Here's another simple way to explain Wittgenstein's hinges.

Imagine opening a door; you don't ask yourself if the hinges will do their job by holding the weight of the door and allowing it to swing, you simply trust they'll do the job. Now compare this to our everyday beliefs, you don't consider whether or not the ground won't vanish under your feet, or whether the person you're talking to really exists. These bedrock assumptions are what we call hinges, and they're the grounding of every action and question you ever ask, yet you rarely stop to justify them.

Wittgensteinian hinges aren't based on theories or logical proofs. They're the unspoken bedrock certainties that make epistemology possible. If someone asked you, "How do you know the Earth will be here tomorrow?" You'd probably reply, "I just do." Questioning hinges feels absurd, yet without them, you couldn't even begin to act or think.

Wittgenstein is making a profound point. Just as the door would fail to function without its hinges, so would our entire system of thought or epistemology collapse if we tried to justify all of our bedrock convictions. Hinges are the silent pillars holding everything up, everything we know, and we rarely notice them.

Comments on Gettier

I claim that the Gettier problem is a philosophical non-issue, driven by the semantic confusion of conflating subjective certainty with objective justification. Far from undermining JTB, it exposes a misinterpretation of how justification works within language. I find the debate a waste of time, fixating on contrived cases that distort epistemic practices and offer no substantive challenge to JTB.

JTB is a practical working definition of knowledge. A person knows something if they believe it, it’s true, and they have objective justification (good reasons for supporting the truth). In everyday contexts, JTB works seamlessly: I know it’s 3:00 PM if I believe it (based on a clock), it’s true, and I’m justified (the clock is reliable). The Gettier problem claims to show that JTB is insufficient, but it relies on a misunderstanding of justification, not a defect in the definition.

People often conflate subjective certainty (feeling justified) with objective justification (having good reasons as required by JTB). For example, if I believe a clock shows the correct time because clocks are generally reliable, then I have subjective certainty. But if the clock is stopped, I’m not actually justified, my reason fails to connect to the truth. JTB demands objective justification and conflating it with subjective certainty creates confusion about JTB.

Wittgenstein’s language games reveal that justification is not a universal standard but a context-specific practice (or a practice that extends across our forms of life), varying across epistemic games like testimony, logic, sensory experience, and linguistic training. Each game has its own rules:

In the sensory experience game, justification comes from trusting perceptions (e.g., a working clock), but a stopped clock violates the rule.

In the logic game, justification follows from sound reasoning, but false assumptions (e.g., about Jones) undermine it.

Subjective certainty arises when a person follows a game’s rules (e.g., trusting a clock), but objective justification requires those rules to hold up (e.g., the clock must work). The Gettier problem misapplies these rules, treating subjective certainty as objective justification.

In Gettier cases, subjects have subjective certainty but lack objective justification, yet philosophers debate whether their true beliefs are JTB. This is a semantic error:

In the clock case, Smith feels justified (sensory experience game: clocks are reliable), but the stopped clock means he’s not objectively justified. His true belief is lucky, not knowledge, and JTB correctly dismisses it.

In the job case, Smith feels justified (logic game: strong evidence about Jones), but his false assumption undermines objective justification. The truth is coincidental, and JTB rightly denies knowledge status.
The problem arises when philosophers equate subjective certainty with JTB’s justification condition, then puzzle over the lucky truth. This is a linguistic trap, debating justification or knowledge abstractly, ignoring the contextual rules of our language games

The Gettier problem is unproductive because it’s rooted in this semantic confusion and disconnected from real epistemic practices:

Stopped clocks and coincidental coin counts are artificial, and they're unlike the everyday scenarios where JTB thrives (e.g., trusting testimony in court, and reasoning in science).

The debate hinges on misusing justification (subjective vs. objective) and knowledge (everyday vs. philosophical), turning epistemology into a semantic game.

Gettier cases fail as knowledge because the justification isn’t objective (due to poor reasoning or luck). JTB stands firm; the debate adds nothing.

Wittgenstein’s language games dissolve the problem by showing that justification and knowledge derive meaning from their use in our form of life (or language games). Philosophical confusion arises when we take these terms out of their natural games, seeking universal definitions. In the sensory experience game, a stopped clock isn’t a valid justification; in the logic game, false assumptions aren’t either. JTB works within each game’s rules, and Gettier cases are outliers that violate those rules. The debate is a philosophical misfiring, obsessing over edge cases instead of clarifying how we justify beliefs in practice.

Conclusion: The Gettier problem is a distraction, not a crisis. It stems from conflating subjective certainty with objective justification, misapplying the contextual rules of language games like sensory experience or logic. JTB remains a robust definition: knowledge requires a true belief with objective justification, which Gettier cases lack. Philosophers should abandon this semantic quibble and focus on real epistemic practices, viz., how we use testimony, reasoning, or perception in daily life. Let's leave the Gettier puzzles behind to the philosophers entangled in semantic quibbles and focus on the practical language games where knowledge really lives and thrives.

