But none of this is relevant to the point being made.

Naive realists claim such things as this:

The second formulation is the constitutive claim, which says that it introspectively seems to one that the perceived mind-independent objects (and their features) are constituents of the experiential state. Nudds, for instance, argues that ‘visual experiences seem to have the NR [Naïve Realist] property’ (2009, p. 335), which he defines as ‘the property of having some mind-independent object or feature as a constituent’ (2009, p. 334), and, more explicitly, that ‘our experience […] seems to have mind-independent objects and features as constituents’ (2013, p. 271). Martin claims that ‘when one introspects one’s veridical perception one recognises that this is a situation in which some mind-independent object is present and is a constituent of the experiential episode’ (2004, p. 65). — https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-021-01618-z

the conscious “phenomenal” character of that experience is shaped by the objects of perception and their features, where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense. — https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0340.xml

colours are mind-independent properties of things in the environment that are distinct from properties identified by the physical sciences — https://academic.oup.com/book/5610

Indirect realists reject these claims, and the science of perception supports this rejection.

That's all there is to it.

How is it an inference, then, and not a sentiment, or a mere prejudice? — Banno

My belief that my experiences are caused by distal objects is a "prejudice". My belief that a distal cow exists is inferred from a) my "prejudice" that my experiences are caused by distal objects and from b) I experience a cow.

It's not based on anything. It's just what seems most reasonable to me. I don't pretend that it's anything more than that.

Yes. It's more reasonable than "an evil demon is deceiving me".

Ah. SO you induce the existence of the world by application of "scientific method"?

SO does this method involve falsification, or is it statistical? — Banno

I believe in the existence of distal objects because I believe that the existence of distal objects best explains the existence and regularity and predictability of experience.

And you deduce, or perhaps infer, the existence of the world, including the things around you, from what the senses present to you?

How does that work? — Banno

Are you asking how induction and the scientific method work?

Yes. Indirect realists aren't idealists. They're realists. They just recognize, contrary to the claims of naive realism, that mental phenomena exist, that distal objects and their properties are not constituents of mental phenomena, that many (even all) of the properties of mental phenomena are not properties of distal objects, that many (even all) of the properties of mental phenomena do not even resemble the properties of distal objects, and that we have direct knowledge only of mental phenomena.

Yes.

Do you agree that sensory experience provides us with knowledge of the things around us? — Banno

It provides us with knowledge that there are things around us and that our bodies respond in such-and-such a way to sensory stimulation, but that's it.

Naive realists falsely claim that we know more than this because they falsely claim that distal objects and their properties are constituents of sensory experience. Indirect realists reject these claims.

Again, this is a bad question. — Banno

No it's not. It's a pertinent question that seeks to address the extent to which our body's physiological/psychological response to sensory stimulation allows us to form justified beliefs about the existence and mind-independent nature of distal objects.

You can call it a merely grammatical dispute if you like, but then you must be in agreement with me that our perceptions are mental representations, that our perceptions of the world do not require any mediation, and that we can have direct perceptions of the world.

But I don’t see how this is consistent with the indirect realist position that our perceptions are directly of mental representations and only indirectly of the world; that is, that our perceptions of the world are mediated by mental representations. — Luke

What is the physical/physiological difference between mental representations existing and not being mediations and mental representations existing and being mediations?

This distinction you're trying to make just doesn't seem to make any sense.

The indirect realist claims that something like mental representations exist, that distal objects and their properties are not constituents of these mental representations, and that we have direct knowledge only of these mental representations.

If you want to make the same claim but call it "direct realism" then you're welcome to, but as it stands there is no meaningful difference between your direct realism and my indirect realism.

Not all direct realists hold that color is a mind-independent property of distal objects. — creativesoul

I'm not arguing against direct realism. I'm arguing for indirect realism and against naive realism. Much of my time has been spent trying to explain that non-naive direct realism seems consistent with indirect realism: see Semantic Direct Realism.

Maybe you should read supertasks because you don't seem to understand what is being talked about. Nobody is questioning the fact that 1/2 + 1/4 + ... = 1.

