If you realize that it is a common interpretation, then why ask me for passages? All you need to do is read his "Physics" to see that the theme of the book is change. He starts by saying that physicists take for granted that either some things, or all things are in motion, and he proceeds to the conditions of change (the causes), and then to talk about time and motion. Why would you interpret his "Physics" in any other way? — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not about interpreting his Physics, per se. It's about the concept of phusis.

Why did Bernie sell out on the corporate bonanza bill? Anyone? — Baden

You may have noticed we're in the middle of a pandemic. Bernie is principled, but also pragmatic. This bill was by no means perfect, and he spoke out against the parts he abhorred, but something needed to be done -- and quickly.

To describe this as "selling out" may sound great in conservative media (or even liberal media), but it's a complete joke. Just think about it a minute.

Nothing that can't be detected or measured i.e. perceived is real in science. — TheMadFool

But this just isn't saying much. It seems to me you're defining science in a reaction to religious or supernatural claims. But religious believers will claim God is "detectable" as well. There's no sense debating them.

If science is simply anything we can reasonably understand, fine. That's philosophy, too. That's life, in fact. So what?

The basis for modern science is the concept of nature. This concept has gone through many mutations throughout history. It's very true that when trying to define "science" we may emphasize the empirical, the senses, the "physical," careful observation and experimentation, the use of mathematics, clear language (technical nomenclature), the role of theory (Kuhn and others), and so on, but even all these attempts take place against the backdrop of an understanding of being, an understanding with a history -- what Heidegger calls the "tradition." Its roots lie in Greek ontology, which is what I'm trying to explore here.

My question is about phusis. Ultimately this is the point. As a reminder.

For Aristotle, the physical is the world of "becoming", change, and this is the subject of ancient Greek science, and Aristotle's "Physics". In a number of distinct places, he demonstrates that "being" and "becoming" are incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's really not that simple. But if you have passages you want to share that you believe support this thesis I'd be happy to take a look.

I realize this is a common interpretation of Aristotle, by the way.

The idea of the physical is intimately tied to the senses. What is physical is exactly that which can be sensed; — TheMadFool

Sounds more like empirical to me, but I take your meaning.

Naturalism, to me, is the philosophy that claims that all there is is the physical; in other words, what is real has to be sensible in some way or other. Since this implies that what isn't sensible iisn't real, naturalism excludes religion and the spiritual from the realm of reality for they deal in what can't be sensed. There is good reason to assume such a position because to admit the non-physical as part of reality is like a blind man admitting colors into his world; even if there are colors, the blind man will never perceive them and it will fail to make a difference to his world. — TheMadFool

What about the forces of nature? Are those "physical"? Newton thought that notion was absurd. Quantum entanglement, curved spacetime. Einstein considered a lot of this "non-physical." Etc. Is language and mathematics physical?

Physical is an honorific term. What it appears to mean these days is anything we more or less understand. If we understand it, it's physical. Again, I'm not too interested in coming up with definitions, I'm interested in the etymology of phusis. At least in this thread.

The religious, the spiritually inclined and supernaturalists may counter naturalism by saying that it is possible for existence to be true despite nothing being perceptible through the senses i.e. all is not physical. However, a moment's reflection reveals a serious problem, the problem of defining reality. Being perceptible through the senses and not being perceptible through the senses are contradictory statements and, as it appears to me, it's impossible to bring them together under the same banner, reality. If both the perceptible and the imperceptible are real then what is not real? — TheMadFool

The word "real" is likewise honorific. If we define reality as anything "perceptible" or "physical" or "natural," etc., then we get an answer in one step: reality = the natural. But that only means we have to understand what physical and natural mean, and then to have some idea of what "material," "matter," and "body" mean (including the senses, which are part of the body), and so on. So we're back to the beginning and the topic of this thread.

Incidentally, there hasn't been a notion of "body" since the 17th century.

