x need not be true, then how can we thus know that reasoning brings us necessarily to truth?

So, as far as I can tell, all you're doing is insisting in one way and another that our reason is incapable of bringing us an awareness of a being who has power over reason — Bartricks

I am insisting that you are undermining yourself by forwarding the idea of a being that can break the laws of reason so much so that the laws of reason does not necessarily lead to truth and then use said laws of reason to get to the "necessary truth" of this being. This is self undermining and self defeating. You cannot have your cake and eat it too. Either the laws of reason do not necessarily bring truth, in which case we can't trust your argument, or the laws of reason are necessarily true, in which case your argument is invalidated.

Again, you just keep begging the question. — Bartricks

Give me one set of quotes where I do so. I for one can actually substantiate such a claim. Watch:

I can discover by reason - as can anyone who exercises it as carefully and diligently as I do - that God exists — Bartricks

So reason can necessarily bring you to truth you can trust...

So, God could do anything - he could make 2 + 2 = 7, hell he could make 2 + 2 = a giraffe — Bartricks

Interesting... so the reasons you got to God are overthrown by your conclusions as we can't trust reason to take us to truth. And how do we know God hasn't done this? Well...

But has he? No. How do I know? My reason tells me 2 + 2 = 4. It tells me it 'must'. — Bartricks

That's right, an appeal to reason... wow, that didn't work out for you did it my good friend :lol:.
Especially given the case that God could just make 2+2=6 just as rational as 2+2=4, given he's omnipotent, right? And this God can make both equally true and false, or one true and the other false, or vice versa, correct? See my point yet? If you overthrow the absolute power for reason to find an absolute truth you really can't take a ride on said overthown things back and say reason has absolutely found an absolute truth necessarily.

How? Here's my argument again:

1. If the imperatives of Reason are the imperatives a mind is issuing, then that mind is not bound by those imperatives
2. The imperatives of Reason are the imperatives a mind is issuing (see my proof of God for that).
3. Therefore, the mind whose imperatives are the imperatives of Reason - God - is not bound by those imperatives. — Bartricks

Well first, as I've said earlier...

Therefore, there is a mind whose laws are the laws of Reason
— Bartricks

Exactly right, except you make a nonsequiter and follow by saying "therefore this mind or being may overthrow the object of his mind". Indeed, its ridiculous to make this jump without an extra premise. Indeed, even if you did, as I hope you have seen by now, theres no way such a conclusion is tenable, as it overthrows your premises of premises: that reason leads necessarily to truth.

Also, in case your wondering how on Earth I can't make the easy jump from "reason in the mind of God" to "thus he may overthrow it" I present you oncemore with Thomism and the gospel, along with ancient and medieval philosophy which recognized the flaws in your proposal and instead recognized God not as above reason, but instead as the logos; reason itself. — Questio

Second, 3 contridicts the formulation, as it opens the possibility of me and you being totally rational yet not necessarily concluding in truth, which of course is the purpose of your formulation.

I could be in Paris. I mean, it is metaphysically possible. By your logic that means I can't know that I'm not. But I do, yes? I know that I'm not in Paris. — Bartricks

Well if God is all powerful, he can very much make it so that you are in Paris yet you think your not, despite reason as well given it takes that. Do you still not see the skeptical box you put yourself in? If so, maybe you should consider abandoning the premise or conclusion which got you here. After all, there is no justification for your idea of God's omnipotence, as I have pointed out (given its a nonsequiter).

This is getting tedious now.

As to forward the idea of any entity or reality that can exercise the power to bring about self contradictory state of affairs would itself rely on consistency, cohesivness, intelligibility in order to be forwarded. — Questio

To be honest, I don't know what you mean here and I've been charitable in assuming you mean that there is something incoherent in using reason to establish the existence of a being who can flout reason.

If that's not what you are trying to say, then why not just lay it out as a deductively valid argument? If it 'is' what you are trying to say, I addressed it. You are simply reasoning fallaciously.

"therefore this mind or being may overthrow the object of his mind" — Questio

I didn't say that though. I mean, I don't know what that even means. Overthrow the object of his mind??

I just keep explaining and you keep willfully misunderstanding.

Forget God and focus on me. I am sat at a computer. I want you to believe this - I am telling you that it is the case. Because of this you have reason to believe I am sat at a computer. But I can lie. I can bid you believe things about me that are not true. Does that mean you no longer have reason to think I am sat at a computer? No. You still have reason to believe I am sat at a computer.

God can make true propositions be false at the same time. But he's told us that true propositions are not false at the same time. Does the fact he's told us that true propositions are not false at the same time give us reason to believe that true propositions are not false at the same time? Yes.

A proposition - including a proposition about an imperative of Reason - does not 'have' to be true to be true. It just has to be true.

