I wonder opinions and thought people on this forum have in regards whether or not China is willing to invade Taiwan or not in order to make it part of China. — dclements

They certainly want Taiwan, but they might end up destroying all they've accomplished in the last 50 years. Trying to predict what China will do is difficult. I think the chances of a war in the next five years are about "50 50," but that's just a guess. I'm sure China would like to have TSMC, but that factory will probably be blown up if they invade. That said it's probably a matter of pride for them to get Taiwan. China could do a blockade because Taiwan imports just about everything. However, if they blockade Taiwan, the U.S. and its allies would have time to bring more force to bear.

If I was China, I would attack before the U.S. had time to build up long-range missile inventories. The U.S. is trying to build inventories as we speak. The carriers are going to have to stay about 1000 miles away or risk getting sunk. China could be stopped but the price would be high in lives and ships. Is it worth it? If the U.S. does nothing, then Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, etc., are going to start wondering if the U.S. will protect them if China wants to expand its influence. I hope it doesn't happen, but who knows?

Here are a couple of videos for those who like to keep up with the latest AI news.

I'll continue to work on the book and maybe get back to post some of it sometime.

I think this thread has run its course.

Good one Josh, I stand corrected.

I was equating “system of convictions” with the expression you did use: “truths that are part of our background certainty.”
Do you distinguish between what you call the “framework of reality” and what Wittgenstein calls a system of convictions, which I see as equivalent to language games, hinge propositions and forms of life? — Joshs

While it's true that many of our convictions are hinges (basic beliefs), I wouldn't use "system of convictions," and Witt never used this wording. He did equate Moore's use of "I know..." to that of an expression of a conviction, which closely resembles a strong opinion, although not always. Sometimes one's conviction is the result of JTB, it's just that the conviction is justified as opposed to Moore's conviction which isn't justified, nor can it be.

I've explained in other posts the answers to your last two paragraphs. Please, I don't want to re-write it, or even search for where I talked about these issues.

Glad I could provide some humor. :grin:

By the way, the whole Gettier problem is misguided, but I agree with you and am not interested in re-hashing that mess.

Wittgenstein pointed out in several instances that Moore's use of "I know..." is more like an expression of a conviction, it's not that JTB is incomplete. You seem to not acknowledge that there are uses of "I know..." outside JTB, i.e., they have nothing to do with JTB. For example, "My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything that I could produce in evidence for it. That is why I am not in a position to take the sight of my hand as evidence for it. Here the expression 'I know' stands for the conviction [my emphasis] that this is so (OC 86)." These are two completely different language games. Not every language game involving the use of "I know..." is about an epistemological language game (JTB).

No, it's not incomplete, there are just other uses (language games) where the use of "I know.." isn't JTB.

Yes.

But did Wittgenstein continue to believe it was a good definition? — Banno

I'm sure he didn't align himself with the traditional accounts of JTB. So, no, I don't think he would agree with traditional JTB. This was acknowledged above in my account, although not explicitly.

"Don't think, look!"

"I know I have a toothache - how silly of you to suppose otherwise!". "I know where my hand is".

These look to be reasonable, straight forward uses of "I know..." and yet they are problematic for the JTB account. The use of "I know..." is broader than the JTB account sanctions. The game is played, in such a way that the JTB account is inadequate to explain it. — Banno

They do look reasonable, after all, Moore thought so. I wouldn't say they're problematic (although they're problematic for Moore's account) for JTB. I would say they aren't JTB at all, and that's Witt's point.

I don't think it contrary to the OC to say Wittgenstein was arguing for the inadequacy of Justified True Belief. And he would be in good company. — Banno

I don't see any indication that Witt was specifically arguing against JTB. He was arguing against the misuse of language, specifically Moore's misuse of know. Moreover, Moore's use of know, strictly speaking isn't a case of JTB. I think that's more to the point.

You say that the system of convictions that form the background certainty of a language game can be used as propositions in an argument — Joshs

Sorry Josh, but I never said anything about a "system of convictions." You're confusing what I said about Moore's use of "I know..." (which is more like an expression of conviction as opposed to knowledge) with the framework of reality, made up of basic beliefs or certainties.

