We seem to be going round and round on this one Bob. :)

How is my abstraction invalid?

Let’s call the set of caused things C, the set of all things A, a first cause to C F, an infinite circularity O, a self-cause of C S, a necessary cause of C N, and an infinite regression R. — Bob Ross

You didn't need to introduce a new set, as everything was in the U1 and U2 sets.

The debate in metaphysics, ontology, which your OP claims to solve, is about C not A. — Bob Ross

But I'm not including the set of all things in the U1 and U2 comparison.

U1 = A -> B -> C
U2 = infinite regress -> C

This is the set of all causal relations in the the universe Bob, not set of all things.

What you are doing is conflating A with C. You are noting that irregardless of who is right about how causality works, the totality, A, of all things is uncaused; and this is trivially true and has nothing to do with the debate. — Bob Ross

I'm not conflating A, because A does not belong in the above example. I'm noting that if you extend the causality to its entire scope, you will reach a point where it is inevitably uncaused. In the case of U1, its A. In the case of U2, its discovering there is an infinite regress of causality. What caused there to be a universe that had infinitely regressive causality? Nothing. What caused there to be a universe with finite causality? Nothing. There is no prior cause at the end of the causal chain of discovery, therefore it is impossible to note that a finitely regressive causality is anymore necessary then an infinitely regressive causality.

A being that is uncaused is something which is real and lacks any explanation for its existence; whereas a set of real things is not itself real and lacks the ability to require any explanation in the first place — Bob Ross

A set of infinitely regressive causality could itself be just as real and lack any explanation for its existence as a set of finite regressive causality.

Thusly, if we say that R is A — Bob Ross

But I am not saying R is A, so I don't think this applies. Remove A from the notion, which I am not including, and I'm not sure my abstraction is invalid. Try again without A being involved and see if your claim still holds.

If the answer is that it would good for there to be no existence and bad for there to be existence, then the best scenario would be for there to be no good because once you eliminate all existence, you eliminate good too. — Hanover

You're close. The OP notes that if there is an objective morality, then the only answer which isn't a contradiction is that there should be existence. If its good for there not to be existence, then that means that morality shouldn't exist. But if your morality says there shouldn't be existence, then it, itself, shouldn't exist. Thus it contradicts itself leaving the only rational answer being "There should be existence".

So if you're saying, "There should be no good," what you're saying is, "It should be, there there should not be." Which means "It should not be, should not be." meaning its nonsensical.

↪Philosophim, so are you by saying "good should be" is more along the lines of maximizing good but minimizing bad? If so then I can see what you're saying. — DifferentiatingEgg

Its about states of existence. As a very simple example imagine a state of existence where someone is murdered, vs where they are not murdered. The good state is what should be, the bad state is what should not be. This is at a very basic level again, which the OP goes over. The link at the end of the OP goes onto the second part.

Oh, I didn't realize there was a misunderstanding. The link you went to was a reference I posted earlier to detail the logic that extends from the notion that the universe is uncaused.

The post I intended you to go to is at the end of the OP, which is the second part of this. Now I understand why you haven't gone there. :D Here, I'll link it one more time. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15217/if-existence-is-good-what-is-the-morality-of-non-life/p1

Why can't you just give me an example of a "should" that doesn't involve minds, as I asked? Seems like a simple request. — Relativist

I have, its that link. Once you read it if you wouldn't mind, post in that thread so I can keep this one's ideas separate from that. This should give you a much better understanding of what I'm noting, and we'll continue there if there are further questions and critiques. I look forward to it as I need a lot more feedback on that one. I'm not sure how tight it is, and I would love someone else to critique it.

If Bad shouldn't exist then niether should Good since they're linked. You can't deny half the equation and expect to exist. — DifferentiatingEgg

Bad is what should not exist. By virtue of good things existing, there is a state of being that would be a possible negation of that good existence, and should not be. I'm not denying any half of an equation here.

You can't even detail a system of good without the bad. You use circular reasoning in your logic to assume Good and Bad can exist without the other. — DifferentiatingEgg

I've never assumed anything like this. This is your thing, not mine. :)

1. If only good should exist, and bad should not exist
2. Then in that scenario bad does not, and good has no contrast and begets no meaning — DifferentiatingEgg

I don't understand how you're getting point 2 from what I wrote. Bad and good are direct opposites of one another.

You're deriving "ought" without properly addressing "is". — DifferentiatingEgg

No I'm noting that what good is, is what ought to be. What evil is, is what not ought to be. I don't understand the issue.

You had said, "The 'should' is entirely logical." I'm trying to understand what that means. So I gave you an example which you rejected with a reason that I can't understand. What is a "positive state of existence"? What makes one state more positive than another?

You referred to your second post. In that post, you said,
"If we are to take that good is, "What should be", then we can take at a base level that there should be existence over nothing. This is because any morality which proposed that existence should not be would contradict itself." — Relativist

Have you read the entirety of the second post? Do you understand the example of atoms versus molecules that I put forward?

It sounds like you might say "an electron should be attracted to a proton"? — Relativist

No, should would denote a more positive state of existence. But for there to be a more positive state of existence, it must be at its base that existence is itself good, versus there being no existence at all.

This is my issue: "should" typically connotes an outcome that is contingent upon a choice. — Relativist

But since you know I've stated repeatedly that it does not require a being, its a state. Compare state 1 and state 2, and one would be logically better than the other. Go. Read. The. Second. Post. :D Heres the link so you don't have to go back to the first page. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15217/if-existence-is-good-what-is-the-morality-of-non-life/p1

That is precisely what I've been challenging! The very point you're responding to is such a challenge! Your response should be to explain how "should" applies to objects that lack minds. — Relativist

Then I have misunderstood. First, I've already told you this is not a proof that an objective morality exists. This is IF an objective morality exists. If it exists, we can construct a necessary initial premise, then try to build from there. The 'should' is entirely logical. As I've tried to communicate a couple of times now, my theory is this is consequence or property of existence itself. This is not a proof of an objective morality, this is an exploration into what an objective morality would have to necessarily entail if it existed. That's all it requires from you to explore it. To my mind, if there is an objective morality, this is the best place to start. I have seen no criticism from you thus far that has countered this point.

I'm glad to hear you say "there is no contingency for existence", because it sounds like you're agreeing with me that existence is metaphysically necessary. Is that correct? — Relativist

No, existence is not necessary in any regards. It exists today, but it was not necessary that it ever existed at all if we're tracing back to an origin.

However, if existence is metaphysically necessary, how does "should" apply? — Relativist

I explore that in the next post by looking at the idea of existences within existence. This involves identities and quantities at an attempt at some type of measurement. Does a certain combination of basic matter result in overall more existences within a set existence? Again, you'll need to read there, I'm not summarizing an entire post. :)

There are no discrete odds only because your premise implies there are infinitely possible initial states. This translates to an infinitesimal probability - but it's still a probability. — Relativist

Correct. And all probabilities would be equal as there is nothing which would influence one over the other.