The whole third chapter of the Introduction - tellingly titled 'The Restriction of Being' - is more or less an account of how Plato and Aristotle fucked up (or began the fucking-up-of, completed by Latin translators) the perfectly good notion of φῠ́σῐς that the pre-Socratics, Heraclitus and Parmenides in particular, had - at least according to Heidi's as-usual idiosyncratic reading of philosophical history. — StreetlightX

The fourth chapter. But yes, in that he discusses the various "restrictions" made through history. I don't understand why you say that Plato and Aristotle "fucked up," though. Heidegger never implies anything like that. In fact he believes the beginning of Western philosophy (the "inception") reaches its end with Aristotle. By that point the "idea" and ousia had come to the fore, but hadn't completely lost the presocratic sense of phusis either.

Regardless, I'm not seeing your point with this response, which was supposedly a reaction to my statement that Heidegger contradicts de Beistegui in a number of ways. Maybe I'm completely wrong, but I don't see anything in your response that shows how.

There was no metaphysics in Aristotle. "First philosophy" is his physics, and what's later called "metaphysics" is just as much physics.
— Xtrix

Perhaps you could argue why this is so.
It is not immediately apparent to me as a phenomenon. — Valentinus

Sure, although I'd rather just quote directly from Heidegger so there's no mystery:

"Aristotle’ s Physics is the hidden, and therefore never adequately thought out, foundational book of Western philosophy.

Probably the eight books of the Physics were not projected as a unity and did not come into existence all at once. Such questions have no importance here. In general it makes little sense to say that the Physics precedes the Metaphysics, because metaphysics is just as much “physics” as physics is “metaphysics.” For reasons based on the work itself, as well as on historical grounds, we can take it that around 347 B.C. (Plato’s death) the second book was already composed. (Cf. also Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development, p. 296, originally published in 1923. For all its erudition, this book has the single fault of thinking through Aristotle’s philosophy in the modern Scholastic neo-Kantian manner that is entirely foreign to Greek thought. Much of Jaeger’s Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles, 1912, is more accurate because less concerned with “content.”)

But even so, this first thoughtful and unified conceptualization of nύσις is already the last echo of the original (and thus supreme) thoughtful projection of the essence of nύσις that we still have preserved for us in the fragments of Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides." (On The Essence and Concept of Phusis in Aristotle's Physics B, 1. p. 3, in German from the Gesamtausgabe: p. 241) —

Remember that "metaphysics" was coined after Aristotle. "After the physics lectures" is what it probably meant. It's evolved to mean essentially anything "outside" or "beyond" what is physical, but that's misleading. Heidegger often uses it as basically synonymous with "ontology" in terms of its subject matter for most of history after Aristotle.

But the point is the same: phusis is the concept we're trying to understand here, in light of the question of the meaning of being.

Aristotle emphasizes that metaphysics (which he also calls “first philosophy”) is required only to the extent that there is indeed a motionless reality, without the existence of which physics would be the primordial and universal science. It is the very existence of a motionless reality that turns physics — the object of which is the kind of reality that has the principle of its own motion and rest within itself, in contrast to the technical object — into a merely secondary philosophy. For Aristotle, Φῠ́σῐς does not designate the whole of reality, but only “a specific kind of beings.” There is, therefore, a reality of being, which the world of becoming does not exhaust." — StreetlightX

There was no metaphysics in Aristotle. "First philosophy" is his physics, and what's later called "metaphysics" is just as much physics.

What this writer is indicating is that there's a difference between the "becoming" world and the "motionless" world, and tries to say the former is "physics" (secondary) and the latter "metaphysics."

Parts are reminiscent of the old Parmenides vs Heraclitus "dichotomy" as well. Although the interpretation is fine, I don't find it all that profound. It's actually quite common.

I don't know anything about de Beistegui, but from what I Googled he's supposedly a Heidegger scholar. That's surprising, because none of this comes close to Heidegger's analysis. Heidegger in fact contradicts much of what's referenced here.

Was Sandyhook a "false flag"? I could cite Alex Jones and several articles about it. I guess that makes it plausible, in your world, and totally worth entertaining?
— Xtrix

That's a bit of a strawman argument, isn't it? — fishfry

No.

How does one relate to the other? — fishfry

Because not only is there no evidence, it fails at being even interesting speculation. That's how it relates.