The statement, "I believe this is a hand," can be said (I don't like the term 'truth value') to be true in some language games. It's comparable to saying "It's true that bishops move diagonally." These are just certainties that grow out of very basic beliefs about our foundational background. For example, part of the background reality of chess is that there are rules, pieces, and a board, and it's this background that allows for the game of chess. In the same way, basic beliefs (hinges) are basic beliefs about our background (beliefs like "we have hands" "there are other minds" etc) - this background is necessary for the language games of knowledge and doubt to take place. This doesn't mean that basic beliefs can't be referred to as true, just not in combination with being justified, i.e., justified and true. So, you can't on the one hand believe that the foundation is not justified (i.e., hinges) and on the other say they are justified. It's necessarily the case that hinges aren't justified - that's the whole point of Witt's argument.

If read closely, much of what I've written implies that Wittgenstein's OC enhances the traditional view of knowledge as JTB. I believe that JTB is still a good definition, but given OC, it needs a bit more nuance. Let me be a bit more precise about my view of JTB given the backdrop of OC.

So, integrating JTB into OC involves rethinking how we use justification and truth, and how we think of beliefs. For example, justification often focuses on logic or rational argument, but Wittgenstein's approach is more practical focusing on the various language games within our forms of life. Also to acknowledge the limitations of justification as foundational or bedrock to our whole system of knowledge. Thus, what constitutes justification is based on the context of the language game being played. To understand this requires a good understanding of Witt's views in the PI.

My approach to truth is that it's more about their role in different language games. So, one role is that statements can be true as part of a framework, like the role of hinges or the role that rules play in a game. These are not truths that are justified, but truths that are part of our background certainty (and they can be used as propositions in an argument).

The other predominant role of truth is those that are justified, these are epistemological, i.e., they are used in our language games of epistemology. So, I don't think the use of truth is restricted to the language games of epistemology. I guess this is a dualistic approach to truth.

You can think of traditional JTB as being enhanced by OC. First, with the base layer of hinge propositions (or as I like to say basic beliefs or basic subjective certainties). In this layer justification and truth are about their role in our system of epistemology, viz., they're bedrock to our system of epistemology. In other words, they allow the language games of epistemology to take root.

The upper layers above the base layer (bedrock) are more akin to the traditional language games of JTB. This is where the typical role of inference takes place.

Then there is the role of skepticism in all of this or the role of doubting. Some claims don't need to be justified in response to skeptical doubt because they are part of what makes doubting possible.

This view of knowledge (JTB) is more holistic and is connected to a web of beliefs, practices (forms of life), and language games. So, JTB is enhanced by Wittgenstein and how it correlates with our practical life, viz., how we act (linguistically and as we move in the world).

By integrating these ideas the traditional model of JTB can be enhanced.

So, whenever I use JTB this is what I think about.

No problem Banno, and thanks for the kind words. I tried to capture what I thought was Witt's thinking. I'm sure I did in many ways but failed in others. What I tried to do is go beyond his thinking, i.e., to see where it might lead.

My account of JTB is a bit more nuanced than what you might normally hear from those who hold to JTB. For e.g., there are different language games that account for the different uses of justification (logic, testimony, sensory experience, and linguistic training for e.g.). And my account of truth is a bit more nuanced. We all think the other guy we disagree with is doing poor philosophy.

C1 is an intermediate conclusion and C4 in the final conclusion. Of course, there are different theories of knowledge, but since Witt is generally dealing with JTB that's how I formulated the argument. Any argument that's formed like this is based on a particular interpretation, so it can always be challenged.

So, what would a logical argument look like in favor of my interpretation of Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions?

P1: All knowledge in the traditional epistemological sense requires justification, truth, and belief.
P2: Hinge propositions, do not require (or cannot undergo) justification since they are bedrock.
C1: Therefore, hinge propositions do not fit into the traditional knowledge model (from P1 and P2).
P3: If something does not fit into the model of knowledge where it must be justified to be known, then based on JTB, it is not "known."
C2: Hence, hinge propositions are not known in the epistemological sense (from C1 and P3).
P4: If something is not known epistemologically, it does not meet the criteria of being justified or true in the traditional sense.