If you want to find out about Reason, consult your reason. And if you do that, you'll see that your reason tells you that Reason is a mind who can do anything.

You think that's not possible, right - that it is not possible for our reason to tell us about the existence of a being who is not bound by reason? Well, a) I've demonstrated that it is possible by actually doing it and b) that's as silly as thinking that words can only tell you about words.
Here: there are some things that can't be expressed in words. Presumably you consider that utterance incoherent?

I don't understand your response.

You asked me why one mind is posited rather than multiple minds. I explained.

There are lots of other reasons why one mind should be posited, but I wasn't going to give them all when one would do. So I gave you one: Ockham's razor.

Then you have just told me that you believe that our own minds issue the imperatives of Reason. Ok, just ignore the evidence then. Posit lots rather than one. Go for it. I mean, by hypothesis, what you think is the case now is the case. If you tell yourself that contradictions are true, they will be - right? If you tell yourself that 2 + 8 = an elephant, that's true, right? You have reason to believe it and none not to. I mean, that's what you're telling yourself about what 2 + 8 = and you're now Reason.

Or are you only responsible for one or two imperatives of Reason? In which case, which ones are yours? Pray tell. And who determines whose imperatives are the imperatives of Reason? Cos that person would be Reason - that is, God, right? So it must be no-one. So, you'd have to endorse an extreme form of individual subjectivism about reason. In which case, once more, if you tell yourself that 2 + 6 = a giraffe, then it does and that's all there is to it, because you're your reason and I'm mine.

So, so silly.

And you don't need to know the first thing about Anselm to recognize that there is no fucking way that you can use logic (Reason, ratiocination, etc) to prove this sentence is true:

There is an omniscient being who has the ability to create a square circle in a galaxy 20 billion light years away if He so chose, but He has not done this.

To use the vernacular, this is just bat shit crazy. — EricH

But I did precisely that.

BUT - maybe I'm wrong. Maybe right now - in this very exchange - I'm demonstrating a classic case of Dunning Kruger and these posts will be quoted 100 years from now. So in your response to me (and I know you will respond) please demonstrate the logic that proves the sentence just above. Give me your definitions/premises and how you arrived at your conclusion.

If you can do this then you are truly a genius of the highest caliber. — EricH

Yes, your responses do constitute a very good illustration of the Dunning Kruger effect.

Questio pasted the argument on my behalf. Then, rather than acknowledge that I had indeed presented an argument, you just insist it is full of holes and asked your inane questions once more.

It might be as well to drive home further why a sensible use of Ockham's razor is by itself sufficient to establish that we are dealing with one mind and not many.

After having established that imperatives of Reason require a mind to be their issuer, Ockham's razor - itself an imperative of Reason - enjoins us to posit one mind, not many. For why posit lots of minds when one mind will do?

But by the same token, we should not posit extra minds unnecessarily. So, given that we are aware of our own mind's existence (and have better evidence for its existence than we have of any other), we should start by assuming that the mind of Reason is our own mind.

However, that thesis is contradicted by the evidence. For as the rest of my argument demonstrates, if I myself am the mind whose imperatives are imperatives of Reason, then I will be God. And clearly I am not God. I cannot do anything and everything. It is evidently not in my power to destroy all things, and so on.

So, I now have extremely good evidence that I am not the mind in question. Thus, I should assume the mind is a mind other than my own.

Note, it would make no sense to suppose instead that I am the source merely of 'some' of the imperatives of Reason and other minds are sources of other imperatives. That would not be a simple thesis at all. And the same evidence that implies I am not the source of 'all' of the imperatives of Reason implies as well that I am not the source of any of them.

Again, then, I should now proceed to assume that the mind whose imperatives are imperatives of Reason is some mind other than my own.

This is getting tedious now. — Bartricks

Perhaps a bit :lol:

To be honest, I don't know what you mean here and I've been charitable in assuming you mean that there is something incoherent in using reason to establish the existence of a being who can flout reason. — Bartricks

Sure; call it self-undermining, but not because I am falling into the obviously fallacious argument of saying because it is irrational for an irrational being to exist it must not exist. I am instead arguing that if you do not take reason to necessarily be oriented towards absolute truth and instead hold that good reason could still be wrong (like 2+2=6 could be true) then you aren't making much of a case, as your very case relies on such notion.

