This is a good point, but the problems still exist even if you reframe the debate, as you mentioned in parentheses. It doesn't make the fundamental issues with perception, consciousness and language go away. — Marchesk

Sometimes. But in many cases, it simply causes the question or the problem to disappear. Why? Well take consciousness -- the "hard problem." What's the problem, exactly? Someone has to tell us what "consciousness" is. Likewise with "God's existence." Why is that not a "hard problem"? It certainly was for centuries, but that essentially drifted away.

I think the same is true of the mind/body problem, which serves as the underlying assumption to all "problems" and investigations into perception, language, etc.

No, phusis was not the Greek term for being. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it is. Ousia as well, later on. The evidence doesn't support you on this. I'll stick with Heidegger's extensive scholarship over yours, unless you have something more to contribute other than a simple declaration.

So if Heidegger introduced a concept of Being which is supposed to be equivalent with the Greek concept of phusis, then this Heideggerian concept of Being is not the same as the Greek concept of being. — Metaphysician Undercover

Heidegger didn't introduce anything of the kind, as I've already made clear. What he does do, knowing Greek, is analyze the texts thoroughly, giving convincing evidence.

All you've done, on the other hand, is repeat a dichotomy which he repeatedly says is a mistake and due to poor translation over many centuries. I've given you the sources, quoted extensively, and offered to go into the weeds if necessary; you don't seem particularly interested in that. That's fine. I take partial blame for not being clearer, and appreciate your time.
__________
For the rest of us, let's get back on track:

Phusis is the Greek understanding of being as emerging, abiding sway. Being and becoming, and "being and seeming" come out of this originary sense. Later, "being and thinking."

The basic feature throughout Western thought which has dominated all thinking since the inception has been presence. From this soil we get the changeless Forms, substances, matter, existentia and essence, subjects and objects, God and creation, "nature," physics, metaphysics, etc. All presuppose presence.

Our modern age is a secular and scientific age. We go to scientists for the "truth" now, using their stories rather than myths and legends. But this understanding of being as "nature" or as "subjects and objects," has led both to a peculiar view of what it is to be human and, ultimately, to nihilism.

I'll fill this out more in a future post, with references.

"Phusis" does not mean the same as "being". You're wrong to equate these two. They are completely distinct. So if that is your "entire point", it's wrong. Your quoted passage says that "Being" (it's capitalized, so this is the third sense, the Heideggerian sense) is equivalent to the ancient Greek "phusis". But this sense is not "being" in the ancient Greek sense of "being", it's a new sense created by Heidegger, signified by the capitalization. — Metaphysician Undercover

Phusis was the Greek term for being, yes. This is exactly what Heidegger says, and he's correct. You're hung up on the capitilization, but that's irrelevant. It doesn't signify anything. I only used it, mistakingly, for clarity. It's not a special "Heideggerian" sense at all. Being is often capitalized in translations, yes...but EVERY noun in German is capitalized. There's no reason to capitalize it, and in many translations they don't. So you're simply wrong about that.

As for whether Heidegger is correct in claiming phusis is the Greek understanding of being - well, that's the topic- one may find convincing or not. It convinces me.

I wanted to know in what sense you were talking about "being". Are you discussing what things have in common, "being", existence, like when we say that a thing "is", instead of a fictional thing which is not? In this case "being" is a verb, what a thing is doing, — Metaphysician Undercover

Saying it's a "verb" isn't quite accurate either, but yes I mean it in the former sense of "is-ness" you mentioned.

You seemed to be switching back and forth between the two — Metaphysician Undercover

Not really, although being can only really be discussed through beings. If you take away all beings, it's not that there is left over "being" as a void of some kind.

Regardless, using your terms of verb vs noun, I've been clear about the distinction between being and beings. Again, this is the ontological distinction.

Instead of giving me a clear answer, you've introduced a third sense of being, a capitalized "Being", which appears specific to Heidegger, but you want to assign it to ancient Greece. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no third term. I mentioned that i capitalized it for clarity only, so you wouldn't take it to mean "permanence" and so not to confuse you. I may have failed but that was the only reason - no third term.

It is not the verb I described above, because you say it is not a property of things, the activity which is proper to things as "being". — Metaphysician Undercover

You're the one defining being as a verb. I never said that. Being is that on the basis of which beings "are" at all. It's not an easy concept to define. Maybe "existence" is better, but even that doesn't quite capture it because of historical connotations.

Instead, you assign to it the mystical description of "emergence", or "emerging sway". The problem though, as I explained to you already, is that these concepts are better associated with the ancient Greek "becoming", rather than "being", — Metaphysician Undercover

But you see that you're begging the question. You're simply starting with the dichotomy of being vs. becoming and trying to fit the data in with this dichotomy. But emerging is phusis, and not simply change and motion. It's the "is-ness" of anything at all, and the fact that it is - whether it changes or moves or is at rest. It's not an action, it's not a property, it's not an entity. When we ask about becoming, we say "becoming 'is' xyz" - we're presupposing being. In this sense "change" has a kind of being as well. Just because it's a verb or an activity doesn't matter. Ditto for whether something is abstract or "not real" like unicorns or imaginary numbers. They all "are."

Greek "becoming", rather than "being", and these two are distinct in ancient Greek conceptualization. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. This distinction has its origin in ancient Greek thinking, it's true, but it grows out of an originary unity, the Greek notion of being is phusis. Once we get to Plato and Aristotle, the split between being and becoming and "being and seeming" take off. But we're attempting to go back even further, to the milieu in which they grew.