When the government tells you the North Vietnamese attacked us at the Gulf of Tonkin, or that Saddam has WMDs, are you one of those people who wave the flag for war without a moment's thought? You never question what you're told? Ever? — fishfry

Yes, questioning the motives and pretexts of government foreign policy, formulating alternative narratives, and (most importantly) relying on experts and the documentary record to support these narratives is important.

So far you've cited NY Post speculations and betting odds for a stupid, stupid idea. What's more embarrassing is that you continue on in your quest to make it look less stupid. But this isn't Fox News, and cheap spin doesn't work.

There's no way Hillary Clinton will be the democratic nominee. Ever. Put your money on it if you want. I'll gladly lay the odds.

I'm curious, do you even read much political commentary? I agree Hillary's not getting much buzz lately but Cuomo's name keeps coming up. Just yesterday he officially denied he's running for president, saying, "This is no time for politics." Exactly what a politician would say, don't you agree?

Are you completely unaware of all of this that I'm talking about? — fishfry

Right, because you've proven yourself such a very widely-read, credible source of news, you feel perfectly entitled to ask me that question.

I suppose you take seriously the "perfectly reasonable" speculation that Cuomo will jump in and be the nominee too, eh? I've got a better one: I have reason to believe, based on what "many people are saying," that Fauci will try his hand at the democratic nomination. People are saying it, so it must be credible and worth discussing. Haven't heard anything about it? Probably because you don't follow the news -- or at least aren't as well-read as I am. Pity.

I guess I'm ultimately the fool for wasting time responding to you.

"Aristotle’s Physics is the hidden, and therefore never adequately thought out, foundational book of Western philosophy."

Perhaps I should have started a thread about this to make it more accurate.

That's interesting indeed. I'm not familiar with Cunliffe but will check it out.

A thought: idealism, or the role of the mental in constructing (our?) reality, seems inevitable once you spend enough time philosophizing. — Pneumenon

This entire thesis rests on suppositions: (1) that there's such a thing as the mind/body problem, (2) that there's a subject apart from an object, that there's an "external world," etc. These show up over and over again.

But as I've pointed out elsewhere, the very notion of subject/object, "inner and outer worlds," mind and body, etc., already presume an understanding of what it is to be. They themselves operate in the context of an ontology. In the West, at least, that ontology is still very much Greek. Until we understand this point fully, we're operating in a blind alley.

(This is not to say these problems don't exist, or that they're "wrong," by the way.)

I want to repeat part of my initial post:

So the question "What is 'nature'?" ends up leading to a more fundamental question: "What is the 'physical'?" and that ultimately resides in the etymology of φῠ́σῐς and, finally, in the origins of Western thought: Greek thought.

The analysis of this concept is very important indeed to understand our current scientific conception of the world, and therefore the predominant world ontology (at least non-religious, or perhaps simply the de facto ontology ). Does anyone here have an analysis to share, original or otherwise? Full disclosure: I am particularly struck by Heidegger's take, especially in his Introduction to Metaphysics. But other analyses are certainly welcome.

I'm interested in the analysis of the Greek word phusis. The claim that this word is the origin of our word "physics" and "nature" shouldn't be controversial, but perhaps it is more troubling than I assumed -- in which case, if anyone wants me to elaborate further on why I make that statement I'd be happy to.

Otherwise, if we take this as a given, we should move on to understanding the word itself and its historical variations in meaning. To do so, one should know something about ancient Greek history and both Homeric and Attic Greek language. These should be considered prerequisite for this discussion -- at least in terms of what I'm interested in hearing. This is what I meant by "analysis." I did not mean armchair speculations, feelings, evidence-free claims, vague statements, etc.

Friendly clarification.

in regard to etymology, the Greek word is similar to saying something like: "Events keep Happening."
It is relentless and leaves us poor mortals trying to get a grip when we control very few things. — Valentinus

Why is phusis something like "Events keep happening"? Could you offer more here please?

"I don't agree.... I don't believe.., ..nor has it ever been defined."

From our friends at Dictionary.com:
"scientific method, n.
The principles and empirical processes of discovery and demonstration considered characteristic of or necessary for scientific investigation, generally involving the observation of phenomena, the formulation of a hypothesis concerning the phenomena, experimentation to demonstrate the truth or falseness of the hypothesis, and a conclusion that validates or modifies the hypothesis."

