Yes, one person feels hot, the other cold. — Banno

Yes, so the words "hot" and "cold" refer to those sensations they feel — even though they predicate them of the bath and "disagree".

Get out the thermometer. — Banno

That tells you the temperature, not if it's hot or cold.

Two people can disagree about whether the bath is hot or cold. It does not then follow that the bath either "really is" hot or "really is" cold, and that one of them is feeling it wrong. The reality is that the bath causes one to feel hot and the other to feel cold, and the words "hot" and "cold" are referring to their private sensations.

And, once again, the example with the faulty and then fixed visors is a simple demonstration of this with colour. Colour talk is public, they agree or disagree about the colour of strawberries, but then when something changes with their visor they ask why strawberries are now a different colour, and continue to ask this even after confirming that strawberries are still reflecting 700nm light. Evidently whatever is showing on their private screens cannot be dismissed as irrelevant.

I replied to your visor example here, here and here. — Banno

The most recent of those was from 13 days ago. The post I referenced (and repeated) was from 8 days ago.

That's irrelevant. — Banno

It's not if you want to continue to claim that words don't refer to private experiences. Do you at least accept that the word "headache" does?

If colour terms worked like headache reports, then disagreement, correction, and error about colour would be impossible. But as the dress demonstrates, plainly they aren’t. — Banno

The dress demonstrates the opposite, and it's absurd that you think otherwise. The reason some people say "I see a white and gold dress" and others say "I see a black and blue dress" is because they are having different visual experiences, and they are using the words that they associate with the character of their visual experiences. Any "disagreement" about the colour of the dress is a tacit endorsement of the naive view that the phenomenal character of their experience is a mind-independent property of the dress, which is a fundamentally mistaken view. Common (and understandable), but still mistaken.

No, they do not refer to "phenomenal qualities", because such "qualities" are never just "phenomena", they are always public. — Banno

My headache isn't public. Neither are the colours I see. The example with the faulty and then fixed visors is a simple and intuitive demonstration that there is more to language than you seem willing to admit. Time to move on from Wittgenstein and Austin.

Your visor example has been adequately responded to, by myself and others. — Banno

You never responded to it.

You’re right. “Information” is a verb-to-noun derivation. There is no referent. If I was to be more precise (and careful) I’d say “The molecules in the air, the wavelengths in the light, the soundwaves in the water, come from the distant objects, informing us about those distant objects.” There is no need to go on multiplying entities, after all. — NOS4A2

A thrown ball hitting my head informs me about a person throwing a ball at my head, but that doesn't mean that the ball hitting my head is direct perception of the person who threw it. There's something missing from this account.

My account is quite different. Here’s what I actually said:

“our senses are in direct contact with those mediums, whatever information they afford us, and those mediums are features of the environment. The molecules in the air, the wavelengths in the light, the soundwaves in the water, come from the distant objects, affording us information about those distant objects.” — NOS4A2

All of which happens when I watch a prisoner via CCTV. Yet I don't directly see the prisoner when watching him via CCTV. So the above account does not suitably exclude situations which we ought all agree are indirect perception.

Why can't "that object is orange" mean the same thing as "that object reflects the wavelengths of light required for me to see it as orange"? — flannel jesus

It can. But what does the word "orange" mean/refer to in the ending phrase "for me to see it as orange"? It refers to the phenomenal character of your first person experience and not a mind-independent property of the object.

You just need to make sure you don't conflate. This is why I think it's clearer if we interpret "the object is orange" as "the object appears orange". The grammar of the first suggests that this phenomenal character is a property of the object (naive colour realism), which is false.

