My interpretation of Wittgenstein and hinge propositions is that hinges are neither true nor false, i.e., hinges have a role similar to the rules of a game. I’m specifically referring to the use of true and false as something verified by facts, i.e., something justified within an epistemological system. “If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false. If someone asked us ‘but is that true?’ we might say ‘yes’ to him; and if he demanded grounds we might say ‘I can’t give you any grounds, but if you learn more you too will think the same (OC 205, 206).” One can use “true,” but note it’s not an epistemic use of the concept as justified true belief. Rational discourse requires that there be these basic beliefs for rational discourse to function.

If someone asked, someone who is just learning chess, “Is it true that bishops move diagonally?” I would answer “Yes.” And if they further asked, “How do you know (an epistemological question)?” I might respond “It’s just one of the rules of the game.” In this case, the use of true is not justified, it’s just accepted as a basic belief without any grounding.

“But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put (OC 343).”

Not only do hinges make it possible for rational discourse, but they also set the limits of what can be reasonably doubted.

We're never going to come to a consensus on OC, that's clear. There will always be some interpretation that someone has that you'll disagree with. What's important is that Witt established that there are some very basic beliefs about the world (call them hinges, foundations, Moorean propositions, call them what you like) that are starting points for language games, a place where there is no need for justification.

I think this idea has ramifications beyond epistemology. I think it solves the problem posed by Godel's two theorems. These hinge beliefs seem to exist in any system where proofs are required, whether epistemological or mathematical. This of course goes beyond anything Witt talked about in OC, but I think it has merit.

My view is that Moore's assertion, "I know this is a hand," amounts to an expression of subjective certainty, i.e., akin to a conviction (which Witt points out) that he is certain without justification (although Moore thinks he's justified). The reason I add the subjective is that there is a use of certainty as a synonym for know, i.e., objective certainty.

There's always going to be a certain amount of cultural relativism.

Just as there is no fixed point from which we can observe the motion of the universe, there is no fixed foundation for our knowing. — Fooloso4

There is no fixed point, but there are fixed points within given contexts. You seem to add things not part of what I'm contending.

Anti-foundational foundations? — Fooloso4

Yes, if what you mean by anti-foundationalism, is traditional foundationalism. His presentation of a foundation is nothing like traditional foundationalism. It's a different way of thinking about the foundation. It's outside epistemological constructs, i.e., it supports and gives life to epistemology.

It's interesting to note that different language games reflect different endpoints. However, it seems to me that some endpoints are not really hinges, and the way we can see this is by asking if it makes sense to doubt one's endpoint. For e.g., I've listened to some philosophers who want to place belief in God in the same category as Witt's hinges, so within their language game, it's a given, in the same way, this is a hand is a given. However, there is an important test to see if your hinge is proper, viz., does it make sense to doubt that proposition? Compare this is a hand and belief in God, it's much more natural to doubt the latter. There is an exception, let's say you had a veridical encounter with God, then in that case it could be considered a hinge. However, trying to prove your experience would be very difficult indeed.

...but... — Sam26

The "but" wasn't meant to be a disagreement but an additional point.

I agree with you that our actions are an important part of all this, they reflect something very important. We cannot forget about what we do! Our forms of life reflect this.

"Doesn't this mean: I shall proceed according to this belief unconditionally, and not let anything confuse me?

"But it isn't just that I believe in this way that I have two hands, but that every reasonable person does.

"At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded (OC 251, 252, and 253)."

Again, these endpoints seem to be foundational.

They are foundational in regard to what we do with them. Their meaning is their use in a language agme. — Banno

Yes, but there is a sense where we are also forced into a foundational position if we want to play the game, whatever that game may be. However, this doesn't mean the foundation can't change, at least in some contexts.

"'Here I have arrived at a foundation of all my beliefs (OC 246)." This passage plays off of OC 245.

So, the analogy I use over and over again is to think of foundational in the same way that the rules of chess, the board, and the pieces are foundational. One doesn't need to justify these components they are just there as part of the background needed to play the game. The games rest on these components, i.e., they're foundational to the game. You can also think of language games in the same way, viz., resting on certain implicit and explicit rules within our forms of life.

:grin: No, it's a concept that has various uses in different contexts. I don't see how anyone can read OC and not see a foundational component to what Witt is saying. I've read quite a few papers on this subject and it comes up time and time again, so it's not unique to me.

Well, as you know I do read a kind of foundationalism into OC, but it's nothing like traditional foundationalism. Also, I don't view much of what I'm saying in an absolute sense, but in a general sense. I agree with all but your first statement, unless you're referring to traditional foundationalism, then I would agree.

In other words, the endpoints, i.e., where justification ends are a kind of foundational position, but a foundation without justification.