As to your opinions and your beliefs, how do they weigh in the scales of argument? — tim wood

It's not my opinion -- it has never been defined. Maybe it will be some day. I don't "believe" because I see no evidence for the claim that you and others are making. If you have evidence, present it please.

By the way, this is now the fourth time in this forum that someone has quoted the dictionary to settle an argument. It's almost unbelievable. Were you really thinking, in this case, that I believed there wasn't such a thing as a science dictionary -- or dictionaries in general? Or that someone couldn't simply make up a definition? Is this how we settle philosophical questions about meaning? By consulting the dictionary?

We have to do better than this. Within the context of philosophy -- in this case, the philosophy of science -- there have been many attempts to define the scientific method, as I assume you know. It is often believed that there is one, even among scientists. But there isn't. The concept of the "inductive method" goes back at least to Bacon, and we could talk about that and its variations in history, but there's a great deal in science that simply doesn't fall into this methodology.

Science is not separated from "philosophy," as I indicated in my original post. It's certainly not separated by a special "method" that accounts for its successes. If you have specific insights or evidence that demonstrates it, I'd be happy to hear it. But citing the dictionary? Come on.

"Useful to determine a current scientific theory" is incoherent. Philosophy plays no role in scientific theory? Of course it does. The basis for modern science has its roots in Greek ontology, which is the subject of this thread. It's not simply a matter of philology, it's a history of Western thought and, therefore, modern science.
— Xtrix

Excuse me, but saying that contemporary science has something to do with the Greek concept of nature, perhaps, probably indicates that one has vague ideas of one and the other. — Borraz

OK -- why? This isn't an argument. You're offering nothing here.

Even the conception of the physical during the Enlightenment is not related to contemporary physics. By the way, have you heard of Einstein? — Borraz

Are you going to present any kind of analysis? Making vague statements and asking fatuous questions isn't interesting to me.

"Heidegger wrote well"? Says who? I didn't think he wrote particularly well, myself. What have you read, exactly, to make a claim one way or another about him I wonder?
— Xtrix

For example, Heidegger, M (1976) Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, in Gesamtausgabe; V.9. I Abteilung : Veroffentlichte Schriften 1914-1970, pp. 105 ss. — Borraz

This is an "example" of what? That Heidegger wrote well or what you've read? If the latter, why am I particularly interested in "pp. 105"?

Fun thing I discovered recently: the roots of "physics" and "ethics" have senses very, very similar to "nature" and "nurture". Etymologically, the physical or natural is the inborn; the ethical or "nurtural" is the cultivated. — Pfhorrest

Well "inborn" is an interesting translation. I've heard a more common one is "birth" or, in Heidegger, an "emerging, abiding sway" (kind of a strange wording). But apparently the contrast in Homer's day, and through to the pre-Socratics, was between phusis and nomos. So that definitely makes sense.

Insofar as "our senses and our reason" are "natural" (i.e. of nature as well as in nature, that is, do not transcend nature), how is it even possible for us to "know" more than, or anything else but, "nature" when our cognitive apparatus consists of only "natural senses and reason"? — 180 Proof

That's fine -- once we know what "nature" is. Saying our senses and our reason are part of nature is sensible, but nothing new.

The even more fundamental, or preliminary (thus, 'perennial'), question at the root (ῥάδιξ) of (Western and non-Western) "thought": "what is real?" - more precisely: what about 'any X' differentiates 'real X' from 'not-real X'? — 180 Proof

I don't agree with that. This has been believed for centuries, of course, but I don't find it compelling. "What is real" is hardly more fundamental than, for example, "What is?" I think we'd agree on that. So my point in creating this thread was to question the origins of the concept "nature" -- not the "real," although this is related. Why is it related? Because most scientists (and philosophers) would claim, as you are, that what is "real" is what's natural.

Maybe you can present a better way of connecting the two.