I have accepted your premise that moral imperatives exist, but I've argued that everything in a contingent universe is therefore contingent - including a wavelength of light and any moral imperative that happens to exist. Do you agree? If not, why not? — Relativist

This ironically goes too far for me. I really am only asserting IF an objective morality exists. This is not an assertion or proof that an objective morality exists. I have noted that Subjective morality has many problems, and I don't find it impossible for an objective morality to exist. Therefore we do what we can in philosophy, reason though what would necessarily be if it did exist by noting a fundamental question that all moral systems must answer at their base.

As for contingencies, I'm not sure what you mean here. My note was that if we are talking about the origin of the universe's existence, the only thing we can conclude is that the ultimate origin is uncaused and contingent on nothing else. What do you mean when you say a wavelength of light is contingent within the context I'm noting?

If EVERYTHING came out of randomness then this includes all moral imperatives. — Relativist

Correct, I've said that several times now. My note is that this does not diminish its existence if it is real, like it doesn't diminish any other existence if it is real.

You've repeated it over and over, but you haven't explained how it is reasonable for a random moral imperative is an OBJECTIVE moral imperative. — Relativist

For the same reason that a random appearance of a red wavelength of light is still an objective red wavelength of light. If an objective morality is real, it is as real as a wavelength of light. Do you understand?

Having objective EXISTENCE does not entail there being something objective about the moral imperative. — Relativist

And I have not made that claim. I'm noting IF such a thing exists, what logically must the answer to the question, "Should there be existence" is.

I've said that a moral imperative pertains only to choices made by things that can make choices. I don't think you've stated either agreement or disagreement. — Relativist

I have told you from the beginning up until the last post that it does not because the logic of the OP does not require a person to make a judgement. Its simply a logical conclusion. I have told you I personally believe it to be a consequence of existence itself, like a property, and informed you that if you read more, you might better understand what I'm trying to tell you. I have noted this first post is a very limited scope argument, and I build upon it in that second post. If you refuse to read that post, when I am telling you that is part of the answer to your question, then insist I'm not answer your question, then don't be surprised if you don't understand it.

I've been trying for quite some time, and I've brought to your attention the reasons I think your premises are incoherent. — Relativist

And I have answered. Go read the second post. Then continue. If you don't, this conversation will go nowhere as I cannot answer your questions fully from this initial post alone.

I infer that you're saying your basic premise doesn't account for all moral values that most of us accept — Relativist

Correct! Its not an inference, I've been telling you this repeatedly. :D

I presume that you're only saying that moral values which are entailed by your premise are objective values. Is that correct? — Relativist

No. IF there is an objective morality the only thing this post has asserted is that the answer to, "Should there be existence," is yes, because no contradicts itself. I have asserted no more than this at this time.

Your remaining points I've already answered or you'll need to read the next post. And I do appreciate your engagement in the conversation.

And you said be = exist.
Thus
good should exist
bad should not exist

You have a fundamental problem because bad exists. — DifferentiatingEgg

"Should" does not mean "does". If what is bad exists, it should not exist. If what is good does not exist, it should exist. Does that address your issue?

How can bad not exist when what is good and what is bad is determined by what is within us? You can't reconcile the devaluation of Good by removing the valuation of what's bad. — DifferentiatingEgg

I'm a little lost. Good is defined as what should be, bad is defined as what shouldn't be.

P1:All concepts of evaluation require contrast between opposites.

P2:Good and bad are opposites that define each other — DifferentiatingEgg

I encourage you to review several posts back where I agreed with your points 1 and 2 and laid out that your conclusion did not not make sense. I'll be more explicit here again.

↪Philosophim You've not presented a counter argument.

Make a p1 and p2 and C that necessarily follows. — DifferentiatingEgg

P1:All concepts of evaluation that have opposites require contrast between opposites.

P2:Good and bad are opposites of each other

Therefore good is what should be and bad is what should not be.

"Should" only applies only to choices made by beings that can make choices. — Relativist

I have several times noted that 'should' does not involve beings. If you are saying it does, and I'm presenting the entire argument that it does not, you need to challenge my point why I say it does not. You have not done that. You are creating a straw man by stating, "Should requires a being, therefore you contradict yourself," when I have noted, "Should does not require a being, but a logical state of existence."

If I was noting that an objective morality requires a being, you would have a point. But I haven't, I won't, and its not going to change. So this criticism does not counter my point. If you merely insist that it requires a being, please point out logically why it does while keeping within the definitions I listed. If your argument is, "Morality is only subjective, therefore it requires a being," that's just circular logic. You're going to have to first note that an objective morality could exist, and why it would require a being for it to exist. If your argument is instead just another roundabout way of saying, "I insist morality is subjective," that's not a viable argument.

Everything's existence is contingent. Nothing had to exist.
— Philosophim
If there is an uncaused first cause, how could it have NOT existed? What accounts for its contingency? What is it contingent UPON? — Relativist

You may want to read my post on this here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15722/the-logic-of-a-universal-origin-and-meaning/p1 I go over the logic of uncaused origins and what it entails. I'll try to summarize the point here.

When thinking upon the fact that the universe was ultimately uncaused by anything else, you realize that anything could have happened. Odds are calculated based on contingencies. There are four jacks in a deck of cards, which is why if we don't know the shuffle order we say pulling a card bling has a 4/52 chance of being a jack.

An uncaused universe has no odds. It has no reason that it should have formed, and it has no reason that it should not have formed. There is no limit as to what could form, and no limit as to what could not form. There is no cause behind it, so there is no rule behind it besides the fact that it now exists. How it exists is where further causality and rules of the universe are made. It is contingent upon nothing prior.

Even if you believe the actual uncaused first cause is contingent, how could there be a state of affairs of nothingness- an absence of anything at all? Existence itself (the fact SOMETHING exists) is metaphysically necessary entailed by the fact that we exist and something cannot come from nothing. — Relativist

How could there be a state of affairs that there is existence at all? The same as a possible state of affairs in which there is no existence at all. There is no contingency for existence. No prior causation. It simply is, and it had no reason to be or not be. We believe something cannot simple 'be' without prior cause in the universe, but logically, its the only conclusion that works.

Now if you are talking about, 'what is', that's a different story. And that's my point on an objective morality. It is 'what is'. We do not include any reference to a prior cause of the universe because that's pointless. An objective morality if it exists is within the universe that is, just like everything else. It does not exist on some outside intention, but would be an existent thing in the universe just like a wavelength of light.

Your op only claims "existence should be". You haven't explained how that entails the moral imperative "don't steal". — Relativist

Correct. Thus why your point is a straw man. If you want to figure out what I ultimately conclude on that, you'll need to read the next section. I've mentioned several times the limited scope of this particular OP, and noted that if you want to answer some of your other questions that go beyond the scope of this OP, you'll need to read the next section.

