I did say that I was going to sum this up in a couple more posts, but it seems there will be a few more than I thought.

Post 14

There is a clear, at least at a certain level of analysis, ontology in the Tractatus. Reality for Wittgenstein is composed of facts, not things [not Wittgensteinian objects] (T. 1.1). In other words, reality is not composed of individual objects, i.e., in isolation, but objects in combination, which form atomic facts and facts proper. As has been said many times throughout this thread objects are simple and unanalyzable, and they only exist as the smallest constituent parts of states of affairs (facts). “[O]jects fit into one another like the links of a chain (T. 2.03).” Objects are necessarily prior to the facts in the same way atoms are prior to material objects. This does not mean that atoms are like Wittgensteinian objects, i.e., atoms are not simple or unanalyzable in the same sense that objects are.

If the world had no substance, and by extension no objects, then whether a proposition was true or false would depend on other propositions (T. 2.0211, 2.0212). (However, it seems to me that it would be hard to imagine propositions without a world of some kind, and thus facts of some kind.)

In 2.0212 Wittgenstein first introduces the idea of a picture and its connection with truth and falsity, then, in 2.1 he says “We picture facts to ourselves.” We have now moved from the world of facts to thoughts. When we picture facts to ourselves we are modeling reality (T. 2.12). “A logical picture of facts is a thought (T. 3). “In a proposition a thought finds an expression… (T. 3.1).” We move from thoughts, specifically pictures of possible states of affairs, to expressing these thoughts/pictures using propositions. “[A] proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world (T. 3.12).” What a proposition projects is not included in the proposition, but its possibility is, and so a proposition does not contain its sense but the possibility of expressing it (T. 3.13).

I'm going to write one or two more posts to sum this up in the coming days.

Interesting NDE - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ZfaPCwjguk

This is a good example of why I believe both religions and materialists have it wrong. There are 100,000's of testimonials like this.

I guess at some point when discussing this Wittgenstein's logic begins to break down, but I'm not sure where it begins breaking down. I point this out because we know that there are no such things as names and objects in the Wittgensteinian sense. That said, when Wittgenstein states that "the variable name 'x' is the proper sign for the pseudo-concept object (T. 4.1272)." - he is simply saying something about the essence of symbolic representation in formal logic. 'X' is simply a placeholder for any object within a particular domain, and Wittgenstein has created his own domain with his concept of objects. The concept of an object, as Wittgenstein envisions it, is not real in the sense that it lacks empirical content or logical significance within his analysis. However, 'x' may still function as a sign within his logical context even though what it represents is considered a pseudo concept.

Strangely, he refers to objects as pseudo-concepts, and at the same time, they form the building blocks of atomic facts. Maybe it's a pseudo-concept because no concept can capture their essence. I'm not sure.

I must point out that you don't have to understand all of this to understand Wittgenstein's basic ideas in the Tractatus.

Post 13

According to K.T. Fann Wittgenstein is trying to answer two questions “How are propositions related to the world?” and “How are propositions related to one another (Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy, p. 8)?” These questions are related to Wittgenstein’s goal, viz., “My whole task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition (Nb. p. 39).”

It's already been stated in earlier posts that Wittgenstein assumes a priori that if we can talk about the world, then some propositions must be connected with the world. These propositions are called elementary propositions, and what determines their truth or falsity is the world, not other propositions. Complex propositions, made up of elementary propositions, are truth-functions of elementary propositions (e.g., T. 5). Elementary propositions are combined using truth-functional connectives such as disjunction, conjunction, negation, and implication (T. 5.101).

We know that elementary propositions consist of names in immediate combination (T. 4.221). “It is a nexus, a concatenation, of names (T. 4.22)” We also know that Wittgensteinian names are not the kind of names we’re used to, viz., dog, cat, Plato, pencil, etc. Names are simples that cannot be dissected “…by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign (T. 3.26).” “Names are simple symbols: I [Wittgenstein] indicate them by single letters (‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’) (T. 4.24).”