Who knows? We have to disagree about something. :grin:

If it appears that I lump all language games about truth into a single mix, that is becasue the games around knowledge and the games around truth are not unrelated. One can only have justified true beliefs if there are truths. — Banno

Where we seem to disagree is on the idea that "One can only have justified true beliefs if there are truths." Obviously this is true, but this doesn't address my issue.

Sorry, I edited this.

You didn't direct this at me, but I wanted to respond.

Yes, they're examples of hinges. However, certain hinges (basic beliefs) provide the framework for the language games of epistemology to work. There is no mistake here about truth, it just depends on the language game being used. It appears that you're lumping all language games about truth into a single mix. Moreover, hinge propositions are not normal propositions, if they were he wouldn't have singled them out. So, in what sense are they true? You seem to ignore the examples I gave that point out how they can be said to be true, and the ways they cannot be said to be true. Maybe you can clarify.

Well that's my interpretation of OC.

OC 291 is just Witt reiterating that some truths about the world are just part of the framework or foundation of understanding. They're not questioned or doubted. I just believe it, i.e., I believe it's true without justification.

OC 292 - Our knowledge is part of an enormous system and the value of our beliefs or knowledge takes place in the broader system of beliefs and practices.

OC 293 - Again, some basic beliefs must remain fixed for practicality and if they didn't, we wouldn't be able to act effectively in the world.

One can look at these basic beliefs as foundations for action, both in linguistics and epistemology. This is why I think Witt is just giving us a foundation for our beliefs to stand on, but it's not a traditional foundational view.

This should probably be in my thread on OC.

So for example, when Moore raises his hand and says ‘I know this is a hand, and therefore it is true that it is a hand’, he is confusing an epistemological with a grammatical use of the concepts of know and true, because he considers his demonstration as a form of proof. Would you agree? But then what would be an example of a grammatical use of the word true in Moore’s case? Something like: ‘it is true that Moore is invoking a particular language game by raising his hand and saying he knows it is a hand? — Joshs

The way I explain Moore's confusion, which is Witt's point, Moore's use of know is more akin to an expression of a conviction. In other words, a subjective feeling of truth expressed by emphasis or gesticulation. A feeling of certainty, not to be confused with objective certainty or knowledge.

Moore does consider "I know this is a hand," to be empirical proof, a self-evident truth. In the Wittgensteinian sense "This is a hand" would be a grammatical truth by virtue of the language game and context. However, Moore is saying something different, he thinks he has good reasons to suppose that he knows "This is a hand." Wittgenstein disagrees.

But 2+2=4 is not arbitrary in the way that "bishops move diagonally" is. — hypericin

Yes, you are correct; it's not the same. However, any system, whether epistemological (JTB) or formal mathematical systems, will have hinges (hereafter referred to as basic beliefs) that are true, but not in the JTB sense. All I'm saying is that both are basic statements of belief, and they function in similar ways. In both systems, these basic beliefs are bedrock to the system and function in a way that's not provable within the system. Some mathematical statements are accepted as true for the system to function.

Or rather, 2+2=4 follows the rules of adding in the same way that a diagonal bishop move follows the rules of chess. But the rules of adding are not mere convention, they capture some sort of truth that has not been stipulated into being, like the rules of chess were. — hypericin

Some basic beliefs are arbitrary and some are not, but both are basic and needed for the system to function. The difference in the use of truth is that one use is epistemological, and one is not. This is where part of the confusion lies, at least in OC. Another part of the confusion is the idea of hinge proposition, which is why I think they should be called basic beliefs.

I believe that mathematical systems are the product of minds and that anything created by that mind/s involving mathematics will have mathematical systems intrinsic to it. In other words, mathematics will be discoverable within that creation, by other minds, which is the case when we discover math as an intrinsic part of the universe. I'm an Idealist and believe that at the bottom of reality is consciousness (other minds). So, I believe, mathematical knowledge is intrinsic to this consciousness or mind. So, the answer to the age-old question, "Is mathematics discoverable or created by minds?" - it's ultimately a product of a mind/s, but it can be discovered as part of a creation too. So, again, if any mind uses mathematics to create something, then mathematics will be discoverable within that creation.