Secondly, you had referred to moral imperatives being the product of randomness- and THAT is the basis of my claim that each moral imperative could have come out as its converse. If that is not the case, then explain what you mean by "randomness" in your context. Why couldn't this imperative have come out as "do steal"? — Relativist

No, I clearly stated that everything came out of randomness. So saying that the universe had no intention or causation behind its 'origin' of existence is the same argument that be applied to anything in the universe. Since an objective morality does not require an intention or prior causation, it is a logical part of existence if it exists. I've stated this again and again. Perhaps you just can't comprehend it, it is very different from the normal subjective argument of morals you're likely used to. Bend your mind a bit. And if you still can't understand it, just go with the basic premises of the OP for now and read more. Maybe you'll understand better, have your questions answered, and be able to make a point that demonstrates I'm wrong. Read on to find out why eventually I can make a reasoned conclusion that "do steal" is not an objective moral notion.

1) it's existence is contingent. It didn't have to exist. — Relativist

Everything's existence is contingent. Nothing had to exist. This is not an argument against the existence of an objective morality. A red wavelength of light never had to exist, yet its still an objective classification. You have not answered this counter point the last few times I've pointed this out and only repeated your own. If you simply list the same argument again without answering this I will assume at this point that you understand the point and are unable to adequately challenge it.

2) it's value is contingent. Its converse could have existed. But if "don't steal" could have randomly come out as "do steal", there is no objective reason to follow it. — Relativist

No, it could not have. First, you don't even know if this initial point leads to whether stealing is right or wrong. Second, the OP's claims is only about whether there should be existence. That's the entire point of the OP, to demonstrate an objective morality has a logical and certain answer to this question. An objective morality cannot exist that states "Existence should not be" as that is a logical contradiction. Go back to the OP and bring up the points if you wish to counter this conclusion.

My man, I proved it logically in my P1 P2 C statement. — DifferentiatingEgg

And I presented to you a counter that you have not fully addressed. So until then, my point stands.

It's idealic, you're pretending good should be and thus bad wont be. — DifferentiatingEgg

Alright, that's one part, but you didn't provide your own definition.

First, I'm not defining good and bad as you think I am.

Good - What should be
Bad - What shouldn't be

Its not that good WILL be and bad WON'T be, its that good is a more favorable reality then bad.

That's not idealic, because I'm noting there is possibly an objective evaluation and means of measuring this. Thus its not an ideal based on human emotion or desire, but rational thought.

What do you think is wrong with that definition, and do you have an alternative?
— Philosophim

The highest presentment of humanity seems always to be through crime.

Oedipus, Prometheus, Adam and Eve. — DifferentiatingEgg

That didn't answer the question. If you don't give an answer to that question, then that means mine has every reason to stand.

No, because this means what shouldn't exist is "bad." — DifferentiatingEgg

I think that's fine. What do you think is wrong with that definition, and do you have an alternative?

Oftentimes the overbearing weight of what is good creates bad. A certain tyranny and oppressiveness is formed out of its axioms in a sort of choking sense. — DifferentiatingEgg

That's why we're careful here in our definitions. Is good what should be, and is bad what shouldn't be at its very basic? Do you feel we've reached an assessment of the definitions which allows you to continue on with the rest of the OP?

They exist together or not at all is my point. — DifferentiatingEgg

And we agree!

And what's good for me may be bad for you. — DifferentiatingEgg

True. A subjective morality is merely opinion though while and objective morality would be a reasoned fact. If you're starving without alternative, its good to steal food. If I'm not starving and have money, its bad for me to steal food.

Perhaps you mean, what is good should be what we manifest into reality? — DifferentiatingEgg

Good is what should be. "Be" is exist.

Cause Good and Bad are concepts behind actions. — DifferentiatingEgg

That would be a moral decision. So for example, I might have the intent at an outcome, but fail. So I may intend to do good by donating to an organization, but it turns out that organization was corrupt. I may have had the intent to do good, but the money ended up not being used the way I intended. What should be is that I donate money to an organization and they use it as promised. What is bad is the organization not using the money as promised. My intentions, or moral action, was good, but the outcome was not good because the organization lied.

An objective morality would be a reasoned methodology that allows an assessment of what is good and bad beyond subjective emotional experience. With a subjective morality, we can never reasonably state that an organization scamming a person's donations is bad. With an objective morality we can.

If there is a first cause, F, then it would be outside of the set of causality. — Bob Ross

Considering the first cause would be the first part of causality, A -> B, isn't A part of the set of causality?

If you were to say something like “why F has no reason for its existence: it is necessary”, then you would be correct; and there’s nothing about it that is similar to an infinite regress: a regress would entail that there is an infinite series of sufficient explanations. — Bob Ross

But what I'm doing is looking at the entire set. In the case of U1, the first cause is the first part of the set. So when I ask, "What caused U1?", the answer is that the first cause existed without prior causation, then caused other things. In the second case there is no first cause, but there is still the question of "What caused U2?" The answer is that its entire infinitely regressive existence exists without prior causation.

I think you think such an infinite series of sufficient explanations doesn’t have a sufficient explanation because you are invalidly abstracting out the entire series and treating it like an object. — Bob Ross

Lets focus on this part then. How is my abstraction invalid? If I'm expanding the scope of the universal evaluation to include everything, don't the U1 and U2 examples each capture this accurately?

The whole error of the OP is in your definition of "good." — DifferentiatingEgg

It's merely an occasion sentence.
Further morality also measures what is bad too.
And what is bad is often overcome in specific circumstances and labeled as Good.[/quote]

Ok, I appreciate this critique. First, what is an 'occasion' sentence? Second, the evaluation of what is good by consequence includes the evaluation of what is bad. If good is what should be, bad is what should not be. Third, if good is what should be, then what should be must involve the context of the situation. So for example, if a person is starving and will die, the objective morality I ultimately conclude here would say stealing food to live is good. In the case of a person who can buy food and just doesn't want to, it would be bad. An objective evaluation requires careful evaluation.

Fact is you have yet to make an argument where the premises are true such that the conclusion necessarily follows. — DifferentiatingEgg

This is a fantastic argument, and I'm glad we've started here. Without an agreement on the definitions, there's no point in moving to the next steps.

P1:All concepts of evaluation require contrast between opposites.

P2:Good and bad are opposites that define each other

C:Therefore, all evaluations should be based on good and bad and can not exist as "good" alone. Thus, good is not what should be, but rather good and bad. — DifferentiatingEgg

I agree with points 1 and 2. But wouldn't the conclusion be that good is what should be and bad is what shouldn't be? That is what I conclude here.

Your logic in the Op was based on the assumption that objective morality exists. I'm showing that morality that is the product of a random existence cannot be objective; it's logically impossible. If you want to assume there are objective moral values then you need to drop the assumption that they are a "random addition". — Relativist

The problem with this statement is that you haven't just declared that an objective morality cannot exist. This statement declares that nothing objective can ever exist. Its the same thing as saying, "An objective evaluation of light waves can never occur because its completely random that light waves were made."