Wittgenstein was a traditionalist in his early philosophy because his view was that the meaning of a name was the object it denotes. “A name means an object. The object is its meaning (T. 3.203).” So, elementary propositions, composed of names, if true, are arranged in a way that pictures or mirrors the objects in the corresponding atomic facts, which make up states of affairs. Objects are important in that they provide meaningful referents for our language. Objects are the building blocks of states of affairs, and thus the world (reality). Objects also play an important role in showing the limits of language and what can be meaningfully said. There is nothing for names in elementary propositions to latch onto besides objects in atomic facts, which make up the substance of the world (T. 2.021). In other words, you can't go beyond the substance of the world using language. The mystical, for Wittgenstein, which does go beyond the world, can only be shown not said.

Some of this has already been said, but hopefully wording it a bit differently will help to clarify misunderstandings.

Are you saying that somehow the fact plays some role in whether or not x and y do combine? Or that if and when they combine the result is a fact? — Fooloso4

No, I wouldn't go that far. My intention was not to go this far into the meanings of these Wittgensteinian concepts and their place in the world. It's beyond the scope of this thread.

Both are true, I believe. As I pointed out in post 12, one of the internal properties of objects is that they can combine with other objects. Whether it does combine depends on whether or not the atomic fact obtains.

The purpose of the post above "Taking a step back..." was to clarify my earlier statements, in which I used a couple of terms in a different sense than Witt. This caused you to think I meant one thing when I meant another. My error. I think we're pretty close to interpreting objects in the same way.

Objects by themselves are mere potentiality ...
— Sam26

What do you mean "by themselves"? If they are mere potentiality what actualizes them? — Fooloso4

I'm thinking along the lines of what Wittgenstein said, viz., "...there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others (T. 2.0121)." In other words, it's only as they combine with others that we get atomic facts, otherwise we just have Witt's substance. Or it's only when they combine with other objects that they're actualized into atomic facts or complex facts. That's my take.

This is going much further into the Tractatus than I intended, but it's interesting.

Post 12

Trying to be clear about objects, so a step back.

We know this, viz., that objects, which make up the substance of the world, can be arranged to form any possible fact (state of affairs). This is basic to what an object is. You move from object  to atomic facts  to complex facts. Logic dictates this for Wittgenstein. Objects contain the possibility of arranging into any potential fact (“If things can occur in states of affairs, the possibility must be in them from the beginning (T. 2.0121).”). Whether the fact obtains depends on the arrangement of the objects in an atomic fact. Objects by themselves are mere potentiality, like any building block, but also unlike any building block we are familiar with.

My understanding of Wittgensteinian objects leads me to believe that they are the fundamental components of objective reality, i.e., they’re real things that combine. They combine to form states of affairs (T. 2.01). If states of affairs are objectively real, it would seem to follow that objects are real, at least in some sense. Otherwise, what would be combined to form states of affairs? They also seem real because they can occupy logical space. Obviously, Wittgenstein’s objects don’t exist, but Wittgenstein’s theory of objects is a theory that postulates them as real.

You must be careful about what you say about objects because you can’t ascribe external properties to objects, only internal properties (T. 2.01231). One such internal property is that they are simples, but it’s not the only internal property. Other internal properties include the ability to combine with other objects to form atomic facts, and that they make up the substance of the world of facts.

Keep in mind that to have a basic understanding of Wittgenstein’s picture theory you need not have a perfect understanding of objects or names. After all, we’re not trying to write a doctoral thesis.

Sorry, I'm falling behind. I'm in the middle of a move, and I'm recovering from a virus.

I've made a couple of misstatements that I have to also correct, as @Fooloso4 pointed out.

I have no problems with the way the thread is going.

Sorry Banno, but I think we disagree on the nature of objects. It's pretty clear what Wittgenstein had in mind, at least partially clear.

:up:

I don't find much to disagree with here, and I didn't skip over objects.

