Sorry, but I'm a bit burnt out when it comes to Wittgenstein. Good luck with your thread.

Ya, I'm familiar with him. I do believe we live other lives based just on what I've learned from NDEs.

Fair enough. As I've said many times in this thread, I think research into children with memories of previous lives is corroborative in some ways to NDE reports. Both indicate modes of being beyond physical birth and death. — Wayfarer

There is some evidence that supports previous lives, but I don't know how strong it is because I haven't studied it as closely as NDEs. In terms of numbers, it's not as common as NDEs.

It's a shame you can only see it through your pre-concieved notion of what a 'religious point of view' must be. — Wayfarer

It's not a preconceived notion, it's a conclusion arrived at through more than 45 years of study. I was very religious for years.

But they're not synonyms - one is a state of a thing and one is the thing itself. But anyway, I suppose that's just a terminological issue (actually, I think it reflects the 'mind is the brain' view currently dominant, where it is consciousness that is what is distinctive about the brain, as opposed to there being a soul that has the consciousness). — Clearbury

I'm afraid I have to disagree with the dominant view. The mind as I use it is, for all practical purposes, is synonymous with consciousness. Although there may be differences in some contexts, especially if you're a materialist or physicalist. Also, I generally don't use the term soul in reference to that which survives death. I believe consciousness is more accurate.

There are two types of NDEs that you seem to be conflating. There are those that involve floating about in the room. Those are the ones that, supposedly, others can corroborate - though I think there's no hard evidence of such corroboration. Plus, just as we incorporate alarm sounds into dreams, nothing stops the same happening in these scenarios. — Clearbury

Actually, I'm not conflating anything. I've described three kinds of NDEs (category 1, 2, and 3) pointing out the differences between each of these NDEs. I don't know why you would say supposedly corroborate, the data on this is overwhelming. As I've pointed out it's the same data that a detective uses when trying to confirm or disconfirm testimony, you interview the people involved. It's not very difficult and it's done all the time. I find it a bit strange that people just dismiss this information. Although you did acknowledge it with some hesitation. I don't know what you mean by "hard evidence?" Maybe you mean scientific evidence, but this is something I've also addressed, viz., by pointing out that epistemology is not limited scientific evidence. This seems to be a common misunderstanding of many that post in this thread, and even when they do acknowledge it, they seem to forget just how powerful good testimonial evidence is.

I'm not saying there aren't some similarities between dreams and veridical experiences. I'm saying that we don't corroborate hallucinations, delusions, or dreams in the same way that we do veridical experiences. The way these terms (hallucinations, delusions, and dreams) are used in our everyday language clearly separates them in a significant way from veridical experiences. On the other hand, NDEs are being corroborated all the time, and if they can't, then I'm skeptical of them, or at least I set it aside. I'm not saying that all NDEs can be corroborated, but a significant number can.

Then there are the NDEs where people seem to have the experience of travelling to a different realm. Those are not corroborated. There's a similarity among these experiences, but there's a lot of similarity between dreams too, and the similarity does not seem significantly greater. — Clearbury

When we look at the testimonial evidence of NDEs we have to examine it the same way we would examine any testimonial evidence. First, again, is corroboration, which gives us an objective way to verify the testimony. Even NDEs that incorporate traveling through a tunnel, seeing loved ones, having a life review, have been corroborated. What I mean is that if you can objectively corroborate at least part of their story, then you can make an inference based on how consistent it is with other stories that see and hear generally the same things. So, although you can't corroborate some of the story that doesn't mean we don't have other means of testing the story. For example, let's say someone tells you of their trip to Alaska and part of their story can be corroborated and other parts can't, we generally would accept the testimony as accurate, especially if there are other stories that match with theirs. So, although we can't corroborate all of it, there is enough consistency with other stories that allows us to accept their story as truthful or veridical. Do people sometimes lie, of course, but are all these people lying? Analyzing testimonial evidence takes time and patience. It must be compared with a lot of data. I've spent a lot of time analyzing the testimonial evidence and I generally find it to be accurate. There're two main reasons that people reject these stories: First, they're wedded to a particular worldview. Second, they don't have all the facts/information.