Your central argument here is you think how something came to be as the same as its possibility to be. That's false. Morality as I've noted, does not come from an intelligent being. It doesn't come from outside of what exists. It is found within existence. So whether that existence formed is random or not is irrelevant to its existence. Same with a wavelength of light. My point is that if existence is, there is a rational initial proposal to objective morality that we can reasonably look at and explore.

Are you willing to move on Relativist? This doesn't mean you admit that I'm right. But for the last time, I will ask that I would like someone as keen as yourself to look at the next steps that I'm proposing. I think it would help you understand a bit more what I'm talking about overall, where I'm going with this, and possibly give you the ammunition you need to point out issues with it that I'm not seeing as I move along with this. You may have an underlying point that you're not quite able to communicate because you're coming from a stance that from my viewpoint, is limited in understanding what I mean by a non-entity pushed objective morality. I look forward to it as I think you're one of the few people who can understand and evaluate what I'm doing.

A moral imperative that is a "random addition" is not an objective moral value, it's a random value whose converse could have instead come to exist. In effect, the universe flipped a coin, and "do not kill" won. — Relativist

No, I don't think so. If I'm right in the logic put forth, in at least any universe we can imagine, 'existence should be' is the necessary base answer to any objective morality. Second, all objective conclusions are within the universe that exists. This 'arbitrary' argument is pointless, which I've noted several times now. You still think morality comes from something else. I'm noting its a property/consequence of existence itself. It doesn't matter how that existence formed.

Now we've gone around on this point for a couple of posts, and I've noted that if you want a better understanding, its best you read the second post linked in the OP. I'm not sure there's anything to add either way from what's been noted in the OP at this point. If you're willing to think on something new and explore, I think you'll enjoy it, for the novelty at least. If you're here only to insist I can't do what I'm doing, you really don't have the understanding you need to convince me at this point. Not that I can't be convinced in later arguments, I'm quite willing to admit I'm wrong and adapt where needed. But I feel we've reached the limits within this particular post.

How do you get a relevant* moral imperative from an undesigned universe composed of matter and energy and evolving deterministically? — Relativist

Everything comes from an undesigned universe that evolves 'debatably' deterministically. I don't want to sidetrack too much, but if an undesigned universe can incept without prior cause, what's to stop other things from also happening later in the timeline? Such things would be completely unpredictable. Again, not a design intent, just random additions.

So if everything comes from this, what do you mean by relevant? Everything is relevant to that. As I've been noting, from the logic I've established above I hypothesize that morality at its base is the result of matter that has existed without cessation for 13.8 billion years. It is this unexplainable continued existence that is the base of all morality. Its not that there is a want, or desire, or conscious impetus. Just like there is no want or conscious impetus behind atoms grouping into molecules, molecules grouping into DNA, and ultimately creating life. I believe it is simply a consequence of 'eternal' matter. This is of course completely my musing after exploring the topic more fully and I genuinely wonder what you'll think after looking at the whole thing as well.

One major problem at this point is you're trying to figure out everything from my one little post noting that at its base IF there is an objective morality, existence is good. I've just told you 1+1=2 and you're asking me how its possible calculus can come from that. You're not really going to understand until you go through the rest. I'm not trying to trick you or do some, "Gotcha!" at the end. I'm genuinely exploring an idea that no one has ever had before. And I need other people to give it a genuine look. Your criticism has been understandable and the questions good, but you'll probably do better if you keep reading. For all I know my continued reasoning from this point is like most philosophers, "A solid start that loses steam midway through".

You're not confessing I'm right by moving on. I hope these explanations give you a 'good enough to explore it more' vibe and keep going. So if you don't mind, would you read the next section and point your criticism there? I'm not sure there's much to explore in this post at this point, and I would love it if someone with a keen mind took a look at where I go from here.

You refer to "shoulds" - which sounds to me like a moral imperative. Correct me if this is not what you mean. — Relativist

Right, this is the logic. Morality is what should be. If there is an objective morality, then we boil every moral question down to what should be implicitly answered first. "Should there be existence?" And by existence we mean, "Something vs nothing". So not any one particular set of existences, only existence vs nothing at all. The OP concludes that if there is an objective morality, the only answer which would logically make sense is "There should be existence".

I used the word "arbitrary" to highlight the fact there is no reason for these cosmic morals to be what they are. There can't be a reason unless there is some intent behind them- and intentionality entails a mind. — Relativist

Does a red wavelength of light have intent behind it? No. Is a red wavelength an objective entity? Yes. My intent is to find a morality that exists like a wave of light. We may subjectively interpret it in different ways, but its something underlying that we're all observing.

This is relevant to your question about the implications of there being objective morals. If objective morality is rooted in a mind, it would have different implications than if there is no mind. — Relativist

I've mentioned this a few times, and will do one more time in case you have any fears I'm going to recant later on. There is no mind that intends morality. There is no God. This is not my opinion or way to shape you into doing what I want. This is an objective exploration into the nature of morality as existence itself. You may note that my positions may be incoherent in the next post and you might be right. As I've noted, I need other people to look at it besides myself. But I feel its fairly clear hear that it is not.

Arguments from brute facts in cosmology are almost always extremely ad hoc. Yours is no exception. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Normally I would agree with you. It is an exception here because we're talking about a rational limit to causality. If I'm wrong, point out where in the argument my point fails please.

No doubt, if Penrose's hypothesis for why the entropy of the early universe was so low, or any of the others, was borne out by more evidence and became the consensus opinion of cosmologists, it would not make sense to rebut the new theory by stating: "no, it's just is. No explanation is possible." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I understand your concern, but that's not what I'm trying to do here. This is not an attempt to shut down further examination into why things work the way they do in our universe. This is not to shut down the causality that exists. Learning these things can only be helpful and should be encouraged. My point is 'the limit'. One day we may, or may not find the limit. But logically, we can determine there is one. Ultimately that limit is something that is uncaused by something else.

Knowing this we can determine that any proposal to a necessary universal origin without evidence is 100% wrong. If the limit is something uncaused, then necessarily anything could be the limit in an ontological theory. This doesn't mean it actually is anything we can imagine, only that without knowing the origin, we know this at least must be true. Thus we are left without any other means of discovering the actual origin besides science, research, and evidence.

Consider: if new stars appeared across the sky tonight that clearly spelled out "Allah is the greatest," would that be evidence of a creator? Well, on the brute fact view the emergence of the new stars, and the timing of their light reaching Earth, is all just the result of brute fact laws and initial conditions. If the advocates of such a view are consistent, they will declare: "We cannot assume that this happening is any more or less probable than anything else, since the laws and initial conditions just are, for no reason at all." — Count Timothy von Icarus

No. Within existence we have causality. There would be a reason why the stars aligned that way. Anyone who said, "It can't be Allah" should be dismissed. Same with anyone who said, "Maybe its aliens or a government trick." The only way to determine the truth would be through evidence. My point is not that 'everything is arbitratry', my point is that the origin of the universe is ultimately uncaused. That doesn't mean things within aren't caused by other things within it.