Post 11

We know, according to Wittgenstein, that propositions are pictures of possible states of affairs (facts). “A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts (T. 2.2).” It has logico-pictorial form in common with the facts it depicts. And, as we’ve said over and over the picture (the proposition) by itself only represents the possibility that it mirrors or reflects reality or the facts (T. 2.201, 2.202, 2.203). “A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree [with reality]; it is correct or incorrect, true or false (T. 2.21).” How does it do this? The picture does this by displaying its pictorial form, and what the picture represents is its sense (T. 2.22, 2.221). The sense of a proposition is separate from whether it agrees with the facts. If this wasn’t the case, we wouldn’t understand the sense of false propositions. We cannot know from the picture alone whether it is true or false, it must be compared with reality (T. 2.223, 2.224). In other words, “There are no pictures that are true a priori (T. 2.225).”

This ends my comments on the second of the seven main propositions of the Tractatus.

Post 10

We know that the idea of propositions being pictures, as presented in his picture theory of propositions, is central to his thinking in the Tractatus. So, propositions represent reality through their pictorial form. The elements of a picture include several things, including the following: Names, of course, are part of what is included in the elements of a picture, names correspond to the objects, i.e., the arrangement of names corresponds to the arrangement of objects that make up atomic facts and hence complex facts.

Second, is the logical structure of the picture (all propositions whether true or false have a logical structure). The logical structure of the picture (the proposition) also includes the logical connectives, such as disjunction, conjunction, negation, etc., and they determine the truth-possibilities of propositions (T. 4.31).

Another way to talk about the elements of a proposition is to refer to the representational content of the picture. So, the elements of a picture can be talked about in different ways. A propositional picture is a particular picture, say of A as opposed to B, because of how the pictorial elements of A (the form of the picture) relate to the situation pictured. They are identical (T. 2.15).

Geez, I think I'm misreading @013zen I need a break. Talk later.

You mean atomic facts, right?

I agree with that, I've said that over and over again. Do you disagree with that @Banno?

I may have read it years ago. I should re-read it. I don't think I'm at odds with her, am I?

I haven't read everything. :gasp: I only read every other word.

I agree with that.

You're not saying there are untrue facts are you? Every proposition represents a possible fact, but whether the proposition is true or not is dependent on whether it is a correct picture of the fact/state of affairs.

What? I don't follow.

All propositions picture possible facts, a true proposition is one where the fact obtains.

Yes, I agree. I think maybe Wittgenstein's negative facts cause some problems, but I'll let @013zen explain what he means.

@Banno

It's easy to be misunderstood because of Wittgenstein's use of these concepts. Hell, even Wittgenstein couldn't remember what he meant by certain statements. Years after he wrote the Tractatus he was asked about what he meant by this or that statement and he couldn't say. So, I'm not going to claim that my interpretations are always correct. We're all going to be off to one degree or another, and we're certainly not all going to agree.

The logical form of a true or a false proposition shares the same logical form as that of a fact; As you point out, a fact can either be true or false. So, that sentence, I'd remove. It might be more helpful at that point to reference 4.063, which reads: — 013zen

I would probably clarify it this way: The logical form of a true proposition matches the logical form of a positive fact. Some of the confusion has been that when I've been talking about states of affairs or facts I've been talking about positive facts/states of affairs.

Post 9

Just a couple of points of clarification before I continue.

When a proposition is true it mirrors a positive fact. False statements are possible states of affairs not actual states of affairs, in other words, they don’t obtain, but they still have sense because they picture a possible fact. Again, there is nothing in a false statement that connects with reality, i.e., it’s a picture that isn’t representative of a positive fact. The logical form of a true proposition matches the logical form of a fact. “Logical form is mirrored in propositions. Propositions show the form of reality (T. 4.121).” In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally (Nb p. 7). A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it (T. 4.01).”

Post 8

I will continue with a few more remarks. All of this is still under the second main proposition of the Tractatus.

“What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs (T. 2).”
What’s obvious is that states of affairs are real. For example, “The Earth has one moon,” Is a state of affairs. The proposition represents a picture of a fact. A fact is something real, not imagined. The two parts of complex facts are atomic facts and the objects that make up atomic facts. These things (things in the normal sense) are real for Wittgenstein. “Objects make up the substance of world [reality] (T. 2.021),” so substance and therefore objects are real.