In some passages, Witt seems to compare Moore's statement about knowing this is a hand to someone's conviction of a particular belief. In other words, when Moore states what he knows, at least in these passages, it seems to be more a function of his convictions than a function of knowledge. For e.g., in OC 6 he says, "And through this misuse [misuse of the word know] a queer and extremely important mental state is revealed." I don't think it's a stretch to think that this mental state is the mental state of conviction. For instance, "Suppose I replace Moore's 'I know' by 'I am of the unshakeable conviction' (OC 86)." Or look at OC 91, "But has he got the right ground for his conviction? For if not, then after all he doesn't know (Russell)." Witt seems to be pointing out the subjective nature of what Moore is saying. Of course, as I've already pointed out, Witt uses certainty in two different senses, subjective certainty and objective certainty, the latter is akin to knowing, the former not, at least not in this context. Knowledge is not generated by some inner subjective point of view, at least not the knowledge that Moore's trying to convey to the skeptic.

My thinking on OC is that Witt's biggest contribution is the idea that certain basic beliefs are the endpoints that form the bedrock of epistemological ideas. It solves the problem of the infinite regress of justifications, and it solves the problem of circularity. This is not insignificant.

The other important idea, and there are probably many more, is the way we think of doubt, viz., just as knowledge requires justification, so does doubting. People tend to think that their doubts are always warranted, but they're not. Think of knowledge and doubting as two sides of a coin. Both require a justification.

I do want to comment on what I was saying about hinges in relation to Godel's proofs. All I was trying to say is that instead of looking at certain axioms within a particular system as something that can't be proven within the system, we could look at them as endpoints not needing proof or justification, like Witt's hinges.

I agree. Although I make a distinction between subjective certainty and objective certainty, the latter being akin to knowledge. I think Witt made this distinction too.

nor are there clear conclusions in On Certainty. I think you have missed quite a bit of what is going on here. — Banno

This is important because OC is not a finished work so we don't know what the editing process would have looked like, i.e., what passages would have been left in or left out. Although, certain ideas seem to have some staying power. For example, the idea that Moorean propositions are not normally justified, i.e., justification does have an endpoint. It ends with very basic beliefs. The problem is that what's basic in one context is not in another. One has to look carefully at the specific language games and contexts. In one context "Here is one hand," is outside epistemological systems, and in another, it's within the system. One needs to ask if it makes sense to doubt the proposition. That tells us a lot.

I'm mostly trying to take Witt's ideas and run with them. I'm not always agreeing with Witt or trying to stay within the confines of his thought process. I think it's fun to see where a particular line of thought goes. People who try to tell me that this or that passage says this as opposed to that are not paying attention. The thread is indeed called An Analysis of OC, but my analysis does sometimes go beyond Witt and will indeed stretch his ideas. I will at times debate this or that interpretation, but I'm not going to debate forever these differences, it distracts from the overall goal, which is to give a particular twist to OC, right or wrong. Many of my ideas coincide with what other philosophers have concluded so it's not that I'm so far out in left field that the ideas don't have some validity.

So, if I don't engage, mostly it's about not getting sidetracked or because I don't have the time to answer every question. Don't take it personally. As you've noticed I don't devote all my time to this, I post here and there.

Finally, I've devoted a lot of time to OC. I've read it more times than I can count. So, I do have fairly good background knowledge of Witt's thinking. There are only about 4 or five people in this forum who have as much or more knowledge of this text than I do.

Witt's hinge propositions function the same.. They too are necessary conditions and outside experience.. Their examples might be different, but their functional roles are about the same. They both propose preconditions that are cognitive frameworks for knowledge and experience to take place. — schopenhauer1

I don't see Witt as saying hinges are like Kant's a priori statements, i.e., outside experience. Just the opposite, they are the experiences or beliefs that provide a foundation for epistemology. Think of them like the rules of chess, the board, and the pieces, without which there would be no chess game. There may be some overlap with Kant, but it's not what drives Witt's thinking. Witt's thinking in OC is just much different.

Yes but explain what you think Witt is saying and how it connects with Kant, and then I'll respond. I'm not sure we're on the same page.

Why do we need to read Wittgenstein's "On Certainty" to get back to conclusions which Kant already implied with his ideas of "synthetic a priori truths"? — schopenhauer1

I'm not sure what conclusions you're referring to. What do you think the conclusions of OC are?

It's not a good idea to consider hinges to be "outside our epistemological framework", any more than it would be a good idea for a hydrologist not to consider the riverbed. They are rather the foundation on which an "epistemological framework" rests. — Banno

I assume this is directed toward me, so I'll respond. We know that much of what Witt was saying was directed at Moore's propositions in his papers Proof of an External World and A Defense of Common Sense, so we're referring to specific propositions that Moore says he knows. Moore believes he has a justification for claiming to know "This is a hand (as he raises it to the audience)." Witt resists this notion, although he starts OC with, "If you do know [my emphasis] that here is one hand, we'll grant you all the rest (OC 1)." It seems clear to me that when Witt refers to hinge propositions or Moorean propositions he's saying that you don't know what you think you know, viz., Moore's use of the concept know doesn't apply because these statements don't fall within the domain of JTB. We don't normally justify these basic beliefs or Moorean statements. There are of course exceptions to this general rule (generally we don't justify them) and Witt points these out.