Do you not see how "well other people might not have logic and reason on their side, because people sometimes have irrational beliefs," is not a good response to: "We reject the premise of the univocity of being." — Count Timothy von Icarus

My point was only intended to criticize the notion that a unity of people believing something leads any credence to the accuracy of that belief. It is not intended to convey anymore than that.

A. Cosmologists are in no way unanimous that the universe even has a begining. Cyclical theories are still posited. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And my conclusion determines this is a viable possibility, as is anything.

Space and time do not exist prior to creation. God is not in space or time. God is not a being. — Count Timothy von Icarus

God is an uncaused being. But I've noted that if something can be uncaused, there is no limit as to what could be uncaused as an origin. Meaning rocks being uncaused is just as possible as a God being uncaused. My point does note that a God is a possibility, but it is only one of an infinite amount of options, and not logically necessary.

Sure, you are correct. Provided that we accept that "it just is, for no reason at all," is as good an explanation of things as any other, this would indeed render any other explanation "unnecessary," and imply that there "[should] be no more debate or consideration." After all, such an explanation can be proffered for literally anything we might inquire about. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The grass is green because light bounces off grass at a particular wavelength that we interpret as green. It is not, "Just because". Again, my argument is talking about the very specific scenario that the ultimate cause of our universe is uncaused. Everything else within it follows from the causality of its integrated existence. So not only am I not specifically saying this argument can be applied to everything, I'm pointing out it would be wrong to.

Your argument in your OP you said is arguing that there is no cause for the totality of causal things and that a first cause would be in that totality; but this contradicts what you just said above.

No contradiction. Let me see if this helps.

U1 = A -> B -> C
U2 = infinite regress -> C

What caused U? In both cases the answer is, "Nothing". There is no prior cause for U1 or U2. But the causality within U1 and U2 are true. U1 has a first cause, A. U2 does not. U2 simply exists like A simply exists in U1.

If nothing caused U1, and nothing caused U2, then there is nothing which would prevent their formation either. Since there is an equal weight for both for or against the U's existing, both U1 and U2 have an equal chance of being or not being.

We are talking about if they are in space—not if you feel them in space. — Bob Ross

If I feel them in space, aren't they in that space? When I prick my finger, I feel the pain locally to the wound, not in my foot. Its not some other dimension. The most simple way of understanding that is that pain is tied to places in time and space.

Ok, then you are using the term ‘interaction’ much more strictly than I was. E.g., the gravitational pull of the sun on the earth is an interaction (in a looser sense) without there being touch. — Bob Ross

Good point actually, I hadn't considered that! My understanding though is that gravity is a bending of space from matter. So there is some interaction at the touch point of matter that spreads out. We still don't know how it all works though, so this is a pretty good approach to the idea of indirect touch. Still, gravity originates at a point in time and space, so we still don't have a good example of something outside of time and space.

Yes, that is true; and I am saying you haven’t demonstrated why it is incoherent to believe that something outside of space and time cannot have some connection with things which are spatiotemporal. — Bob Ross

Can you give an example of how a being outside of time and space creating existence would work? We can invent any combination of words and concepts we desire. The only way to know if these words and concepts can exist outside of our imagination is to show them being applied accurately to reality. This is the point of the unicorn mention. There is nothing that proves the concept of a unicorn is incoherent. A magical horse with a horn that cannot be sensed in anyway passes as a logical amalgamation in the mind. But its impossible to demonstrate it exists in reality, therefore its not a sound concept to use when talking about reality.

The same with an entity that does not exist in time and space. If I were to say a unicorn uses its magic to keep the world rotating, this is again not necessarily incoherent, there's just no way to show this exists. The same with saying a being outside of time and space interacted with and created time and space. You've invented a being that cannot be shown to exist that did something which violated the currently known laws of time and space or 'magic'.

Material implication does not create a biconditional: A → B just means that when A is true, then B is true as well—it does not mean that when B is true A must be true. — Bob Ross

True, but we're talking about causation. You're telling me an A exists and creates a B by essentially magic. You haven't shown that A must necessarily exist for B to exist, so you need something more to show that A can exist and must exist.

If there is a first cause, then it has no prior causation for its being; so, by your own logic, it resides outside of the totality of causal things (viz., outside of causality). — Bob Ross

Correct, its formation would be outside of causality. However, what it caused next would be within causality. The issue here is not that the being you describe is impossible. The point here is that once such a being formed, how do we reconcile that the universe necessarily came from this being? At that point we need causality, and we need some explanation for how A caused B. This is of course if we're trying to prove that A is a necessary existence for B to be. If we're just saying, "Its an option", I have no qualm with this as anything imaginable and beyond could be an option.

Your paradigm assumes there are moral values existing external to humans that were caused to exist by undirected natural forces. You have not explained how these moral values are non-arbitrary. — Relativist

My point is that noting the natural world is 'arbitrary' doesn't make any point. We both agree that the universe is uncaused, meaning we cannot look outside of the universe for explanation. We can only look within it. The term 'arbitrary', if you are to use it against morality, would apply to everything in the universe at its core. You could just use the word 'random', but arbitrary adds an unneeded emotional element of dismissal to it.

As I pointed out earlier, the subjective experiences we have are based on underlying objective reality. Like a wavelength of light that we classify as red allows us to subjectively experience the color red. Of course, we could also say that the wavelength is arbitrary, the subjective experience is arbitrary, and people are arbitrary too. After all, its all ultimately the result of an uncaused event. This is of course nihilism, which I don't think you agree with either.

Further, I'll mention again that I believe morality is a consequence of existence that 'just won't quit'. We are made out of this existence, and this property of continued existence repeats across what is. While it may have been random that some existence formed that doesn't quit, vs possible existence that formed and did quit, the existence we have today at its base, is resilient in its continued existence.

After establishing here the base idea that if there is an objective morality, then the rational base of any objective morality would be, "There should be existence", I expand logically from there. In the second post I go through and think, "If this is a base level of goodness, what can we build from that?" I would actually love your thoughts on that there, as I am not 100% convinced I'm doing that part right and actually want some decent criticism to refine or abandon it for another approach.

In the second post I find some rules and patterns for existence as 'existences', or identified differences within the whole of everything. Are there certain interactions or setups that create more overall existences within existence than others? As a basic example, a universe with the same mass as ours that is only full of hydrogen atoms vs ours with 100+ elements.

After establishing some of those base patterns in existence, I move up to life and demonstrate these patterns repeat. Finally I get to human morality and show these patterns continue in personal and societal evaluations as well. If you're interested in exploring that, there are only a few things we need to settle here.

1. You believing in exploring a potential objective morality.
2. You believe that the argument given in this OP is rational enough to view as a starting base to continue with the next post.

And that's really it. If you're interested, read the next post and post your criticism there. As I mentioned, I do not think I 'nailed it', and I need other people to really hammer into it. So if the two above conditions have been satisfied for you, I'll take further questions and points there. If you still have questions on the first two points, then address them here.