This is an example of a supertask:

I write down the first ten natural numbers after 30 seconds, the next ten natural numbers after 15 seconds, the next ten natural numbers after 7.5 seconds, and so on.

According to those who argue that supertasks are possible I can write out infinitely many natural numbers in 60 seconds.

Examples such as Thomson's lamp show that supertasks entail a contradiction. So even though it is true that 30 + 15 + 7.5 + ... = 60, it does not follow that the above supertask is possible.

It makes no sense to claim that I stopped writing out the natural numbers after 60 seconds but that there was no final natural number that I wrote.

what is "the epistemological problem of perception" — Banno

Does sensory experience provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects and their mind-independent properties?

Naive realists claim that it does because they claim that distal objects and their mind-independent properties are constituents of sensory experience.

Indirect realists claim that it doesn't because they claim that distal objects and their mind-independent properties are not constituents of sensory experience; they only causally determine sensory experience, and so the properties of sensory experience (e.g. smells and tastes and colours) may not resemble the mind-independent properties of distal objects.

Back on page one I said: "This argument is interminable because folk fail to think about how they are using 'direct' and 'indirect'." — Banno

And as I said back on page 1:

So to avoid using the terms "direct" and "indirect", my own take is that we have an experience that we describe as seeing an apple, but that the relationship between the experience and the apple isn't of a kind that resolves the epistemological problem of perception (or of a kind that satisfies naive colour realism, as an example). — Michael

The science is accepted by both "sides". You still haven't come to terms with that simple fact. — Banno

The science does not support naive realism.

Undefined by the description. That is to say, the color of the box afterwards is not a defined thing, which is different than it displaying the color of 'undefined'. — noAxioms

And so it is meaningless to claim that such a supertask can complete. The fact that we can sum an infinite series is a red herring.

Says the guy who has spent weeks asserting that direct realism is false because it denies indirect realism. — Banno

I haven't said that. I've said that the science of perception supports indirect realism and not naive realism.

there are no seconds unless measured out — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes there are. A second is "the duration of 9,192,631,770 periods of the radiation corresponding to the transition between two hyperfine levels of the ground state of the caesium-133 atom". This occurs even if we don't measure it.

Yet again you can't seem to get beyond our use of labels to understand that our labels refer to things that exist and do things even when we're not around.

Odd that all that color matching can be successfully achieved by a brainless machine. — creativesoul

It's not odd at all. We build it to measure the wavelength of light and then program it to output the word "red" if the wavelength measures 700nm.

This doesn't entail naive colour realism.

If the cow is in the field, then it is not in the brain. If we see the cow, then we see things that are not in the brain. The cow is one of the things we see.

What scientific account of ocular nature forbids us from seeing cows in fields? — creativesoul

As I have said before, I accept that we see cows.

But this has nothing to do with the dispute between naive and indirect realists. The dispute between naive and indirect realists concerns whether or not distal objects and their properties are constituents of the phenomenal character of conscious experience. Naive realists claim that they are and indirect realists claim that they're not. I think the science supports the claim that they're not.

I don't want to keep repeating myself.

What scientific account of ocular nature forbids seeing things that are not in the brain? — creativesoul

I don't know what you mean by "seeing things".

All I am saying is that visual experiences occur when there is appropriate activity in the visual cortex, that distal objects are often causally responsible for these visual experiences, and that these distal objects are not constituents of these visual experiences – and I think the science of perception supports this view.

What concerns us is the "conscious 'phenomenal' character of ... experience". I would say that the evidence strongly suggests that the conscious 'phenomenal' character of experience is either reducible to brain activity or supervenes upon it, neither of which allow for distal objects and their properties to be constituents. The connection between the two is merely causal.

I do not see how scientific evidence refutes 2. The emphasized part needs unpacked. — creativesoul

The important part is this: “… where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense.”

Distal objects like cows are causally responsible for the activity in my visual cortex, and so the resulting visual experience, but they are not constituents of that resulting visual experience.

To claim that distal objects are constituents of visual experience is to assert an unscientific account of visual experience.

