I have no expertise in this subject. — Tom Storm

C'mon. What expertise is needed? Either you see a reason or you don't. What I'm asking you is that if I persuade you to accept something - not even the argument at hand, but anything - has anything physical passed between us?

We have no knowledge or experience of any immaterial entity or process. — Fooloso4

My claim is that the perceived dichotomy between material and immaterial is a consequence of Cartesian dualism. Recall that Descartes posited mind as 'res cogitans', literally a 'thinking thing'. This leads to the problem of how the thinking substance interacts with 'material substance' and the so called 'ghost in the machine' argument. It is foundational to the modern mind-matter conceptual division, based on the premisses that physical sciences must provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time and specified in terms of the primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were relegated to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world. This is the basis of the modern 'mind-matter problem', and what the argument from reason is aimed at. And within that paradigm, there are no immaterial entities as a matter of definition. That's why I said that whatever we try and conceive of as an immaterial entity will miss the mark , as it will invariably interpreted in those terms, which I'm sure you're doing.

But the question was actually this:

This is because it is my dogmatic belief that matter does not act, but is only acted upon.
— Wayfarer
If "matter does not act", then "matter" "is only acted upon" by what? — 180 Proof

In order to try and illustrate the alternative way of approaching it, I provided text of a couple of readings, apparently too long. So to try and paraphrase what I think the first reference is getting at: the non-material or non-physical factor involved is life itself. Living beings, even the very simplest beings, display attributes and characteristics that actually can't be accomodated in the mind-body duality that is embedded in the modern worldview. Steve Talbott's biological philosophy is that organisms are expressions of meaning. They're not mechanisms to which we have to attribute a spooky 'elan vital' to account for the uncanny abilities which life manifests. As soon as life begins to manifest, then we have the emergence of an order which can't be reduced to, or explained in terms of, only physical processes; organisms have their own reasons for acting as they do. At the very beginning there is the appearance of the 'epistemic split' of self-other, the beginning of cellular memory and genetic inheritance, and a very primitive form of subject-hood. So the subject, the mind, is not the accidental by-product of a material process, but way in which agency appears in the earliest forms of life. And, to appeal to Indian philosophy, tat tvam asi, 'thou art that'.

And in a broader sense, many of our intellectual processes rely on immaterial entities, such as numbers, ratios, laws, and so on. Humans are situated between two worlds, so to speak - the physical world, governed by the laws of physics, but also the world of ideas and reasons, 'the space of reasons' as it has been called. That is the argument of the second book, Rational Causation by Eric Marcus. I don't know if that book talks about the argument from reason as such (haven't had the chance to read it yet) but it seems to operate from similar premisses.

So by 'immaterial' I don't mean spooky ghosts in machines, or some 'ethereal realm of ideal forms'. But as soon as physicalism is questioned, that is what comes to mind, isn't it?

The arguments in Aristotle do not follow this line of reasoning. The "identity" with the object is not a simple correspondence of "forms". — Paine

Sure, you might be right. But in context, Gerson's point was this: 'when you think you see—
mentally see—a form which could not in principle be identical with a particular, including a
particular neurological element, a circuit or a state of a circuit or a synapse, and so on. This is so
because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally. For example,
when you think ‘equals taken from equals are equal’ this is a perfectly universal truth which you
see when you think it. But this truth, since it is universal could not be identical with any
particular, any material particular located in space and time.' Which makes perfect sense to me.

Let's say that reason can not be explained by naturalism.

What follows from this, for you? — Tom Storm

The crux of this whole thread was an un-answered question:

I can see you have not been persuaded by the argument thus far and probably won’t be, until you can see a reason why you should accept. At that point, you might typically say 'I see'. So - what is it that you see? (Or in the other case, what is it you’re not seeing?) Whatever it is (or isn’t) it won’t be seen as a consequence of anything physical that has passed between us.

What do you make of that?

I haven't read through the Tractacus, but what you said reminded me of the Zen saying, "Before one studies Zen, mountains are mountains and waters are waters; After one gains insight through the teachings of a master, mountains are no longer mountains and waters are no longer waters; After enlightenment, mountains are once again mountains and waters are waters." — wonderer1

How do you interpret that? How does it bear on the topic?