It boils down to an initial, uncaused state of affairs. What that might be is unknown, but whatever it is, it exists for no reason. This is because to have reason would require there to be something existing ontologically prior to it, which is logically impossible. — Relativist

We're in complete agreement here.

But if what is good is feelings, then the only reason we can conclude is whatever we feel is right, and whoever has might gets to assert what they feel is right.
— Philosophim
That is categorically false. Self preservation, extended through empathy to the preservation of life in general, is the strongest mutual feeling that we have. — Relativist

You declared it to be false, but your admittance that its 'the strongest mutual feeling we have' means its true. You essentially said, "Its not only feelings, but the majority of us have a strong feeling". In other words, might makes right. As long as the majority have that feeling and can enforce that feeling, that's morality.

Indeed we have other feelings/urges that we often act on that are inconsistent with our moral feelings, but we still make moral judgements of those actions - and never claim it's OK because we "felt like it". — Relativist

Then what you're saying is morality is not based on our feelings alone. This is the problem again with subjective morality. The only answer is, "Whatever I feel, whatever I enforce." No one likes that, so there is an attempt to sneak 'other reasons' in. What are those other reasons if not feelings? In which case we have a morality that does not rely on feelings alone.

We've gone around this a few times now, and I feel this probably won't alter your point. If there's anything new to add feel free, but I think we're probably at odds for now.

You side-stepped my objection. Moral values that exist due to the blind forces of nature would be completely random. — Relativist

No, they would be consequences of that nature. Because again, the argument of, "completely random" would apply to everything even apart from morals and is a dead end.

This is the Euthyphro dilemma, but it doesn't apply to my model of intersubjective moral values. In my model, good=directed positively toward life (preserving life and helping it flourish). It's fundamental basis is a properly basic belief- one that is innate and incorrigible. — Relativist

So based on an 'arbitrary' feeling. Of course it applies to you. If everything is arbitrarily made, so are your feelings. You like preserving life only because you feel it. You can't give me an actual reason why life is positive beyond that. Its fundamental basis is purely emotional and nothing more.

Within the scope of humanity, no moral value is arbitrary because it is necessarily consistent with this this properly basic belief. — Relativist

But it is arbitrary to say the scope of humanity matters at all. That humans should exist at all. Of course I don't believe that, but we need more than feelings to explain that.

But our scope of interest is humanity: our basic moral value is an intrinsic part of being human. As a properly basic belief, a moral value is right because we all believe it to be right, and it is a belief that has no defeaters. — Relativist

Its not intrinsic, and we don't all believe it. It is no more than a feeling, and is easily defeated by any other feelings and basic logic. If I can find one person who disagree with what is moral then you, then you're wrong. I disagree, therefore you're wrong.

So my foundation of morality is epistemic. — Relativist

No its not, its a belief based on a feeling. An assertion no more foundational than belief in a God.

There are, BTW, theistic arguments that deal with the Euthyphro dilemma. You can google them if you like, but you'll find they won't fit your paradigm. You're on your own. — Relativist

That was a criticism of your point, not mine.

Our survival IS arbitrary in a cosmic sense, but it is NOT arbitrary in the only sense that's relevant to humanity. — Relativist

Only because you feel that way. I feel there is morality that is not relevant to humanity, and would exist even if we were gone. And since you believe morality is subjective based on feelings, I guess I'm right eh?

The paradigm I have presented is the OP and a note that a subjective morality does not serve any rational purpose, but is just a surface level feeling that fails upon close inspection. Feel free to go back to the OP at this point if you're interested. If not, I'm not sure there's anything more that you can add, and I'm not sure I can either.

You may be interested in reading this then. There's a summary the next post down to help. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

Basically you're noting a difference between knowledge and truth. Truth is what is. Knowledge is what we can logically ascertain that does is not contradicted by the truth.

Per general relativity, mass and energy are interchangeable. — Relativist

Correct, which is why I just used the term matter and instead of "Matter and energy". They're the same thing. Just giving a concrete to the abstract of existence as an example.

Under the right conditions, energy can be converted to matter and vice versa. Those conditions are the cause. — Relativist

What caused the energy to exist, which is matter? As you noted, all causality at the end boils down to an uncaused reason for existence.

I'll set aside the objections raised above, and just consider your sentence, ""If an objective morality exists, what must be true?" The answer depends on what objective morality IS. This was another of my questions. Is it a set of moral values (e.g. murder is wrong; altruism is good), or something else? — Relativist

That is exactly what the OP walks through and concludes. I'm not intending to be short, I just don't have a lot of time to re-summarize tonight.

Reason gets involved no matter what the basis is:moral questions can be complex, and evaluating them can be complex. — Relativist

Of course. But if what is good is feelings, then the only reason we can conclude is whatever we feel is right, and whoever has might gets to assert what they feel is right. Anything else that does not involve feelings must be dropped. My proposal lets us consider things other than feelings. Subjective moralities conclusion is ironically at odds with our feelings and practice, as well as the many other reasoned approaches we make towards morality.

You're proposing that morality exists without a God. I agree that is logically possible, but it has a fatal implication: they exist by chance, so they are arbitrary. — Relativist

Everything exists by chance. "Arbitrary" would apply to everything then and is a pointless criticism to morality in general. Of course its not arbitrary, or you would have hung up on this discussion long ago. Further, if a God formed, it too would be an arbitrary formation, and we're stuck with the same pointless argument.

that's why I inferred the presence of intersubjective moral values. They aren't arbitrary - they are consistent with survival — Relativist

Why is your survival not arbitrary? Why are your feelings not arbitrary? By reason, how is a subjective morality not arbitrary? As you can see the arbitrary argument leads nowhere.

What I am saying is that they are not in space like objects: if you cut open your arm, you will not find this feeling that is spread throughout your body. You are right that feelings can have spatial references to them, but they are not in space; for you would be able to find them in space like your neurons if that were the case. — Bob Ross

But you feel them in space. You feel them in a place. You might experience red, but that's due to the red wavelength of light being interpreted by your brain. Just because I can't open up the brain and see redness doesn't mean the objective form of redness doesn't exist through neurons. Same with feelings.

Why? What’s the argument for that? Do you think everything, or at least everything that can interact with ordinary objects, is in space and time then? What kind of metaphysics of time and space are you working with here? — Bob Ross

The definition of interaction is a touch from one thing to another. To my mind I know no other definition.

The problem I’m having is that you are not contending with the argument in the OP, but instead are asserting that non-spatiotemporal beings cannot interact with spatiotemporal ones—what’s the argument for that? — Bob Ross

Again, I don't know of any definition of interaction that is not some connection and imparting between two things. If you say the universe comes from a God, then in some way that God must have imparted upon space and time. To say it cannot have any space or time, then say it can interact with space and time, is either a contradiction, or something that has never been discovered before like a unicorn.