If you're reading my statements in an absolute sense, I would agree they are not always outside our epistemological framework, but Witt is saying that they generally are not within our epistemological framework (which is what I'm claiming), i.e., requiring a justification. So, I agree, that these Moorean propositions are the foundation on which our epistemological framework rests, but that doesn't mean they are part of epistemology, they support epistemology. I think OC 1 is key to interpreting the thrust of my point because Witt is saying "If you do know..." then your conclusion follows, i.e., Moore's point is epistemological, but Witt doesn't agree.

I'll just make these points for now.

It may be questionable for you but not me. If you want to interpret it another way that's fine, but I think it goes against Wittgenstein's general thinking.

It does not matter how many times Wittgenstein refers to this kind of proposition as "hinge," most philosophers use the term to refer to this kind of proposition (hinge, bedrock, foundational, basic, all mostly refer to the same thing).

I’ll try to re-word my point to make it clearer. First, a summary of Godel’s incompleteness theorems. The first theorem states that in any formal system adequate for number theory there exists true mathematical propositions (including its negation) that cannot be proven within the system. The corollary (the second theorem) is that the consistency of the formal system capable of expressing arithmetic cannot be proved using only its axioms and rules.

My point is that if we think of the propositions in Godel’s theorem (the ones that cannot be proven within the system) in the same way Wittgenstein thinks of hinge propositions (basic beliefs), viz., that hinges are outside our epistemological framework, then there is no requirement to prove the propositions within the system. We could think of Godel’s unprovable statements as hinge-like. So, Godel’s unprovable statements are necessary for the formal system to operate, just as hinges are necessary for our epistemic practices. The systems are held fast by viewing certain statements as hinges. I’m assuming you understand Wittgenstein’s point about hinges in OC.

Hinges provide a way of understanding Godel’s theorems without the need to justify certain basic beliefs within the system. I prefer to call these basic beliefs, non-propositional, which eliminates the need to refer to them as true or false. It seems to me that you can always ask of a true proposition, “How do you know it’s true?” – which evokes a justificatory response. Moreover, if you refer to them as true, can you also ask if they can be false? This seems to open a can of worms.

It seems to me that formal systems are held together by background beliefs, i.e., that you can’t create a formal system (epistemic or mathematical system) without the background. I’m specifically referring to the prelinguistic background that is even more fundamental than linguistic hinges. For example, the prelinguistic beliefs that occur as a result of engaging with the world, walking, running, touching, smelling, object and special awareness, etc. Even causal and simple logical relationships are probably part of these basic beliefs. So, the basic beliefs that are formed before linguistics play an important role in the more sophisticated linguistic beliefs (such as what it means to know) that come later.

Basic beliefs are important because they form the substructure that allows epistemic and mathematical systems to form without the need for justification, i.e., they are prior to our justificatory models. Basic beliefs, especially prelinguistic beliefs, are the scaffolding that allows our models of epistemology and mathematical systems to take root. These kinds of beliefs are necessarily prior to our world of justification.

Wittgenstein’s Hinge Propositions and Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem

I’ve been thinking for quite some time now that there might be a novel framework for understanding Godel’s incompleteness theorems by using Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions. Godel’s first incompleteness theorem states that in any reasonable mathematical system, there will be statements that are true but unprovable within the system. Godel’s second incompleteness theorem takes this a step further by showing that the system cannot demonstrate its consistency using only the axioms and rules of inference within that system.

I believe there is another way of looking at Godel’s conclusions that might solve the problems posed by Godel’s theorems. There seems to be a parallel between Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions and the foundational axioms of a mathematical system. Wittgensteinian hinges are outside any formal epistemological justification or doubt. If we carry this idea over into Gödel’s theorems, then the axioms of the theorems might be thought of in the same way, i.e., there’s no requirement for proof if they are the hinges that provide the framework for the system to function. In other words, the foundation is not proved from within the system but is necessary for the system to function. The foundational axioms act as hinges in the Wittgensteinian sense. This would eliminate Godel’s requirement for the axioms to be proved within the system. We could then think of the foundational axioms of mathematics, such as the Peano axioms or the axioms of set theory as hinge propositions of mathematics. They would be the basic beliefs of mathematics which would be outside any formal justification. This would eliminate the need for trying to prove the axioms within the system.

Although these two systems, viz., epistemology and formal logic, are different domains, it may be that Wittgenstein’s hinges could fulfill a role in each domain, which may provide a better way of understanding the difficulties of Godel’s theorems.

Can you be any more condescending? I'll refrain from saying what I want and leave it at that.