In respect of the general question, one way of thinking about it is that the search for general laws brings a simplicity to complex phenomena. For example Newton's laws sum up in a few lines the rules which govern the behaviour of matter across an enormous range. Einstein's theories can be written on an A4 page (or so I believe). But their manifestations can form unfathomable complexities.

I listened to a talk by a physicist the other day. He pointed out that the concept of gravity is simple. But if you balance, say, a pencil on its point, it is impossible, to all intents, to predict how it will fall. He used that as an illustration of how simplicity can give rise to complexity.

Overall, in traditional philosophy, I think 'the simple' was felt to be somehow prior to or superior to 'the complex' because of the tendency of complex things to break down. The source or origin of things - not God, in Greek philosophy, but the One - was completely simple, and so not prone to change. But then, the world, as they obviously recognised, was exceedingly complex. So how the simple One became the complicated Many was one of the major preoccupations of Greek philosophy. Intererestingly, atomism was a proposed solution to that problem, as the atom was essentially simple in that it was not composed of parts and was eternal, but in combination with other atoms, could give rise to an infinite number of variations. That was the genius of Democritus and Leucippus (eloquently stated in the classic text, De Rerum Natura, by the Roman poet Lucretius, still a staple of university curricula worldwide).

Shall I paraphrase?

I'm sure that whatever way we try and conceive of as 'an immaterial entity or process' will miss the mark. It requires, as one of the earlier contributors to this thread was wont to say, 'a paradigm shift'. Explaining all of the implications of that would take a lot of time. But one of the essays I've mentioned makes this point in respect to the differentiation between organisms and the inorganic domain. The context is that the author is arguing that an appeal to something other than physicalism doesn't necessarily imply an acceptance of some spooky 'elan vital'. He wishes to abide within the constraints of naturalism, whilst questioning mechanistic materialism. He writes:

The scientist observes meanings at play in organisms, and appeals to them in biological explanation. Anyone who construes this appeal as conjuring unacceptable vital forces needs not only to torch almost the entire biological literature, reconstructing it upon some new and as yet unknown basis; he also puts himself in an untenable position regarding the human being. For at least some of what we do, we do because we consciously think and intend it. If invoking this because of reason — this play of meaning and idea — in the explanation of human behavior is to rely on vital forces, then virtually everyone (in daily life, if not within their cocoon of theory) is a vitalist. If, on the other hand, we grant meaning to the human being without trying to make this meaning an expression of vital forces, then we can hardly voice the charge of “vitalism” when we observe meaningful activity in less conscious forms — for example, in the activity of cells and lower organisms.

So, no, we don’t need vital forces. If the organism as an expression of meaning requires us to recognize a different sort of order from that of inanimate nature, science offers no presumption against this. Our knowledge of some thought-relations in the world — for example, those of mathematized physical law — does not tell us what other thought-relations we might discover in various domains. The mathematical order, however, does tell us that there must be other principles of order. For mathematics alone doesn’t give us any things or phenomena at all; numbers are not things. Whatever the things may be to which our mathematical formulations refer, they either have a qualitative character that we can consciously apprehend in a conceptually ordered way, or they must remain unknown and outside our science. And that qualitative conceptual ordering cannot be predicted from the mathematics. Rather, the qualitative order is the fuller reality that determines whatever we abstract from it, including mathematical relationships. — From Physical Causes to Organisms of Meaning, Steve Talbott

There's another book that was mentioned by @Pierre-Normand a while back, Rational Causation, by Eric Marcus. I think it is compatible with this general line of reasoning. The abstract says:

We explain what people think and do by citing their reasons, but how do such explanations work, and what do they tell us about the nature of reality? Contemporary efforts to address these questions are often motivated by the worry that our ordinary conception of rationality contains a kernel of supernaturalism—a ghostly presence that meditates on sensory messages and orchestrates behavior on the basis of its ethereal calculations. In shunning this otherworldly conception, contemporary philosophers have focused on the project of “naturalizing” the mind, viewing it as a kind of machine that converts sensory input and bodily impulse into thought and action. Eric Marcus rejects this choice between physicalism and supernaturalism as false and defends a third way.

He argues that philosophers have failed to take seriously the idea that rational explanations postulate a distinctive sort of causation—rational causation. Rational explanations do not reveal the same sorts of causal connections that explanations in the natural sciences do. Rather, rational causation draws on the theoretical and practical inferential abilities of human beings. Marcus defends this position against a wide array of physicalist arguments that have captivated philosophers of mind for decades. Along the way he provides novel views on, for example, the difference between rational and nonrational animals and the distinction between states and events.