OK, so you want to remove "being" in the sense of the verb, "the 'being' of beings" and replace it with "the 'permanence' of being". That's fine, if it makes more sense to you this way, but the problem is that we are discussing how the ancient Greeks talked about it, and they used what is translated as "being", and Parmenides described this in terms of permanence. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, he didn't. That's how you are using it. Permanence and impermenance applies to beings. Parmenides is talking about being. Heraclitus is, likewise, talking about being. Our predominant interpretations and translations of these men are simply wrong. Now this is a big claim to make, and needs to he supported. I'm prepared to do that through the fragments themselves, but it could take a while. For the time being, just briefly suspend incredulity and assume it, at least to fully understand my position.

This I don't understand either. What do you mean by "showed up"? — Metaphysician Undercover

They are present before us, they appear to us, they "are."

Is Wittgenstein relevant here? — TheMadFool

I'm embarrassed to say it, but I've never read Wittgenstein carefully enough to say anything useful about him.

The analysis of this concept is very important indeed to understand our current scientific conception of the world, and therefore the predominant world ontology — Xtrix

Yes, very much so. I wholeheartedly agree! And well said, if I might say so myself. :)

I still don't see how this equates to "First we must define our terms before we do science." I'm discussing the ontology of science in the sense of "nature" -- the study of nature, the "naturalistic stance" that pervades it, etc. That's a very concrete framework, a view about the universe.

To trace the concept of naturalism and thus "nature" historically can tell us something about the philosophical (ontological) basis of our modern science. This is the point of this thread. It's not that science has to suspend while we explore its theoretical evolution, however, and it's not simply a matter of definition. In that case I would simply ask: "What is the definition of science?"

That intellectual virus "First we must define our terms" infects this thread.

This is your point?

In that case I don't see the evidence for it. Neither I nor others have made any such claim, so far as I can tell. Speaking only for myself, "first we must define our terms" completely misses my aim in creating this thread.

You start out by referring to "the being of entities", and that is consistent with the ancient Greek usage of being, which is a verb. The you switch to equate "being" with an entity ("Entities (beings) may be seen as changing or not changing..."), and that is to use "being" as a noun. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the being of entities is phusis, the emerging sway.

That "entities may be seen as changing or not changing" is indeed discussing beings. There is a distinction (which Heidegger calls the "ontological distinction") between Being and beings (I capitalized the former in this case for clarity). Being is the basis on which any particular entity (a being) shows up, but "it" is not an entity. Being is not a property, either.

I can't find where in my statement you think I meant anything like this, but if it came off that way that was not my intention. Being is not an entity or a property. But do all beings "emerge"? Of course, or they wouldn't be beings for us at all. This "emergence" is phusis -- the Greek term for Being.

Hopefully that was clearer.

So we can talk about the being of things, and the becoming of things, but this is not to talk about the same aspect of the things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Translate your sentence this way: "the being of beings and the becoming of beings." You see where the problem is, I think. The equating of "being" as something changeless, as something opposite of "becoming," of all change and motion and flux -- this is the mistake. Better to say "the permanence of beings and the becoming of beings." In that case, I totally agree they're very different aspects.

Substituting "being" for "permanence" and than contrasting it with "becoming" is just a mistake, or at the very least confusing. Why? Because as you say here:

but it is supposed that the thing itself provides some unity, by having both being, and becoming. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "thing" (the being) itself exists, of course -- whether changing or otherwise. It has being. "Becoming" in general has "being."

But that's just misunderstanding what the word means. Beings show up, emerge, appear, unconceal themselves -- this is phusis, the "emerging, abiding sway." This is how the Greeks apprehend beings:
— Xtrix

Now you're switching "being" to a noun, talking about "beings", and this is not consistent with the ancient Greek. — Metaphysician Undercover

Beings are nouns, yes. Being, on the other hand, isn't a noun, or a "thing." The being of beings is what we're discussing, in fact. If no-thing emerged or showed up in any way for us, there'd be no question of being at all.

There was this type of thing, and that type of thing, "species", and fundamental elements which all types of things were composed of, but they didn't have an overall concept of "being" which could be used to refer to any different thing as "a being". — Metaphysician Undercover

They did: phusis. That's the entire point.

Heidegger says it better than I:

"What we have said helps us to understand the Greek interpretation of Being that we mentioned at the beginning, in our explication of the term "metaphysics" -- that is, the apprehension of Being as phusis. The later concepts of "nature," we said, must be held at a distance from this: phusis means the emergent self-upraising, the self-unfolding that abides in itself. In this sway, rest and movement are closed and opened up from an originally unity. This sway is the overwhelming coming-to-presence that has not yet been surmounted in thinking, and within which that which comes to presence essentially unfolds as beings. But this sway first steps forth from concealment -- that is, in Greek, aletheia (unconcealment) happens -- insofar as the sway struggles itself forth as a world. Through world, beings first come to being." —

That is from page 64.

Where in his poem are you interpreting this from exactly? He never says being "always refers to the stable aspect of phusis." He does speak especially of the Goddess "truth," however.
— Xtrix

He says that what is, is, and cannot not be. This means impossible to change, therefore stable. If he said that what is, is possible to not be, then it would refer to instability. — Metaphysician Undercover

He's discussing Being. One may interpret this as opposing being to not-being in the sense of "nothing," and thus arguing that "nothing" is impossible. The argument that any change is impossible is another interpretation, and one I never found very compelling from reading the fragments.

But it is my experience that in way too many Internet philosophical discussions, the request to "define X" is more a challenge intended to divert. Someone is attempting to move away from an argument that has been successful made. — Frank Apisa

All too often ego takes control...and people will do everything possible NOT to concede a valid argument. — Frank Apisa

Yes. That's a good point, and I've noticed it as well. I'm sure I've been guilty of it, in fact. It's especially "useful" to save face when someone else has far more knowledge than you do about a matter, and thus can present far more evidence and reasons for his or her argument. That's what many would accuse Socrates of doing, in fact, and one of the reasons Nietzsche (to name one) comes down pretty hard on him.