Funny opinions, but that's about all it is. :grin:

My theory of consciousness is similar in some ways to Donald Hoffman's. There are differences, for example, I’m not sure that you can use a mathematical model to describe consciousness on a fundamental level, which he’s attempting to do. The reason is that mathematics, for me, is something that is either generated by consciousness/mind or that eternally exists as part of the fundamental nature of consciousness. Also, Hoffman and others want to say that core consciousness is outside space (it may be outside space, although I’m not sure) and time, but I think time is fundamental on some level with consciousness. I believe it’s contradictory to say that a mind could exist outside all time. It may be that the core mind is outside what we experience as space and time, but it’s not completely outside time. For example, if consciousness created our reality, the one we find ourselves in, then there would have to be a point X before that creation, otherwise, what would it even mean to say that the mind created this reality? You couldn’t even make sense of creating outside time, what would create even mean? The word create seems to imply definitionally something temporal, i.e., before the creation and after the creation.

I want to say that core consciousness or even our consciousness on an individual level cannot be doubted, it’s like trying to doubt that you exist. Our doubts show or demonstrate our existence. In a very important sense consciousness is the hinge of existence (to use Wittgensteinian language). Existence swings on the hinge of consciousness. It requires no justification. It just is. It’s the presuppositional axiom of existence.

I do believe we are individuals that are part of the core mind, i.e., we are individuals that are connected with the core. My theory or model is based on my extensive study of many thousands of NDEs and the reports of those experiences, which I believe are veridical.

The core consciousness is constantly creating experiences for the innumerable conscious beings that are associated with the core mind. The core mind experiences the totality of experiences of each mind. In this way, the core is constantly having new experiences, and we will also continue to experience new things as we choose to have the experiences generated by the core. So, we can experience any reality that is created by consciousness. Moreover, the essence of who we are cannot be harmed by any of the realities we enter.



Donald Hoffman on Consciousness and Conscious Agents

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HIxz9pyHukA

To compare the testimonial evidence of abductions to the testimonial evidence of NDEs is a complete misunderstanding of good testimonial evidence.
— Sam26
Explain why you think "testimonial evidence of alien abductions" is not "good testimonial evidence". — 180 Proof

That is a good question, and I believe part of the answer can be seen in good detective work. If all you have to work with is the testimony of a person or persons, then you have to ask yourself several questions.
1) Was the person in a position to know? Was the person there? Is the testimonial evidence firsthand or secondhand?
2) Can the evidence be corroborated, which can give us an objective way to verify its accuracy?
3) How many reports do we have that are firsthand?
4) Are the reports generally consistent? This helps to identify the truthfulness of the reports. The reports don’t need to be 100% accurate, but they do need to be more consistent than not. Even if you have a 60% or 70% accuracy, you’ll still get a good idea of what’s happening. For example, if we have 100 people reporting what they saw at a concert and 60% reporting X, Y, and Z, then we can be relatively certain that X, Y, and Z happened. Even if the other 30 or 40% are reporting things that the others didn’t see or hear. In other words, you can take what the majority of people are reporting and infer that that’s what probably took place.
5) Do we have a variety of reports to choose from that are reporting the same things? The more variety added to the consistency strengthens the reports.
6) There are many other factors to consider. For example, the character of those who are reporting the events. Do they have something to gain? Are they lying, etc?

These are just some of the things to consider. This is not meant to be exhaustive.

The one thing that stands out to me when considering alien abductions is that almost none of them can be corroborated. This is probably the biggest negative against these claims. You can’t go and talk to others who were at the scene to verify the accuracy of the claims. On the other hand, NDEs can and are being corroborated by doctors, nurses, friends, and family members. Many alien abductions consist of very vague memories and some of the memories are accessed through hypnosis, which makes them questionable at best.

Many of the abductions occur as sleep-related events or in isolated locations, which is why there is seldom if ever any good corroboration. This means that there is little to no way to objectively verify the events.

It’s also interesting that most of the alien abduction reports started happening in the 60’s when more and more reports of UFOs were happening. Alien abductions are not a historical phenomenon. NDEs have been reported as far back as Plato (the supposed Myth of Er, 380 BC), The Tibetan Book of the Dead (8th century), and the Egyptian Book of the Dead (around 1550 BC), so it has more of a historical context.

There are a lot more weaknesses in alien abductions, but this is a start.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=07EYacr3rBg&t=3347s

I came back to my original argument because of a debate I saw between Dr. Sean Carroll and Dr. Steven Novella vs Dr. Eban Alexander and Dr. Raymond Moody. Sean and Stevan are much better debaters than Eban and Raymond, so I thought Sean and Steven won the debate. Frankly, I was disappointed in Raymond Moody because as a philosopher he should’ve done a better job. He started to make an epistemological point (like I do) but didn’t follow through.