Ya, that was meant for Bob Ross and it's part of the title of the thread.

I have no idea what "finite sins" are; no one talks like this.

If you want to argue against eternal or everlasting punishment (depending on your view of time) and whether it's just or not, I think there is a simpler way to argue the point.

Most Christians, for example, argue that God is omniscient, which means that God knows everything that can be possibly known. It certainly would be reasonable to conclude that before God created you, he knew who you would become and, at the very least, would know many of the choices you would make freely. So, as part of his omniscience, he would know before creating you that you would probably make choices that would lead to eternal punishment. If God knew this before creating you, then creating you would be inconsistent with his moral character because the outcome would be devastating for that person. Why would any loving being create a person whose ultimate end would be torturous? Even a being that is not omniscient could reasonably deduce such an outcome. At the very least this is an argument against eternal punishment and is inconsistent with how many religious people define God.

This is just a general response to your opening statement.

Here is a more detailed definition of bedrock beliefs or bedrock convictions, aka hinges.

Hinges are layered, arational foundational convictions shared by all humans within our form of life. They serve as indubitable certainties grounding our epistemological language, systems of doubt, and justification. Hinges operate on both the prelinguistic and linguistic levels, with their truth shown in our actions rather than in propositional form.

Prelinguistic Hinges: These are the most foundational convictions, such as “Chairs exist” (shown by sitting) or “I have hands” (shown by using them), which are instinctual, prelinguistic beliefs embedded in our actions before language develops (OC 475: “I want to regard man here as an animal…”; OC 148: “Why do I not satisfy myself that I have two feet…? There is no why. I simply don’t. This is how I act”). They form the primary layer, enabling both language and language games by providing the unarticulated certainties on which linguistic practices are built (OC 115: “The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty”).

Linguistic Hinges: These are articulated convictions that develop within language games, such as “I am not a brain in a vat” (OC 114) or “2+2=4,” which remain indubitable and ground specific epistemic or mathematical practices (PI 23). They build on the prelinguistic layer, extending its certainties into linguistic frameworks while retaining their foundational role.

Arational Nature: Hinges are arational, neither true nor false in the traditional epistemological sense because they are not subject to justification or doubt (OC 205: “If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false”). They are the “hinges on which our questions turn” (OC 341-343), exempt from the true/false evaluation applied to propositional statements (OC 243: “One says ‘I know’ when one is ready to give compelling grounds… However, with hinges, there is no such possibility”).

Foundational Convictions: Hinges are foundational convictions that anchor our epistemological systems, providing the ungrounded basis for language, doubt, and justification. They are the inherited background against which we distinguish true and false (OC 94: “I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness…”). In OC 102, Wittgenstein says, “There are propositions which… are expressions of a conviction,” highlighting their role as the untested certainties we live by.

Shared Within Our Form of Life: Hinges are communal, not individualistic, they are subjective certainties shared by all humans within our form of life. The prelinguistic belief in chairs’ existence, shown by sitting, is a universal certainty across humans, persisting even after language develops.

Truth Shown Through Actions: The truth of hinges is pragmatic and lived, shown in our actions, both physical and linguistic, rather than through propositional confirmation. For prelinguistic hinges, truth is in the acting: sitting on a chair shows the truth of “Chairs exist." For linguistic hinges, truth is shown in lived practices within language games: treating the world as real reflects the truth of “I am not a brain in a vat” (OC 206: “If someone asked us ‘but is that true [referring to a hinge]?’ we might say ‘yes’ to him…”). This truth is a new category, pragmatic, lived truth, quite distinct from propositional truth, as it exists apart from language for prelinguistic hinges and remains action-based for linguistic hinges.

Forget the Tractatus, it has nothing to do with any of this. Some of this is my own extrapolations from OC, but I believe it follows. OC is an unfinished work. We don't know what Witt would have left in or out, or what he would've added.

We can talk about prelinguistic truth in terms of facts by understanding facts as states of affairs that are separate from language, similar to the lived truth of prelinguistic hinges. The fact that “The Earth has one moon” exists as a reality (a fact), and a prelinguistic human’s engagement with it (e.g., navigating by moonlight) reflects a lived belief in that fact, similar to how sitting on a chair reflects the lived truth that “Chairs exist.” This isn’t about hinges corresponding to facts in a propositional sense but about their truth being a lived engagement with facts as prelinguistic realities.

Here's a rough definition of hinges.