So why don't they kill themselves and encourage others to do likewise? That is what we would typically do if we find a beautiful place - we try and revisit it and encourage others to do likewise. These people claim to know, in a way that the rest of us do not, what lies in wait for us the other side of death. And they claim it is wonderful. Yet they seem reluctant - more reluctant, if anything, than the general population - to go back there. That's very peculiar to me. — Clearbury

I've read over 5000 accounts of NDEs, and what you'll find is that many people who have an NDE don't want to come back to this life, but they're told they must return because their objectives for coming here aren't complete. What I've found is that we enter into some agreement before choosing to have these human experiences, and it's important that we finish our task. Also, those who commit suicide often find that they've made a huge mistake, i.e., they're just going to have to come back again and do it all over again. So, it's not as simple as you might think and killing yourself is not an escape.

From a philosophical perspective, it might be instructive to consider the Buddhist view — Wayfarer

I have found that nothing gives us as clear a picture as NDEs. The evidence is much stronger than any religious point of view. I find that most religious have it generally incorrect. There are interesting ideas in the Buddhist tradition, but, again, if you want some answers about the afterlife, then NDEs give the most information.

Although I believe in life after death, I think NDEs are not good evidence for it. They seem better explained as dreams. — Clearbury

I'll answer this question first. I've written a lot about why I think NDEs give us good testimonial evidence, and why they're different from hallucinations, dreams, delusions, or any other purely subjective experience. The main difference is that they can be corroborated by others who were there. In other words, doctors, nurses, family, friends, and any other person at the scene can corroborate or invalidate what the NDEr is claiming to have experienced (seen, heard, etc). So, if others who were at the scene affirm one's claims, then that puts the experience into the realm of objective reality. This is what separates the NDE from hallucinations, delusions, or dreams. We can't corroborate what you see or hear in a dream. I can't go to your friend who was in your dream and ask if he said X, Y, or Z. The way we generally know that an experience is veridical is that others are having the same experience, or generally the same experience. Corroboration is one of the ways we use to examine whether or not testimony is reliable. This is seen in good detective work and even in good science.

'consciousness' survives death, rather than 'the person' or 'the mind' survives death? I am not a consciousness. i am a person. I am conscious a lot of the time (though unconscious some of it). When I am unconscious I am not non-existent. I exist, but I am just not conscious. So 'consciousness' and 'a person' are not equivalent. My quibble, then, is that it is persons or minds (I use the terms interchangeably) who survive death, not 'consciousness' (consiousness is something persons have, but it is not what a person 'is'). — Clearbury

Consciousness is much broader in scope than just being a person, although it's true that I'm referring mainly to persons. I believe that there is some element of consciousness in most if not all living things. I also believe that consciousness is at the heart of reality and that all of us ultimately come from this core consciousness. Death simply returns us to where we reside. What makes you who you are, are the memories and experiences that attach to your specific conscious awareness. For you to survive death I believe that your specific conscious awareness with all the memories and experiences that attach to you must survive, and I believe it does.

When you're unconscious you still exist, you're just not aware for a while, or you're vaguely aware as in a dream. Being unconscious seems to be something specific to this body, or more specifically, to the brain.

I also generally use the terms consciousness and mind as synonyms.

An interesting take on the argument of materialism vs idealism by Bernardo Kastrup.

Bernardo Kastrup | Refuting Materialism: full lecture

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cPCvQQQrZwU&t=2164s

An interesting podcast on consciousness.