Bolds added. This is where the argument appears to converge with the argument from reason, although I haven't laid hands on the book yet.

If "matter does not act", then "matter" "is only acted upon" by what — 180 Proof

Say if I suggested 'mind' or 'consciousness' as a hypothetical answer - how could you go about defining that in objective terms? You can't ever cognise mind as an object - it doesn't appear to us, it appears as us.

I would like you to explain what you mean by ‘true belief’ if you have the time. I have a feeling you do not wish to dive into any epistemic issues here but given that what I said makes no sense to you there must be something I failed to take into account?

My general point is that rationality is applied to experience. I felt like there was an error with mixing abstract and real. — I like sushi

The term 'scare quotes' is used to refer to the use of quotes to indicate that a word is being used in an ironic, referential, or otherwise non-standard sense.

In respect of 'mixing abstract and real', I can see what you mean but the type of argument that it is does not appeal to empirical validation.

"How long would it take monkeys to compose the complete works of Shakespeare?" is about 300,000 years. That experiment has already been run. — Srap Tasmaner

Really? They must have started a long while ago!

Question: how important to the argument from reason is your unusual interpretation of human evolution? — Srap Tasmaner

My view is that whilst h. sapiens evolved in line with the understanding of evolutionary biology (subject as it is to frequent revision) that the faculty of reason, and other specifically human attributes and powers, can't necessarily be accounted for in Darwinian terms. With simpler life-forms, the issue is not applicable, as they are occupied wholly and solely with survival and procreation. Only when species evolved to the level of h. sapiens, did living beings who possess the kind of rational self-awareness to question the nature of reality and existence appear. With that ability comes existential dread and much else besides. I feel one of the unfortunate consequences of popular Darwinism is that it has lost sight of this. It doesn't really do anything to address the human condition on the philosophical level. Evolutionary materialism, such as Dennett/Dawkins, amply reinforce that impression by being so utterly, philosophically tone-deaf. (Not nearly so much the continental philosophers.)

Fair point. A lot of Wallace' Victorian prose is pretty hideous in today's terms, specifically all the references to 'savages', but I still think the argument that such faculties as mathematical and artistic abilities can't be accounted for in terms of the theory is sound. And also the fact that the guy credited as co-discoverer of natural selection had such divergent views on those matters to Darwin.

Looks a cool book. Some of those Big History types talk about those kinds of topics (Brian Swimme comes to mind. Oh, and I thought you said 'someone needs medication' but then I read it again. :joke:

I'm not seeing why acquiring the capacity for reason should not be thought of as a result of evolutionary biology, driven by adaptation. — Janus

Because there's nothing in the theory that addresses it specifically. The theory is about the factors that contribute to the survival and evolution of species. It's a biological theory, but the view that it accounts for everything about human nature and the human condition is biological reductionism (whereas I would say that we're 'underdetermined' by biological factors). Historically, because evolutionary biology stepped into the vacuum left by the abandonment of religion, then such capabilities as the faculty of reason are simply assumed to be explained by that theory. But Alfred Russel Wallace, for one, never accepted it - see his essay Darwinism Applied to Man

I should add, the expression 'neo-Darwinian materialism' which I already mentioned, describes the view that living things are material in nature, that were formed by some as-yet-to-be-understood process designated 'abiogenesis', allowing the 'Darwinian algorithm' (Dennett's phrase) to take off, giving rise to ever-more complex life-forms over hundreds of millions of years. This is the sense in which neo-Darwinianism is materialist. Whereas the kind of dualist philosophy that I'm tentatively exploring, sees the earliest life as the manifestation of intentionality, not necessarily as a consequence of theistic creation (although that might be thought of as a metaphorical account), but as an expression of a latent attribute of the Cosmos being made manifest through the process of evolution. In other words, that conscious beings manifest through the processes of evolution. This leaves space for consciousness to be understood as having a formative role, rather than as an accidental byproduct of a fortuitous process (Bertrand Russell's 'accidental collocation of atoms'.)

it doesn't follow that there can be no physical, neurological or evolutionary explanations for the fact that humans are capable of rational thought. — Janus

You're quite right. Please note the terms of reference provided in the original post. It is quite specific about the type of physicalism the argument has in its sights. The fact that naturalism has changed signficantly in the last 60 odd years in regard to physicalism (for example, with the introduction of biosemiotics) might be due to the growing realisation of the inadequacy of physicalism, although the original physicalism is still defended by the philosophers that I have mentioned in this thread (such as Daniel Dennett).