If that's not what you are trying to say, then why not just lay it out as a deductively valid argument? — Bartricks

Fair enough I suppose:
1) Let it be assumed that reason brings us to an entity which may defy reason
2) Given such, this being may have created the world in such a way where as what is reasonable does not necessarily entail truth.
3) Given such, we may also say that the being may have created the world in such a way whereas we believe certain statement to be true via the virtue of reason, but in fact are not (such as 2+2=4 may seem true because we think it irrefutably rational, but it may be that 2+2=6 is more rational, just hidden from our intellect, or perhaps irrational but more true, or absolutely true until this being decides otherwise).
4) Thus, despite common intuition and reason, we can never know what is true because we can never know if the entity created reality as such (and if we try to show through reason that he didn't, we violate 2 or 3).
5) Thus, reason cannot be trusted as a measure or tool for truth, as truth and reason may be loose and separate (as Hume might say).
6) Reason being a trusted measure and tool which leads to truth, however, leads to 1.
7) Therefore, even 1 can be overthrown just as the necessary connection between reason and truth can.

I'm hoping you find this useful.

Forget God and focus on me. I am sat at a computer. I want you to believe this — Bartricks

Fair enough...

I am telling you that it is the case. Because of this you have reason to believe I am sat at a computer. But I can lie. I can bid you believe things about me that are not true. Does that mean you no longer have reason to think I am sat at a computer? No. You still have reason to believe I am sat at a computer. — Bartricks

Certainly so! However, I simply can't have certainty that you sit at a computer. And I believe thats the thing we're caught up in. Its not a matter of whether or not something is or isn't true, but rather if, given we rule out the basic tools of certainty, we can know anything to be certainly true via argumentation. Certainty lies at the core of this discussion, I'd forward.

Does the fact he's told us that true propositions are not false at the same time give us reason to believe that true propositions are not false at the same time? Yes. — Bartricks

But not with certainty unless we may fix onto some aspect of his nature, or from a set of certain truths, and be guided from these things to the truth of his statement. For example, I believe that God is logos via reason, thus he can never lie, so for him to tell me that would only be taken as true by me. For God to be omnipotent as you describe it, however, does not seem enough to make the point that his statements maybe taken as true (except via discussion of his omnibenevolence, yet, due to his omnipotence, we may consider that he is lying to us and also being omnibenevolent at the same time given contradictions don't effect him. Sure, he might not, but the lack of certainty simply cannot give us a proper fixed principle by which knowledge can rely on).

A proposition - including a proposition about an imperative of Reason - does not 'have' to be true to be true. It just has to be true. — Bartricks

If by that you mean "there is a phone on my desk" is true, but it doesn't have to be true, then sure. But I don't think that's actually relevant (it could be and I'm just mistaken, but I'm quite sure its not), as I'm sure that certainty is the root of the problem.

If you want to find out about Reason, consult your reason. And if you do that, you'll see that your reason tells you that Reason is a mind who can do anything. — Bartricks

But if perfect reason can still lead to falsehood, how can we be certain of this principle?

You think that's not possible, right - that it is not possible for our reason to tell us about the existence of a being who is not bound by reason? — Bartricks

Its possible, just not tenable. All you would do is cast doubt on your own position if seen all the way down.

Well, a) I've demonstrated that it is possible by actually doing it — Bartricks

You still had a non-sequitur moving from "reason comes from a mind" to "if its in the mind of an entity, he is not constrained to act according to such", as there is the perfectly reasonable alternative conclusion without all the sticky holes you seem to fall in: "therefore reason and this mind are one".

b) that's as silly as thinking that words can only tell you about words. — Bartricks

Certainly; but I would call it a false equivalency as words are oriented beyond themselves while reason seems to orient itself into a closed logical system.

God can make true propositions be false at the same time. But he's told us that true propositions are not false at the same time. Does the fact he's told us that true propositions are not false at the same time give us reason to believe that true propositions are not false at the same time? Yes. — Bartricks

No.

First of all we don't know that your omniscient being (AKA God) planted these imperatives of Reason in our minds, that's one of many things you are trying to prove.

But even acting under that assumption - even if we assume that He planted these imperatives of Reason in our minds - there is no way to know that what He planted in our minds is correct. He could have planted false/bogus imperatives of Reason in our minds. Our limited human minds (which He created) would have no way of knowing that.

Or perhaps our limited mortal human minds (which He created) are incapable of processing the actual imperatives of Reason, and so your omniscient God has placed a greatly reduced and simplified version of the full set of imperatives in our minds - and this reduced/simplified set of imperatives only function properly under certain limited situations - e.g., when dealing with the practicalities of our physical existence.

Can you use your imperatives of Reason to rule out these possibilities? No, because your omniscient being is not bound by your imperatives - and so you cannot use the imperatives to prove anything about such a being since there is no certainty that the imperatives of Reason are correct and/or will lead to correct conclusions.

End of discussion.

- - - - - -

BTW - at the risk of asking too many questions at once, why do you keep capitalizing the word "Reason" and not the word "imperatives"? Is there some person, place, or thing called Reason?