Two AI's Discuss: The Quantum Physics of Consciousness - Roger Penrose Deep Dive Podcast

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-isq40ARB9g

Clearly, you haven't understood a thing I've said. I question your ability to interpret not only what I've communicated over and over again, but your ability to interpret OC. I find it a waste of my time trying to explain myself to you. You either don't take the time to read or you have a bottle of vodka next to you, maybe it's the latter. I don't know which.

It's not at all a leap in the dark, no more than accepting the Earth is more than 100 years old is a leap in the dark, or that I have hands is a leap in the dark.

And maybe life itself leaps forward with unreasonable confidence. — frank

It's not reasonable or unreasonable it just is the framework we have to work with.

It is justified within the system. — Fooloso4

To say that hinges are justified in any epistemic sense is to miss the main thrust of OC. It would be to "...grant you [Moore] all the rest (OC 1)." Hinge propositions are not subject to verification or falsification (the doubt) within the system, they allow all our talk of epistemic justification and doubting to take root. In other words, they are the ungrounded linguistic framework that allows the door to swing (the door of epistemology). This is why justification ends with basic beliefs, and why it solves the infinite regress problem. They form the bedrock of how epistemic language gets off the ground in the first place.

My interpretation of Wittgenstein and hinge propositions is that hinges are neither true nor false, i.e., hinges have a role similar to the rules of a game. I’m specifically referring to the use of true and false as something verified by facts, i.e., something justified within an epistemological system. “If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false. If someone asked us ‘but is that true?’ we might say ‘yes’ to him; and if he demanded grounds we might say ‘I can’t give you any grounds, but if you learn more you too will think the same (OC 205, 206).” One can use “true,” but note it’s not an epistemic use of the concept as justified true belief. Rational discourse requires that there be these basic beliefs for rational discourse to function.

If someone asked, someone who is just learning chess, “Is it true that bishops move diagonally?” I would answer “Yes.” And if they further asked, “How do you know (an epistemological question)?” I might respond “It’s just one of the rules of the game.” In this case, the use of true is not justified, it’s just accepted as a basic belief without any grounding.

“But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put (OC 343).”

Not only do hinges make it possible for rational discourse, but they also set the limits of what can be reasonably doubted.

We're never going to come to a consensus on OC, that's clear. There will always be some interpretation that someone has that you'll disagree with. What's important is that Witt established that there are some very basic beliefs about the world (call them hinges, foundations, Moorean propositions, call them what you like) that are starting points for language games, a place where there is no need for justification.

I think this idea has ramifications beyond epistemology. I think it solves the problem posed by Godel's two theorems. These hinge beliefs seem to exist in any system where proofs are required, whether epistemological or mathematical. This of course goes beyond anything Witt talked about in OC, but I think it has merit.

My view is that Moore's assertion, "I know this is a hand," amounts to an expression of subjective certainty, i.e., akin to a conviction (which Witt points out) that he is certain without justification (although Moore thinks he's justified). The reason I add the subjective is that there is a use of certainty as a synonym for know, i.e., objective certainty.

There's always going to be a certain amount of cultural relativism.

Just as there is no fixed point from which we can observe the motion of the universe, there is no fixed foundation for our knowing. — Fooloso4

There is no fixed point, but there are fixed points within given contexts. You seem to add things not part of what I'm contending.

Anti-foundational foundations? — Fooloso4

Yes, if what you mean by anti-foundationalism, is traditional foundationalism. His presentation of a foundation is nothing like traditional foundationalism. It's a different way of thinking about the foundation. It's outside epistemological constructs, i.e., it supports and gives life to epistemology.

It's interesting to note that different language games reflect different endpoints. However, it seems to me that some endpoints are not really hinges, and the way we can see this is by asking if it makes sense to doubt one's endpoint. For e.g., I've listened to some philosophers who want to place belief in God in the same category as Witt's hinges, so within their language game, it's a given, in the same way, this is a hand is a given. However, there is an important test to see if your hinge is proper, viz., does it make sense to doubt that proposition? Compare this is a hand and belief in God, it's much more natural to doubt the latter. There is an exception, let's say you had a veridical encounter with God, then in that case it could be considered a hinge. However, trying to prove your experience would be very difficult indeed.

