What does the Indirect Realist believe?

The homunculus infinite regress problem arises when the mind is assumed to be a separate entity to the brain, and the mind is looking at the neural activity in the brain.

When it is agreed that the mind is the neural activity in the brain, then this problem disappears.

John Searle pointed out the nature of identity in The Philosophy of Perception and the Bad Argument

The relation of perception to the experience is one of identity. It is like the pain and the experience of pain. The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain. Similarly, if the experience of perceiving is an object of perceiving, then it becomes identical with the perceiving. Just as the pain is identical with the experience of pain, so the visual experience is identical with the experience of seeing.

It’s not inconsistent because the rest of the world is full of mediums through which to view, hear, and smell distant objects. Dealing with those mediums counts as direct perception of the world because our senses are in direct contact with those mediums, whatever information they afford us, and those mediums are features of the environment. The molecules in the air, the wavelengths in the light, the soundwaves in the water, come from the distant objects, affording us information about those distant objects. — NOS4A2

You're still not explaining what it means for a biological organism to "see" a distant object. If eliminative materialism is true then there is just skin and bone and muscles and organs, with sense receptors absorbing energy and converting it into other forms, often causing the body to move. So how do you get from "the rods and cones in my eyes are reacting to electromagnetic radiation" to "I see the distant object that reflected the light", and what does the latter even mean without reference to first person phenomenal experience?

And your account of direct realism is rather vapid. If I place mirrors all around my house such that I can be in the attic and see what's happening in the basement, does this count as direct perception of the basement because my senses are in "direct contact" with the light that "affords me information" about what's happening in the basement? What if I replace the mirrors with CCTV?

You’ve gone from defining direct realism in such a way that we only directly see light to defining it in such a way that we directly see World War II when watching a documentary on the History Channel.

Answering the second question involves appealing to shape, size, colour, salience and motion. These are features of the perceptual episode — Esse Quam Videri

So shape, size, colour, and motion are "features of the perceptual episode". Do you accept that I am aware of these shapes, sizes, colours, and motions, and so that I am aware of the "features of the perceptual episode"? Do you accept that this perceptual episode and its features are visual in nature? Do you accept that to be aware of visual features is to see these features?

Not quite. I don't use "mind independent", it's a term of philosophical art, not at all useful

"Bird" refers to the bird. Red is the colour of its head, chest and back, it being a male rosella.

These sentences are extensionally true.

We do not need a metaphysical contrast between “mind-dependent” and “mind-independent” to make sense of any of this. Doing so is philosophical hokum. — Banno

Then replace "mind-independent" with "exists at a distance to my body and has such properties even when nobody is looking at it".

So there's an organism that exists at a distance to my body, and this organism is referred to by the word "bird", and it has properties even when nobody is looking at it, and one of these properties is referred to by the word “red”.

I agree with the first part, but not the second part. The bird certainly has properties even when nobody is looking at it, and one of these properties is to reflect 700nm light, but the word "red" as ordinarily understood doesn't refer to such a property. Rather, 700nm light stimulates my eyes in such a way that it triggers certain neural activity in my brain, from which first person phenomenal experience emerges, and this first person phenomenal experience has various qualities, one of which I refer to using the word "red".

We naively think of this phenomenal quality as being one of the properties that the bird has even when nobody is looking at it, but our science has confirmed that it isn't. This naive view is mistaken. A sentence like "the bird is red" to be literally true ought be interpreted as "the bird appears red", where the word "red" refers to the quality of the first person phenomenal experience it causes to happen. Much like with "the dress I see is white and gold" — it really does appear white and gold to me, with the words "white" and "gold" referring to the very real quality of my first person phenomenal experience (and not something like wavelengths of light).

The homunculus infinite regress problem arises when the mind is assumed to be a separate entity to the brain, and the mind is looking at the neural activity in the brain. — RussellA

A person is thought of as being in a relation to a mental state, such as believing a proposition, imagining Paris, etc. Conceiving of thought as having the character of relationship naturally implies a separation between believer and belief, or in the case of perception, between the witness and the thing witnessed.