The advent of the new conception of physics and science swept aside the Aristotelian concept of science - as it had to do, because this conception was based on a thoroughly outmoded method largely comprising armchair reflections on what things ought to do, without the rigorous observation that true science requires. — Wayfarer

I really don't agree with this. What "concept of science" did Aristotle have, exactly? To say there was an "outmoded method" is also anachronistic, if we're to agree that there is such a thing as the "scientific method" at all, which I don't believe there is -- nor has it ever been defined.

I'm not sure you understood my question. I was asking for an analysis of phusis, which is the root of our words "physical" and "natural."

Thus I don't see how Nagel's quote is relevant, nor do I agree with his analysis.

The analysis of a concept is a legitimate philological task, but little or nothing useful to determine a current scientific theory. Heidegger wrote well, but not for scientists. — Borraz

"Useful to determine a current scientific theory" is incoherent. Philosophy plays no role in scientific theory? Of course it does. The basis for modern science has its roots in Greek ontology, which is the subject of this thread. It's not simply a matter of philology, it's a history of Western thought and, therefore, modern science.

"Heidegger wrote well"? Says who? I didn't think he wrote particularly well, myself. What have you read, exactly, to make a claim one way or another about him I wonder?

Fantastic point. The Heraclitean maxim panta rhei will probably never lose its relevance. As you so correctly remarked, the axiom I'm using in my argument is that whatever there is, if there is, beyond our senses and instruments is simply impossible to access and ergo, all that we can ever do is speculate, speculate and speculate. Given that these speculations will forever be impossible to verify, to invest belief in any one of the many theories that will invariably pop up would be a grave mistake because there'll be implications, some of which may not be beneficial to us. Think of religion for instance - it is, in essence, a theory of what is beyond the senses and our instruments and look how much damage it's done. — TheMadFool

Yes indeed. But not only religion -- philosophy as well. You can't have science without philosophy. Remember that science was simply "natural philosophy" in Descartes' day, Newton's day and Kant's day. This framework and its interpretation of the empirical world dominates every other understanding in today's world, including the Christian account (or any other religious perspective, really). Therefore it's important to ask: what was this philosophy of nature? What was the basis of its interpretation of all that we can know, through out senses and our reason?

Well, a clue is given from the word itself: "natural." And so "nature." This word, as you know, comes from the Latin "natura" and was a translation of the Greek "phusis."

It turns out that φῠ́σῐς (phusis) is the basis for "physical." So the idea of the physical world and the natural world are ultimately based on Greek and Latin concepts, respectively.

Nothing you don't know, of course, but since you mentioned "beyond the senses" I was reminded of ideas about the "metaphysical" world (currently kidnapped in part by New Age-type "thinking"), which itself has its origin in φῠ́σῐς, as being the title for all of Aristotle's lectures after the ones on "physics." Supposedly this told students not to read the "meta-physics" until they read the lectures on "physics." So our current conception of metaphysics as the study of things "beyond" the natural world isn't even quite right -- but an interesting side note anyway.

So the question "What is 'nature'?" ends up leading to a more fundamental question: "What is the 'physical'?" and that ultimately resides in the etymology of φῠ́σῐς and, finally, in the origins of Western thought: Greek thought.

The analysis of this concept is very important indeed to understand our current scientific conception of the world, and therefore the predominant world ontology (at least non-religious, or perhaps simply the de facto ontology ). Maybe this digression is worth a separate thread, but I've always found Heidegger's analysis of it to be the most enlightening. Would be worth discussing.

Wanting only temporarily ceases depending on the want. Other wants come up to guide our actions. If we're hungry, we seek food. Once we're full, we're off to something else -- the need for entertainment, maybe, or sex, or drugs, or writing on the computer. It goes on and on. There is no real way out of it except in death. You can tweak it all a bit, but that's all you can do.

I still don't think this question really makes sense, nor have you clarified it in any meaningful way. Better to talk about what wanting IS rather than why we want "more." There's always going to be something more we want. Who cares.

As far as I can tell, naturalism seems the most reasonable point of view for anyone to assume as a worldview. — TheMadFool

You're not alone. And that's a respectable position, no doubt.