I'm going to quote from Naïve Realism:

Naïve realism is a theory in the philosophy of perception: primarily, the philosophy of vision. Historically, the term was used to name a variant of “direct realism,” which claimed (1) that everyday material objects, such as caterpillars and cadillacs, have mind-independent existence (the “realism” part); (2) that our visual perception of these material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (the “direct” part); and (3) these objects possess all the features that we perceive them to have (the “naïve” part). In this, the theory contrasted with theories such as scientific direct realism (which rejected (3)), indirect realism (which rejected (2) and (3)), and phenomenalism, which rejected (1). Today, however, most philosophical theories of visual perception would endorse at least claims (1) and (2), and many would also endorse (3). In this setting, “naïve realism” has taken on a more precise use. As understood today, the naïve realist claims that, when we successfully see a tomato, that tomato is literally a constituent of that experience, such that an experience of that fundamental kind could not have occurred in the absence of that object. As naïve realism, thus understood, sees perception as fundamentally involving a relation between subjects and their environments, the position is also sometimes known as “relationalism” in the contemporary literature. Typically, today’s naïve realist will also claim that the conscious “phenomenal” character of that experience is shaped by the objects of perception and their features, where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense. On such a view, the redness that I am aware of when I look at a ripe tomato is a matter of my experience acquainting me with the tomato’s color: the redness that I am aware of in this experience just is the redness of the tomato. As such a view appears to commit its proponent to a version of claim (3) above—that for one to see an object to have a feature, the object must actually have that feature—the inheritance of the name “naïve” realism seems appropriate. As for whether there can be naïve realist theories of senses other than vision, this is an issue that awaits a more detailed exploration.

The key parts are in bold.

Specifically, I think that "our visual perception of these material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data" means "the conscious 'phenomenal' character of that experience is shaped by the objects of perception and their features, where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense."

Those who call themselves non-naive direct realists seem to want to accept the first part but reject the second part, but I can't make sense of the first part except as the second part.

So the relevant considerations are whether or not these are true:

1. Everyday material objects, such as caterpillars and cadillacs, have mind-independent existence
2. The conscious “phenomenal” character of that experience is shaped by the objects of perception and their features, where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense
3. These objects possess all the features that we perceive them to have

If (1) is true and (2) true then direct realism is true (and (3) is true).
If (1) is true and (2) is false then indirect realism is true (even if (3) is true).

I think the scientific evidence supports the claim that (1) is true and that (2) and (3) are false. Therefore, I think the scientific evidence supports indirect realism.

I meant better options than just indirect realism(indirect perception) as compared/contrasted to naive realism. There are more choices than just indirect realism that presuppose all components of all experience is/are located in the brain. — creativesoul

This is where I think there's confusion.

Naive realists claim that distal objects are constituents of experience. Indirect realists claim that distal objects are not constituents of experience.

Either distal objects are constituents of experience or distal objects are not constituents of experience.

Therefore, either naive realists are correct or indirect realists are correct.

What third option is there?

I think that there are better options... — creativesoul

Either naive realism is true or naive realism is false. It's a simple dichotomy.

Not necessarily. I’m undecided between eliminative materialism and property dualism.

All I will say is that experience exists inside the brain, distal objects exist outside the brain, and so distal objects are not constituents of experience. Therefore naive realism is false. Indirect realism as I understand it is nothing more than the rejection of naive realism, and these further disputes between indirect realism and so-called non-naive “direct” realism are confusions arising from different groups meaning different things by the terms “direct” and “see”.

If "the cow I see isn't a constituent of my visual experience" makes sense according to the position you're arguing for/from, but you cannot clearly and unambiguously state what does count as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see, then that is not a problem with the question. It's evidence that there's a problem with the framework you're practicing. — creativesoul

The constituents of visual experience are shapes and colours, the constituents of auditory experience are sounds, the constituents of olfactory experiences are smells, etc.

I don’t understand your question. It’s like asking “what counts as a constituent of a portrait of the President if not the President the portrait is of”.

The fact is that the President is not a constituent of the portrait. The portrait is paint and canvas hanging on a wall. The President is in the White House having breakfast.