Philosophers going back to Augustine have believed that names, in the normal use of the word, refer to objects (objects in this sense are things like chairs, pencils, cars, etc.). Wittgenstein develops this idea into his theory of names and objects. Of course, his idea of names and objects is much different from what philosophers traditionally meant, at least up to Frege, Russell, and maybe a few others.

“If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true (T. 2.0111). In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false) (T. 2.0212).” Pictures, of course, are sketched by propositions, and names are the smallest component of propositions. The names within a proposition refer to objects in the world. All propositions for Wittgenstein are logical pictures. A picture presents a form, i.e., the arrangement of the elements of the picture, and the “…elements of the picture are the representatives of objects (T. 2.131).”

So, the form of a proposition, which is the arrangement of the elements of a picture (made up of names), must match the form of a fact, which is made up of the arrangement of the objects. “There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable the one to be a picture of the other at all (T. 2.161). What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in the way it does, is its pictorial form (T. 2.17). A picture can depict any reality whose form it has. A spatial picture can depict anything spatial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc (T. 2.171).”

All propositions have a sense, and that sense is represented by its pictorial form. Whether that sense is representative of reality depends on whether its logical form matches the logical form of reality. The sense of a proposition is independent of whether it matches the form of reality. This must be for us to understand the sense of false propositions or pictures that do not match reality.

“A picture represents its subject [the subject being the possibility of the existence of a fact] from a position outside it (Its standpoint is its representational form.) That is why a picture represents its subject correctly or incorrectly (T. 2.173). A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form [a picture presents or shows its form] (T. 2.174).”

Much of what we know is probabilistic, i.e., I know based on inductive reasoning. E.g., I know my car will start tomorrow morning, and I know I will probably wake up tomorrow morning. Much of science is probabilistic knowledge.

What I know absolutely or with absolute certainty are things that many people have already mentioned. For example, I know that I'm sitting here in my office typing with 100% certainty. A doubt here wouldn't even make sense. There are millions or even billions of conscious things we do that we know with absolute certainty. This is not to say that people don't express doubts about these things, it's just that certain doubts people express aren't reasonable or justifiable.

I'll answer some of this as I continue.

But the picture might be true or false. This cannot be determined by the proposition. The proposition might be a false picture of reality. — Fooloso4

Every proposition (true or false) presents a picture of a possible state of affairs. If the picture matches the facts (state of affairs) of reality, then it's true, if not it's false. Of course a proposition may be a false picture. I don't see the problem.

"When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components-no further division is possible and an apparent one is
superfluous-and these are objects in the original sense (Nb. p. 63)."

I'd have to do a careful reading of the preceding pages but keep in mind that the Tractatus is the final arbiter of how to interpret propositions and facts. The Notebooks are not the complete story, the Tractatus is. That's not to say that it's not important, it's just that he's working through these ideas in the Notebooks. Besides I'm not sure I see your point.

I'm trying to give an accurate presentation for people to read. I don't want to get sidetracked with every little disagreement with you. I only say this so I can focus on my goal. If you want to present a different interpretation that's fine, but don't be surprised if I don't respond. I'm not always going to be correct with every nuanced word, but I think I can give an accurate overall interpretation.

If I understand you correctly, I agree.

Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them. They are a priori objects of human thought. His concern is with propositions are how they make sense. — Fooloso4

I don't disagree with these statements.

The analysis of language does not reveal simple names of simple objects — Fooloso4

I might argue over the wording of this, i.e., the analysis of language brings us to names, the smallest component of an elementary proposition. Names correspond to objects, which make up atomic facts. A proposition is a picture, according to Witt, its "...end-points [names]... actually touch the object (T. 2.1521), like a measure laid against reality (T. 2.1512). Another way to say it, is that the proposition mirrors or pictures reality.

The terminus of a proposition is that point at which the meaning of the proposition requires no further analysis. We do not need, and it would be counterproductive, to chop Plato up into simpler components for a proposition about him to make sense. He is in such cases a simple propositional object with the elementary name 'Plato'. — Fooloso4

I definitely wouldn't say that Plato is a "simple propositional object." I would say that Plato, as part of a proposition about the person, is either part of an atomic fact (simple fact) or a more complex fact. There are no simple propositional objects. There are simple propositional names, but not objects. Objects are connected specifically to atomic facts. Names point to objects, which again make up facts or reality.