As I've said many times, I do not doubt that fact of evolution, but the way I put it is that h. sapiens has developed the capacity for reason. I still say it's a mistake to say conceive of reason as result of evolutionary biology, because it reduces reason to mere adaptation (the argument at the basis of Nagel's Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion* and also Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism.)

*From which: 'I suspect that there is a deep-seated aversion in the modern “disenchanted” Weltanschauung to any ultimate principles that are not dead--that is, devoid of any reference to the possibility of life or consciousness.'

The other point of inconsistency in your position seems to be that you think rational persuasion is a matter of free will; but how could it be if rational persuasion is as strict as valid logical deduction is? — Janus

As you point out, logic itself is not necessarily descriptive of the world of experience - something can be logically true but physically impossible, and things happen which defy logic. The argument from reason is not presenting reason as a panacea or magic bullet, but as an indispensable faculty which can't be explained in physicalist terms (among other things.

what explains the fact that there is so much disagreement among them? — Janus

It's the old Indian elephant parable; that we've only ever got a grasp of some aspect of the elephant, its tail or its ear or tusk and we form conclusions on that basis. Reality, or rather, Being, is infinitely vast, and coming to an understanding exceedingly difficult.

I'm not even sure I've posted a criticism of the argument so much as I've tried and failed to understand it. — Srap Tasmaner

That's what it seems to me, but I appreciate the fact that you directly addressed it, rather than changing the subject or digressing.

If it was all just pure sovereign reason, then why would everyone who can think rationally not agree about everything? — Janus

That's subjectivism and relativism. It's obvious that, for example, in the American political scene, there is a huge polarization, but it's no coincidence that a large part of the cause of this is a leading political figure who quite openly tells enormous lies which large numbers of the electorate are willing to swallow. Surely a political scientist or pollster can come up with reasons why they do that, but it doesn't change the fact that they're believing lies, and that they are lies, regardless of anyone's opinion.

I have read that Penrose is saying these anomalies might support his 'CCC' cosmology, which is the idea that the Universe goes through an endless cycle of expansion and contraction (suggestive of Hindu cosmology). He details the theory in one of his books although I find Penrose's books to mathematically abstruse to understand.

Nonreductive materialism is popular among philosophers. — Jamal

And I would guess that this is because it purportedly gets them off the hook from having to defend the ridiculous implications of reductive materialism, whilst not giving ground to anything that sounds like dualism or idealism. In which context, 'supervenience' serves as a kind of convenient gap-filler.

//furthermore, the OP stipulates that the argument from reason is directed at reductive materialism. It is arguable that the reason for the development of such views as 'non-reductive materialism' was just because of such challenges as the argument from reason.//

our everyday vocabulary around thinking, perceiving, imagining, remembering, and so on, not only presupposes objects for these activities but folds them into terms that are in some ways holistic. — Srap Tasmaner

That would be the subjective unity of perception - which is another thing that is not explainable in physicalistic terms, as the linked article explains.

That you will defend it with reason is irrelevant (although you haven’t actually defended it yet). — Jamal

I believe I have successfully defended it in numerous places in this dialogue, and I don’t think Srap’s criticisms come to terms with the argument. Say if I do persuade you to believe any proposition whatever - not necessarily this one - where you agree that you 'see the point' of the argument - how can that be understood in any terms other than rational persuasion? What is it that you see, when you see the point? What about that kind of transaction can be described in physical terms? I think that's a very direct question, which prompted nothing more than circumlocution.

This is because it is my dogmatic belief that matter does not act, but is only acted upon.

Imagine the lucky guy who gets to execute the warrant.

Gee I bet the CIA and State Dept are breaking out popcorn.

I can see you have not been persuaded by the argument thus far and probably won’t be, until you can see a reason why you should accept. At that point, you might typically say I see. So - what is it that you see? (Or in the other case, what is it you’re not seeing?) Whatever it is (or isn’t) it won’t be seen as a consequence of anything physical that has passed between us.