We don't simply want to be undermining everything and postponing action -- political or otherwise -- UNTIL we "finally," at long last, discover some ultimate definition or bedrock axiomatic truths. In that case, even geometry wouldn't be possible.

My point was a simple one about discussions on a philosophy forum. In that case, invoking everyday words and their meanings in to the discussion is a mistake, and shows either ignorance or a certain laziness which one would never bring to a physics or biology department.

If you do survey of topics with techinical definitions that differ greatly from their common lexical definitions I feel they'll be about highly abstract matters - far removed from what people are concerned about in their day to day lives. — TheMadFool

Sure. So what? Take, as I mentioned, the example of "energy." I know what people mean when they talk about "having no energy today," or something to that effect. Or when Trump labeled Geb Bush "Low energy Geb" or something like that. In neither case are we using "energy" the way it's used in physics. But is that a problem? All it means is that common sense notions and everyday usage doesn't work in that particular domain of study.

In medicine, it's particularly important to use the right terms -- specificity and detail matter. In mathematics, it's absolutely essential, although this is the most extreme case perhaps.

My point in raising this issue is simply not appealing to common usage when discussing science or philosophy, or simply engaging in a fruitless discussion on "let's define x," without any knowledge of the history of the field in question, its problems, its terms, its theoretical basis, etc. I see a lot of that here.

No, you don't need to find the basis for modern science in order to do science. — Banno

True, no more than you need to find the basis of "sports" to play basketball. What's your point?

"Stupid, lazy millennials" (and not just millennials).

It's difficult to say exactly what happened with Bernie. On the one hand, the DNC consolidated their power in a hail-Mary attempt that ended up succeeding to beat Sanders back, and never supported him from the beginning. Nor did most of the media pundits and op-ed contributors. If they had supported him, rather than playing up "socialism" and convincing voters that he had "no chance" of beating Trump (which wasn't supported by polling), who knows what would have happened.

On the other hand, the voters didn't show up in the numbers we needed. He also didn't win over the African American vote. Remember that although Elizebeth Warren was in the race, even if you counted all of her voters Bernie still only had a plurality in many states.

It's worth keeping in mind, when trying to understand what the hell is happening here, that propaganda and misinformation are everywhere, that many Americans get poor or little education, that most are living paycheck to paycheck regardless of their "class" status, that real wages have stagnated and thus they are deeper in debt than ever before, and that the neoliberal-dominant legal and economic system in which they have grown up has many built-in measures (some accidental, most deliberate) that encourages and magnifies social isolation and division (through media-fueled fear and suspicion of others, "wedge" issues, etc), constant diversion and perpetual work. These phenomena have all been studied systematically, but the evidence for this is everywhere, just look around.

So this is all as much "true" as saying that they're stupid and lazy, which may also be true.

I agree -- if we're ascribing to the word "being" as something "changeless," for example.
— Xtrix

Right, this is "being" in the Parmenidean sense. Being is associated with truth, what is, is, and it is impossible for it not to be, and what is not, is not, and it is impossible for it to be. What is, i.e. "being" can be understood as eternal changeless truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well remember what's getting translated as "truth" -- αλεθεια, aletheia. The concept of "truth" has gone through many semantic changes. In fact it says basically the same thing as phusis, as the simple perception of things, as that which shows itself, discloses itself, or in Heidegger "un-conceals" itself. All of this to the Greeks is "true."

But when you view being in a different sense -- not as the "changeless" but as that which emerges, as in phusis, then you see the original unity. Granted, they do become disjoined -- just as later they do as "being and thinking" -- but we come to understand from what they became disjoined: the Greek sense of being in phusis.
— Xtrix

I don't see any "original unity". Being in the sense of what emerges is more like Hegel's "being". Are you sure that Heidegger doesn't get his sense of "being" from Hegel? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well it's not really a "sense," it's simply interpreting the texts. Heidegger himself makes very few positive claims about being. Hegel was one of the first to discuss the presocratic thinkers, so perhaps there's some influence in that sense.

But I'm not understanding why you don't see the unity. That which emerges, that which shows itself, which "appears," is the being of entities in the Greek sense. Entities (beings) may be seen as changing or not changing, moving or not moving -- but they all exist, they all "are." To say entities that move or change or "become" do not possess "being" is simply a mistake.

This seems a little confused to me. It appears like you are saying that there is a sense of being which means phusis. There is no "being in the sense of phusis". That is a misrepresentation. However, there may have been a "phusis in the sense of being". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the Greek understanding of being is phusis. When I say "being in the sense of phusis" this means the same: phusis is the word that describes the being of beings. Heidegger says the same, and it's worth going over the reasons for this-- I can't transcribe his entire lecture.

"Phusis in the sense of being" seems to me an attempt to fit things into what you're already expecting, to make "being" something more fundamental as "changeless." But that's just misunderstanding what the word means. Beings show up, emerge, appear, unconceal themselves -- this is phusis, the "emerging, abiding sway." This is how the Greeks apprehend beings:

"Phusis is the emergence can be experienced everywhere: for example, in celestial processes (the rising of the sun), in the surging of the sea, in the growth of plants, in the coming forth of animals and human beings from the womb. But phusis, the emerging sway, is not synonymous with these processes, which we still today count as part of "nature." This emerging and standing-out-in-itself-from-iself may not be taken as just one process among others that we observe in beings. Phusis is Being itself, by virtue of which beings first become and remain observable." (Intro, p. 15) —

Being relates to phusis, and becoming relates to phusis, as two distinct ways of describing what is referred to by phusis. — Metaphysician Undercover

No: phusis is being itself. You continually come back to separating "being" and becoming" and then want to make phusis 'related' to both -- but rather "being" in the sense you mean (as changeless) and becoming are both aspects of being in the Greek understanding (phusis).