One can believe this as an idealist without believing in some religious doctrine.

Chess rules are not true or false in themselves, the moves in the game which these rules specify are true or false. — Joshs

Hinges aren't true in the epistemological sense, i.e., justified and true. However, one can use the concept of true in other ways, just as the concept know can be used in other ways. For example, someone might ask when learning the game of chess, "Is it true that bishops move diagonally?" You reply "Yes." This isn't an epistemological use of the concept.

I wouldn't use the phrase "true or false in themselves." I think that just confuses things even more. However, if you mean that the rules of chess are not something we discovered as a fact of reality (JTB), then I agree. The point is that what we accept as true can be independent of provability. So, hinges can be accepted as true, i.e., apart from provability and epistemological uses. I believe this is also how we should see some mathematical truths, e.g. 2+2=4 is true.

Since the laws of chess are the ground in the basis of which moves in the game can be correct or incorrect, the laws of chess are ‘not true, not yet false’. Is this what you meant? — Joshs

This is slightly different but related. The rules of chess do not describe the truths of reality in the same way that "water freezes at 32 degrees F" does. Instead, they constitute the very framework within which true and false (correct and incorrect) can be assessed.

This is one of the main points of OC. We often refer to things as true without being justified, just as we can use the word know without it being JTB. They're just different language games. In other words, you can hold them as true in practice, e.g., chess rules.

You still don't seem to follow my points. Of course, they could be used in arguments. We can talk about their truth values just as we can talk about the truth values of the rules of chess, they just aren't epistemological truth values, i.e., they're not justified and true. There are different language games for these words outside their epistemological use, and Witt points this out. It's in this sense you can use know, true, and even justified outside epistemology.

Hinge propositions are said, but never quite rightly. "Here is a hand" isn't justified, at least not by other propositions. It's shown. "If you do know that here is one hand, we'll grant you all the rest".

So I keep coming back to PI §201. What's not expressible may nevertheless be enacted. Not just in following a rule, but in using language, deciding what to do, and generally in what he called a "form of life". You don't say it, you do it.

Any comments, Sam26? I suspect this is an older reading of Wittgenstein than is popular now. — Banno

I'll comment on this: I'm not sure why you would say this, viz., "Hinge propositions are said, but never quite rightly." They are often mischaracterized and taken as normal propositions, so in this sense they are often "never said quite rightly." However, they can be talked about if one understands what they are and how they function. Indeed, they aren't justified but neither are they true, i.e., they are outside of epistemological talk. This means that not only are they outside talk of justification, but they are outside talk of truth, at least in the epistemological sense. They are true in the sense that the rules of chess are true. This use of true is not epistemological.

The point of OC 1 is not about showing. It's about saying to Moore that if he does know as he claims, then Wittgenstein will grant the rest of his argument. But of course, Wittgenstein demonstrates that Moore doesn't know in the JTB sense. He's using the concept know, not epistemologically, but as an expression of a conviction. It's purely subjective. This is where people seem to get confused, i.e., they don't understand this point.

Where we do see the idea of showing in OC is that many hinges are shown in our actions even prior to the expression of the belief. Showing is prior to the expression in many ways, but not always. In the most basic of hinges, showing is bedrock.

I given a more detailed explanation in my most recent posts in my analysis of OC.

The Practicality of Understanding Hinges

Wittgenstein's hinge propositions (hereafter known as basic beliefs) from On Certainty offer profound insights into how everyday life connects with intellectual pursuits. The ideas contained in OC extend far beyond philosophical theory, reaching into reality on a practical level, namely, how we learn, know, and act in the world. One example of this is how we teach a child. We don't start by proving fundamental facts about reality - we show them how to interact with the world, which is closely connected with our forms of life. A child learns this is a hand not by proof, but by interacting with the world, non-linguistically or linguistically. This practical subjective certainty provides the foundation for later learning, especially the more advanced concepts of knowledge and doubt. We teach a child how to follow the rules of mathematics, we don't prove that 2+2=4. We show them how to count, and we show them how to interact in the world by using mathematics. They learn the basic beliefs of mathematics first. The certainty they acquire is through practice and participation in our forms of life. A child doesn't start by questioning these basic beliefs. For example, they don't question if a word refers to some thing, they start by learning the language games of the concepts. Questioning and doubting come later in the more advanced language games after the foundation has been put down.