Hinges are layered, arational (arational because they are not subject to the rational processes of justification, doubt, or proof that characterize traditional epistemological theory), foundational convictions shared by all humans within our forms of life that serve as indubitable certainties grounding our epistemological language, systems of doubt, and justification. They exist both prelinguistically and linguistically, with their truth shown through our actions rather than propositional validation.

Today, that "here is one hand" means waving one hand is beyond doubt, and is therefore a hinge.

Neither "here is one hand" nor waving one hand is a hinge. "Here is one hand" means waving one hand is the hinge. — RussellA

What makes Moorean propositions ("Here is one hand.") a hinge, according to Wittgenstein, is their status as bedrock certainties. This particular bedrock certainty is prelinguistic (not all hinges are prelinguistic, but bedrock certainties are), i.e., it's shown in our actions. Our actions alone demonstrate our certainty that we have hands. (This is not an objective certainty, i.e., it's subjective and communal, not individualistic, meaning they’re shared in our forms of life.) Many such bedrock hinges fall into this prelinguistic category and they're the foundation for language itself. These prelinguistic certainties or beliefs are a necessary precursor for all our talk of justification and truth (i.e., traditional propositional talk). The subjective certainty in these bedrock hinges is lived, prelinguistic beliefs shown in actions—is equivalent to what we hold to be true in a pragmatic lived sense, but not in the traditional, propositional sense. You still seem to want to think of them in the traditional sense. They don't function like that.

We treat certain actions as true in a very practical way. The act of opening a door shows that we treat this hinge as true in a very practical and pragmatic sense. There is no doubt here, there is just action that reflects our subjective communal certainties.

Point 1:
You seem to agree that truth is more than a propositional notion, tied to our actions, which aligns with Wittgenstein’s meaning as use (PI 43). You point out that this is already present in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and I agree – it’s a cornerstone of my argument. In OC 204, Wittgenstein says, “It is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language game.” I build on this by showing how the truth of hinges is demonstrated in our actions. For example, sitting in a chair shows the truth that chairs exist, a prelinguistic certainty (OC 148), whereas linguistic actions – like saying “I know the Earth exists” in a communal context reflect lived certainties (OC 206). Your acknowledgment doesn’t fully address my layered view of hinges, which makes a distinction between prelinguistic and linguistic certainties. This is crucial to understanding how truth operates at different levels of our practices. I’ll return to this point as I address your other critiques.

Point 2:
There is a tension between Godel’s formal notion of truth and Wittgenstein’s constructivist approach, which suggests the need for further investigation. Godel’s incompleteness theorems (1931) rely on objective truth—unprovable statements are true in a mathematical sense, independent of proof within the system. You argue that Wittgenstein leans toward constructivism, which ties truth to our practices (OC 241). However, my analogy between Godel and Wittgenstein is structural. Godel shows that formal systems require unprovable statements to function, and Wittgenstein shows that epistemological systems require unprovable hinges that enable justification and doubt (OC 115). Both systems rely on unprovable foundations despite being in different domains (formal systems vs lived practices). This supports my argument about the limits of human knowledge without conflating the two notions of truth.

Point 3:
You argue that truth is propositional, rooted in the Tractates’ “the world is all that is the case” (T 1), and that hinges are effectively not about the world” but set up our language (as per Anscombe). You trace this through Wittgenstein’s development—PI’s focus on what we do with words (PI 43), and OC’s hinges grounding our language use. I disagree with your interpretation on two grounds. First, your reliance on the Tractatus overlooks Wittgenstein’s evolution in On Certainty. In OC 241, he says, “It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.” Truth is embedded in our communal practices, not just what can be stated. Hinges aren’t merely linguistic setups—they’re tied to the world we live in (OC 94: “I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness…”). Sitting on a chair shows my belief in chairs, this is an action in the world, not just a language rule.

Second, you claim that hinges can’t be non-propositional truths because truth is statable, which misses my layered view. Prelinguistic hinges, like “Chairs exist,” are shown in actions before language (OC 475: “I want to regard man here as an animal…”). Their truth is in the acting itself—sitting on a chair demonstrates its truth (OC 204). Linguistic hinges, like “I am not a brain in a vat,” are stated, but their truth is still pragmatic—I live as if the world is real. In OC 206, Wittgenstein says we might say ‘yes’ if asked if a hinge is true—we treat it as true because we live it, not because it’s a justified proposition. My view isn’t about unstatable truths; it’s about truths shown in actions, which later we articulate. Your propositional focus overlooks this prelinguistic layer, where truth precedes language.