...but... — Sam26

The "but" wasn't meant to be a disagreement but an additional point.

I agree with you that our actions are an important part of all this, they reflect something very important. We cannot forget about what we do! Our forms of life reflect this.

"Doesn't this mean: I shall proceed according to this belief unconditionally, and not let anything confuse me?

"But it isn't just that I believe in this way that I have two hands, but that every reasonable person does.

"At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded (OC 251, 252, and 253)."

Again, these endpoints seem to be foundational.

They are foundational in regard to what we do with them. Their meaning is their use in a language agme. — Banno

Yes, but there is a sense where we are also forced into a foundational position if we want to play the game, whatever that game may be. However, this doesn't mean the foundation can't change, at least in some contexts.

"'Here I have arrived at a foundation of all my beliefs (OC 246)." This passage plays off of OC 245.

So, the analogy I use over and over again is to think of foundational in the same way that the rules of chess, the board, and the pieces are foundational. One doesn't need to justify these components they are just there as part of the background needed to play the game. The games rest on these components, i.e., they're foundational to the game. You can also think of language games in the same way, viz., resting on certain implicit and explicit rules within our forms of life.

:grin: No, it's a concept that has various uses in different contexts. I don't see how anyone can read OC and not see a foundational component to what Witt is saying. I've read quite a few papers on this subject and it comes up time and time again, so it's not unique to me.

Well, as you know I do read a kind of foundationalism into OC, but it's nothing like traditional foundationalism. Also, I don't view much of what I'm saying in an absolute sense, but in a general sense. I agree with all but your first statement, unless you're referring to traditional foundationalism, then I would agree.

In other words, the endpoints, i.e., where justification ends are a kind of foundational position, but a foundation without justification.

In some passages, Witt seems to compare Moore's statement about knowing this is a hand to someone's conviction of a particular belief. In other words, when Moore states what he knows, at least in these passages, it seems to be more a function of his convictions than a function of knowledge. For e.g., in OC 6 he says, "And through this misuse [misuse of the word know] a queer and extremely important mental state is revealed." I don't think it's a stretch to think that this mental state is the mental state of conviction. For instance, "Suppose I replace Moore's 'I know' by 'I am of the unshakeable conviction' (OC 86)." Or look at OC 91, "But has he got the right ground for his conviction? For if not, then after all he doesn't know (Russell)." Witt seems to be pointing out the subjective nature of what Moore is saying. Of course, as I've already pointed out, Witt uses certainty in two different senses, subjective certainty and objective certainty, the latter is akin to knowing, the former not, at least not in this context. Knowledge is not generated by some inner subjective point of view, at least not the knowledge that Moore's trying to convey to the skeptic.

My thinking on OC is that Witt's biggest contribution is the idea that certain basic beliefs are the endpoints that form the bedrock of epistemological ideas. It solves the problem of the infinite regress of justifications, and it solves the problem of circularity. This is not insignificant.

The other important idea, and there are probably many more, is the way we think of doubt, viz., just as knowledge requires justification, so does doubting. People tend to think that their doubts are always warranted, but they're not. Think of knowledge and doubting as two sides of a coin. Both require a justification.

I do want to comment on what I was saying about hinges in relation to Godel's proofs. All I was trying to say is that instead of looking at certain axioms within a particular system as something that can't be proven within the system, we could look at them as endpoints not needing proof or justification, like Witt's hinges.