Basic beliefs are why scientists don't question everything. There's a certain set of basic beliefs that stand fast in order for scientific investigation to proceed. A biologist doesn't question the existence of the microscope, they simply use the microscope. Basic beliefs make scientific investigations possible.

Wittgenstein's basic beliefs explain why there are cultural differences, viz., some cultures have different sets of basic beliefs. This is true even if some core basic beliefs are shared between cultures. This is also true of religious beliefs; each religion has its own basic beliefs within its religious system. This doesn't mean that all basic beliefs are equal, some are absolute (like there are other minds), and some change because they're challenged.

There are obvious implications for how we understand knowledge. Instead of seeing basic beliefs as requiring justification, we recognize that some certainties (basic beliefs) must stand fast in order for epistemological justification and truth claims to be possible in the first place.

These insights demonstrate that our relationship with reality isn't primarily theoretical but practical. This doesn't diminish philosophical inquiry; it just puts it in the proper light.

Let me explain this idea more simply:

Again, thinking about the rules of chess. When we assert that "bishops move diagonally," this isn't something we prove or justify, it's just a rule we accept to play the game. It's like saying "This is how we move the piece," how we act when we play the game. We can say that it's true that bishops move diagonally, but this is different from saying that it rained yesterday, which we can defend by looking at the weather records and other evidence.

Imagine trying to prove that you have hands in a context similar to Moore's example. It would seem ridiculous because it's not something we normally need to prove. The subjective certainty we have about our hands is very basic, it's like the chess rule - we start with it, we act with our hands and we play chess using the rules of chess. We don't prove these things.

The key point is that some things in life aren't things we know in the JTB sense. They are the foundation that lets us know in the epistemological (JTB) sense. In other words, you have to accept the rules of chess before you can play the game, and there are certain things you have to accept about the world before you can start making knowledge claims.

We often use words like true and know in different ways. When we say, "I know my name," we're not really offering a proof, we're just expressing a basic certainty. It's different from saying the Earth is the third planet from our Sun, which we can prove by observation. Much of the confusion stems from the different uses of these words (true and know), some are foundational (hinges), and others are not.

So, hinge propositions (bedrock beliefs) are outside our epistemological framework (JTB), which means that hinges aren't known in the epistemological sense, i.e., they are not justified and true. I say, "epistemological sense" because there are language games where using true about hinges can make sense. However, it's not an epistemological use. One can see this if, for example, we look at the rules of chess, which are hinges. There is no objective justification for saying that bishops move diagonally, i.e., there is no objective justification that leads me to the truth of the statement that bishops move diagonally. The rule is just an arbitrary backdrop or a matter of convention that we accept. Does this mean we can't use the word true about these rules, of course not. We accept them as true, but not epistemologically. For example, it's similar to the use of know that's not epistemological. Moore's use of "I know this is a hand," is the classic example, it's not an epistemological use in the context Moore is using it. His use of know is akin to a conviction, it's not epistemological. The word true can be used in the same way, as an expression of an inner certainty. Is it true that bishops move diagonally? In other words, is the statement "Bishops move diagonally" justified and true? No. It's a rule we accept that is foundational to the game. Are there instances where the "Bishops move diagonally" is justified and true? Yes. It depends on the context of the language game. People tend to conflate this distinction.

My take on some of this differs from what's been discussed here, especially since I'm an Idealist.

In Wittgenstein’s final work, OC, he grappled with the fundamental ideas of knowledge (JTB), certainty, doubt, truth, and others. This was in response to G.E. Moore’s claims about what we can know with certainty. This led to what many philosophers refer to as hinge propositions. Hinge propositions can be referred to in several ways including bedrock, foundational, or basic beliefs; however, no matter how you refer to them they raise important questions about the foundations of knowledge, i.e., our epistemological practices.