There is ordinary language and philosophical language. — RussellA

Yes, worth reading up on fictionalism:

Here is a kind of puzzle or paradox that several philosophers have stressed. On the one hand, existence questions seem hard. The philosophical question of whether there are abstract entities does not seem to admit of an easy or trivial answer. At the same time, there seem to be trivial arguments settling questions like this in the affirmative. Consider for instance the arguments, “2+2=4. So there is a number which, when added to 2, yields 4. This something is a number. So there are numbers”, and “Fido is a dog. So Fido has the property of being a dog. So there are properties.” How should one resolve this paradox? One response is: adopt fictionalism. The idea would be that in the philosophy room we do not speak fictionally, but ordinarily we do. So in the philosophy room, the question of the existence of abstract entities is hard; outside it, the question is easy. When, ordinarily, a speaker utters a sentence that semantically expresses a proposition that entails that there are numbers, what she says is accurate so long as according to the relevant fiction, there are numbers. But when she utters the same sentence in the philosophy room, she speaks literally and then what she asserts is something highly non-trivial.

In ordinary life we talk about ordinary objects as being coloured, but it's a fiction that we ought recognise in the philosophy (and science) room. Ordinary objects only reflect various wavelengths of light, which is something very different.

Some here seem to think that how we speak in ordinary life is the answer to all the questions. They're just burying their heads in the sand.

Now the question arises, if perception is a biological process continuous with others, why would it uniquely require a mental veil?

...

So, as naturalists we are committed to the idea that organisms are directly related to their environment through evolved biological processes. So, perception is how organism process light. — Richard B

Sunflowers don't see. They react to and move towards the sunlight but they lack first person phenomenal experience. The dispute between direct and indirect realism is uniquely an issue for organisms that have first person phenomenal experiences like ours, and concerns the exact nature of the relationship between these first person phenomenal experiences and distal objects; are these distal objects "directly present" in first person phenomenal experience as direct realism claims, or are they only causally responsible for them?

But that aside, how do you get from "the organism processes light" to "the organism has direct perception of the distal object that emitted and/or reflected this light"?

It looked gold and white. — Banno

The words "gold" and "white" in the above sentence refer to the phenomenal quality of the experience that some people have when they look at the photo. They don't refer to wavelengths of light or any other property of the pixels on the computer screen.

The case shows that colour concepts are not anchored in private experience, because private experience alone cannot sustain disagreement, correction, or explanation. — Banno

I believe my example with the visors demonstrates otherwise. Repeated from here:

The visors have been constructed in such a way that when the sensors on the outside detect 700nm light they output on the screen 500nm light and vice-versa. Their wearers use the word "red" to describe the colour of strawberries and associate the colour red with 700nm light and use the word "green" to describe the colour of grass and associate the colour green with 500nm light.

Then when they're asleep we fix their visors so that the light emitted by the screen matches the light detected by the sensors. When they wake up do they go about their day as if nothing has changed, continuing to use the word "red" to describe the colour of strawberries and associate the colour red with 700nm light and to use the word "green" to describe the colour of grass and associate the colour green with 500nm light? Or do they immediately ask "why are strawberries now green?" and "why is grass now red?" and then be very confused when nothing about strawberries, grass, or the light they each reflect has changed?

I think the latter is obviously what will happen, showing that even though the use of the words "red" and "green" was public the words primarily referred to the colours on their private screen (assuming direct realism for the sake of argument) and not whatever was happening in their shared environment. The same reasoning holds when we remove the visors and instead surgically alter their eyes and/or brain to switch which wavelengths of light cause which phenomenal experiences.

As far as I know light provides information about an object's composition, temperature, motion, shape, texture, or distance by revealing how it emits, absorbs, reflects, or refracts different wavelengths of the electromagnetic spectrum. We’re limited to visible light, but that proves to be good enough here on earth. — NOS4A2

So point to where in the light and the organism's body I can look to see this "information"? If I open up your head can I see the information you have about the object's composition?

No, I agree, looking at something through a cctv camera on a screen counts as viewing that something indirectly. I’m fine with that. — NOS4A2

Then your account is insufficient, because you said that we directly see an object if "our senses are in direct contact with the wavelengths in the light affording us information about those distant objects". This would entail that if we look at something through a CCTV camera on a screen then we are viewing that thing directly, which you admit we aren't. Therefore, direct perception isn't just "our senses being in direct contact with the wavelengths in the light that affords us information about those distant objects".