I agree. Although I make a distinction between subjective certainty and objective certainty, the latter being akin to knowledge. I think Witt made this distinction too.

nor are there clear conclusions in On Certainty. I think you have missed quite a bit of what is going on here. — Banno

This is important because OC is not a finished work so we don't know what the editing process would have looked like, i.e., what passages would have been left in or left out. Although, certain ideas seem to have some staying power. For example, the idea that Moorean propositions are not normally justified, i.e., justification does have an endpoint. It ends with very basic beliefs. The problem is that what's basic in one context is not in another. One has to look carefully at the specific language games and contexts. In one context "Here is one hand," is outside epistemological systems, and in another, it's within the system. One needs to ask if it makes sense to doubt the proposition. That tells us a lot.

I'm mostly trying to take Witt's ideas and run with them. I'm not always agreeing with Witt or trying to stay within the confines of his thought process. I think it's fun to see where a particular line of thought goes. People who try to tell me that this or that passage says this as opposed to that are not paying attention. The thread is indeed called An Analysis of OC, but my analysis does sometimes go beyond Witt and will indeed stretch his ideas. I will at times debate this or that interpretation, but I'm not going to debate forever these differences, it distracts from the overall goal, which is to give a particular twist to OC, right or wrong. Many of my ideas coincide with what other philosophers have concluded so it's not that I'm so far out in left field that the ideas don't have some validity.

So, if I don't engage, mostly it's about not getting sidetracked or because I don't have the time to answer every question. Don't take it personally. As you've noticed I don't devote all my time to this, I post here and there.

Finally, I've devoted a lot of time to OC. I've read it more times than I can count. So, I do have fairly good background knowledge of Witt's thinking. There are only about 4 or five people in this forum who have as much or more knowledge of this text than I do.

Witt's hinge propositions function the same.. They too are necessary conditions and outside experience.. Their examples might be different, but their functional roles are about the same. They both propose preconditions that are cognitive frameworks for knowledge and experience to take place. — schopenhauer1

I don't see Witt as saying hinges are like Kant's a priori statements, i.e., outside experience. Just the opposite, they are the experiences or beliefs that provide a foundation for epistemology. Think of them like the rules of chess, the board, and the pieces, without which there would be no chess game. There may be some overlap with Kant, but it's not what drives Witt's thinking. Witt's thinking in OC is just much different.

Yes but explain what you think Witt is saying and how it connects with Kant, and then I'll respond. I'm not sure we're on the same page.

Why do we need to read Wittgenstein's "On Certainty" to get back to conclusions which Kant already implied with his ideas of "synthetic a priori truths"? — schopenhauer1

I'm not sure what conclusions you're referring to. What do you think the conclusions of OC are?

It's not a good idea to consider hinges to be "outside our epistemological framework", any more than it would be a good idea for a hydrologist not to consider the riverbed. They are rather the foundation on which an "epistemological framework" rests. — Banno

I assume this is directed toward me, so I'll respond. We know that much of what Witt was saying was directed at Moore's propositions in his papers Proof of an External World and A Defense of Common Sense, so we're referring to specific propositions that Moore says he knows. Moore believes he has a justification for claiming to know "This is a hand (as he raises it to the audience)." Witt resists this notion, although he starts OC with, "If you do know [my emphasis] that here is one hand, we'll grant you all the rest (OC 1)." It seems clear to me that when Witt refers to hinge propositions or Moorean propositions he's saying that you don't know what you think you know, viz., Moore's use of the concept know doesn't apply because these statements don't fall within the domain of JTB. We don't normally justify these basic beliefs or Moorean statements. There are of course exceptions to this general rule (generally we don't justify them) and Witt points these out.

If you're reading my statements in an absolute sense, I would agree they are not always outside our epistemological framework, but Witt is saying that they generally are not within our epistemological framework (which is what I'm claiming), i.e., requiring a justification. So, I agree, that these Moorean propositions are the foundation on which our epistemological framework rests, but that doesn't mean they are part of epistemology, they support epistemology. I think OC 1 is key to interpreting the thrust of my point because Witt is saying "If you do know..." then your conclusion follows, i.e., Moore's point is epistemological, but Witt doesn't agree.

I'll just make these points for now.