Point 4:
Finally, you claim I haven’t provided an “adequate” notion of truth, suggesting I’ve tried to do “too much” by extending truth beyond propositions. I believe this is an unfair critique because it doesn’t fully engage with my pragmatic view, which is specific to hinges, not a universal redefinition of truth. I argue that truth for hinges is shown in our actions—physical (sitting on a chair) and linguistic (using words in language games)—and embedded in our forms of life. This isn’t a new theory of truth but a way of understanding how truth functions for hinges, aligning with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. In OC 204 he emphasizes acting, and in OC 206, he notes we treat hinges as true - as a lived certainty. My layered view ensures this applies to both prelinguistic hinges (truth in acting) and linguistic hinges (truth in language games). Your T-sentence model assumes truth is propositional, but prelinguistic hinges aren’t propositions—their truth is in the acting itself. My notion of truth is adequate for hinges—it captures their lived, communal nature, offering a nuanced perspective on how truth works in our practices, not just in statements.

It is my position that Wittgenstein is offering a more nuanced view of truth that is embedded in our subjective certainties, practices, and language use. His nuanced view takes into account the relationship between language, practice, and reality. This account is a departure from the traditional notions of correspondence and coherence. He doesn’t offer a theory so much as a way of understanding how truth works in our lives. So, truth is more than a propositional notion, it's deeply tied to our actions, both physical and linguistic. We couldn’t even understand propositional truth without these very basic or bedrock shared convictions. They provide the framework that allows the language of traditional propositions to work. Such convictions (hinges) underlie our entire way of thinking, speaking, and acting in the world.

(Subjectivity here isn’t about individualism but about what is shared by all of us, i.e., it's communal agreement.)

Now you want things that are outside the world, that are the case but not true, or true but not the case. — Banno

I'm not talking about anything outside the world. His hinges are tied to the world, i.e., there would be no hinges without the world. You're tied to the notion of propositions and language, but hinges, at least some hinges, support the very ideas you're proposing. The language game of propositions wouldn't exist without these basic certainties.

I think we can get locked into formal definitions and miss these subtleties.

I see truth as more than propositional truth. I don't think we'll get passed this disagreement.

OC 206. If someone asked us "but is that true?" we might say "yes" to him; and if he demanded grounds we might say "I can't give you any grounds, but if you learn more you too will think the same"

In other words, if someone asked me "is it true that hinges are beyond doubt", I might say "yes".

If someone asked me "is it true that one feels pain when stung by a wasp", I might say "yes"

The truth is that one feels pain when stung by a wasp. It is not the pain that is true.

The truth is that hinges are beyond doubt. It is not the hinge that is true. — RussellA

You're going a bit too far. My point is that when referring to truth, Wittgenstein is not only thinking in terms of traditional propositions. He applies truth to hinges, too. This is in reference to my discussion with Banno. The truth is built into the actions. The actions show their truth.

And being a hinge proposition is a role taken on in the course of setting up a language game. While playing the game it cannot be doubted. And some games are always being played. — Banno

Hinges are layered. Some hinges, the most basic kind, like "The Earth has existed for more than ten minutes," must be accepted to even have a language or a language game. Here, I'm speaking of the most basic beliefs (such beliefs are the precursors to language) shown only in our actions (although they remain even after language develops), apart from language. The act of sitting on a chair shows my belief in chairs. The act of using my hands shows my belief in hands, etc. This is where hinges start, and they are more fundamental than the hinges that form as part of language. "t is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language game (OC 241). The truth is shown in the actions. This is different from traditional thinking about truth because these truths cannot be doubted or falsified.

In other games, the hinge may be doubted. — Banno

A hinge is never doubted, or it wouldn't be a hinge.

You don't follow the post where I referred to OC 205, 206? I'll try to clarify.

I understand that you want to use OC 205 to support your position, viz., that hinges are not true or false. My point is that OC 206 says, "If someone asked us 'but is that true [referring to a hinge]?' we might say 'yes' to him..." OC 206 refers to a response about hinges, and 205 refers to traditional propositions. In other words, hinges (the ground) are not yet true or false in the same way traditional propositions are true or false. He then points out in 206 that despite not being able to call the ground true or false, you can still say they're (hinges) true (206). This indicates to me and others that truth can be ascribed to hinges, just not in a propositional sense. They're like subjective truths that we all hold firm or as indubitable.

What would it mean to say one is certain or one has a conviction, which Wittgenstein points out over and over again, about hinges other than you believe they're true? This is a bedrock truth that cannot be doubted or falsified, which is why they're not like traditional propositions, which can be falsified.

Our differences go a little deeper because my idea of a belief is that it goes beyond propositions. In other words, our actions show our beliefs apart from language.

I made an error/typo in the first sentence. It should read, "OC 205 seems to indicate that the true/false idea shouldn't be used with hinges, but again, he's talking about traditional propositions[/quote]

@Banno @RussellA @Josh

OC 205 seems to indicate that the true/false idea shouldn't be used with hinges, but again, he's talking about traditional hinges. Moreover, we can't forget OC 206, where Wittgenstein points out that if someone asked, "but is that true" (referring to hinges), we might respond "yes," Which gets to my point that we do treat hinges as true in a practical sense, i.e., a lived certainty. In other words, I act in a way that shows their truth. The act of opening a door shows my certainty that there is a door to be opened, and it shows my certainty that I have hands. This practical certainty is a very practical truth.

