This is the view I am rejecting, Frank.

Suppose I argued that your view on, say, abortion is wrong because your mother wears army boots.

@aletheist seems to think (and doubtless I am wrong here, but it will serve) that the appropriate reply is something like "one ought not make such conclusions", as if an ad hom argument were a bit rude, subject to the same sort of rejection as "one ought not pick one's nose in public".

I don't think that is enough. It's not enough to say an ad hom argument is a bit rude; it is also plain wrong; the conclusion does not follow from the premise.
— Banno

I don't see the distinction you are trying to set up. If something is wrong, you ought not do it, and if you ought not do something, it is because it is wrong. If murder is wrong, you ought not do it. If picking your nose in public is wrong, you ought not do it. There is no division here, between things which are wrong, and things which we ought not do. To imply such a division is to speak nonsense.

Logic does not just set out how we ought speak, but how we can speak. It shows us what sorts of speaking are wrong. — Banno

If and only if it is wrong, one ought not say it. By your principles, you have said here what you cannot say. There is no such thing, by way of contradiction, as what one cannot say, because to identify it as 'the thing which cannot be said' requires that it be said. The sorts of speaking which are wrong are those which we ought not engage in, but this says nothing about our capacity to speak them.

Stephen Hawkings, or a theologians expertise should color there view of the above - but neither changes anything. We all know exactly what they know - that this whole existence that we are aware of either ends with God or a big black whole. We all get to decide for ourselves. — Rank Amateur

I can't accept that, that we all know exactly what they know. Every person's knowledge is unique and specific to that individual.

.

You mean that obscure theory about all the many ways to arrange some system that are differences that don’t make a difference? When a system arrives at equilibrium, changes no longer result in a change? — apokrisis

Right, doesn't the passage of time (nature) create these differences?

Thanks, I'll reassess my beliefs about what nature does in relation to differences. Perhaps nature doesn't create differences, maybe it limits them, as you say. First though, are you familiar with the second law of thermodynamics?

One almost inevitably generates inconsistencies when talking about religion. If one dismisses the whole thing out of hand, announce that it is all hogwash, then one can avoid inconsistency. When one tries to make sense of the whole thing, one is bound to fall down the rabbit hole, at least for a while. — Bitter Crank

It seems I'm in the rabbit hole right now. So. referring to those inconsistencies, would you think that they are honest mistakes, or a tactic which Plato described, and is now called a "noble lie"? I would think that there is some of each, but we're discussing the principal point here, God Himself.

If we judge theologians as not telling us the truth concerning the existence of God, then there ought to be a reason why they are not telling the truth. And I believe, that what is important here, is not the fact that they are not telling the truth, but the reason why they are not telling the truth, because this is what will influence our attitude toward them. Either we think of them as having made an honest mistake, or we think of them as deceitful.

Notice how "deceitful" implies unfaithful, so those who preach faith are practising unfaithfulness, if this is the case. But the unfaithfulness demonstrated is an unfaithfulness to us, their fellow human beings. Why would they be unfaithful to us, and seek to deceive us, do they hate us? If we are pawns in their game, which includes "God", then doesn't that imply that they actually believe in God and they are not really deceiving us?

A Catholic theologian would say the purpose of genesis is to speak to God as creator, and in that purpose it in inerrant. — Rank Amateur

But the question is, is "God as creator" itself an untruth? Stephen Hawking is a renowned physicist, he knows a lot about the physical world. If he says that it is highly improbable that the physical world was created by God, one might be inclined to believe this. Then what does this say about the catholic theologians who are speaking to God as creator? Is it the case that they are mistaken, and when they thought they were speaking to God they were really speaking to something else, or are they acting deceptively? Or could a renown physicist mistake the physical world?

Hmm. Nature creating seems to pose no issue for you. Yet nature failing to prevent accidents does.

Backwards as usual. — apokrisis

I am working with your premise, which already implies that nature creates differences, but your claim is that nature only produces differences which make a difference. When the alternative is that nature is failing to prevent particular differences, because it only cares about differences which make a difference (as you claim), the clear choice is that nature is producing, or creating all the differences, not just producing the ones which make a difference to some pragmatic purpose.

I apprehend some inconsistency in your reply. How is it that theologians interpret the Bible as "not literally true", yet they also believe it? If you know something is not literally true, you would never believe it. You might recognize some other purpose to the writing, other than to speak the literal truth, and instead of believing it, you "believe in it", but what would be that other purpose? To deceive?

Theologians say that belief in God's existence, His infinite goodness, wisdom, authority, and power, depends on faith. (Some have claimed that God's existence can be logically proved, but never mind about that now. Someone else will have to rehearse scholastic logic.) If the Theogony in Genesis is not True, then faith is indeed required to accept the Bible as True. — Bitter Crank

Take this passage for example. Let's assume that Genesis is not true. You say that we are still supposed to accept (on faith), that the Bible is true. This implies two distinct meanings of "true". We know that it is not rue, yet we may still accept on faith, that it is true. What could this second sense of "true" mean, in relation to the sense of "true" (literally true) by which we reject Genesis as not true? Is this "true" in the sense of honest? This is the only way I see to avoid the conclusion of deception. If the people who wrote the material truly believed it, at the time, as the truth, then they were being honest and true, despite the fact that we see it now as untrue. That doesn't seem to be likely in some instances, so deception seems probable.