So this is the same as saying that if it is possible for something to be necessary, then anything is possible. — Bob Ross

No, something being necessary has to be clearly defined here. A -> B, A is necessary for B to exist. But that doesn't mean that it was necessary that A exist. Anytime you get to a point in which there is something which has no prior causation for its being, then it is outside of causality. Once you introduce the concept of something that can exist outside of causality, you introduce the fact that anything could have, or will, happen. That is because something outside of causality has no reason for its being, and no reason that it should not be either. Thus all things are equally possible.

Well, that’s a huge difference! An argument that the totality of what exists has no cause is true (trivially) because any cause—be itself caused or not—would be included in such totality; however, that the totality of caused things has no cause does not follow these lines of thinking—for an uncaused thing would be outside of that totality. — Bob Ross

No, the uncaused thing would be the limit inside of that totality.

Either way, nothing is equally probable in the sense you described; for either the ultimate cause explains itself (viz., is contingent upon itself) or there is an infinite series of sufficient explanations. — Bob Ross

There would still be the scope of, "What caused there to be an infinite series of sufficient explanations?" And this would be uncaused.

The set itself of contingent members is just a bunch of contingencies abstracted into a set: the set is not a necessary being. — Bob Ross

No, its not a necessary being, only uncaused. Feel free to look at it again with the limit being inside of the totality.

So it appears you have some sort of hypothesis that goodness is some sort of existing entity that we perceive, or perhaps that its a physical property of...something (what?) Clarify exactly what you're proposing exists, and what facts this hypothesis is supposed to explain. — Relativist

Certainly, that's the focus of the OP. I believe goodness is the physical property of continued existence. Let me see if I can explain. Its amazing that we have a reality in which there is a law which states, "Matter can neither be created or destroyed." Except that philosophically we know that one part of this is false. As you noted, logically the ultimate origin of existence must not have a prior cause. Meaning, matter was 'created', 'incepted', or whatever you want to note. Read here if you're unsure what I'm talking about. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15722/the-logic-of-a-universal-origin-and-meaning/p1

Scientifically, we also know the second part of this law is also theoretically false. The math that we understand at this point in history demonstrates that there should be a lot more matter left over after the big bang. One proposal to this is that there were nearly equal parts anti-matter which bound with the matter that existed, cancelling the matter out. By this, its been casually admitted that matter can be destroyed. But if we take the conclusions of matter formation we realize something that is logically possible. Matter does not have to form that cannot be destroyed.

Just as matter could be incepted without prior cause, it could also break down or simply cease to exist. Now it wouldn't be the same type of matter we have today, as this is the type of matter that doesn't break down, at least for this long. But what if some matter did break down? That it wasn't antimatter, just the properties of that particularly formed matter that did not continue?

If that is the case, what we have today is matter, or existence, which has as its core the resiliency to continue to exist in the face even extreme energy concentrations. Everything that exists is built out of this. This resiliency is the core of morality. The logic of the OP is to say, "If an objective morality exists, what must be true?" And what must be true if there is an objective morality is that "Existence should be."

I see no reason to believe there is an objective foundation. You haven't provided one. I await your clarifying your hypothesis, and its factual basis. — Relativist

The reason to believe there is an objective basis is the patterns I've been noting. The fact that a subjective morality based entirely on emotions breaks down to where even you admit 'reason' gets involved. In other words, there is no concrete proof that morality is only purely subjective emotions. Do I have proof of an objective morality? Absolutely not, that's never been the goal of this paper. My point here is to say, "If one exists, what must be its base?" So the question we are debating is not whether one exists, its whether you think its possible for one to exist, and if so, does the logic I've put forth put forward a reasonable base to start from.

Clarify what you mean by "existence". For example, are you referring to the fact that something exists? — Relativist

In the OP, it is a question of, "At least some existence" vs "Non-existence". That's as far as the OP starts.

Also: on what basis is this system optimized? E.g. prolonging the system's existence? Enlarging its scope (like having more children)? — Relativist

That's what I explore after establishing the base. That starts in the next post linked in the OP. Of course its moot if you don't at least agree that the OP is worth consideration.

I agree, and I tried to address this when I clarified that the fundamental basis could be as simple as: the true meanings of good/bad entailing the feelings they invoke with respect to some very simple situations: the vicarious feeling we get when considering someone suffering in some way (i.e. empathy). — Relativist

No, that's just a subjective experience. Let me use another example I gave another reader. You and I have a subjective experience of seeing red. But there is an objective wavelength of light underneath it that is what allows us to see red at all. If I'm color blind, that wavelength of red still exists. If I'm dead, that wavelength of red still exists. It is irrelevant whether there is something there to observe it or not, that wavelength of light persists. What will not exist is the subjective experience of red, but the objective reality of a red wavelength will still exist.

Feelings are simply subjective experiences of reality. My point is that we may have different subjective feelings as to what is good, but there is an objective reality to good underneath it. Just like the experience of a red wavelength is not the same as the dry analysis of what is objectively red, the experience of an objective morality is not the same as our subjective experience of it.

A computer couldn't understand it as we do, because they lack emotions. — Relativist

Correct. But if there is an objective morality, it won't need emotions. Whatever AI's subjective experience of an objective morality would be, it would still have an understanding of that underlying objective conclusion.

I also discussed the fact that we also apply learnings (what we teach your children and what our society teaches us) and reasoning when making moral judgements - so it's certainly much more than feelings. — Relativist

As I've noted before, if we supply reason beyond emotion, then we are asserting an objectivity to morality beyond feelings. If I have a son or daughter that cannot feel empathy, I can teach them how to behave in social situations regardless. But I have to give them more than, "You have to behave this way because I feel its good, or others feel its good." Why should I listen otherwise? Most other people's feelings are irrelevant to me, and in many situations, should be. If moralities base is on feelings only, then the only reason to shape or follow any moral code is feelings. That's not how societies work. That's not how people work.

You asked me to explain why I suggested it ("This in no way suggests deism or theism, and I would need to see some reasoning why you think that is"). I did just that: I showed that your unsupported assertion (that reason or whim must be involved) entails a God. I provided my analysis so you can identify a flaw in it. Instead, you're just complaining that I said it. — Relativist

I simply don't understand the point then. Emotions and reason's don't require a deity, and I still don't see why you think this does.

How can that be? How can objective morality exist without minds? — Relativist

Did the wavelength of red exist prior to human beings observing it? Yes. If there is an objective morality there is no need for beings to observe it for it to exist. This is not to be confused with labeling it, understanding it, or having the subjective experience of it. All of those require an observer. What is being observed does not depend on us.

As I've tried to explain, it appears to me that human morality is entirely a human thing: it relates to human actions, and it entails human judgement. If you think it's more than that, then explain how that can be. Explain how bank fraud or murder is wrong even if there are no humans. — Relativist

That is because you are still only thinking in terms of subjective experience instead of looking for an objective foundation. The OP only introduces the ground floor of morality which is answering the first and most basic question, "Should there be existence?" I do eventually build up to human morality and I start that in the second post linked at the end of this one. I get it, you want to dance in the human subjective experience, but to get there we have to build to it. I would try to explain more here, but that's why I wrote a few other posts. :) The point of this particular OP is, "If there is an objective morality, then its fundamental question, "Should there be existence," is "Yes". From there we can build, and I start doing so in the next post.