One issue (among others) that emerges with hinge propositions within epistemology is understanding their relationship to truth. Propositions traditionally are thought of as either true or false. It seems clear that Wittgenstein is separating the traditional view of what we mean by proposition, with a more nuanced view given Moore’s propositions. For example, “If true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true nor yet false (OC 205).” This suggests that what separates hinges from other propositions is their role, viz., that they are foundational or bedrock. This bedrock status is what separates them from traditional propositions. “I should like to say: Moore does not know what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast for him, as also for me; regarding it as absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt and enquiry (OC 151).” The implication is that it is not justified or true because of evidence or reasons, but it is part of our method of inquiry that certain hinges (beliefs) stand fast. This is borne out in our forms of life. Our world picture comes before our talk of true and false. We inherit our background, it’s not a matter of it being true or false. The ground is what enables epistemological claims, which by definition include truth claims.
We can think of this as a kind of logic of precedence, i.e., before we can say anything we need a framework, shared practices, basic (subjective) certainties, and ways of judging. The ground is not yet true or false. In other words, hinges, which are the ground, are not true or false in this setting. This is simply the way I act, whether linguistically or otherwise.

We can think of the use of true in the same way we think of the use of know. For example, just as “know” can be used as an expression of JTB and as a conviction of what one believes, so the use of “true” can be used apart from its epistemological uses. This insight helps to explain Wittgenstein’s reference to the truth of 2+2=4. These basic mathematical statements, especially when functioning as hinges operate more like rules of practice, something akin to a rule of chess. They demonstrate how we operate with numbers rather than making truth claims. However, it depends on the language game or the context. Certainly, there are proper uses of “true” outside the context of epistemology, just as there are proper uses of “know” outside epistemology. The use of “know” has this dual nature, so too does the concept of “true.” The context of the language game is what drives the correct use.

Given that Wittgenstein never completed OC the term hinge proposition itself might be problematic. Alternative terms like bedrock beliefs, foundation beliefs, or basic beliefs might be better suited to capture their pre-propositional nature.

I’ve been thinking about expressing Wittgenstein’s hinges in terms of types.

For example…

1. Types of Hinges

• Pre-linguistic beliefs (shown in our actions)
1. Spatial awareness
2. Continuity of objects
3. Causal relationships

• Rule-based hinges
1. Rules of chess
2. Mathematical rules/axioms
3. Any defined practice

• Varied hinges
1. Physical facts (“This is my hand”)
2. Social conventions
3. Rules of language

• Chess example
1. The rules can be learned as statements
2. However, their role as hinges is learned from:
a) Accepting their use in practice
b) Their role as enablers of the game
c) Their status as foundational

• Wittgensteinian Insight
1. Hinges have a particular function
a) Foundational framework
b) Beyond doubt in practice
c) Necessary for activity (science, linguistics, games, epistemology, etc)
d) Must be accepted to participate in the activity

Some insights into Wittgensteinian hinges and Godel’s incompleteness theorems.

Extended Theory: Foundations of Knowledge and Formal Systems

1. Parallel Foundations

A. In Epistemological Systems:
• Hinge beliefs serve as unquestioned beliefs
• Pre-linguistic beliefs ground our knowledge
• Pre-linguistic beliefs enable the practice of justification

B. In Formal Mathematical Systems:
• Godel’s unprovable propositions function like hinges
• Some mathematical truths must be taken as bedrock
• Some mathematical statements are necessary for system operation but unprovable within the system

2. The Foundation Principle
• All systems whether epistemic or formal require unprovable foundations (hinges)
• Unprovable statements are not weaknesses but necessary features
• Hinges do not limit systematic knowledge but are a requirement for all systems of knowledge
• The attempt to prove every statement within a system leads to the following:
o Infinite regress
o Circular reasoning
o Foundational assumptions (hinges/axioms)

3. Unified Understanding of the Limitations of Systems
• Epistemological systems are built on hinges
• Formal systems have unprovable but necessary truths
• Both systems require the following:
o Statements that cannot be justified within the system
o Statements that are necessary for the system to function
o Statements that must be accepted rather than proved