I haven't met that many theologians running around busily deceiving little children. The work of theologians is to train preachers, evangelists, religious education specialist, and the like in the fine points of the divine plot. The preachers, et al then turn around and deceive the innocent. And the world around, in all sorts of religions, they do a pretty good job. Most people end up believing in the gods that everybody else believes in. — Bitter Crank

If the theologians are training preachers to deceive children, then you can't really say that the theologians are not deceiving children. They are guilty through complicity.

But my claim is that nature fails to limit those differences - they are simply accidents that don't change anything - while your claim is that nature creates them, and thus somehow they must exist for some (still undefined by you) reason. — apokrisis

These differences do exist, or are you denying their existence? If they exist, then they must have been either been created by nature, or artificially. They were not created by human beings, so they were created by nature.

I don't know what "nature fails to limit those differences" could even mean. How would nature act to limit differences? By creating sameness? But no two natural things are the same, so nature doesn't create sameness, it creates differences. Sameness is artificial, created by human minds which seek to classify thing,. it is not created by nature. And since nature is in the business of creating differences, it is illogical to refer to nature in terms of limiting differences.

Show that nature cares to prevent what it appears to permit. — apokrisis

It was you who said:

And nature only seems to care about differences that make a difference in some practical sense. Nature is essentially statistical. — apokrisis

Nature creates differences which do not make a difference to us. So, the onus is on you to demonstrate why nature would create differences which do not make a difference, when it doesn't care about such differences. Who would create something without caring about what was being created? That would be like random production.

Do theologians try to deceive? Well... I would think not. Not because theologians are always pure of heart, always honest, never deceptive, etc., but because they would have little to gain. As I see it, it isn't the job of theologians to convert anyone; that's the job of evangelists, missionaries, preachers. Theologians are academics, experts. Dishonesty would be no more welcome among theologians than it would be among physicists or medieval history scholars. — Bitter Crank

All right, so you don't think that theologians are intentionally trying to deceive us, and they are the experts on this subject, so what do you think is going on here, why don't we listen to them and believe in God? Maybe it's not so clear, maybe we really do think, deep down inside, that they're trying to deceive us, maybe it's some sort of subconscious belief.

Theologians are not of one mind on this point: Some think we are led, like horses, to water and are made to drink (by God); others take the view that we are more like horses and can be led to water, but can not be made to drink. On whatever basis, we have to decide to drink. — Bitter Crank

The theologians are the experts, they tell us we ought to drink, yet we refuse. But we're supposed to be rational beings, not horses. Is this a psychological problem, or are we just children, and refuse to do what we ought to do because we enjoy doing what we ought not do?

I didn't choose to acquire the set of god-concepts that I possess. It was handed to me as part of my childhood education and what followed from early instruction and the community intention that we would believe. I have found theologians very helpful in sorting out ideas about god and religion--because I was a believer in the first place. — Bitter Crank

This is the part that makes me wonder about deception. The childhood mind is extremely malleable and easily taken advantage of. And the theologians like to impress their principles onto the very young minds. They might appear to be experts on God and religion, when in reality they are experts on deception. How could we know the difference?

Whether something exists (or not) is the first question we ask about items for which this is not known with certainty. Anyone can think their house happens to be situated on top of a seam of gold or a pool of fine petroleum. Finding the gold seam or the pool of oil is far more complicated; specialists will be needed. — Bitter Crank

So, wouldn't it be the specialists who are best qualified at determining whether the seam of gold exists or not? And if the specialists claim that it does exist, when they really believe that it does not, can't we say that they are for some reason acting to deceive the home owner?

The matter is not as simple as every person ought to decide for oneself whether or not to belief that God exists, it appears more like a question of whether these theologians, who are the specialists, are trying to deceive us.

Who cares what anyone, ever, writes about God? — StreetlightX

It may be quite unsympathetic to say "who cares" in response to someone discussing something which is of great importance to them. Don't you think that being unsympathetic is being selfish?

I defined logic as the science of how we ought to think if we wish to arrive at true beliefs. — aletheist

I think that the problem is in how one defines "true beliefs". If we define truth along the lines of "what logic provides us with, then we are just begging the question. If we define truth along the lines of that which experience gives us, then logic is not the provider of true beliefs, memory is.

Aletheist, following Peirce, appears to be trying to conflate these two distinct, and somewhat opposing notions, of what provides us with truth:

while I (following Peirce) hold that logic is the science of how any intelligent beings should think, if their purpose is to arrive at true beliefs by learning from experience. — aletheist

I would caution against following such a principle because premises which are unclear and confused, as this one is, will produce conclusions which are even more confused and unclear.