Post 7

Wittgenstein wasn’t blind to the fact that he was unable to give examples of objects. He says for example, “Our difficulty was that we kept on speaking of simple objects and were unable to mention a single one (Nb. p. 68).” For whatever reason Wittgenstein suppresses his doubts and proceeds with his analysis.

I’ll try to define objects as I see them, i.e., based on, I believe, a reasonable interpretation. Let me say first that you don’t need to have a perfect understanding of names or objects to have a clear understanding of the general ideas of the Tractatus, this seems obvious. You can be wrong about this or that interpretation (within reason) and still have a clear picture of most of his ideas.

First, we know that Wittgenstienian objects are independent of human thought and perception, i.e., their existence persists regardless of what we claim. Their subsistence or their persistent nature is independent of thought and language.

Second, being subsistent in the case of objects, means their reality is not contingent on any observation or linguistic description. This implies that their existence is objective, which is the case with atomic and complex facts.

Third, objects are unchanging or unalterable.

Fourth, as we’ve already pointed out, objects form the substance of reality. They form this substance by combining into atomic facts or the structure of the world (reality).

Fifth, the implications of all this are closely related to the limits of language. Objects represent all that can be meaningfully said about reality. Why? Because combinations of objects represent every possible state of affairs. They are the building blocks of reality.

Thanks for the compliment. As for Russell being influenced by Mach, I agree. The physicist and philosopher Ernst Mack did influence Russell's work, especially his early work.

Post 6

Wittgenstein’s reasoning was that if I assert that “Plato was a philosopher,” I know what I mean. But who is Plato and what is a philosopher? If we try to answer the questions, the questions may be open to more questions. Therefore, the process of analysis might go on and on without resolution. Wittgenstein believed that the process of analysis must come to an end (Nb p. 46), but what is that end? The end for Wittgenstein, as stated in the Tractatus and the Notebooks, are elementary propositions made up of names, “…which will correspond to... simple objects (Nb p. 61).” The point is that even though Wittgenstein was unable to give examples of names and objects (names being simple signs, and simple objects being the basic substance of the world), he believed that logic dictated that this is how it must be. Wittgenstein believed that the idea of a simple is already contained in the idea of a complex and the idea of an analysis (Nb. p. 60). For us to say things about the world, our statements must come in direct contact with the world. This is accomplished via names. “A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign (T. 3.26).” And, although Wittgenstein was unable to carry out the analysis completely, he was sure that this is how it must be. Of course, we remember that Wittgenstein inherited many of these ideas from Frege and Russell, which provided the impetus for his logic.

Post 5

In the previous post we talked a little about the 2nd of the seven main propositions of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein spends about six pages on this topic.

We know based on 2.01 that a fact is made up of a combination of objects. Objects are the fundamental building blocks of reality; they make up the substance of the world. They cannot be further analyzed into simpler parts. Think of them as irreducible (T. 2.021). (They are sometimes referred to as “atomic objects.”) Objects have an independent existence (if you’re thinking of what we mean by ordinary objects, then you’re far from what Wittgenstein meant by objects in the Tractatus), free from the existence of other objects.

Wittgenstein uses the idea of objects as a necessary ingredient to his a priori analysis. He doesn’t just create objects out of thin air, i.e., at the time Frege and Russell were thinking along similar lines. This is most likely why Wittgenstein created both the name and the object. Names being the smallest component of an elementary proposition, and objects being the smallest component of an atomic fact. Names in propositions represent objects. This is a source of confusion for many who read the Tractatus for the first time. Also, objects have no material properties because propositions represent properties, “…and it’s only by the configuration of objects that they [material properties] are produced (T. 2.0231).”

Frege developed a system of logical notation to express logical relations in mathematics, and he played a significant role in the development of formal logic. Wittgenstein extended Frege’s ideas of logical notation to show the logic behind the proposition and its connection to a fact, so the Tractatus reflects Frege’s influence.