Anything beyond what can be known and beyond reason is by defintion then unknowable and/or incomprehensible. Given that what is non-naturalism coincides with the unknowable, it strikes me that to entertain a non-naturalistic standpoint is like a person born blind trying to perceive and understand color. It's impossible. — TheMadFool

If anything "non-natural" is completely unknowable, then of course what you say logically follows. But what is "nature"? If it's simply anything we can understand, then that's fine - but coming to view the knowable world as "nature" has a history, up to the modern scientific narrative of the Big Bang, evolution, particles, forces, etc. Its origin is ultimately Greek. If this current worldview is one among others, as you admit it is, then it too will evolve.

History has all kinds of ways of understanding the world -- whether it was considered God's creation or φῠ́σῐς. To believe we've settled on the ultimate interpretation is common in every era.

Ok. So do you think it's reasonable to speculate that the Dems might try to replace him? — fishfry

Just give it up man, for the love of God. There's no chance in hell this happens. None. Zero. That some "speculate" about it to rile people up, create buzz, and broaden readership is completely irrelevant to any thinking adult. Was Sandyhook a "false flag"? I could cite Alex Jones and several articles about it. I guess that makes it plausible, in your world, and totally worth entertaining? If you think so, please remove yourself from the adult table and go have fun "speculating" about anything you want.

So you all-in for Biden or what? Taking a poll of my liberal friends. — fishfry

I'm not liberal and I'm not your friend.

Nor am I "all in" for Biden. I've never liked Biden as a candidate. Will I vote for him over Trump? Of course I will. That decision should take about 3 minutes to make.

Think about it this way... If my desire for more is confused with a need, then isn't that some form of trapping oneself in a manner of speech? — Shawn

"Trapped" in the sense that the "needing" and "wanting" never end? I suppose so.

I didn't understand this.

I have to say that it appears to me to be a given -- the constant sense of moving towards something -- the future, an object, a location, a feeling, a sensation, a thought. In this activity, we're evaluating as well, meaning we label the phenomena "pleasant" or "unpleasant", "good" and "bad." We approach some aspects and avoid or "flee" others. It's always appeared to me to be the same as "willing," although this may be more associated with the act of planning and goal-creation. In Schopenhauer this is the "will to live," in Nietzsche it's "will to power." In Buddhist philosophy, it's "desiring" in the sense of "craving."

This is all just completely false. Everyone knows what matter is. — Gregory

:)

OK.

That's "understanding what the world is". How could Newton have disproved the solidity of matter? How is that possible? I don't get it. If it's solid and cohesive, we then have some understanding of it — Gregory

What is "understanding what the world is"? What are you referring to in that first sentence?

I never said Newton "disproved the solidity of matter."

"Understanding" was defined, in the beginning of the scientific revolution, in the context of the mechanical philosophy -- and explained, for example, with the concept of contact action. In this context, "body" and "matter" was given a definition. With Newton's "occult forces," that philosophy collapsed.

It doesn't mean the world doesn't exist or we can't understand anything. It just means the idea of "matter" or "body" or "physical" no longer have a technical definition. Hence issues like the "mind/body" problem is meaningless and, as I've written elsewhere, the long debates about "subjects and objects," about the inner/outer world, etc., are likewise useless.

So, reader, how do you explain the need, no... want! for more? — Shawn

I don't think this is a well-formulated question.

What do you mean by "explain"? Explain what, exactly? Desire? Wanting itself? Willing?

I take what you mean as explaining greed. In which case, there's been plenty written about that. There's been plenty written about "selfishness," etc.

The obvious answer, to me, is simply that these aspects are part of our being, our "nature" (in the loose sense of the term). But that could be wrong -- maybe some people don't have it at all. We are also very generous, we love others, we're kind, value friendship and cooperation, etc.

But for us -- the people of the modern world -- I think it's largely conditioned by the predominant philosophy, beliefs, and values of our culture.

any real definition of "body" went out the window in the 17th century, as you know.
— Xtrix

They just brought up questions of solidity, energy, and such. We still can understand what the world is and that it exists — Gregory

No, they completely discarded any sense of "body" or "material." Newton himself thought it was an absurdity, but it's what the evidence was pointing to. So the mechanical philosophy was a dead end. And it has never been revived.

I didn't say anything about "understanding what the world is" or that it "doesn't exist."