What category do you think the idea your OP consists in is based on? — Janus

Philosophy, I would hope. I think the lineage of the argument can plausibly be traced back to the Phaedo.

How will you persuade me? — Srap Tasmaner

By giving reasons, yes? As distinct from twisting your arm, or threatening you in some other way.

It's okay if you don't get it. — wonderer1

You haven't provided anything to 'get' save reference to a youtube video and various links.

If you're suggesting a superior paradigm, as distinct from an area of study, then go ahead and do that. So far I see nothing of the kind, beyond vague inferences.

It refers to having an attitude of openness, eagerness, and lack of preconceptions when studying

Something which you've in no way demonstrated. Start an OP on whatever it is you're trying to say, rather than constantly de-railing.

Many people dislike science because it is seen to be delivering a picture of humans as exhaustively material beings. — Janus

No, that's scientific materialism. It is not the same thing. It mainly comes from the attempt to apply scientific methodology to philosophical problems, as a few here are doing.

we think of logic as normative, within limits; if P entails Q, and you believe P, then you ought to believe Q. Do people always do what they ought? — Srap Tasmaner

Of course not, but you've already made that point, and I've said that it's not really relevant to the argument at hand.

I want to double back to this early comment to bring out this point.

This [i.e. the OP] appears to be begging the question, by presuming that the exercise of reason is something different than information processing occurring in our brains.

Smuggling in a dualism which isn't part of the materialist view doesn't do anything to contradict a materialist view. — wonderer1

The argument from reason doesn't rely on 'smuggling in' a dualism - it is an explicit appeal to dualism to highlight a fundamental weakness in the type of reducionist physicalism that is being criticized. It is not 'begging the question' but presenting an argument to that effect, which propenents of physicalism are then required to answer.

Naturalism being true only requires beliefs being *caused*, by what at the lowest level are non-rational causes. — wonderer1

Which is exactly what the argument from reason is criticising.

Diverting the thread to AI research and neural networks as a kind of 'general argument for physicalism' is just changing the subject.

Thanks, Javra, I'll mull that over, although I think it's rather more metaphysical than the argument itself warrants. But may come back with some more responses.

Aristotle regards living beings as self-sustaining functioning wholes. The four causes are inherent in a being being the kind of being it is, not something imposed on or interfering with it from the outside. Human beings are by their nature thinking beings. This is not an explanation, but a given. It has nothing to do with Gerson's "form 'thought'". Nothing to do with a transcendent realm accessible to the wise. — Fooloso4

Are the following not characteristic of Aristotle, then?

if happiness [εὐδαιμονία/eudomonia] consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then this be the Intellect [νοῦς/nous], or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and it has been stated already* that this activity is the activity of contemplation [θεωρητική/theoria]. — Nichomachean Ethics, Book X, 1177a11

*In 6.7.2-3 Aristotle says that

Wisdom [σοφία] is the most perfect mode of knowledge. A wise person must have a true conception of unproven first principles and also know the conclusions that follow from them. 'Hence Wisdom must be a combination of Intelligence [Intellect; νοῦς] and Scientific Knowledge [ἐπιστήμη]: it must be a consummated knowledge of the most exalted objects.' Contemplation is that activity in which one's νοῦς intuits and delights in first principles."

Surely this does at least suggest 'a transcendent realm accessible to the wise'?

One proposition can entail another; one belief state cannot, in this same sense, entail another. — Srap Tasmaner

Sure it can. If I believe that P, and this entails that I believe that Q, then that is entailment. You're splitting hairs.

At least now he can stick to his knitting.

That's a theory similar to J S Mill's. To which the Kantian rejoinder is, that it would be impossible to arrive at 'synthetic generalisations from experience' without the faculty of reason and the innate categories of the understanding which can contrast like and unlike within a context and against a background. But if you want to launch into explaining the foundations of logic, then go right ahead, but it would seem to me it's going to involve a lot of writing.