Both Dr. Carroll and Dr. Novella are presenting arguments similar in many ways to the arguments people are trying to use against me in this thread. We know that the brain generates consciousness, therefore NDEs are generated by the brain. So, by definition, consciousness is generated by the brain. Their point is that there’s a causal relation between the brain and consciousness, it’s settled science for Sean and Steven and many materialists, not all materialists but many.

My counterargument is that they’re confusing correlation with causation. I would say that it’s settled science that there’s a correlation between the brain and consciousness, but not causation just as there’s a correlation between what we hear from a radio and the radio itself. We know that the sound isn’t generated by the radio even though we can make many correlations between the sound and the radio. Someone primitive might believe the radio is causing the sound, but we know there is something else involved, viz., the radio's antenna picks up electromagnetic waves transmitted by radio stations. Of course, on my side of the argument, I can’t point to anything like an electromagnetic wave that would cause consciousness, so I look at other kinds of evidence, viz., testimonial evidence. Testimonial evidence is one of the main ways we come to know most of what we know. Testimony is not science, although sometimes the data collected can be science. There are the beginnings of scientific data in some NDE research, but more needs to be done. However, I rely on logic and testimonial evidence to make what I believe is a strong inductive rational argument for my conclusion, viz., consciousness survives the death of the body. I don’t define the argument in such a way that no amount of testimonial evidence can make a persuasive case against my conclusion. The arguments against my conclusion (most of the arguments especially the ones by Dr. Carroll and Dr. Novella) are clearly fallacious. They’re self-sealing in that all testimonial evidence is rejected out of hand. No amount of counterevidence (testimonial evidence) can be enough to counter their definition of consciousness, viz., that consciousness is a brain function. Note that when you give testimonial evidence to the contrary it’s never good enough. It can always be explained by the brain, even though they’re just guessing or surmising that the brain, even when in a condition that probably wouldn’t generate the detail of an NDE, is producing the NDE. According to them, there must be some level of brain activity to explain why people are having the experience, even if they can’t explain what activity that is. All they do is guess at what might be causing these experiences, and all they’re saying is that the brain produces consciousness, therefore you’re wrong. These are weak arguments at best. They can keep repeating the mantra that the brain causes consciousness but that doesn’t make it so. Correlation doesn’t mean causation.

To reject my argument, you have to reject that testimonial evidence is a valid form of knowing apart from science. This doesn’t mean that because people tell us that they’ve been abducted by aliens that’s good testimonial evidence because it’s not. All good testimonial evidence must be evaluated rigorously. As I’ve said in other posts it’s what a good detective would do, and it takes a lot of work and comparing the data collected. To compare the testimonial evidence of abductions to the testimonial evidence of NDEs is a complete misunderstanding of good testimonial evidence.

Given the large amount of disagreement on what life after death looks like, I concluded that NDE are subjectively experienced phenomena of a dying brain, rather than of an objective reality. — Brendan Golledge

You can't go on YouTube and read a few testimonials and come to a decent conclusion. I've studied and read over 5000 testimonials, and many others have studied NDEs for years and there is no doubt, at least for me, if you have an ounce of objectivity in you that there is something veridical about these experiences. If they were purely subjective without an objective component I'd agree with you, at least partly. However, any large number of testimonials will have differences that seem contradictory and even may be contradictory. You can take 20 people who were at the scene of an accident, and you may find contradictory statements, but that doesn't mean the accident didn't happen. You have to look for consistency to make sense of what happened at the scene. And that consistent testimony must line up with objective facts.

If someone who has had an NDE comes to you and describes their experience and says they saw a doctor do X and say Y, or that they can describe what someone was talking about in a waiting room while they were under anesthesia, sure I'd be skeptical. But if you then verify that the doctor did do X and say Y and that the conversation in the waiting room was also verified to be accurate, you're at least going to be curious and ask questions. True, you may also just dismiss thinking there's another explanation. But let's take it a step further, suppose you have thousands of objectively verifiable experiences like this, how can you just dismiss all of the objective components? People who claim that it's all subjective are refusing to see the obvious.

There are also other explanations why people are claiming to see Jesus, angels, or some other religious figure, viz., because all of our experiences are filtered through cultural beliefs, so if you're a Christian you may see a being as Jesus or some other religious figure. Again, you have to look at what's consistent and proceed from there, and there is a lot of consistency. You could take 100 people who were at a concert and some of the reports would be completely different, but that doesn't mean they weren't at the concert. You could take another 100 people who were at the theatre watching a play and you would get many different interpretations of what the play was trying to convey. People always misinterpret what they see and hear, but that doesn't mean the play didn't happen. Evaluating testimonial evidence is like detective work, it takes time and careful examination of the testimony. You don't have to do some experiments in a laboratory to always confirm your findings a careful examination of what people say is often enough to come to a definitive conclusion, i.e., that X is what probably happened. You may not know with absolute certainty, but you don't have to know with absolute certainty to claim knowledge, which is what I'm doing.