Wittgenstein's pragmatic view handles different kinds of hinges "I have hands," "The Earth has existed for a long time," and "2+2=4." Their truth is seen in how we live them, whether through actions, practices, or the rules of the game.

Apparently you can't doubt that you exist (in some sense). — frank

It's logically impossible to doubt that you exist. Doubting your existence shows your existence. :grin:

Wittgenstein is not referring to traditional theories of truth - like the correspondence (matches reality) or coherence theories (fits within a system of beliefs). These may work for empirical propositions like "It is raining." Hinges are about lived truths, i.e., how we act without doubting. If you're stuck with traditional ideas, then you'll never see this. Wittgenstein is thinking outside the box of traditional ideas of epistemology. These truths are outside epistemology, they give life to epistemology, which means they give life to our ideas of justification and truth. Without these truths/convictions, there would be no talk of propositional truth. So, it's very pragmatic, and they lie at the very bottom of our forms of life. If you doubt what's bedrock, everything collapses. If you're looking for a definition, especially a traditional one, you won't find one.

They're a pragmatic lived foundational/bedrock truths, but without the possibility of being false, i.e., doubted. Remember, if you doubt the truth or falsity of a traditional proposition, you're challenging one of the true/false paradigms. Hinges are beliefs accepted without question. If you doubt them, nothing follows, even the questions fall apart.

I'm not sure I haven't read Frege's account. I suspect that it might be similar in some respects but dissimilar in others. I'm guessing.

The T-sentence assumes a proposition’s truth is about whether the content matches reality, but hinges aren’t evaluated like that. In OC 205, Wittgenstein says the ground (hinges) isn’t true or false—it’s just the ground. “The earth has existed for a long time” (OC 85) isn’t true because we’ve checked it against reality—it’s true because it’s a hinge, a certainty we don’t doubt. The T-sentence (“‘The earth has existed for a long time’ is true if and only if the earth has existed for a long time”) doesn’t capture this. It’s a formal equivalence, but it misses the lived role of the hinge as a conviction we act on. Hinges don't play this formal game.

The truth for hinges is pragmatic, not formal. Wittgenstein ties truth to our forms of life, not to logical definitions. In OC 241, he says truth and falsity depend on our shared language, our forms of life, not on a formal standard like the T-sentence. Thetruth of “I have hands” isn’t in a T-sentence; it’s how I live: I use my hands every day, and I don’t doubt them. In OC 204, he says our acting is what matters. The T-sentence is too abstract, it doesn’t get at the pragmatic, action-based nature of hinges’ truth.

The language game of hinges is different. The game of truth for empirical propositions (“It’s raining,” check the window) is different from the game of truth for hinges. In OC 243, he says, “One says ‘I know’ when one is ready to give compelling ground - but with hinges, there is no such possibility.” Hinges don’t play the game of justification or demonstration. They’re certainties we live by. The T-sentence assumes a single game of truth, but Wittgenstein’s approach is more pluralistic. The truth of hinges is a different game—one of lived certainty, not formal equivalence.

Not all hinges fit the "counts as" mold (if that's your point @Banno): "The Earth has existed for more than 10 minutes" or "Objects don't vanish randomly" are background certainties (convictions), not rule-setting propositions. I think Wittgenstein's pragmatism captures the truth of these certainties and fits our life forms much better.

We treat hinges as true for practical reasons. And the fact that they're not doubted demonstrates they don't play the true/false game. We accept them as true, period.

@RussellA @Josh

How Are Hinges True?

Hinge propositions, like the earth has existed for more than ten minutes or "I have two hands” —aren’t true in the way we typically think of propositions being true (i.e., through evidence, justification, or correspondence to reality). Wittgenstein’s point in OC is that hinges are the bedrock of our epistemic practices—they’re what we don’t doubt to even start asking questions or justifying anything else (OC 341-343). So, their truth isn’t about being proven; it’s about their role in our forms of life.

Hinges are true in a practical, functional sense—they’re the scaffolding we rely on to play our language games. In OC 94, Wittgenstein says, “I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates.” They’re true because they’re embedded in how we act and think, not because we’ve epistemologically validated them. For example,things don’t vanish randomly (OC 342) isn’t something we test - it’s what lets us test other things.

Their truth comes from being immune to doubt within our system. In OC 115, he writes, “If you tried to doubt everything, you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.” Hinges are true in the sense that they’re the ground we stand on—doubting them unravels the whole game, like pulling the tablecloth out from under a dinner party.