I don't have to reduce logic to psychology to point out that logic describes some relations between propositions and no relations among an epistemic agent's belief states. — Srap Tasmaner

However, if I adopt a view on account of logic, then that informs my 'belief states', I am willing to accept it, and act on it.

you need an actual argument showing that if brain state A, with contents P — Srap Tasmaner

How could you specify 'content' in this sense? How would you ascertain what the 'brain state' is for some ostensible content? Could 'believing that p'be described in terms of the state of billions of neurons at a given instant in time? I don't think it could, as the brain, being a dynamic neural network, is constantly changing. The element of constancy amongst that flux is syntactic and semantic - not physiological.

The target of the argument is re-iterated in this post, the passage commencing 'The materialist worldview presumes a mechanistic base level. This doesn't mean necessarily deterministic - there can be chance at the basic level of reality in a mechanistic worldview (e.g. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and the 'quantum leap'.) However at the level of basic physics, nature is free of purpose, free of meaning or intentionality, free of normativity, and absent of any and all forms of subjectivity. If one is operating within a materialistic framework, then one cannot attribute purpose to what happens at the basic level."

Logic is not the natural science of thought. That's psychology. — Srap Tasmaner

Isn't that psychologism? The philosophical position that asserts that all meaningful statements or concepts can ultimately be reduced to psychological terms or explained in psychological language. It suggests that the study of psychology is foundational and can provide a comprehensive understanding of all aspects of human experience, including areas traditionally studied by other disciplines such as logic, mathematics, or philosophy.

Psychologism was particularly influential in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, primarily associated with figures like Wilhelm Wundt, Edward Titchener, and Oswald Külpe. They sought to establish psychology as a fundamental science that could explain all aspects of human cognition and behavior, including areas previously considered the domain of philosophy, such as logic and ethics. Frege criticized Husserl's philosophy of maths on the grounds of psychologism.

But critics argue that psychologism commits the "psychological fallacy" by conflating psychological descriptions or explanations with logical or conceptual analysis. They claim that not all meaningful concepts or statements can be reduced to psychological terms, and that the proper understanding of logic, mathematics, and philosophy couldn't be reduced to psychological terminology. Accordingly, sychologism was largely rejected as a philosophical position in the early 20th century.

Some notes on 'transcendental arguments': 'What is typical of transcendental arguments proper is that they purport to establish the conditions necessary for experience, or experience of a certain kind, as a whole; and, at their most controversial, to establish a conclusion about the nature and existence of the external world, or other minds, as these – and particularly the world’s existence – can be derived in consequence of paying attention to what has to be the case for there to be experience, or in order for experience to be as it is.” (A. C. Grayling, The Refutation of Skepticism, pg. 83). So the strategy of transcendental arguments is that they start with a given - some incontrovertible fact of experience - and seek to answer the question: “what must be true given this experience.”

Descartes' cogito ergo sum argument is one example. There are others in The Critique of Pure Reason.

Not 'taking for granted': presenting an argument for it, which I don't believe you've addressed - or at least, until this post.

That kind of purely formal logical deduction has little to do with actual human life and reasoning. — Janus

It is the subject of the OP, and the basis for an argument.

Well, hopefully, that is what the overall aim of philosophy is for anyone engaged in it.

An aspect of my communication strategy, in venues like TPF, is an attempt to lay some subconscious groundwork in people's minds that might allow them to make a paradigm shift — wonderer1

From what, to what?

As Leibniz would say, they will "never find anything to explain a thought". And think that "perception" that Leibniz talks about is much more concrete and near to physicality that thinking. — Alkis Piskas

:up: Leibniz is frequently cited as one of the predecessors to David Chalmer's 'Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness'

it seems that if it is not possible to rationally believe something contrary to what I genuinely find, whether rationally or not, convincing (which itself is a function of how I am constituted emotionally and intellectually, which in turn does not seem to be something I can actually determine "causa sui"), and it follows then that my belief would not be rationally driven at all, but emotionally driven. — Janus

All of which is quite irrelevant if you were doing an actual exercise in logic. But rationally-inferred propositions aren't a matter of belief at all - the hackneyed example I gave of 'if X>Y and A>X then X>Y' is not dependent on belief nor a matter of belief or sentiment.

This "rational necessity" you're talking about, I don't know what that is. We sometimes speak of "logical necessity" but most such talk is pretty loose; if you really need such a thing, it's just a necessity relation that doesn't include any facts or history or natural laws and so on. A "bare necessity", as it were. It just means logic and logic alone, and only applies to what logic applies to. — Srap Tasmaner

Again, how is a logical syllogism 'pretty loose'? Logic is quite precise. I don't think that the argument from reason is setting out to prove that reason is infallible or all-knowing - simply that it comprises the relationships of ideas, and so that can't be reduced to, or explained in terms of, the physical cause-and-effect relationships that are grist to the naturalist mill.