Many of the arguments in this thread are based on pure speculation. There's not a shred of evidence that these are hallucinations, drug-induced, a dying brain, dreams, lack of oxygen, or whatever else people want to attribute to these experiences. This is pure speculation. Not one argument in this thread has even come close to defeating the evidence. There are reasons to be skeptical, but those reasons can't be maintained if you carefully study the evidence, that's my position.

Furthermore, these experiences have all the hallmarks of veridical experiences, clear memories of what they saw, general consistency when looking at a large number of testimonials, memories that are sustained over time, the impact of the memories on their lives, etc.

By the way, you haven't read the thread if you're saying I haven't given an argument. The inductive argument was given at least three times.

p. 35 about halfway down

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1980/evidence-of-consciousness-surviving-the-body/p35

Your mind is made up, why bother? You seem to think the question is settled, but It's far from settled, not even close. Your dogma is just as bad, if not worse than many on the religious side of these beliefs.

What is explained? How about the source of this reality? How about consciousness surviving death? How about a metaphysical reality? How about the information in cells that point to intelligence? How about the source of mathematics? How about the source of individual consciousness?

You may disagree, but a mind or consciousness behind the universe can explain a lot of things. It may not give a perfect explanation, but most theories don't. At the very least it opens the door to a whole slew of explanations.

You remind me of many people in politics who get captured by a narrative and can't think for themselves. All they do is repeat the narrative ad nauseam.

The more we discover about reality the weirder it will get; our puny minds can't even imagine what's coming. Dogmatism is a huge red flag, which is why many reject religion.

It depends on what you're looking for and what your questions are. In some contexts, it may not add anything, in other contexts, it may extend our ideas and research beyond the physical (e.g. consciousness). In the context of this thread, it may add to the evidence of a mind behind what people are experiencing in NDEs.

I don't like using the word God because it carries too much religious baggage, but whatever the source of what we are experiencing it's far greater than anything we can imagine.

↪Sam26 The teleological argument for God is by far the best of the core 3, but it suffers from a crippling counter point.

Essentially, you are saying people and the world are too complex to simply have formed. But have you applied that same criticism to a God? Once you do, the argument falls apart. God is at least as complex as a human being, so therefore the same argument would apply to a God. Something would have to create a God. But then, something would have to create that as well! The only logical conclusion is that the origin point of causality must have existed without prior cause. That origin could be a God, but it could also be a universe without a God. I have post on it here if you want to look into it.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1 — Philosophim

I'm not quite saying that the "world is simply too complex to simply have formed," i.e., it's logically possible for the world to have simply come about by chance or some first cause (naturalistic first cause). In other words, there is no contradiction (it's logically possible) in proposing this as far as I can tell. Although it may be metaphysically impossible, I'm not sure. I don't want to get side-tracked with modal logic. I'm trying to keep the arguments as simple as possible.

I don't have to apply your criticism to an intelligence behind the universe (not necessarily God, any intelligence). It's perfectly reasonable to pick what you think the first cause might be based on the evidence and use that as your starting point. Also, why would you think that consciousness (I prefer to use consciousness or mind) is complex, it might be simple, we don't have enough information to say one way or another, However, even if it's complex and it might be, I'm trying to point out that a mind behind the universe is the best explanation based on all the data, especially specified information, which I haven't got to yet.

It certainly doesn't follow that if you believe that consciousness is the first cause that that would have to have a creator. It just is. Many naturalists propose that something naturalistic is that point of origin, that first cause, I just go back one more step and start with consciousness/mind based again on the evidence.

I agree with much of your logic in that link, maybe not all of it, but much of it.

I think this is a good conversation between Dr. Tour and Dr. Cronin about some of the complexity involved in creating life naturalistically. I'm not posting this video because it supports my position, I'm posting it to show where we are in terms of a naturalistic explanation. Once the video gets past some of the misunderstandings, I think it makes good points. I like what Dr. Lee is doing, although I disagree with his optimism. Obviously, there is a lot more going on in other fields that will give more information, but I think this is a good start.

I do think this is worth listening to because I think many people think that we have the answers, and we don't.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DHvNRK452c

The following is a straightforward version of the teleological argument as outlined in Dr. Bitar’s book Classical Christian Wisdom (pp. 99-115). After I present Dr. Bitar’s version of Paley’s argument I will add to the strength of the premises with more remarks about the argument.

Before I present the argument, I want to point out a major flaw with counterarguments, viz., that most if not all challenges to this argument suffer from the fallacy of the self-sealing argument . In other words, they present their argument in such a way that nothing would count as counterevidence. The argument is sealed off from counterevidence because nothing would count as evidence of intelligent design. Dr. Bitar phrases it like this: “If their belief is not simply a prejudice held to apart from evidence, then they should be able to specify what additional evidence of design would have to be present in the universe that is not there now which would then warrant belief in a designer. In short, what features of design are missing? Dr. Bitar continues, “If they cannot specify what is lacking, then their belief is an irrational prejudice sealed off from evidence (pp. 106-107).” This is a glaring problem that isn’t stressed enough.