Traditional truth often means a proposition matches reality (e.g., “snow is white” is true if snow is, in fact, white). Hinges don’t work that way. “The earth exists” (OC 99) isn’t true because we checked; it’s true because our entire way of living—building houses, farming, launching rockets - assumes it. Their truth is more like a lived certainty, not a verified fact. This is very similar to the rules of chess that allow the game to be played.

Justification, as an epistemological practice, stops at hinges. Wittgenstein says in OC 204, “Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.” So, if hinges aren’t epistemologically justified, what kind of truth do they have?

If justification is epistemological, hinges live in a pre-epistemic space. Their truth is a kind of certainty that’s more basic—almost instinctual or animal, as Wittgenstein hints in OC 475: “I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination.” The truth of “I have hands” (OC 153) isn’t argued for—it’s a certainty I live with, like breathing. It’s true because it’s part of the scaffolding of my existence, not because I epistemologically proved or justified it.

How can you have a conviction (OC 102) that's not an expression of something you believe is true? Hinges are true is a matter of pragmatics or a way of acting, it's a different language game. Again, like the rules of chess. Someone might ask you "Is it true that bishops move diagonally?" and you reply, "Yes," but does this mean that it's true in an epistemological sense? No,

OC isn't a finished work, so we don't know which passages would have been left in or eliminated.

There is support, but there is also seeing where his notes are leading us. I've said this before, but let me repeat it. There are two language games of truth in OC. One is the language game of traditional propositions, which can be true or false and require justification. The other language game of truth is one of foundational convictions. The latter convictions are accepted as true and cannot be sensibly doubted. If they can't be doubted, it means they can't be false. Whereas traditional propositions have true/false built into their meaning. These convictions are lived truths built into our actions. They reflect subjective certainties that we all have. If they could be doubted and thus false, knowledge would collapse

The two language games I'm referring to are seen in one use of 'I know.." as an epistemological use, the other use as an expression of a conviction. Something I believe to be an indubitable truth, which doesn't have a justification like normal propositions. There is no justification; it's a lived conviction shown in our actions.

It's ok if people disagree that's just the nature of philosophy.

Well, we disagree. I think this position is clear and a common misinterpretation of OC.

1) Wittgenstein’s hinges function as indubitable certainties outside the domain of epistemological justification.
2) They differ from traditional propositions by enabling traditional truth operations to function.
— Sam26

These are contradictory statements.

A hinge proposition cannot be both outside the domain of epistemological justification, including justifications such as truth and falsity, and be inside the domain of epistemology justification that enables truth operations. — RussellA

I can see how you might think they're contradictory, but I'm making a subtle distinction about truth, which I believe Wittgenstein is also making. Hinges aren’t true in the same way that ordinary propositions are, i.e., they're beyond the truth-testing game. Their truth is their unshakeable role in our practices. Wittgenstein points out, “It belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are indeed not doubted” (On Certainty 342). They’re not conclusions; they’re the ground.

The truth of traditional propositions is tied to evidence or falsifiability. “It’s raining” is true if I look out and see rain; it’s false if I don’t. Hinges can't be meaningfully doubted without collapsing the system. Doubting “The earth exists” isn’t false, it’s nonsensical, as no test could apply outside the framework of everyday epistemological language. Doubt is essential to how we use traditional propositions. “The keys are on the table” invites checking; it’s true or false based on what I find. However, again, the truth of a hinge, which is like a foundational conviction, is indubitable (impossible to doubt, unquestionable).

Hinges are indubitable not because they’re proven beyond doubt but because they’re the foundation of doubting, outside the game of justification. Ordinary propositions play inside that game, subject to the rules hinges silently uphold. Wittgenstein’s move is to say: what Moore calls indubitable truths aren’t truths in the propositional sense. they’re the very backdrop that lets propositional truths get their life.

Think of a conviction, one could hold that it's true without appealing to justification, it's bedrock to a system of beliefs that are justified and true. These truths are essential to how I act in the world, but their function is much different.

If I repeat myself, it's for effect.

Ya, but not in the way I'm presenting this issue. I can't find anywhere where someone makes this connection, but I could be wrong.

Here's my abstract for my upcoming paper.

Wittgenstein's Hinges Reimagined

Abstract

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889-1951) final notes were published posthumously as On Certainty (1969). In these notes, he introduced the concept of hinge propositions (OC 341) as a response to G.E. Moore’s arguments (“Proof of an External World,” 1939) against the radical skeptic. Wittgenstein’s hinges function as indubitable certainties outside the domain of epistemological justification. They differ from traditional propositions by enabling traditional truth operations to function. This paper reimagines hinges as foundational convictions, namely, as arational certainties that act as a foundational platform that grounds our epistemological language and systems of proof.