It may be questionable for you but not me. If you want to interpret it another way that's fine, but I think it goes against Wittgenstein's general thinking.

It does not matter how many times Wittgenstein refers to this kind of proposition as "hinge," most philosophers use the term to refer to this kind of proposition (hinge, bedrock, foundational, basic, all mostly refer to the same thing).

I’ll try to re-word my point to make it clearer. First, a summary of Godel’s incompleteness theorems. The first theorem states that in any formal system adequate for number theory there exists true mathematical propositions (including its negation) that cannot be proven within the system. The corollary (the second theorem) is that the consistency of the formal system capable of expressing arithmetic cannot be proved using only its axioms and rules.

My point is that if we think of the propositions in Godel’s theorem (the ones that cannot be proven within the system) in the same way Wittgenstein thinks of hinge propositions (basic beliefs), viz., that hinges are outside our epistemological framework, then there is no requirement to prove the propositions within the system. We could think of Godel’s unprovable statements as hinge-like. So, Godel’s unprovable statements are necessary for the formal system to operate, just as hinges are necessary for our epistemic practices. The systems are held fast by viewing certain statements as hinges. I’m assuming you understand Wittgenstein’s point about hinges in OC.

Hinges provide a way of understanding Godel’s theorems without the need to justify certain basic beliefs within the system. I prefer to call these basic beliefs, non-propositional, which eliminates the need to refer to them as true or false. It seems to me that you can always ask of a true proposition, “How do you know it’s true?” – which evokes a justificatory response. Moreover, if you refer to them as true, can you also ask if they can be false? This seems to open a can of worms.

It seems to me that formal systems are held together by background beliefs, i.e., that you can’t create a formal system (epistemic or mathematical system) without the background. I’m specifically referring to the prelinguistic background that is even more fundamental than linguistic hinges. For example, the prelinguistic beliefs that occur as a result of engaging with the world, walking, running, touching, smelling, object and special awareness, etc. Even causal and simple logical relationships are probably part of these basic beliefs. So, the basic beliefs that are formed before linguistics play an important role in the more sophisticated linguistic beliefs (such as what it means to know) that come later.

Basic beliefs are important because they form the substructure that allows epistemic and mathematical systems to form without the need for justification, i.e., they are prior to our justificatory models. Basic beliefs, especially prelinguistic beliefs, are the scaffolding that allows our models of epistemology and mathematical systems to take root. These kinds of beliefs are necessarily prior to our world of justification.

Wittgenstein’s Hinge Propositions and Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem

I’ve been thinking for quite some time now that there might be a novel framework for understanding Godel’s incompleteness theorems by using Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions. Godel’s first incompleteness theorem states that in any reasonable mathematical system, there will be statements that are true but unprovable within the system. Godel’s second incompleteness theorem takes this a step further by showing that the system cannot demonstrate its consistency using only the axioms and rules of inference within that system.

I believe there is another way of looking at Godel’s conclusions that might solve the problems posed by Godel’s theorems. There seems to be a parallel between Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions and the foundational axioms of a mathematical system. Wittgensteinian hinges are outside any formal epistemological justification or doubt. If we carry this idea over into Gödel’s theorems, then the axioms of the theorems might be thought of in the same way, i.e., there’s no requirement for proof if they are the hinges that provide the framework for the system to function. In other words, the foundation is not proved from within the system but is necessary for the system to function. The foundational axioms act as hinges in the Wittgensteinian sense. This would eliminate Godel’s requirement for the axioms to be proved within the system. We could then think of the foundational axioms of mathematics, such as the Peano axioms or the axioms of set theory as hinge propositions of mathematics. They would be the basic beliefs of mathematics which would be outside any formal justification. This would eliminate the need for trying to prove the axioms within the system.

Although these two systems, viz., epistemology and formal logic, are different domains, it may be that Wittgenstein’s hinges could fulfill a role in each domain, which may provide a better way of understanding the difficulties of Godel’s theorems.