"Should there be any evolution at all?"
— Philosophim
Do you agree that a "should" question entails a judgement? — Relativist

No. Should entails what is optimum for a system. In this case the system is "existence".

A whim is also a product of a mind - we would not describe the random result of a quantum collapse as a "whim". So both your options entail a mind. You seemed to imply that whatever happens has been caused or influenced by reasons/whims, and this would entail one or more supernatural actors. — Relativist

Either we're really not on the same page anymore, or you're purposefully avoiding the point. Emotions are not the same as reasons. Having an emotion, "I feel good, so its moral," is not the same as, "We should do this because this outcome is better than that outcome no matter how I feel."

I am not including a God in this discussion, I have told you a God is not part of this discussion, and you keep insisting that one belongs in this discussion. I respect your beliefs, and this is not an attack on them. But for the discussion of the OP, a God is not part of the equation and does not address my points.

Non-sequitur. "Should" implies there being a reason, something other than a physical account of causation. So again, you're implying a mind. — Relativist

Except I've told you I'm looking for something apart from mind. Something core to existence itself. I don't mind if you introduce a mind or think it cannot exist without a mind, but I myself am not implying an objective morality necessitates a mind.

But independently of this. if something exists necessarily, no reason is needed to explain it other than the necessity of its existence, it can't NOT exist. — Relativist

Correct. Again, this is the conclusion of the OP. So we are in agreement here.

Why should any species continue?
— Philosophim
No, not really- there's no purpose behind evolution that is directing it (intelligent design notwithstanding - unless you believe in a god) — Relativist

I still think you're not fully understanding the question. I'm not asking, "How does evolution work." I'm not asking, "Why does evolution work?" I'm asking, "Should there be any evolution at all?" If existence has the moral objective at its base that, "Existence is good," then evolution which entails greater existence would seem to be a good thing, while evolution that entails less existence would seem to be a bad thing. For example a creature that forms that created matter, vs a creature that formed that would inevitably destroy all matter it could.

We all want to live, and most of us would like humanity to live on after our own deaths. I see no reason to think that this common desire exists independently of humans, and that's much of what I've been arguing. — Relativist

Once again, that's not the question I'm pointing out. Why is the desire to live good? Why is life good? Why is existence itself good? I'm not asking for feelings, but objective answers.

Because if there is no logic reason, there is nothing besides whim.
— Philosophim
Both "reasons" and "whims" are products of minds, so this suggests deism or theism. — Relativist

A feeling and a reason are two different products of the mind. A feeling is an impetus or summary that compels a person to action. A reason is the result of an analyzed situation that one can decide to act on.
This in no way suggests deism or theism, and I would need to see some reasoning why you think that is.

Then you should agree your question, "Should there be existence?" is inapplicable, and certainly has nothing to do with morality. — Relativist

No, then you should agree with my conclusion that "There should be existence" is the logically necessary base of an objective morality. You'll need to give greater detail why this isn't the case.

The behavior (having the feeling that induces the actions) has a survival value for the species, so that could account for its presence — Relativist

Right, the underlying value for having that feeling is the species survival. But should the species survive? If there was a cat that was born with the compulsion to kill all other baby cats, should that cat exist over a cat that has a compulsion to nurture newborns? This is a question that asks a rational response, and not an emotional answer.

Other species evolve differently; example: some produce so many offspring that there's high probability some will survive to reproduce. — Relativist

Right, the particulars may change, but isn't the underlying objective purpose to ensure the species continues? Why should any species continue?

I'm not suggesting that feelings fully account for all morality, just that they are at the core. From there, we then think abstractly, apply reasoning, and we learn things (including the morality further developed by others). — Relativist

The feelings of morality are how we first subjectively experience morality. Just like the pleasant warmth of a sunbeam is how we experience the confirmation of objective health of vitamin D and temperature. The benefits to a sunbeam would be no matter how you felt about it however. As soon as you bring reason and learning into the mixture, you're talking about objectivity. And that's what I'm trying to pin down in the OP. The beginnings of any rational discussion of morality must conclude that given the options of existence vs complete non-existence, existence is better, and therefore the base of any good reason.

Why must there be reasons? — Relativist

Because if there is no logic reason, there is nothing besides whim.

Your question can only be meaningful if existence itself is contingent. I don't think it can be contingent, because contingency entails a source of contingency. That source of contingency would have to exist. If that is contingent, it needs a source...ad infinitum - a vicious infinite regress. Therefore existence is metaphysically necessary. — Relativist

That is, (minus the infinite regress) essentially what the OP proves. Therefore we may be in agreement conceptually, just not semantically.

There are reports of mother cats entering burning buildings to rescue their kittens, getting themselves hurt in the process. I suggest it "feels right" to them to do so. — Relativist

Of course, but that doesn't mean there is an objective underlying reason why that feeling exists. We get hungry because we need to eat to survive. But if we only followed our feelings of hunger, we would eat ourselves to obesity or think, "That antifreeze tastes pretty good." Feelings are subjective digests, deeper thought and understanding is objective details. The idea that feelings alone are all we have to go on in morals and there can be no objective details does not pan out in any other feelings we have, why in your mind are moral feelings an exception?

What feels right instinctually IS right and good. — Relativist

No one objectively agrees to that. There are plenty of times that good feelings lead to bad outcomes. To be extreme, the joy of murder for some people. If you've ever helped raise a kid, sometime they think things are fun that shouldn't be done. I took my young nephew outdoors years ago and we found some pill bugs. He delightfully started harrasing and stomping on them. I had to teach him that we don't kill or bother creatures unless its necessary. He didn't have an innate instinct that killing innocent bugs for fun was wrong. His feelings lead him to do wrong, but a lesson fixed the issue.

You minimize the "feeling like it". It's a strong feeling. We don't want others to commit suicide because we fear death for ourselves, and we empathetically extend this to others. — Relativist

I do minimize the feeling of it. Whether its a strong or weak feeling, its still just a feeling and not anything reasoned through. We don't feel through engineering. We don't merely feel disgust at our significant other in the morning because their breath smells and divorce them. We don't cheat on our significant other because it would feel good. There are countless examples of good feelings that you can think of practically in your own life that compel you to do things that you know you shouldn't do. We shouldn't even be entertaining the notion that, "Whatever I feel is good, is good."

As for suicide, many years ago when I was younger that was an appealing option. I was not afraid. Fortunately, I thought about the consequences of it and decided it was wrong despite its allure. As for dogs, its best we don't attribute what they feel when we could never know ourselves.

I get the strong feeling that you want there to be meaning to existence - perhaps you actually need it to be the case. — Relativist

Another example of feelings being wrong. I find meaning in my own existence for myself. I do not need a God or something else to give me meaning in life. What I want to have is a rational standard of right and wrong that can help me approach choices in life that result in better outcomes for myself and everything else. I would be a fool to think my own emotional whims are the answer.