The difference between direct and indirect realists as represented in this thread, comes down to how we want to describe that perceptual relation. Is it between perceiver and a mental state? Or is it between perceiver and physical object?

I'm not denying that "sense" and "reference" are two different things. I'm not saying that one needs to understand the referent to understand the sense. I'm not saying that every word has a referent. I'm saying that the word "red" as ordinarily understood has a referent, and that this referent, like with the word "pain", is a mental phenomenon, and not a mind-independent property of the world (e.g. a surface that reflects 700nm light).

If you want to ignore reference and only consider sense then you're welcome to, but then that's just pretend, because reference is real. And in the context of the debate about the nature of perception, the referents of words such as "red" and "bird" matter.

The difference between direct and indirect realists as represented in this thread, comes down to how we want to describe that perceptual relation. Is it between perceiver and a mental state? Or is it between perceiver and physical object? — frank

There is a relation between perceiver and physical object.

But there is no relation between perceiver and a mental state if the perceiver IS the mental state.

So shape, size, colour, and motion are "features of the perceptual episode". Do you accept that I am aware of these shapes, sizes, colours, and motions, and so that I am aware of the "features of the perceptual episode"? Do you accept that this perceptual episode and its features are visual in nature? Do you accept that to be aware of visual features is to see these features? — Michael

No, not as stated. I would not say that I am "aware of" these shapes, sizes, colours, and motions as objects of awareness. I would say that I am "aware that" they are the way in which I am "aware of" the object. It is the game-object that I am aware of, not the phenomenal qualities themselves. Those qualities characterize the manner of presentation, but they are not what is presented.

But there is no relation between perceiver and a mental state if the perceiver IS the mental state. — RussellA

I would add that a mental state isn't really just one thing. There's the "sensory" mental state, but then also the "intellectual" mental state. I think it quite appropriate to say that my intellect is aware of and tries to make sense of the sensations.

No, not as stated. I would not say that I am "aware of" these shapes, sizes, colours, and motions as objects of awareness. I would say that I am "aware that" they are the way in which I am aware of the object. It is the game-object that I am aware of, not the phenomenal qualities themselves. Those qualities characterize the manner of presentation, but they are not what is presented. — Esse Quam Videri

Then I think this is our fundamental disagreement. As above with my reply to RussellA, I think it quite appropriate to say that I am aware of these phenomenal shapes and sizes and colours. I recognize them as being present, as differing from one another and other things not present, as having names, and so on. And to return to my earlier argument with John and Jane seeing the box to be a different colour, I do make use of these phenomenal shapes and sizes and colours (in conjunction with any background knowledge) to make inferences about what's going to happen next in the game, or about what sort of things are interacting with my body when not playing a game, and so on.

But there is no relation between perceiver and a mental state if the perceiver IS the mental state. — RussellA

I take this to be a problem for cognitive science. If they end up agreeing with you, they'll at least have to explain the expectation of the duality of perceiver and perceived.

I can't really do anything with the mere suggestion that there is no duality.

Then I think this is our fundamental disagreement. As above with my reply to RussellA, I think it quite appropriate to say that I am aware of these phenomenal shapes and sizes and colours. I recognize them as being present, as differing from one another and other things, as having names, etc. — Michael

Yes, perhaps this is where we must diverge.

I do want to clarify that I do not deny any of the following:

• that phenomenology is real
• that experience is vivid
• that we can talk about colour, shape, etc.

For me, it is about whether "objecthood" is required to make sense of those facts. Whereas the game-object satisfies public, normative criteria of objecthood - identity, persistence, affordance, counterfactual robustness - phenomenal qualities do not. This doesn't make them illusory. They are subject to other norms - the norms of perceptual description and articulation - but they don't meet the qualifications of "objecthood" in the way that the game-object does.