Are you your thoughts, feelings, actions?
— Xtrix

Yes. And so much more. — ZhouBoTong

Fair enough. In that broader definition, you are also your car, your house, and your clothes.

Where is this "self"?
— Xtrix

It's just a word. It has a definition. We often use words to summarize more complex concepts (like self). — ZhouBoTong

OK, and what is the definition?

I am not saying I don't somewhat understand your post modern semi nihilistic view here (that is like all of my academic philosophy vocabulary used at once, so I may be entirely wrong), but what purpose can it serve? — ZhouBoTong

Not post-modern. Nihilism also has nothing to do with it. What I'm discussing here actually goes back at least 2500 years. Maybe "mystical" is what you mean or something like that. In which case I don't agree.

I don't know what you mean by "purpose" here either. What's the purpose of hanging on to the concept of "self" in that case?

Does grass exist? If we get down to it, it is really millions of individual cells. Within these cells are organelles that serve vastly different functions. How dare we call ALL of this "grass". — ZhouBoTong

Sure. The "self" exists too. So does the meaning of life. So does beauty and justice. So does the financial crisis in Venezuela. Ordinary usage and ordinary language is fine, but we're doing philosophical analysis here, and thus appealing to commonsense notions and the dictionary just doesn't work.

Likewise for "soul," likewise for "spirit," "subject," "mind" for that matter.
— Xtrix

But these are not all the same. By definitions, "subjects" and "minds" certainly exist. "Souls" and "Spirits" only definitely exist as metaphors or fiction (I am not saying they don't exist, but they MIGHT not). Similarly, based on definitions and usage, most of us know "selfs" exist...but, of course, they exist as concepts...but upon deeper inspection, most words only exist as concepts, just like the Grass example I gave above. — ZhouBoTong

I don't understand "by definitions, x and y certainly exist." I think this is all very confused.

Grass not only exists in ordinary usage, but it also has a scientific meaning which you began to describe. It has a color and a form extended in space, etc. When analyzing the "self" scientifically (or philosophically), there's simply nothing to explore -- it hasn't been defined in any meaningful way, so we can't even begin to analyze it in the way we can "grass."

If you're defining "self" within a certain theory, and giving it a technical definition I'm not aware of, then that's different. I don't see you doing so.
— Xtrix

Nope. Just dictionary and common usage. — ZhouBoTong

Which is exactly wrong. Although this surprisingly comes up a lot in this forum - people want to settle issues with appeals to common sense and Webster's dictionary. That's not doing philosophy. It's actually more like walking into a physics department and citing the dictionary when discussing "energy."

What "evidence" is there that there IS a self?
— Xtrix

We both keep using "I" and "you". We are assuming selfs. — ZhouBoTong

So if we didn't use those words, there would be no "selves"?

Regardless, in your sense God exists, since we all say "Thank God" and whatnot. Ok, that's fine. But it's not philosophy and not science.

Lots of things are considered common sense. The moon illusion is a good example. Or gravity for that matter. For nearly 2000 years things were considered to be "going to their natural places." OK, discussion over - everyone knows it, no sense questioning it. Ditto for "God," and these days maybe something like "American exceptionalism." If you're happy with common sense notions, that's fine. I'm not out to "disillusion" anyone, but once you take a serious look into these concepts, it's quite interesting, and everyday notions just don't help.

Speaking for myself, I think and I know there's something doing the thinking but I'm inclined to believe it's just the brain reflecting on its own thoughts. — TheMadFool

The view of naturalism and modern science, for the most part. But again this presupposes "material," "body," and "physical" have meaning, and in my view they don't -- in the technical sense. Again, for ordinary usage there's no problem, but any real definition of "body" went out the window in the 17th century, as you know.

I long ago gave up the appalling vanity of trying to stay awake whilst meditating, — bongo fury

The appalling vanity? I don't understand this comment.

It's fine if one falls asleep while meditating. It's very common. But the point is to fall awake. There's nothing "vain" about that.