What counts as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see? — creativesoul

The cow I see exists outside my head. My visual experience exists inside my head. Therefore, the cow I see isn’t a constituent of my visual experience.

Yes.

No

In the field I presume.

That we coin the term “X” to refer to some Y isn’t that Y depends on us referring to it using the term “X”. This is where you fail to make a use-mention distinction.

If we take the term “1 year” as an example, the Earth orbiting the Sun does not depend on us measuring it. It just orbits it, independently of us.

So to rephrase my example:

A white box turns red when the Earth completes a half-orbit, turns blue when it completes another quarter-orbit, turns back to white when it completes another eighth-orbit, and so on.

What colour is the box when the Earth completes its orbit around the Sun?

Your claims so far are akin to claiming that the Earth will never complete its orbit around the Sun, which just makes no sense. The box does not have the power to influence the Earth's velocity or the Sun's gravitational pull.

In this view, mental representations are seen as immediate reflections of the external world rather than intermediaries that stand between the mind and reality. — Luke

I don't understand this distinction. What is the physical/physiological difference between the two?

If you accept that mental "representations" exist and if you accept that we have direct knowledge only of these mental representations and if you accept that the qualities of these mental representations (smells, tastes, colours, etc.) are not (and are possibly unlike) the mind-independent properties of distal objects then I agree with you.

I call this view "indirect realism" as it is all I understand indirect realism to be; the rejection of naive realism. If you want to call this view "direct realism" then go ahead. The label is irrelevant.

Just understand that your direct realism is not inconsistent with my indirect realism. They're the same position, just given different names.

If you truly believe that an increment of time exists without being measured, tell me how I can find a naturally existing, already individuated increment of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what you mean by "finding a naturally existing, already individuated increment of time", but it is a fact that 60 seconds of time can pass without anyone looking at a clock or a stopwatch. Billions of years passed before humanity evolved, and this isn't some retroactive fact that only obtained when humanity started studying the past.

I don't know whether you're arguing for some kind of antirealism or if you're failing to understand a use-mention distinction.

Regardless, the arguments I am making here are directed towards the realist who believes that supertasks are possible.

I was referring to such things as the projectively extended real line.

Increments of time must be measured — Metaphysician Undercover

No they mustn’t.

The contradiction is very obvious. I'm surprised you persist in denial. The supertask will necessarily carry on forever, as the sum of the time increments approaches 60 seconds, without 60 seconds ever passing. Clearly this contradicts "60 seconds will pass". — Metaphysician Undercover

An ordinary stopwatch is started.

After 30 seconds a white box turns red, after a further 15 seconds it turns blue, after a further 7.5 seconds it turns back to white, and so on.

When the stopwatch reaches 60 seconds, what colour is the box?

Your claim that the box changing colour entails that the stopwatch will never reach 60 seconds makes no sense. The stopwatch is just an ordinary stopwatch that counts ordinary time as it ordinarily would and is unaffected by anything the box does.

Sorry, what? You don't believe that 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + ... = 1? You don't believe in calculus? You are arguing a finitist or ultrafinitist position? What do you mean?

Of course if you mean real world events, I quite agree. But your three-state lamp is not a real world event, it violates several laws of classical and quantum physics, just as Thompson's two-state lamp does. — fishfry

There is a difference between saying that 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + ... = 1 and saying that one can write out every 1/2n in order. The latter is not just a physical impossibility but a metaphysical impossibility.

Some say that the latter is not a metaphysical impossibility because it is metaphysically possible for the speed with which we write each subsequent 1/2n to increase to infinity, and so that this infinite sequence of events (writing out every 1/2n) can complete (and in a finite amount of time). Examples such as Thomson's lamp show that such supertasks entail a contradiction and so that we must reject the premise that it is metaphysically possible for the speed with which we write each subsequent 1/2n to increase to infinity.

So if you wish to define a final state, you can make it anything you like. I choose pumpkin. — fishfry

If you want to say that supertasks are possible but then have to make up some nonsense final state like "pumpkin" then I think this proves that your claim that supertasks are possible is nonsense and I have every reason to reject it.