I said the light comes from distant objects and afford us information about distant objects — NOS4A2

Which means what?

Here's a non-human biological organism with skin and bones and muscles and organs and photosensitive receptor cells. What does it mean to say that electromagnetic radiation "carries information" about some distal object, and what does it mean for this biological organism to "see" this distal object? Because all that's happening is photosensitive receptor cells are reducing the release of glutamate in response to absorbing photons. Everything else you're taking about is meaningless folk psychology. Point to where in the light and the body this supposed "information about the distal object" is.

You’re grasping onto false analogies — NOS4A2

It's not a false analogy because it's not an analogy; it's the literal topic of discussion. Under what conditions is direct perception satisfied? Is it direct perception if I see an object through CCTV? Why or why not? If I see it through my phone's camera? If I see it through a periscope? If I see it through a pair of binoculars? If I see it through a pair of glasses? Even the direct realist must accept that some of these count as indirect perception, and so if your account cannot suitably exclude these then your account fails. Earlier you said that our perception is direct if "our senses are in direct contact with ... the wavelengths in the light ... affording us information about those distant objects", but this does not suitably exclude those situations which everyone ought agree is indirect, e.g. with CCTV. You've gone too far in the opposite direction after your previous attempt left you unable to directly see anything other than light.

You’re still not explaining what it means for a biological organism to see a distant object.

Your first account entailed that we only have direct perception of proximal stimuli, e.g. light, because these are the only things in direct physical contact with our body’s sense receptors. This defeated your own claim that we see distant objects.

Your second account entailed that we have direct perception of the basement when watching it on CCTV because our body’s sense receptors are in direct physical contact with the light that “affords us information about” the basement. This is both vapid — as even most direct realists will accept that we only have indirect perception of the basement when watching it on CCTV — and makes use of the very same folk psychology that you keep denying; what is this “information about the basement” and can you point to where in the light and the body this thing exists?

If you're going to argue that "first-person phenomenal experience" is a meaningless phrase then all you have left is a physical object being moved by the matter and energy that it comes into direct contact with (and by its own internal energy), and so the concept of this physical entity — whether rock, plant, toad, or human — "seeing" some distant object makes no sense. This object no more "sees" the distant object that sent light its way than it "feels" the distant object that threw a ball at it.

I’m listen to the speech now, he’s lost his mind. — Punshhh

Several times he talked about Iceland instead of Greenland. His dementia is showing.

The issue I’m pressing is whether phenomenal qualities satisfy the same kind of public, normative criteria—identity, persistence, affordance, counterfactual structure—that we ordinarily use to count something as an object in a robust sense, such as a game-object or a truck. My claim is that they do not. — Esse Quam Videri

Well, phenomenal qualities are essentially private, so obviously they can’t satisfy public criteria. You’ve defined “direct perception” in such a way that indirect realism is ruled out a priori. This is why I think you’re just using a different definition, because I think the traditional dispute is something that can only be resolved a posteriori.

For me, it is about whether "objecthood" is required to make sense of those facts. Whereas the game-object satisfies public, normative criteria of objecthood - identity, persistence, affordance, counterfactual robustness - phenomenal qualities do not. This doesn't make them illusory. They are subject to other norms - the norms of perceptual description and articulation - but they don't meet the qualifications of "objecthood" in the way that the game-object does. — Esse Quam Videri

For me, to be the "object" of perception is just to be the X in "I perceive X". If I feel pain then pain is the object of perception, if I see colours then colours are the object of perception, and if I hear a truck then the truck is the object of perception. I don't read anything more into the word "object" in this context.

The relevant philosophical questions concern a) the ontology of pain, colours, and trucks, and b) which of these (if any) are "directly present in" (i.e. literal constituents of) phenomenal experience.