Building on this foundation, the paper extends Wittgenstein’s hinges to Kurt Godel’s incompleteness theorems (1931), which demonstrate that any consistent formal system of arithmetic will necessarily contain unprovable statements. Godel’s mathematical discovery parallels Wittgenstein’s hinge insights, revealing the need for system-enabling certainties that ground both frameworks. The problem of infinite regression further illustrates the need for foundational convictions.

This bridges the gap between mathematical formalism and epistemological foundationalism and challenges the notion that any comprehensive proof is possible in either domain. The paper offers a novel approach to understanding the limits and foundations of human knowledge.

I am fairly certain that in PI Wittgenstein says specifically that meaning is often, but not always, use. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There are a lot of nuances to use as meaning (ostensive definitions, family resemblance, etc), but use is king in the PI.

But what determines use? Wouldn't the causes of use and usefulness play an important role in explaining language too?

For instance, the way we use words, the reason we find it useful to use them in certain ways, is dependent on the properties of what the words refer to. Across disparate languages that are developed in relative isolation, the use of terms for certain natural phenomena will be similar because the things the terms describe are similar. Hence, meaning can be traced back, in at least some cases, to reference. Otherwise, our use of "dog" would have nothing to do with dogs, which doesn't seem right. But if the usefulness and use of "dog" is determined to some large degree by dogs, then use is going to be in some sense downstream of being. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Language users determine use, and it's important to recognize that no one person determines use. If someone, a scientist, creates a new word to express a new idea, that word will not get a foothold unless other language users start using it in the same way.

Sure reference, for example, ostensive definition is a way of learning words, but ultimately use is the driving force. If I teach a child by pointing to a pencil and saying, "Pencil," that is a tool that informs use. How do we know if the child understands? We observe how they use the word across a wide range of contexts or language games. If the child points to a cup and says pencil, then we know that they aren't using the word correctly. There has to be community agreement (cultural and social practices otherwise referred to as forms of life).

Use, for the most part, isn't determined by the thing itself (the dog); it's determined by language users and the explicit or implicit rules involved in the respective language game. What we use as a name for a dog could be almost anything.

Second, I had forgot Grayling's full example. People can use "QED" and the like consistently, in the correct way, and not know their meaning. However, consider "kalb." It means dog in Arabic. You now know what kalb means. However, if you don't know Arabic, you don't know how to use it in a sentence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think that people can use a word correctly (consistently) without having some idea of what the word means. Maybe they can't express the meaning, but they still use it correctly. As long as they are using the word correctly in a variety of language games, then they know how to use the word. Meaning again is use, not determined by giving some dictionary definition.

I might not be able to use "kalb" in a sentence, but I can say "kalb" and point to a dog. This demonstrates that I understand how the word is used in Arabic. Use doesn't always require complete sentences.

I tried to answer most of your concerns.

First, it might sound simple (i.e., that you're reducing meaning to something simple) saying that use is meaning, but Wittgenstein spent quite a bit of time explaining it. It's not reductionist.

Second, nothing I've read in that long post does anything to dispel the idea that meaning is primarily derived from use. Some of it shows that people can start using words differently from their intended purpose, but even if this happens, the new use will drive the new meaning. Use is not absolute; it changes, and new uses are formed. Sometimes incorrect uses morph into new language games and that incorrect use becomes accepted as just another use within a certain part of a culture.

How do you think people learned the meaning of words before there was writing? They observed how people used words/language.

Meaning is primarily driven by use. Even dictionary definitions are driven by use. A word might have many different meanings, depending on how many uses there are in a language. It's not context-driven, although context is important, because you can still use a word incorrectly within a context. So, it's use within a culture of language users.

Hinges, hinge beliefs and hinge propositions... — Banno

It's the world of hinges.

By the way, I might submit a paper as part of the Philosophy Forum's paper challenge. I'm not sure yet, but I'm working on it. It depends on how lazy I am. :grin:

I don't think anything I can say will convince you. I've explained it six ways to Sunday. For example, I don't know how many times I've said that hinge beliefs are considered true, but you're locked into one view of truth as if that' the only way we can use the word.

Meh. Moyal-Sharrock tries something like this, taking "belief" to mean "trust" alone. — Banno

Where did I say that?

What do you see as the ‘rules’ of ‘I have hands’ such that they hold across language games? Would Wittgenstein accept that there is any sort of understanding that holds ACROSS language games? — Joshs

The first rule might be assumed embodiment, i.e., I act as if I have hands by grabbing and pointing for e.g..

The second rule might be realizing there is a linguistic baseline. It’s a shared certainty that’s voiced. Pass the potatoes assumes hands, doubt this foundation and things stall.

The third rule is immunity to doubt. Doubting here would break the frame or foundation, not allowing further linguistic action.