Russell’s influence is significant in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy (up to about 1929). Russell’s work on logical atomism, particularly in his book Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) is particularly impactful for Wittgenstein. Russell believed that thought and language could be reduced to atomic propositions that correspond with the basic elements of reality. So, the ideas of the Tractatus were extensions of both Frege’s and Russell’s ideas, but there are also important differences.

“It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something--a form--in common with it (T. 2.022). Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form (T. 2.023).” You can think of form as the way things are arranged in a picture. So, if a proposition presents a picture of a possible fact, then it has a particular logical form, and that form either matches reality or it doesn’t. Its form is the arrangement of things in the picture. So, both the proposition and facts have forms, but whether a proposition is true depends on whether its form, the arrangement of names in the proposition, matches the arrangement of objects composing the atomic fact. Even space, time, and color are forms of objects (T. 2.0251). In other words, objects that have a particular arrangement, make up space, time, and color. Every fact of the world is composed of a certain arrangement of objects (again, objects make up the substance), including space, time, and color.

You don't seem to be thinking about Wittgensteinian objects, which are not objects in the traditional sense.

Post 4

It's important to understand that Wittgenstein is trying to answer the question of why it’s possible to make statements about the world. He answers this by doing an a priori investigation, which is very distinct from his later philosophy. Wittgenstein believes that it’s through purely logical analysis that we can come to understand how propositions connect to the world of facts. He assumes this from the beginning. It’s an a priori investigation that will provide the solution to philosophical problems. He also believed that even vague propositions (Nb p. 70), once logically understood, are not vague, but have a clear logical structure. Once you have a clear understanding of the logical structure of propositions, then you essentially have a clear understanding of all the propositions of philosophy. This is partly the reason why Wittgenstein believed after completing the Tractatus that he had solved the problems of philosophy. It’s his logical analysis of the proposition, and specifically how it connects to the world, that draws him to this conclusion.

“What is the case-a fact-is the existence of states of affairs (T. 2).” We use language, specifically propositions, to make statements of facts about the world. States of affairs are not the same as propositions, they are quite distinct. The world is made up of facts (states of affairs), viz, the totality of all the facts (T 1.11). You might not agree with Wittgenstein’s notion of facts being composed of objects (objects being the simplest component of an atomic fact), but his notion of facts as states of affairs existing in reality and quite separate from propositions, I believe, is a good one; and many philosophers, including myself, use it. States of affairs make up reality, but not as Wittgenstein envisioned it in the Tractatus, but I digress.

Much can be said about Frege’s influence on the Tractatus. In fact, some of Wittgenstein’s ideas reflect Frege’s ideas. For example, Wittgenstein and Frege are trying to break down propositions into their simplest form. Frege’s work marked the beginning of what became known as logical atomism. Frege also introduced the distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung) in linguistic expressions. There are other important ideas that Wittgenstein got from Frege, but it’s beyond the scope of these remarks.

For me it's important to distinguish between claims (statements/propositions) and facts, i.e., states of affairs. If a statement is true, then it represents a fact or facts in reality. The idea that there is an ontology connected with the truth has some merit, i.e., we're referring to the existence of particular states of affairs or the possible existence of a state of affairs. A statement is true if it mirrors a fact, but facts exist apart from the statements themselves (at least many facts). A statement can be true quite apart from any justification, which is to say, I may not know the justification, in which case I don't know it's true. I may claim it's true as a matter of opinion or mere belief, but it's not knowledge. All of us have opinions, some of which are true, and some are false. A claim is never knowledge in itself unless we're referring to statements like "All bachelors are unmarried men." Of course, one could claim that the statement refers to linguistic facts based on the meanings of the words. So, even in this e.g., we could use a linguistic justification.

Truth is always about claims, which come in the form of propositions. I can claim that X is true with little to no justification, but it's not knowledge unless it conforms to one of the many methods we use to justify a claim. I'm a Wittgensteinian when it comes to justification, i.e., we use several methods in our language-games to justify a claim—for example, testimony, reason (logic), linguistic training, sensory experience, and others. Justification is much broader in its scope than many people realize.

I think there is an ontology behind the truth of our statements, and it's in the form of facts, the facts of reality.