The much-vaunted (around here) failure of neuroscience neglects two facts: (1) neuroscience is still in its infancy, maybe adolescence; (2) it has been having truly astonishing and accelerating success. — Srap Tasmaner

I have relatives who owe their lives to neuroscience, and I would never disparage it. But I'm not sure how much of philosophy is indebted to it. It seems to me that many of the appeals to neuroscience are pretty close to scientism. There's a well-known book I learned about on this forum, The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Hacker and Bennett, which I'll probably never get around to reading in full, although this review gives a good précis. It is by a neuroscientist (Bennett) and philosopher (Hacker) and gives pretty short shrift to neuro-reductionism - which is not to disparage neuroscience in the least.

Considerably more smoke than light in most of the above.

There's a very well-worn saying in America, 'why does the Devil have all the best tunes?' The answer is 1, because rock and roll has a beat - we know what that signifies, don't we :brow: - and 2 because it has ambiguous harmonic values, the 'blue notes' and chordal dissonances which 'proper' music would never consider (listen to Purple Haze!)

Is that a fair account of the argument from reason as you understand it? — Srap Tasmaner

I think so, overall. I'm not entirely persuaded by your meta-analysis here:

Grandpa is sick is not caused by my beliefs (a) and (b); it is a free choice (or act?) of mine to believe that (c) on account of (a) and (b). (a) and (b) together entail (c), and I choose to align my beliefs with what is logical, and so hold (c). Nothing forces me to believe (c), and I could (perversely) do otherwise if I choose. As a matter of logic, (c) flows automatically from (a) and (b), but my holding (c) does not flow automatically from my holding (a) and (b). — Srap Tasmaner

It is, of course, true that you're not compelled to believe 'c' by anything other than reason. You could act against your better judgement, you could draw different conclusions ('old bugger is probably hung over') or you could go upstairs and knock on the door (the empiricist approach). But that is not really the point, which is to differentiate the kind of causation involved in physical cause-and-effect, on the one side, and rational necessity - believing something due to reasons - on the other. As I think you already noted earlier the thread - a distinction is being drawn between two types of 'because'.

But overall, I think it's a fair description.

Do you agree with that statement? — wonderer1

Yes. Note 'used by a speaker'. They are on that sense imbued with intentionality, namely, that of the speaker, to convey or represent something.

The reason I asked was to get you thinking about the question. I think that you do interpret the output of ChatGPT as being about something, after all, you've said that you have been making use of it a lot lately. Why would you do that, if you didn't think that the output is about something? — wonderer1

As you know, ChatGPT is a human invention, and trained in large language models to anticipate responses to questions. So of course the answer will be about something, and will represent something. But then, it has been designed to do that, it is a human artefact, after all, which we use for our purposes. Humans engineered the system and then interpret the output. In that respect, it emulates elements of intentionality, but as I already noted, ChatGPT itself says 'AI systems, including ChatGPT, do not possess intentionality in the same way that humans do. Intentionality is typically associated with consciousness and subjective experience, which are currently not attributes of AI systems.'

So all due respect, I think you're missing the philosophical point at issue, which has to do with the nature of reason. So then you try to re-frame the debate, not in the terms in which it was given, but in terms which suit your argument. It's very like the old anecdote of the fellow looking under the lampost for his keys, knowing they've actually been lost elsewhere, 'because the light's better here'. :wink:

I re-iterated in this thread the elements of the materialist/naturalist view that Victor Reppert claims that the argument from reason is opposing. If you think that depiction of materialist philosophy is wrong, or if you think that they're about right, but the argument from reason fails to address them, then that kind of analysis is what is appropriate (pretty much as Srap Tasmaner does.)

You are interested in Buddhism, right? Are you familiar with the Zen notion of beginners mind? — wonderer1

Owned the first edition. Nothing whatever to do with the point at issue.

Yes, I know it would take a paradigm shift for you to get it. — wonderer1

Much simpler than that - the source you provided doesn’t support your meaning of the term ‘intentionality’.

Life is short, 180.