All of the following is a direct quote and starts with the premises and the conclusion.

(1) Human productions that have a structure such that the parts are so arranged that the whole can accomplish or be used to accomplish activities of a higher order than any part alone, as in the case of a watch, are the result of intelligent design.

(2) Objects of nature have a structure such that the parts are so arranged that the whole can accomplish or be used to accomplish activities of a higher order than any part alone, as in the case of a dog.

(3) Hence, the objects of nature are the result of intelligent design.


Analysis of the Strength of the Argument

We need to now analyze the strength of this argument. Since it is inductive and analogical,
we should examine the following:

(a) the number of items used as evidence

(b) the number of analogies (similarities) shared by the objects compared,
here human productions and objects of nature

c) the number of disanalogies (dissimilarities) between the objects compared,
here again human productions and objects of nature

(d) the variety of items used as evidence

(e) the relevance of the properties viewed as connected, here
(1) a structure or architecture so the whole can do activities of a higher order than any part alone, and
(2) intelligent design

(f) the scope of the conclusion

(g) the truth and cogency of the premises

(h) the cogency of the argument structure

(i) the psychological impact or compellingness of the argument

First, the number of items used as evidence. The items used as evidence are human productions and objects of nature; they are innumerable.

Second, the number of analogies (similarities) shared by human productions and objects of nature. Virtually all are complex consisting of many parts, some obviously more complex than others. Moreover, the parts fit with some degree of precision, as in the case of engine parts, on the one hand, and human bones and joints, on the other hand. Sometimes the precision of fit in nature is better than what humans can achieve, as in the case of joints.

Human productions and objects of nature both utilize physical laws. The eye and a microscope both utilize the laws of optics. The bones and muscles of the skeleton and the parts of a crane both utilize the laws of mechanics. And so forth.

eye - microscope, telescope, camera - use laws of optics
skeleton - crane, robot - use laws of mechanics
ear - megaphone, stereo - use laws of acoustics

Some are basically static, such as a house and a rock. Some are active, such as a tree and a watch or a battery.

Human productions and objects of nature can be so 'similar that one is used to replace the other, as in the case of an artificial valve or heart. It takes careful study of the structure of the natural object to produce the artificial entity; this obviously shows their similarity. They can also be so similar that it is not clear whether they are one or the other. For instance, genetically engineered ecoli and mice, are they human productions or objects of nature? Without human study, planning, and action, they would not exist. Yet they are alive, living beings, not your typical human artifacts. They are both human productions for which patents are sought and objects of nature that are alive; this again shows the similarity of the two kinds of beings.

Third, number of disanalogies (dissimilarities). I do not know of any disanalogies between all human productions, on the one hand, and all objects of nature, on the other. Some objects of nature are alive, but not all are. Some have mental life, but not all. Similarly, some human productions are also alive, as in the case of genetically engineered plants and animals. Also, some have mental life, as in the case of genetically engineered animals.


Fourth, variety of the items used as evidence, namely, human productions. There is tremendous variety among human productions ranging from dams and skyscrapers, to watches, pens, batteries, and cars, to artificial limbs, valves, and hearts, and to genetically engineered ecoli.

Fifth, relevance. The issue here is the relevance of the feature or structure in question, namely the parts are so arranged that the whole can perform higher functions than any part alone, to the activity of design. Does design cause such structure? 'The relevance, of course, is perfect, for what is the activity of design but the arrangement of parts so the whole can perform a higher function than any part alone?

Sixth,scope of the conclusion. The conclusion is the narrowest and most conservative possible, namely, that there is one or more designers of natural objects.

(1) Human productions that have a structure such that the parts are so arranged that the whole can accomplish or be used to accomplish activities of a higher order than any part alone, as in the case of a watch, are the result of intelligent design.

(2) Objects of nature have a structure such that the parts are so arranged that the whole can accomplish or be used to accomplish activities of a higher order than any part alone, as in the case of a dog.

(3) Hence, the objects of nature are the result of intelligent design.

Seventh, truth and cogency of the premises, i.e., knowledge of the truth of the premises. I believe every normal adult human, including the agnostic and atheist, knows the premises are true.

Eighth, cogency of the argument structure. Can the argument be followed? The argument is very simple and easy to follow.

Ninth, psychological impact or compellingness of the argument. My experience is that most find it compelling; only committed agnostics and atheists do not, and they are few and far between. They know the premises are true, but refuse to draw the conclusion. We will deal with why they do not find the argument compelling later.

What is the result of our analysis? Given the criteria of strength for analogical arguments, the teleological argument is a very strong argument. In fact, it is hard to think of a stronger analogical argument. I believe the analogy between human productions and natural objects is one of the reasons that the vast majority of humans believe in a divine designer(s), whether that analogy is formulated as an argument or not. Since the analogy and the argument are so strong, the upshot is straightforward and striking: it is rational to believe the universe is the product of intelligent design, and, concomitantly, it is irrational not to believe the universe is the product of intelligent design.