No, not as stated. I would not say that I am "aware of" these shapes, sizes, colours, and motions as objects of awareness. I would say that I am "aware that" they are the way in which I am aware of the object. It is the game-object that I am aware of, not the phenomenal qualities themselves. Those qualities characterize the manner of presentation, but they are not what is presented. — Esse Quam Videri

Then I think this is our fundamental disagreement. As above with my reply to RussellA, I think it quite appropriate to say that I am aware of these phenomenal shapes and sizes and colours. I recognize them as being present, as differing from one another and other things not present, as having names, and so on. And to return to my earlier argument with John and Jane seeing the box to be a different colour, I do make use of these phenomenal shapes and sizes and colours (in conjunction with any background knowledge) to make inferences about what's going to happen next in the game, or about what sort of things are interacting with my body when not playing a game, and so on.

But there is no relation between perceiver and a mental state if the perceiver IS the mental state. — RussellA

I would add that a mental state isn't really just one thing. There's the "sensory" mental state, but then also the "intellectual" mental state. I think it quite appropriate to say that my intellect is aware of and tries to make sense of the sensations.

I'm not denying that "sense" and "reference" are two different things. I'm not saying that one needs to understand the referent to understand the sense. I'm not saying that every word has a referent. I'm saying that the word "red" as ordinarily understood has a referent, and that this referent, like with the word "pain", is a mental phenomenon, and not a mind-independent property of the world (e.g. a surface that reflects 700nm light).

If you want to ignore reference and only consider sense then you're welcome to, but then that's just pretend, because reference is real. And in the context of the debate about the nature of perception, the referents of words such as "red" and "bird" matter.

Not quite. I don't use "mind independent", it's a term of philosophical art, not at all useful

"Bird" refers to the bird. Red is the colour of its head, chest and back, it being a male rosella.

These sentences are extensionally true.

We do not need a metaphysical contrast between “mind-dependent” and “mind-independent” to make sense of any of this. Doing so is philosophical hokum. — Banno

Then replace "mind-independent" with "exists at a distance to my body and has such properties even when nobody is looking at it".

So there's an organism that exists at a distance to my body, and this organism is referred to by the word "bird", and it has properties even when nobody is looking at it, and one of these properties is referred to by the word “red”.

I agree with the first part, but not the second part. The bird certainly has properties even when nobody is looking at it, and one of these properties is to reflect 700nm light, but the word "red" as ordinarily understood doesn't refer to such a property. Rather, 700nm light stimulates my eyes in such a way that it triggers certain neural activity in my brain, from which first person phenomenal experience emerges, and this first person phenomenal experience has various qualities, one of which I refer to using the word "red".

We naively think of this phenomenal quality as being one of the properties that the bird has even when nobody is looking at it, but our science has confirmed that it isn't. This naive view is mistaken. A sentence like "the bird is red" to be literally true ought be interpreted as "the bird appears red", where the word "red" refers to the quality of the first person phenomenal experience it causes to happen. Much like with "the dress I see is white and gold" — it really does appear white and gold to me, with the words "white" and "gold" referring to the very real quality of my first person phenomenal experience (and not something like wavelengths of light).

Answering the second question involves appealing to shape, size, colour, salience and motion. These are features of the perceptual episode — Esse Quam Videri

So shape, size, colour, and motion are "features of the perceptual episode". Do you accept that I am aware of these shapes, sizes, colours, and motions, and so that I am aware of the "features of the perceptual episode"? Do you accept that this perceptual episode and its features are visual in nature? Do you accept that to be aware of visual features is to see these features?