Being always refers to the stable aspect of phusis, — Metaphysician Undercover

I know that's how you're interpreting it -- and you could be completely right, of course. But unfortunately in this case we'll have to get "into the weeds" about it by analyzing Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato, and Aristotle.

as described by Parmenides, — Metaphysician Undercover

Where in his poem are you interpreting this from exactly? He never says being "always refers to the stable aspect of phusis." He does speak especially of the Goddess "truth," however.

Ok buddy. I like Protagoras too. Appreciate the input.

Reread the following: here. You're boring me.

how does ANY of this relate to phusis or anything anyone on here is talking about?
— Xtrix

You are just bringing up a cryptic word and thinking it's going to get somewhere in a conversation. — Gregory

You're not answering the question.

I'm not interested in your opinion about this thread's topic, of which you've contributed nothing. There's nothing "cryptic" about the word phusis, by the way. And if there is, you wouldn't even know it because you understand absolutely nothing about it.

Concepts are what count. — Gregory

Phusis is a concept, a very concrete one. It's also the topic of this thread. If you know nothing of ancient Greek thought or the Greek language, or don't find it compelling, feel free to utter off-topic, incoherent nonsense like "concepts are what count" and "Kant enjoyed doing it" somewhere else. In fact, I urge you to.

We have no sure knowledge of what ancient texts mean. — Gregory

Another silly statement. We have no sure knowledge about any historical event, either. Is history therefore not worth pursuing?

It's very easy to utter complete nonsense and posture as a "philosopher." But there are people out there doing real work and making real progress while you engage in your mental masturbation. Please leave the real work to them.

I have no interest in your ramblings.

Who exactly are you responding to? If no one, what are you talking about?

There are also many spiritualities. Look at the Car's Jr. star and try to imagine it NOT having a smiling face. This is what Kant did for the world, and he enjoyed it. — Gregory

And he "enjoyed" it? What does that mean? And what, exactly, are you claiming he "did for the world?" And, further, how does ANY of this relate to phusis or anything anyone on here is talking about?

Yes, this is what I was saying, something is being interpreted, and this is what you have named "phusis". As I explained there are two distinct descriptions of this thing, one under the terms of "being", the other under the terms of "becoming". If these two distinct descriptions were consistent with each other, like "half empty" and "half full" are consistent with each other, there would be no problem. But Plato and Aristotle demonstrated that these two descriptions are not consistent with each other. Whatever it is which is described as "being" cannot be the same thing which is described as "becoming". So, Aristotle proposed that this one thing, "phusis", has two distinct aspects which he called matter and form, to account for these two distinct descriptions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree -- if we're ascribing to the word "being" as something "changeless," for example. In that case, yes of course that's radically different from something that perpetually changes. That's one way to define "being."

But when you view being in a different sense -- not as the "changeless" but as that which emerges, as in phusis, then you see the original unity. Granted, they do become disjoined -- just as later they do as "being and thinking" -- but we come to understand from what they became disjoined: the Greek sense of being in phusis.

"Becoming" has as much "being" as form or Idea, in this sense.

Things that manifest, that emerge, that "grow," come to take two on different aspects -- that which persists in stability and that which is unstable, which arises and perishes.
— Xtrix

Right, these are the two distinct aspects. Stability relates to being, and instability relates to becoming. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, they both relate to being in the sense of phusis mentioned above. They're both aspects of this. Phusis -- the Greek understanding of being -- is not only "stability" or "changeless Form." If that were the case, the only entities that "are," or that "have" being, are those that don't change. But that's absurd: a river "is" just as much as a triangle, matter, or universal concept "is."

Phenomena seem to change and some seem to stay the same way. This relation between the permanent and impermanent is an ancient distinction. But to ascribe "being" only to the former is a mistake, and quite different from the Greek concept of being in phusis. This is Heidegger's point and the point I'm attempting to make here.

you're essentially equating the "universe" with Kant's thing-in-itself
— Xtrix
Skimmed over your post, and you got this right! Only, the universe is not a thing. — BraydenS

Lol. Ok bud, whatever you say. :) Enjoy talking about something that doesn't exist with someone else. It's too riveting for me.

Having contradictory interpretations is not the same as "half-empty"/ "half-full", as these two are not contradictory. Do you see the difference, between interpretations which are different, yet consistent with each other, and interpretations which contradict each other? It is the latter which I see as a problem, the former is not a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I see the difference. The analogy was flawed, of course. The point remains: something is being interpreted. We all agree. I'm not denying that there are conflicting interpretations -- in fact the history of how these interpretations evolved is the point of this discussion, in part.

No, it just means we're in one phase of "restricting" being, which has an interesting history, and begins with this distinction and then, later, "being and seeming," "being and thinking," etc.
— Xtrix

I don't see where this comes from, nor what you mean by it. Can you explain? What do you mean by restricting being? — Metaphysician Undercover

You're right, it does need explanation. The "restriction of being" I was referring to was Heidegger's chapter of the same name in Introduction to Metaphysics, in which he discusses the four ways Being as been contrasted with an "Other." Becoming, seeming, thinking, and the ought -- these are the four.

Being and becoming, along with "being and seeming," are the most ancient. He discusses how they became disjoined, and how the disjunction sprung from an essential unity. That unity is phusis.

Things that manifest, that emerge, that "grow," come to take two on different aspects -- that which persists in stability and that which is unstable, which arises and perishes. This relates also with that which "appears" as a "seeming" -- a semblance, which eventually hardens into a "mere seeming" in the sense of Plato, who then contrasts this with the Idea.

I'm simplifying greatly, of course. There's a lot of evidence supporting this which we can discuss further, but in general this is what I meant by restriction of being. You may find it compelling or not, but it's worth exploring.

They're interesting to think about, but the both of you taking a position and trying to defend that position is fruitless.
— Xtrix

What about your thesis that all philosophy is saying the same thing? How can any philosophers disagree? — Metaphysician Undercover

They can disagree in all kinds of ways. I'm not denying that. True thinkers think being. There are many ways of interpreting and talking about it.