We need to be clear on a crucial point here. It is this: rationality of belief is not determined by what can possibly happen; rather, it is determined by what probably has or will happen. In other words, it is determined by what the evidence indicates is most likely the case. For instance, it is possible to jump out of an airplane in flight far above the ground, not open one's parachute, fall to the earth, land in soft soil, and live to tell about it. That possibility does not make it rational to believe it will happen in your case; it does not make it rational to jump and purposely not open your parachute. Assuming you are not aiming at your death, it is irrational to believe and act in such a manner because probably you will not survive. Similarly, it is not rational to believe that the universe originated by chance without design just because it is thought to be possible that it did so. The issue is not what is possible, but what is probable; in other words, what one has reason to believe is the case. The evidence obviously points to divine design. And it is so overwhelming that almost nothing can eradicate belief in design, even years and years of atheist indoctrination and religious persecution.

Post 1

First, some background information.

The first part of the argument for intelligent design will be the one presented by Dr. Byron I. Bitar (philosopher) in his book Classical Christian Wisdom, pp. 99-114, 1993). And while I’m not a Christian I do think the argument presents good reasons/evidence for its conclusion, i.e., there is very strong evidence for the conclusion that the universe was intelligently designed. This argument adds to the strength of my metaphysical position.

“Teleological arguments, like cosmological arguments, begin from a feature of the cosmos or nature. In that sense, they are a kind of cosmological argument. In fact, Aquinas’ fifth cosmological argument is a teleological argument.

“The particular teleological argument we are going to examine in detail is set forth by William Paley [1743-1805] in his book Natural Theology written in the 18th century. The feature of nature he begins his argument with is this: a structure or architecture such that the whole individual can accomplish or be used to accomplish activities of a higher order than any part alone. In other words, the individual can perform or be used to perform actions that achieve purposes, goals, or forms of life that are higher than the action of a part alone. William Paley was obviously not the first to use a feature indicating purpose to prove the existence of God. Plato, Aristotle, and, of course, Aquinas did too. However, Paley is justifiably famous for his version (pp. 96-97).”

“[William Paley] spent nine years at Cambridge. Although Cambridge was fairly corrupt at the time and many professors looked upon their position, in which they sometimes had no prior training, as a sinecure, Paley took his appointment seriously. He served as an assistant to his former college tutor, Anthony Shepard, and lectured on metaphysics, moral philosophy, the Greek Testament, and divinity. He became known as one of Cambridge’s finest professors (p. 97).”

I’m not going to give Paley’s argument from his book Natural Theology, but I am going to give Dr. Bitar’s assessment of the argument. Later I will add to the argument with more evidence of intelligent design from recent research and thinking.

“It is worth noting that the publication of Paley's Natural Theology, which expounds, defends, and illustrates the argument from design, occurred after the publication of the two works that have been most influential in questioning the value of the argument. The first was David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion published in 1779, three years after Hume's death. The second was Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason published in 1781. Both were published prior to any of Paley's works.

“1779 Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
1781 Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
1785 Paley's first work: Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy
1802 Paley's last work: Natural Theology

“Nevertheless, it was Paley's argument in Natural Theology which triumphed in England for over a hundred years after its publication (pp. 98-99).”

It must be pointed out that Paley’s argument is inductive. In other words, it is not like other ontological or cosmological arguments that try to infer the conclusion with absolute necessity. “Paley's argument is a specific kind of inductive argument, called an "argument by analogy." An argument by analogy uses a likeness or analogy between two objects or groups of objects to infer the existence of a further likeness. For instance, if I owned four shirts made for L. L. Bean and all wore well, I could infer by analogy that a fifth shirt from L. L. Bean would also wear well.

“Premise: I own four shirts made for L. L. Bean and all have wore well.
Premise: This fifth shirt is made for L. L. Bean.
Conclusion: This fifth shirt made for L. L. Bean will also wear well.

“The likeness used to begin the argument is being made for L. L. Bean; all five shirts share it. The further likeness considered is wearing well; the first four shirts have it. Because of the likeness or analogy among all the shirts, namely all made for L.L. Bean, the property of wearing well is ascribed to the fifth shirt as well.

“[T]he argument has a very narrow, conservative immediate conclusion. It directly tries to show that it is rational to believe in one or more intelligent designers of natural objects. It does not directly try to show the universe was created out of nothing by the intelligent designer(s), nor that there is only one intelligent designer, nor that the designer(s) is a purely mental being with no body, nor that the designer(s) is perfectly good, nor that the designer(s) is the same as the individual(s) who executed the design in making the universe, and so forth. It only tries to show that there is one or more intelligent designers (pp. 100-101).”

In the next post I’ll continue with numbered premises and the conclusion, including an analysis of the strength of the argument.