Yes, I think Wittgenstein would allow for basic understandings across language games. E.g., when we first believe things, it’s a broad swath of things. That I have hands underpins many of the language games of science, daily chat, games, etc

What you’re looking for as a hinge is the underlying metaphysics making intelligible both the kind of faith and the kinds of doubt that accompany it, rather than the proposition ‘God exists’. — Joshs

I'm looking for both.

Good questions.

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Wittgenstein is simply deluded about the nature of truth, knowledge, and justification. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I can't believe you would say such a thing. I have disagreements with Witt, but to call him deluded, it seems to me, demonstrates your delusion. Even people who disagree with Witt wouldn't make such a comment. It shows your bias and lack of knowledge on the subject.

I don't want this thread to become an argument about the existence of God, and whether belief in God is a hinge. If you want to consider whether belief in God is a hinge, please do it in another thread. That said, I will partially answer the question about whether belief in God could be considered a hinge in the Wittgensteinian tradition.

The Christian in acting their life cements the hinge "God as the ultimate source of all power", which is their truth. The Atheist in acting their life cements the hinge "there is no God", which is their truth. The Agnostic in acting their life cements the hinge "it is impossible to know whether there is a God", which is their truth. — RussellA

There is no doubt that Christians and other religions consider belief in God a hinge belief or foundational conviction. There is also no doubt that such language games exist. But just because there are language games that express these ideas doesn’t mean that all language games have equal footing. Some language games have a much better grounding, and we are constantly revising them.

However, the question of whether belief in God could be a hinge in the OC sense is an interesting question. Consider the following: “God exists” might ground certain practices like prayer, morality, and cosmology in the same way that “The Earth exists” grounds geology. Doubting that “God exists” would unravel the entire language game of many religions, just as hinges would unravel epistemology.

Also, for many, “Belief in God” isn’t up for debate within their lived belief system. It’s not a hypothesis that’s tested (for many) it’s a conviction that’s lived.

On the other side of the argument, “I have hands holds across contexts and language games. Atheists function without belief in God, but how would they function without the belief we have hands? Moreover, belief in God is doubted by many, and it’s debated in theology and philosophy. Wittgensteinian hinges resist doubt (OC 19 “incapable of doubting”). The belief that God exists invites doubt, even among those who believe.

I would say that in some cases, especially if someone had a direct experience of God, it could be a hinge for them. I think consciousness is a hinge, and if consciousness is fundamental, then it could be considered a hinge. Moreover, some might argue that consciousness/mind as fundamental might be God. I’m not sure, although I believe consciousness is fundamental.

There’s much more that could be asked and questioned, but this subject should be in another thread.

Your question @RussellA is a good one and is being debated by some philosophers.

Let me explain it one more time why hinges aren’t propositionally true.

1. They’re not open to judgment – typical propositions like “It is raining,” are moves subject to true or false on evidence (OC 243 “compelling grounds”). Hinges are the board itself without the hinges no moves happen. Their truth is accepted as a precondition that makes testing possible. They’re true because we live them – e.g. grabbing a cup, not proving hands exist. They’re simply not candidates for truth/falsity. They set the stage for the testing of true and false.

2. Typical propositions can be doubted (this is key) – “Is it really raining?” If you doubt that you have hands you are not refining the truth; you’re opting out. The truth of hinges is a kind of immunity, not a verdict reached by evidence or reasons.

3. Hinges aren't true because they’re factual, but because they’re the frame facts rest on. The hinge “The Earth exists” isn’t a discovery, it’s the ground for discovering rain (OC 99 “riverbed”).

Sure, hinges look like typical propositions, i.e., they have a subject and predicate, but the job of a hinge is not the same. You don’t come to know its truth by investigation. It’s the rule that allows the game to move forward. Treating hinges like typical propositions is like trying to prove to someone that it's true after explaining the rule in chess that stipulates how bishops move. It’s not a move that we judge in that way, it’s the condition or foundation of the game, just like the pieces and the board. Hinges enable truth talk, they’re a precondition. Their truth is a necessity, just as the rules of chess are a necessity that enables chess games.

Propositions can be true or false, but hinges are true as a condition of being a hinge, i.e., it's their foundational role. Moreover, it’s our acting that cements them in place, not any fact that establishes their truth.

Knowing how is knowledge as a skill, we're talking about knowledge as beliefs and so was Wittgenstein. To act, we have to believe that we have hands, and this belief is reflected in our actions. This is even before knowledge as a skill. Hinges are before any knowledge.

The propositions that set the game up are not typical. If, as Wittgenstein says, Moore's propositions are not known, then they are not epistemological, i.e., not justified or true. They are only true in that we accept them as true (like any conviction/belief) to support our system of beliefs. The propositions you're referring to are true because they refer to facts or states of affairs. In this sense they are justified, justification ends with hinges.