I am talking about the idea of everything, not everything. — BraydenS

This assumes there's a difference, which is not obvious. But let's say there is. In that case, nature is everything as well. Everything within nature is substance. There, I just defined it into existence. I guess that settles it?

An idea of everything is itself natural, that is, within the universe, that is, limited. That is why you cannot talk about the universe/everything. — BraydenS

If we can't talk about "it," and only the "idea" of "it," then you're essentially equating the "universe" with Kant's thing-in-itself, which isn't compelling at all. We can argue the same way about "God," too.

This is exactly why armchair philosophy and throwing around definitions without context is a waste of time. It proves nothing, it's not interesting, it doesn't further the conversation along -- we can't disprove it, we can't study it -- who cares?

Quite apart from the fact that this has nothing to do with the topic of this thread.

But a definition isn't something you find. It's something you create. — BraydenS

Yes, you create a definition in the context of a wider explanatory theory, which you don't have. What you don't do is walk into a physics department and declare what "energy" means to you based on your extensive armchair contemplations. Likewise with philosophy. If you care to give evidence or reasons, or demonstrate any knowledge of the questions and controversies within the philosophy of science, you're welcome to. In the meantime, we can "define" things out in space all we want -- so what?

You could be right or wrong, but simply declaring it accomplishes nothing.
— Xtrix

I believe exactly the opposite. Not declaring a definition accomplishes nothing. Declaring a definition accomplishes something. — BraydenS

No, it doesn't. Simply defining something for yourself may be fun, but it "accomplishes" exactly as much as saying nothing at all. Defining something with reason and evidence within a wider theory, sure. That's in fact what they do in science. But all of that extra work hasn't been done in this case, thus accomplishing nothing.

If you view making up a definition for yourself as an accomplishment, you're welcome.

I have settled something, I have settled some defintion, my definition, of a word. — BraydenS

Fine -- which is completely useless to a conversation with other human beings. Better to go talk to yourself in that case, because otherwise it's settled exactly nothing.

I have no doubt it appears like nonsense to those who look for definitions endlessly outside of themselves, — BraydenS

"Outside of themselves" is meaningless. Definitions don't float around in space somewhere to be found, nor is anyone saying this.

And it is nonsense. As I've noted before, spin doesn't work here -- you either know Greek or not, for example. Stopped being a sciolist.

believe the idea of everything is the same as everything — BraydenS

And yet you've still not shown the difference. Something completely unknown, which cannot be sensed or talked about in any way, which you claim the universe to be (but not the "idea" of it), is a useless concept. I suppose the "idea" of a cup can be talked about, yet the cup "outside our idea" is completely unknowable? That's Kant. That's nothing new. Why you invoke this for differentiating "universe" and "nature" is strange indeed.

who belittles on impact from anger (which always springs from some weakness), — BraydenS

Who's belittling? And who's angry?

Besides, anger does not always spring from weakness. But your welcome to keep declaring broad, vague, unsupported statements.

who thinks things are "interesting for their own sake" (and not for some power) — BraydenS

Got me there, I suppose. I do find things interesting for their own sake, yes. There's obviously a degree of pleasure and perhaps "power" involved -- but it need not be "useful." Playing music, thinking, etc.

who gets on his high horse while talking about the "philosophy of science", — BraydenS

I pointed out that there is such a thing as the philosophy of science. This puts me on a "high horse"? I'm precisely saying the opposite: a little humility is appropriate. Walking into a discussion and simply conjuring personal definitions, without any explanation or demonstrating knowledge of the topic or its history, perhaps would count more as being on a "high horse."

In fact, I even have the virility left to properly define science as a philosophical system of thought — BraydenS

Again, declared without an explanation. Yes, I happen to agree that science is philosophy -- I said that from the beginning. It was called, in Descartes and Newton, "natural philosophy." That's not the point. Perhaps if you deign to read before feeling entitled to make sweeping declarations, you could contribute something.

So far you've contributed nothing.

Science is applied epistemology. — BraydenS

This doesn't make sense even as a personal definition. Espistemology is a branch of philosophy, that studies knowledge. That's where the word comes from -- the Greek for "knowledge." Science is not epistemology, "applied" or otherwise. Science is, as I repeat, natural philosophy. It's concerned with nature, in theory and in practice. Again, this isn't MY definition. I didn't simply "come up" with it.

As I said elsewhere -- a prerequisite for this discussion is knowledge of Greek history and language. I'm not interested in personal, context-free definitions. If that's all you have to contribute, than I thank you and I wish you well. If you have something of real worth to contribute, I'm all ears.

Then why bother distinguishing the two and say nature happens "in" the universe?
— Xtrix

Because we cannot talk about or sense the universe in any way, only parts of it. — BraydenS

We can't talk about the universe in any way, yet you are talking about it.
We can't sense the universe in any way, except its parts -- and what are its parts? Everything in nature.

This is all pretty silly. No offense.

asking what one "gets out" of philosophy is implying it has to have some use, which is reminiscent of those among us who can't see the value of anything that can't be monetized.
— Xtrix

But you just exclaimed that your use of understanding the etymology of the word was for "understanding science", which is a philosophical system of thought built on it's ability to be applied practically and pragmatically. — BraydenS

No, I said this is my belief. But regardless of whether it has any "use" at all, it's interesting for its own sake.

Also, to casually throw around a definition like "a philosophical system of thought [redundant] built on its ability to be applied practically and pragmatically [redundant]" is kind of ridiculous. There is such a thing as "philosophy of science," if you're not aware. That means many minds, much greater than yours, have struggled with the question of what science is. It's not so simple. You could be right or wrong, but simply declaring it accomplishes nothing.

I'm always struck by people who want to quickly and confidently proclaim a definitive answer, or some solid definition, for something or other -- without any context. I'm further struck to watch as they're satisfied by this, as if by doing so they've settled anything.