Go for it. I mean, by hypothesis, what you think is the case now is the case. If you tell yourself that contradictions are true, they will be - right? If you tell yourself that 2 + 8 = an elephant, that's true, right? — Bartricks

Not right. We humans determine things all the time and are wrong to not stick to the agreed upon definition. Apples did not need to be called “apple” for example. We made up the word. The word could have been “eueudjw” but it is apple. So while I COULD start calling apples “eueudjw” I would be wrong to do so. In the same way that I would be wrong in claiming that 2+8=elephant is logical.

Or are you only responsible for one or two imperatives of Reason? In which case, which ones are yours? — Bartricks

When did I say I issued any?

Cos that person would be Reason - that is, God, right? — Bartricks

False. Your fallacious argument would suggest so though.

For why posit lots of minds when one mind will do? — Bartricks

Because one mind won’t do. One mind would suggest two things that don’t match reality. Firstly, that there is a mind that “talked” to each of us individually and told us about these imperatives. That never happened. If anyone had memory of it no one would be arguing against you. And secondly that these imperatives are set in stone and whole from the beginning. Which contradicts the fact that we argue about their contents and why their contents tend to increase across history.

So, given that we are aware of our own mind's existence (and have better evidence for its existence than we have of any other), we should start by assuming that the mind of Reason is our own mind. — Bartricks

Very dumb. Clearly neither of us has issue with other minds existing (heck, you don’t have issue with positing a mind that tells all of us something although none of us remember its instruction) so no need to assume it’s you personally. There is plenty of evidence against that (for example, neither of us discovered logical imperatives on our own instead of being told them). And I’ve just given two pieces of evidence hinting that it’s not 1 mind that makes these imperatives in full so you don’t need to assume it’s one either.

Note, it would make no sense to suppose instead that I am the source merely of 'some' of the imperatives of Reason and other minds are sources of other imperatives. That would not be a simple thesis at all. — Bartricks

If the simplest thesis makes no sense then you move on to the next simplest. One mind being responsible for all of the imperatives would not explain why we argue about their contents or why none of us remember this mind instructing us to follow the imperatives.


And others have said this objection already but I’ll say it again. You have no reason to assume that your reason actually matches the imperatives God created. You have no reason to assume God isn’t trolling you. So then you cannot assume that using your reason will yield correct results. If that’s the case your argument obviously falls apart. You don’t just need it to be the case that your argument is reasonable (not that I think it is in the first place) but you also need it to be the case that God gave us the right “reason”. And you can’t show the latter. Heck, assuming you’re correct no argument can ever be known to be right.

To attribute powers to something which may or may not exist to begin with, seems like an odd starting point to any discussion. — Present awareness

Yet it has never stopped the religious nor the philosophers from doing it.

If I follow his "reasoning" he is not initially attributing powers - his starting point is to simply define the words. Then he is trying to somehow bootstrap his definitions into existence.

Is there anything as real as words?

The better explanation is from Sartre. It's about people, rather than things. You find yourself here in the world, but without an identity, without an essence (a word I would not use outside of exegesis). You must make choices , and as you proceed with these choices your identity, your essence, is created.

Hence, you first needs must exist, then you choose who you are.

Existence precedes essence.

It's the core of existentialism, and contains a truth that is well worth taking on board. — Banno

:ok: :up: Thanks

I wonder though how Kierkegaard or Sartre can talk of people without there being an essence to people - the word "people" wouldn't refer to anything sans an essence that defines people.

Perhaps they do acknowledge that people, as a class, have an essence but both take a step further and mirable dictu they discover that whatever that essence is, it doesn't limit the acquisition of an added layer of essence that makes an individual stand out as a one of a kind.

It's talk of an individual, not of people per se, Yes.

However the assumption that in order to talk about some thing we first need to understand its essence, is fraught. See https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/495682

:up: will check that link

Sartre is doing something closer to description of a new state. Essences don't work because they substitute some type of eternal idea or concept (e.g. human nature, the nature of man, the nature of woman, etc. ), for the work of a specific being at a specific time. There is no problem with people taking certain actions or exiting with certain traits (their "choices"). They happen all the time (indeed, one of Sartre's point is we cannot escape making a choice). His point is just these are finite occurrences, a particular moment of our being, there in terms of itself. Any of them could change with any new moment, when a different moment of ourself makes some other choice. We are always are own creators in this respect.

Any of us might, in fact, possibility do anything. All it would take is a choice in the next moment. Since it is our being which performs who we are, it cannot be limited by some mere concept, by some idea of what us as being or our sort of beings are supposed to do. (given the other content of this thread, it should be noted that "possible" is being used to refer to what our being might be, not what powers for actions we are actually capable of-- we aren't all omnipotent gods just because our being defines us, even though that is something our being might do).