For me, it is about whether "objecthood" is required to make sense of those facts. Whereas the game-object satisfies public, normative criteria of objecthood - identity, persistence, affordance, counterfactual robustness - phenomenal qualities do not. This doesn't make them illusory. They are subject to other norms - the norms of perceptual description and articulation - but they don't meet the qualifications of "objecthood" in the way that the game-object does. — Esse Quam Videri

For me, to be the "object" of perception is just to be the X in "I perceive X". If I feel pain then pain is the object of perception, if I see colours then colours are the object of perception, and if I hear a truck then the truck is the object of perception. I don't read anything more into the word "object" in this context.

The relevant philosophical questions concern a) the ontology of pain, colours, and trucks, and b) which of these (if any) are "directly present in" (i.e. literal constituents of) phenomenal experience.

I think this clarifies our disagreement nicely. When I talk about “objecthood,” I am not using it in the purely grammatical sense of whatever can occupy the X-position in the statement “I perceive X.”

The issue I’m pressing is whether phenomenal qualities satisfy the same kind of public, normative criteria—identity, persistence, affordance, counterfactual structure—that we ordinarily use to count something as an object in a robust sense, such as a game-object or a truck. My claim is that they do not.

That does not mean they are unreal or inaccessible; it means they belong to the structure of perceptual episodes rather than to the ontology of objects of perception. So while I’m happy to grant your grammatical usage of “object,” my denial concerns whether phenomenal qualities should be treated as objects in the same ontological sense as the things we ordinarily perceive (trucks, boats, people, etc.).

The issue I’m pressing is whether phenomenal qualities satisfy the same kind of public, normative criteria—identity, persistence, affordance, counterfactual structure—that we ordinarily use to count something as an object in a robust sense, such as a game-object or a truck. My claim is that they do not. — Esse Quam Videri

Well, phenomenal qualities are essentially private, so obviously they can’t satisfy public criteria. You’ve defined “direct perception” in such a way that indirect realism is ruled out a priori. This is why I think you’re just using a different definition, because I think the traditional dispute is something that can only be resolved a posteriori.

Well, phenomenal qualities are essentially private, so obviously they can’t satisfy public criteria. — Michael

I actually reject this. While I would agree that phenomenal qualities are private in their occurrence, they are not private in their intelligibility, assessibilty, or normativity.

So I wouldn't say I've ruled out indirect realism a-priori. I'm just challenging a background assumption that is usually taken for granted in the debate.

I would add that a mental state isn't really just one thing. There's the "sensory" mental state, but then also the "intellectual" mental state. I think it quite appropriate to say that my intellect is aware of and tries to make sense of the sensations. — Michael

Yes, there is the sensory mental state “I feel pain” and there is the intellectual mental state “I reason that the pain was caused by something mind-external.”

Question one = Is the mind separate from the brain’s neural activity or is the mind the brain’s neural activity?

To avoid the homunculus straw man problem, the mind is the brain’s neural activity.

Question two = Am “I” separate from my mind or am “I” my mind?

Again, to avoid the homunculus straw man problem, “I” am my mind.

Therefore, because “I” am my mind, and my mind is my brain’s neural activity, “I” am my brain’s neural activity.

This means that the brain’s neural activity can process both sensations and reasoning.

This should not be unexpected, as even the most basic of light sensors can detect the intensity of surrounding light and choose whether to turn the light on or not.

Even the basic £10 light sensor can process both sensations and reasoning about what action to take based on these sensations.

I take this to be a problem for cognitive science. If they end up agreeing with you, they'll at least have to explain the expectation of the duality of perceiver and perceived. I can't really do anything with the mere suggestion that there is no duality. — frank

I perceive my pain. I am the perceiver and my pain is what is perceived.

If there was a duality between perceiver and perceived, a duality between me and my pain, this would suggest that I am separate to or outside my pain, and it is my choice whether to feel my pain or not.

But we know that this is not the case. I am not separate to or outside my pain. I am my pain. There is no duality between me and my pain. There is no duality between me as perceiver of my pain and what is perceived, my pain.