We have to do better than this. Try reading this thread for starters. Spouting empty nonsense won't be tolerated -- it'll be, properly, ignored.

Every "part" of the universe is nature. — BraydenS

Then why bother distinguishing the two and say nature happens "in" the universe?

We're trying to explore the basis for the word itself -- which was a Latin translation of the Greek word "phusis."
— Xtrix

I don't see what you'll be getting out of your foray into etymology intellectually besides context, but carry on as you wish. — BraydenS

We'll be getting out of it a better understanding of the philosophical foundations of modern science (and not only that). Understanding science, such a huge feature of our present historical time, is important if we're to understand where we're going as a species. That's my belief.

But ultimately, asking what one "gets out" of philosophy is implying it has to have some use, which is reminiscent of those among us who can't see the value of anything that can't be monetized. Kind of sad.

If I could interject here.

Zeno's paradoxes are precisely that. Paradoxes. There are many of them.

Or take the ship of Theseus -- is it the same ship or not? Should we be arguing about it?

There can't be any answer to these riddles. They're interesting to think about, but the both of you taking a position and trying to defend that position is fruitless.

OK. And not reciprocally? What part of the universe isn't nature? If everything that happens "in the universe" is nature, then why not say the universe and nature are the same thing?

This isn't much of an answer, I'm afraid. But regardless, like I've state elsewhere, I'm not interested in just "defining" what the word means. There's too much of that that in philosophy already. We're trying to explore the basis for the word itself -- which was a Latin translation of the Greek word "phusis."

Plato demonstrated the appearance of incompatibility between Heraclitus' becoming, and Parmenides' being, and Aristotle showed conclusively that this is the case with a number of arguments, one I presented already in this thread. Apprehension of these arguments leads one away from accepting any postulates which stipulate that being and becoming are one and the same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's true that the distinction between "being and becoming" have their origins in Plato and Aristotle. But think about it for a minute -- what, exactly, "becomes"? Things change and move, they arise and pass -- but this presupposes a being and thus being itself. Plato associates Parmenides' being with some kind of permanence opposed to change.

It's not that any of this is "wrong" -- that would be presumptuous. They weren't idiots. Rather it's that by this point the original sense of being, as phusis, is pushed to the background. By the time Plato and Aristotle show up, being has transformed into "idea" and "ousia." But most of the trouble lies in our interpretation of what "becoming" means.

If this is really what Heidegger says, I think he is wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Don't take my word for it:

Even today, in accounts of the inception of Western philosophy, it is customary to oppose Parmenides' teaching to that of Heraclitus. An opt-cited saying is supposed to derive from Heraclitus: panta rhei, all is in flux. Hence there is no being. All "is" becoming.

[...]

Of course, when someone asserts the opposite, that in the history of phlosophy all thinkers have at bottom said the same thing, then this is taken as yet another outlandish imposition on everyday understanding. What use, then, is the multifaceted and complex history of Western philosophy, if they all say the same thing anyway? Then one philosophy would be enough. Everything has always already been said. And yet this "same" possess, as its inner truth, the inexhaustible wealth of that which on every day is as if that day were its first. —

I think that's clear enough. I think you should check it out, too -- definitely worth the time. It's Introduction to Metaphysics p. 74.

It may be the case, that Parmenides describes "phusis" with "being", and Heraclitus describes "phusis" with "becoming", but this does not mean that being and becoming are one and the same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it just means we're in one phase of "restricting" being, which has an interesting history, and begins with this distinction and then, later, "being and seeming," "being and thinking," etc.

So for example, if one person describes a substance as solid, and another person describes the same substance as liquid, this does not indicate that "solid" and "liquid" have the same meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. It does mean, however, that "substance" retains its meaning.

To extend this analogy to our case, it would be like describing a substance as a "substance and a liquid." We have to know something about what "substance" means before we can contrast the two. There's also the problem of what we mean by "liquid" (or in this case, "becoming").

"Heraclitus, to whom one ascribes the doctrine of becoming, in start contrast to Parmenides, in truth says the same as Parmenides. He would not be one of the greatest of the great Greeks if he said anything else. One simply must not interpret his doctrine of becoming according to the notions of a nineteenth-century Darwinist." (Introduction, p 75.) [My emphasis]

Maybe you do not see this as a problem, but I do, as I think it makes it impossible to understand the thing being described. Therefore, I believe that this problem of contradiction needs to be exposed, as Socrates and Plato did, and addressed in a rational manner, as Aristotle did, before we can proceed toward an understanding of the thing which is being described in contradictory ways. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see this particular issue as a problem, no. There are many ways of interpreting things. The wave-particle business you mentioned is a good example. So's the proverbial glass being "half-empty" and "half-full." Is either a "problem"? Well maybe, but what's not an issue is that something is being interpreted.

Anticipating later analyses: it's worth remember that, at bottom, whenever we are engaged in these questions and problems (in philosophy or science), we're interpreting and analyzing -- which is a certain mode of our existence. That mode, reaching back at least to the Greeks, involves presence. This is a mode of our being -- Heidegger calls it the "present-at-hand" -- and includes (of course) an aspect of time (the present).

This in turn is related to ideas of "truth" and all of its transformations, which in the early Greeks was called "aletheia." This term, like phusis, has to do with a "disclosure," an "openness," an "emergence" -- all of which shows up in the context of "presence" and is closely related to "phusis." And so we're back at the OP question.

Thank you, James. I'll check out the links and those citations soon.

This idea of "being" can be contrasted with the "becoming" of Heraclitus. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. As Heidegger points out, and quite rightly, Heraclitus and Parmenides are saying the same thing. They're both discussing being. "Being and becoming" is the first "restriction" discussed in his Introduction to Metaphysics, in fact.