It’s not inconsistent because the rest of the world is full of mediums through which to view, hear, and smell distant objects. Dealing with those mediums counts as direct perception of the world because our senses are in direct contact with those mediums, whatever information they afford us, and those mediums are features of the environment. The molecules in the air, the wavelengths in the light, the soundwaves in the water, come from the distant objects, affording us information about those distant objects. — NOS4A2

You're still not explaining what it means for a biological organism to "see" a distant object. If eliminative materialism is true then there is just skin and bone and muscles and organs, with sense receptors absorbing energy and converting it into other forms, often causing the body to move. So how do you get from "the rods and cones in my eyes are reacting to electromagnetic radiation" to "I see the distant object that reflected the light", and what does the latter even mean without reference to first person phenomenal experience?

And your account of direct realism is rather vapid. If I place mirrors all around my house such that I can be in the attic and see what's happening in the basement, does this count as direct perception of the basement because my senses are in "direct contact" with the light that "affords me information" about what's happening in the basement? What if I replace the mirrors with CCTV?

You’ve gone from defining direct realism in such a way that we only directly see light to defining it in such a way that we directly see World War II when watching a documentary on the History Channel.

Virtual objects exist when the VR system is running — Esse Quam Videri

Isn't there a difference between the "virtual object" as a collection of transistors turning on and off and the "virtual object" as the thing seen with shape, size, colour, and behaviour? I wouldn't say that the monster I see running towards me continues to be "materially realised" if I remove the eye and leave it on the table. Something essential seems to be missing if you subtract the phenomenal aspect. Our bodies and brains (and minds) are as much a part of the system as the eye itself is.

materially realized, but not reducible to a set of material objects, processes or structures — Esse Quam Videri

I’m not really sure what that means. Does the game object exist if the eye is functioning normally but the wearer is brain dead? Does it exist if the wearer is a p-zombie? Or does it only exist as a phenomenal and conceptual construct, i.e created and understood by a sufficiently intelligent mind during high level brain activity?

I was just running through the consequences of your position — Hanover

It's not a consequence of my position. Direct perception of a mind-independent object is not required for our words to refer to it. I've never met Trump — only seen photos and videos of him — and yet when I use the word "Trump" I'm referring to the man, not the photos or videos. This way in which words can refer to things that aren't directly perceived does not change simply by moving the direct object of perception back "into the head", as the indirect realist does.

I've consistently attached it use. — Hanover

And I disagree. Words do, in fact, refer to things. The name "Donald Trump" refers to the man who is President of the United States. The phrase "Napolean's first wife" refers to Joséphine de Beauharnais. And the words "pain", "pleasure", "red", and "sour" refer to different types of first person phenomenal experience. If Wittgenstein and Austin disagree then they are wrong. If they don't disagree then whatever you're saying does not refute my claims.

The bird is not the underying substratum, but is just my phenomenal state. But if that's the case, then the noumenal element does no semantic work and doesn't fix any standard of correctness, so in what sense is it relevant to a discussion of meaning at all rather than just a background causal hypothesis? — Hanover

I'm very confused.

I'm saying that some of our words (e.g. "red") are referring to phenomenal states and some of our words (e.g. "bird") are referring to the mind-independent object that is causally responsible for phenomenal states.

At first you seemed to be saying that the word "red" doesn't refer to phenomenal states because meaning is public use and nobody knows anyone else's phenomenal state, whereas now you appear to be saying the opposite and that all words refer to phenomenal states and none to the mind-independent objects that are causally responsible for phenomenal states.

But then at the same time @Banno appears to agree with you even though my understanding of him is that he claims that the word "bird" refers to the mind-independent object and the word "red" refers to one of its mind-independent properties (e.g. a surface that reflects 700nm light?), and so that you and him are arguing for opposite positions, whereas I'm arguing for a middle ground.

So I really don't know what to make of any of this, or which claims of mine you are disagreeing with. Do you accept that the words "red" and "pain" (can) refer to phenomenal states (even if they can also refer to other things)?

There's no such thing as what pixels "really" look like, if this is supposed to mean how they look when nobody is looking (which is why naive realism is false). But they exist (which is why idealism is false), and their behaviour is causally responsible for the mental phenomena that is brought into existence by neural activity in my brain; mental phenomena with characteristics and qualities that I refer to using such words as "red" and "circle", and in non-pixel related situations as "loud" and "hot" and "sour" and "painful" (which is why your suggestion that there's nothing more to meaning than public use is false).