4. Knowledge Implications

A. Mathematical Knowledge:
• Some mathematical propositions must function as hinges
• These are not problems for the system but features of formal systems
• The unprovability of certain mathematical propositions in a formal system mirrors the role of hinges in epistemic systems

B. Scientific Knowledge:
• Foundational assumptions are necessary for a scientific system
• These function like mathematical axioms and epistemological hinges
• They are necessary to scientific progress

5. Practical Applications:

A. In Mathematics:
• Recognizing certain mathematical propositions as hinge like
• There are limits to formal proofs
• Recognizing the role of bedrock statements

6. Philosophical Implications

A. For Knowledge
• Knowledge doesn’t need complete proof
• Systems are reliable despite having unprovable elements
• Foundational elements and proofs have different functions

B. For Truth:
• What we accept as true can exist independent of provability
• Some truths must be simply believed without proof
• What we accept as true is not always provable

7. Integrating Epistemological and Formal Systems

A. Common Features:
• Unprovable foundations are necessary
• Accept starting points
• Seeing limitations as enabling features

B. Differences:
• Understanding the properties of foundational elements
• Different methods of verification
• Different types of knowledge acquired

Understanding this integration suggests the following:

1. The limits Godel discovered in formal systems coincide with the role of hinges in epistemology
2. Mathematical and JTB necessitate unprovable foundations
3. These are features of these systems, not problems to be solved
4. Having a clear understanding of these systems helps to better understand both domains

As far as I know, no one has made this connection, viz., between hinges and Godel's incompleteness theorem.

:up:

:up:

What might an outline of a theory of knowledge look like in my interpretation of OC?

A Layered Theory of Epistemic Foundations

1. Foundation Layer: Pre-linguistic beliefs or certainties
• Consists of pre-linguistic or animal beliefs or certainties
• Pre-linguistic beliefs are manifested through action
• E.g’s include special awareness, object permanence, and bodily awareness
• These form the foundations of what makes the language games of knowledge possible
• Not subject to claims of truth or falsity because they precede such concepts
2. Framework Layer: Hinge Beliefs
• Built on top of pre-linguistic beliefs
• This is the riverbed of our system of JTB
• Differing levels of stability
o Bedrock hinges (nearly immutable, e.g., physical objects exist
o Cultural hinges (can change over time)
o Local hinges (depend on contexts or practices)
• Not justified by evidence or reasons but shown through our practices
• Makes the language games of justification and doubt possible

3. Operational Layer
• Built on the foundation of hinge propositions
• Requires:
o Meaningful doubt
o Methods of justification
o Context within language games
• Subject to verification and falsification
• They can be taught and demonstrated

Key Principles:
1. The Doubt Principle
• The language game of doubt requires a stable framework
• Not everything can be doubted
• There must be practical consequences to doubt
• Doubt is necessary for knowledge claims

2. The Justification Principle
• Operates within language games
• Different language games require different forms of justification
• Justification ends with hinge propositions
• Justification cannot have an infinite regression

3. The Principle of Context
• Knowledge claims only make sense within the language games of epistemology
• Some propositions can be epistemological in one context and be a hinge in another

4. Principle of Practice
• Knowledge is demonstrated by practice and by our statements
• Actions are more fundamental than statements
• Learning involves the acquisition of explicit knowledge and implicit certainty
• Practice grounds theoretical knowledge

Methodological Implications:
1. Epistemology
• Understand how knowledge claims function in practice (language games)
• Examine the relationship between our actions and our certainties (beliefs)
• Study the many language games of justification across contexts
• Understand the importance of our background reality in knowledge

2. Scientific Knowledge
• Scientific methods rest on hinge certainties
• Paradigm shifts involve changes in hinges
• Understand the relationship between theory and observation

3. Everyday Knowledge
• Acknowledge the importance of practical knowledge
• Again, recognize the role of the inherited background
• Recognize the relationship between action and belief

This is a way of understanding knowledge within the context of some of Wittgenstein’s thinking in OC and the PI.

A lot more work needs to be done, but this is the beginning of how I think of epistemology using Wittgenstein as a catalyst for my thinking.