Again I return to the question of phusis. It's here that we find clues to the Greek conception of being. Parmenides and Heraclitus are interested in exactly this question.

To argue being is distinct from becoming and pit these two thinkers against one another may be something we learn from philosophy books and in most school rooms, but it's just a mistake- in my view. There are better analyses.

What would be interesting would be to see how both "becoming" and "being" get unified into the one Latin concept of "existence". I believe it its done through the Aristotelian matter and form, but this would be a complex research project. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think your analysis is way off base and therefore your research project, although it would be doubtlessly complex, would be a blind alley.

This is vague, of course, but it would take a while to dismantle most of what you said, and I'd prefer to stay on the topic of phusis - the Greek conception of being at the beginning of Western thought.

"With the question of the meaning of being, our investigation comes up against the fundamental question of philosophy. This is one that must be treated phenomenologically. [...] This expression does not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical research as subject-matter, but rather the how of that research. (Being & Time, p. 50)

In Heidegger, phenomenon = the manifest. Regarding phenomenon and seeming (semblance), the latter already includes the former -- that is, no-thing can "merely look like so-and-so" without first manifesting (be a phenomenon in the first sense).

That's the phenomenon aspect of "phenomenology."

As for the λογοσ, which you mentioned:

"λογοσ as "discourse" means rather the same as δηλουν: to make manifest what one is 'talking about' in one's discourse. Aristotle has explicated this function of discourse more precisely as αποφαινεαθαι. The λογοσ lets something be seen (φαινεαθαι), namely, what the dis­course is about; and it does so either for the one who is doing the talking (the medium) or for persons who are talking with one another, as the case may be. Discourse 'lets something be seen' απο ... : that is, it lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about. In discourse (αποφαναισ) so far as it is genuine, what is said is drawn from what the talk is about, so that discursive communication, in what it says, makes manifest what it is talking about, and thus makes this accessible to the other party. This is the structure of the λογοσ as αποφαναισ." —

He'll eventually say that logos, as a "letting-something-be-seen" can be true or false, but truth in the Greek sense of αληθεια (aletheia), "unconcealedness." And falseness as "covering up."

Αισθησισ -- perception, gets invoked here, etc.

In the end, phenomenology means:

Thus "phenomenology" means [...] that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself. This is the formal meaning of that branch of research which calls itself "phenomenology". —

Logos, therefore, plays a prominent role and is important to understand in our search for the meaning of being. Later it becomes relevant in terms of how it's evolved as a term and eventually comes to mean "logic" as the science of thought. But that's a different matter.

If you want to understand the ancient Greek meaning of "Being", read Parmenides — Metaphysician Undercover

An excellent place to start, no doubt. Now to study the morphing of this understanding in the time between Parmenides and Aristotle is especially fascinating.

To me this gels with phenomenology as a making explicit of what is tacitly already dominant. — jjAmEs

Very well said. Yes indeed, I couldn't agree more.

It's not only the emphasis on "practical" behavior which is novel, as overlooked as that has been in academic philosophy - but a way in which to analyze it without invoking the use of traditional concepts (I.e., "phenomenologically"). This is why people unjustly accuse Heidegger of being a charlatan, as he had to essentially invent words in order to discuss the topic.

I'll leave you to more fruitful discussions with others. Thanks. — TheMadFool

There's no sense taking this personally. I respect what you say about science - there's plenty of truth in it. But as much as I'm normally not a stickler for staying "on topic," I don't want to lose sight of my main question and be sent adrift on a discussion about empiricism. You can understand that I'm sure.

Nevertheless, if you're uninterested that's fair enough.

About the word "being" itself in Greek I don't have much knowledge. I didn't think there was such a word, actually. Phusis (as that which emerges), and later ousia, seem to be the words used, but if you know more I'm certainly interested.

Imo, the ancient Greek understanding of nature – or of the physical – would be direly incomplete without an ancient Greek understanding of logos. — javra

That's a very important point - you're absolutely correct.

The word logos as "discourse" is what's commonly assumed, and later becomes a matter of propositions and eventually logic. But initially it was much closer semantically to an idea of Phusis.

I'll respond more fully later about all of that, but your point is well taken.

Focus on the essential. Logic & math are also found elsewhere but the empirical is an exclusively scientific feature. — TheMadFool

Where is this "elsewhere"? What are you implying? If the empirical is exclusively scientific, it doesn't mean science is exclusively empirical. It includes, therefore, logic, mathematics and theory. These are usually considered "cognitive" or "mental." Is this "elsewhere" not science? Is the study of linguistics not science, for example?

There is a theoretical component to the activity we call science. There's a "mental" component to all conscious experience, empirical or otherwise. I'll assume you're not denying this.

Therefore, with this taken as a truism, we're already within a traditional conception: that of the "mind" and the "body" (Descartes) or perhaps the "subject and object" (more in Kant). This is the philosophical basis for modern science, including contemporary science.

What was the notion of "nature" in the 16th and 17th centuries? Take Principles of Natural Philosophy, Descartes' rarely-read but arguably most important work (according to him), or Newton's Mathematical Principles for Natural Philosophy, as two important examples. Take even Galileo's Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations Relating to Two New Sciences. In the latter, he starts off discussing, to no surprise, Aristotle's Physics. The very titles of the former examples indicate that "natural philosophy" is presupposed as a very definite domain of philosophy (here meaning"thinking" in the broadest sense, perhaps).

Ask yourself what these three men's conception of "nature" was. Whatever it was, it will give us a major clue into the intellectual foundations for modern philosophy and science. So the question isn't a trivial one. You agree that Galileo, Descartes, and Newton weren't imbeciles; it's therefore important to actually read what they said. We may have more knowledge now, based on new discoveries, and in this sense we have gone "farther" than these thinkers. But any progress has been won on the tracks they laid.