Meditation may help someone deal with pain (likewise hypnosis) but it is not a permanent state to function in. — Andrew4Handel

Ask Thich Nhat Hahn or Jon Kabat-Zinn if it's a permanent state. Your sense of "meditation" is limited. That can refer to a formal practice, like sitting on a cushion etc., but what's being practiced or cultivated is awareness and equanimity -- which of course can be used in any circumstance. So running can be meditation, swimming, having a conversation, etc. It's an exercise, like yoga. I like thinking of it that way.

All of the philosophical-type stuff about the self, or the concept of "Anatta" in Buddhism, doesn't really matter all that much. But I can tell you from experience that if you persevere with it, you'll see what they're talking about. You don't have to take anyone's word for it. In that sense, I truly doubt you've meditated deeply -- it's not easy to drop attachment or to recognize thinking as thinking. I myself have only caught glimpses -- but even that is worth doing.

The narratives we build around this so-called "self" is what is usually the issue for us. Jealousy, insecurity, reactions to our social environment, reactions to pain, etc. -- all have to do with our conditioned responses and our sense of "self" as a possession.

whereas in the East it's much easier -- due to their very different traditional ontologies.
— Xtrix

Apparently Hindus believe in the soul/self but Buddhists don't but the issue is constantly debated in their histories. I don't see it as a resolved issue in those cultures. — Andrew4Handel

They're actually quite similar. Remember that it's claimed the Buddha himself was a Hindu prince (at least according to legend, I'm not sure how historically valid this is but it's the best we have), which seems at least plausible. The Hindus believe in Atman, the "true self" which is supposedly something different from what we normally identify with. In realizing this, one sees that one is actually part of Brahman.

This is all very different from the concepts we've grown up in, especially handed down in our sciences and since Descartes, Kant, etc.

There is pain, yes. There are sensations. There are thoughts. There are sights and sounds. There are all kinds of phenomena in the world. To attach a "I," "me," mine," "you," etc., to it is tricky.
— Xtrix

I am not attaching anything to these things I am saying they don't make sense without an experiencer to be subject to them. — Andrew4Handel

OK, but where is this "experiencer"? Where is awareness? Is that the "self"?

I can't say you are wrong. But a loss of self seems to fail as the simplest explanation. It feels like claiming there is a god. A HUGE claim, with very limited evidence. — ZhouBoTong

I think you have it exactly backwards. The huge claim being made is that there IS a self. Tell us what it is and what evidence there is for it, and then we can tell you whether we believe in it or not. But that's either not been done, or when it has -- e.g., as some "entity" residing somewhere behind your eyes -- it can be shown to be not that. All we know -- whether on drugs or in deep meditation -- is that there is phenomena happening and changing -- both "in" our minds and "in" our bodies, as well as "outside" of "us," and that none of it is really "me." It's not an easy thing to grasp, especially growing up in the West, but it can be experienced. If you haven't experienced it yet but are truly interested in seeing it, then yes either take harder drugs or my recommendation would be to go to a meditation retreat for a week.

It maybe true that an external reality exists but how can we describe it? Once we start to describe it we rely on individual perceivers. — Andrew4Handel

I think the whole "inner/outer" or "external/internal world" debate is a mistake. In fact I started an entire thread about this in the "Notion of Subject/Object" a couple months ago. It's taken us down blind alleys and dead ends.

The very question, the problem itself (about the self or the subject or the external world), is based on a set of beliefs and assumptions about the world which have their origins in the thinking of Descartes, the Scholastics, and the Greeks. I think this is precisely the reason claims that are made about the "self" being an illusion is particularly hard to grasp to us Westerners, whereas in the East it's much easier -- due to their very different traditional ontologies.

I think that there is a fundamental problem in claiming something doesn't exist that people have direct access to.

For example pain. If you are in pain you know you are and no theorizing is going stop you being in pain. — Andrew4Handel

There is pain, yes. There are sensations. There are thoughts. There are sights and sounds. There are all kinds of phenomena in the world. To attach a "I," "me," mine," "you," etc., to it is tricky. It's fine for everyday use, but when you analyze it philosophically or scientifically, or even introspect for a while (or meditate, as in the Buddhist case) you find that it's not really defined at all. This is why it's sad to be an "illusion." It's not that you or I don't "exist," but that those very terms (when referring to individual "selves") are actually quite vague and, in the end, meaningless.