So when the bionic eye is being used to play a VR game, the direct object of perception — the "object" acting as intentional object — is not a mind-independent material object?

Is this also true when the eye is being used to help the wearer navigate the real world?

You're still not explaining what it means for a biological organism to "see" a distant object. You're an eliminative materialist so there are no mental phenomena or first-person subjective experiences, just skin and bone and muscles and organs, with sense receptors absorbing the electromagnetic or kinetic or chemical energy they come into contact with and converting it into other forms, often causing the body to move.

That you want to be both an eliminative materialist and a direct realist (about distant objects) strikes me as being entirely inconsistent. You could maybe get away with this if you limited direct realism to touch and taste — as you did before when you tried to explain direct realism in terms of the body being in direct physical contact with the object perceived — but it just doesn't work when you include sight, hearing, and smell, where somehow the body’s reaction to proximal stimuli counts as “direct perception” of distal objects.

I don't understand what you're asking.

At the moment there is no ship, only a collection of pixels on my computer screen emitting various wavelengths of light that cause my brain/mind to construct a two-dimensional appearance that somewhat resembles how a ship on water would appear to me were I to look at one in real life.

I'm telling you that philosophy is therapuetic, not a statement about the world. — Hanover

I disagree. Philosophy is us trying to reason about the nature of the world and its workings.

Are these intentional objects something the mind creates or are they mind-independent? Do these intentional objects only exist when the bionic eye is being used to play a VR game, or do they also exist when the bionic eye is being used to help their wearer navigate the real world? If the latter, and if intentional objects are not reducible to material objects, then would it be more accurate to say that their wearers have direct perception of (mind-dependent?) intentional objects rather than direct perception of (mind-independent) material objects, and so that their wearers only have indirect perception of material objects? And presumably whatever is true in this respect with a bionic eye is also true with an organic eye?

I would say that we do not see things like "phenomenal qualities", "mental pictures" or "electromagnetic radiation", but the virtual objects and environments themselves. — Esse Quam Videri

What is the ontology of these virtual objects and environments? Are they material things situated outside the body? Are they the software running on the eye's hardware? Are they neurological? Are they phenomenal?

If a bionic eye, as well as being able to help the otherwise-blind navigate the real world, can be used to play VR computer games, then what, if anything, do we see when we use it to play VR computer games? — Michael

I'd be interested in what you think @Esse Quam Videri. I don't intend to start a new debate so won't argue against anything you say, just curious.

If a bionic eye, as well as being able to help the otherwise-blind navigate the real world, can be used to play VR computer games, then what, if anything, do we see when we use it to play VR computer games?

If someone donates their Medal of Honor to me then do I become a war hero?

But it doesn’t seemingly do that. Rather, it looks like objects are already colored. — NOS4A2

And it seems as if this coloured object exists beyond the body, but it is in fact a feature of the phenomenal experience that emerges from brain activity and does not extend beyond the body. Similar to how when playing a VR game it seems as if there's a monster standing 100 feet in front of you.

I said seemingly projected out beyond the body. Look up phantom itches and phantom pains. It seems as if there's an itch or a pain located where one's arm used to be, but which is in fact now "empty" space. Obviously there is no itch or pain actually there.

Then what are you coloring and shaping if not something in your skull? Are you playing with the light in there? — NOS4A2

I explained it clearly above.

But you color it and give it shape, no? even though you cannot reach it? — NOS4A2

The distant object reflects light into our eyes which triggers neurological activity which causes conscious experience with phenomenal character, with features such as shape, colour, depth, etc., and then like a phantom itch it's seemingly projected out beyond the body, despite the fact that conscious experience does not extend beyond the body.

Then what are you watching when you point your eyes towards distant objects? — NOS4A2

The distant object.