The ultimate goal here is to learn something about phusis and, more importantly, about Greek thought. If we agree with Heidegger that these first thinkers (Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus) were more concerned with "being" than most philosophers since (as the question has gone largely unasked in its own right), then our question is also about being -- our particular, "Western" understanding of being -- our "ontology."

We can't study "being" in the scientific sense perhaps -- if science is more narrowly defined -- but whatever "it" is that allows the very things science studies (physical, chemical, biological beings) to show up for us in the first place -- THAT can be considered "being." No matter the mode we're in when things appear to us. By "no matter the mode" I mean not only our theoretical mode (in our Western,present-favoring understanding of beings as "substance" [[i]ousia[/i]]), what Heidegger called "presence-at-hand," but also our "practical" mode, seen in our everyday actions, interactions, routines, and habits -- most of which is not consciously chosen and of which we're not usually constantly aware of. He calls this the "ready-to-hand."

Heidegger says the latter (everyday activity and habit) tells us more about where our usual "theoretical" ontological interpretation comes from in the first place (and also our interpretations of human nature, the "world," time and space). He concludes that our current, unquestioned and tacitly assumed interpretation (when doing philosophy and science) has its origins in the Greeks, and is due to them favoring the present, which is only one aspect of our "lived time" of everyday life (he calls "temporality"), which is an experience of all-three-at-once.

Whatever allows any of this to show up, that's essentially being. Any understanding of it -- and we all have an understanding, theoretical or "pre-theoretical." Therefore, everything that shows up within this understanding (whether pre-theoretically, or theoretically as in "interpretation" or a "system of beliefs") -- behavior, science, customs, a shared worldview, morality, a class system, gender norms, etc., is going to make sense within this context. In the Greek world, for example, "saints and sinners" wouldn't have made any sense. In the Medieval world, they certainly did. So an understanding of being is arguably as fundamental to culture as religion or language is.

Heidegger wants to get "under" or perhaps "outside" of the traditional ontology by flushing out these "everyday" experiences and analyzing them philosophically -- but without the "baggage" of the tradition's (ultimately Greek) vocabulary and semantics. This is the topic of Part II of Being and Time, which never came but which he published in other volumes.

I've provided a little background here in order to move the conversation in a perhaps a more fruitful direction.

Physical laws are as much physical as the objects they obey them for the simple reason that they're perceivable or observable. — TheMadFool

That's not what Galileo or Newton thought. But regardless, if those things are all "physical," then anything we can understand is physical. Not much of a definition.

Science is empirical. — TheMadFool

Partly, but not always. It's also theoretical. It involves logic, mathematics, etc.

I offered you a definition of physical as that which can be perceived through the senses (and instruments). — TheMadFool

I never asked you for a definition of "physical" and, as I've stated before, I'm really not interested. All you've done is offer a fairly commonplace idea of what physical is -- you've not advanced the conversation, which is about phusis. Giving me your own personal opinion about what you think "physical" means is useless. Quite apart from that, this definition itself is problematic, and only pushes us to now ask "what is perception and the senses?" If the senses are part of the body, and we have no idea what "body" means, then the notion of "physical" as "anything we can perceive with our senses" is itself a definition built on sand.

This definition also tacitly assumes a subject/object dichotomy as well, which I've written about elsewhere.

This conversation isn't supposed to be simple. It's not a matter of me inquiring about "what physical means" and then everyone offering their own "take" on it, based on their favorite readings. It's also not an exercise in "let's try to come up with a definition." This problem has been around for centuries, thought about by far better minds than ours, and persists even today. To think we're going to settle it by throwing around a definition is pure hubris.

That being said, I'd like to return to the actual guiding question:

So the question "What is 'nature'?" ends up leading to a more fundamental question: "What is the 'physical'?" and that ultimately resides in the etymology of φῠ́σῐς and, finally, in the origins of Western thought: Greek thought. — Xtrix

This perhaps was vague, as I didn't emphasis the notion of "phusis" enough. But since I've now clarified what I meant several times, I don't feel this is a reasonable excuse anymore. Others on this thread have understood me correctly.

So if you have insights or analysis about the Greek notion of "phusis," which has shaped every concept of "nature" or "physical" to this very day, including yours, then please do share. Like I said, I'm particularly struck by Heidegger on this one but am open to others I may not have been aware of.

What part of "you're missing the point" don't you understand?
— Xtrix

Put your attitude back in your pants. You don't own the point here. — Baden

Fuck you. That better? :)

You're right, Bernie's a total sellout. I'm bored talking with you.

I'll give you a concrete example. My sister and her husband are looking at probably three months of lockdown or semi-lockdown and no work. They live in LA. Their rent is 3 grand, close to a grand for health, and another 2 for bills and food. Let's say 6 grand a month. How long do you think 1200 bucks each is going to last?

In contrast, a treasure trove of $500 billion has been opened for big corporations to dig into.

The bill is shit. — Baden

What part of "you're missing the point" don't you understand?

I haven't argued that it's a great bill.

A "no" vote would have been in keeping with everything he says he stands for. A "yes" vote looks like capitulation. — Baden

We're in a pandemic. I don't think he cares about the optics right now. A "no" vote would have accomplished exactly nothing. If this truly turns you off to Bernie, by all means keep holding your breath for someone more principled.

"What we need is a revolution pragmatism."

I'm still digging into the bill. But I really don't like what I see. — Baden

Neither did Bernie, I'm sure. You're missing the point.

A "no" vote would have demonstrated a "revolution" in your mind eh?

If you realize that it is a common interpretation, then why ask me for passages? All you need to do is read his "Physics" to see that the theme of the book is change. He starts by saying that physicists take for granted that either some things, or all things are in motion, and he proceeds to the conditions of change (the causes), and then to talk about time and motion. Why would you interpret his "Physics" in any other way? — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not about interpreting his Physics, per se. It's about the concept of phusis.