What is clear, I believe is that we need to distinguish between the products of experience (sensation, memory, etc.), which we know as extremely limited, and highly fallible in any attempt to extrapolate beyond the range of what was immediately sensed, and the products of logic, which give us a broad range of application, with a high degree of certainty. We can place inductive reasoning as intermediary between these two, sharing in the fallibility caused by the extreme restrictions of the empirical, but also giving us a higher degree of certainty than simple memory and sense experience, in application.

The point being that the basic "experience" can only provide us with knowledge of the particulars to which one has been exposed. But in practise we apply this knowledge of what has been experienced, toward the unknown (in the sense of that which has not been experienced). This requires something, "logic", which we must, through effort (and normative means), separate from experience, in order that it may do what it is intended to do, and that is to bring us beyond the limitations of experience.

Isn't the question of whether a specified thing exists or not a question concerning the nature of that thing?

Sure. If you care. But that is epistemology. My claims about process philosophy are ontological. So now it is about the process that is individuation. And nature only seems to care about differences that make a difference in some practical sense. Nature is essentially statistical. — apokrisis

If "nature' was as you say, so that it didn't care about such differences, then why does nature make each individual unique?

I see that you have things backward. Epistemologically there are differences which do not make a difference to us. That's how we class things as the same type of thing despite each one being unique and different from each other. But ontologically, every individual is different and unique despite the fact that we classify them as the same.

No, I agree that the two definitions are incompatible; andrewk seems to be saying that logic is the science of how humans do think, while I (following Peirce) hold that logic is the science of how any intelligent beings should think, if their purpose is to arrive at true beliefs by learning from experience. — aletheist

There appears to be something confused here. Isn't the point of formal logic to go beyond the limits of experience, to learn about things which we cannot experience? Perhaps we need to differentiate between the logical which comes to us naturally through instinct, and this is where I would class inductive reasoning, from formal logic, which is what we are taught.

I think specific forms of logic, like induction come to us naturally, but we are taught not to rely on these types because we have learned of their fallibility. That's why we have developed, and teach forms like mathematics, and deduction, which produce a higher degree of certainty.

Which is a myth. As Peirce observed, "The validity of Induction consists in the fact that it proceeds according to a method which, though it may give provisional results that are incorrect, will yet, if steadily pursued, eventually correct any such error." — aletheist

I agree with andrewk, inductive reasoning is problematic. The solution you state here is nothing more than trial and error. Sure, trial and error works, but it's not a reliable form of logic. "Learning from experience" is trial and error. Formal logic, I believe is grounded in principles not derived from trial and error.

When you're identifying an individual every difference makes a difference.

I believe that logic is a technique for thinking that is hard-wired into our brains and occurs mostly subconsciously. Explicit formal systems of logic are attempts to reverse engineer the way that process works to present it as a system of rules. — andrewk

Combining and paraphrasing these definitions, logic is the normative science of how one ought to think if one intends to pursue truth; i.e., adopt belief-habits that would never by confounded by subsequent experience. — aletheist

I take these two descriptions of logic as somewhat opposed. Andrewk appears to say that logic is innate, something which we do instinctually, while aletheist seems to say that logic is a behaviour which we learn, as in other cases where we learn how we ought to behave. Or am I missing something here, a principle which may establish compatibility between the two perspectives?

Professor Hawking is no more qualified than anyone else to express his opinion about god, and no less. — Bitter Crank

Don't you think that a theologian is more qualified to make statements about the nature of God than a physicist?

However, if a particular judgment is true, why is it true? And if a particular judgment is false, why is it false? In both cases, the answer is that there is a fact of the matter, and that fact is independent of whatever anyone thinks about it. A true judgment represents a fact, while a false judgment does not. — aletheist

I think you are wrong here aletheist. True judgement implies correspondence. Why is it true? It is true because there is correspondence between the judgement and reality. You have provided no premise whereby you can claim that if there is correspondence, one of the corresponding things is necessarily independent of the other.Therefore your conclusion of an independent fact is illogical, invalid, non sequitur. "True" implies correspondence which implies a relationship, it does not imply independence.

Because it entails that the reality of an object somehow depends on the existence of a sign that represents it; but reality is precisely that which is as it is regardless of any representation thereof. — aletheist

The reality of an object is dependent on the process whereby the object is individuated from its environment the rest of reality. This process is carried out by sentient beings. Unless you can demonstrate how this process of individuation is carried out by something other than sentient beings, or demonstrate how this is false, then you have no argument.

Consider this example. We perceive the earth as an object. But we know that the earth is not an independent object, it is part of the solar system. We individuate it, separate it from its context, and assign to it the status of "an object", when it is just as appropriate to say that it is not an object, but part of an object, the solar system. Its independence as "an object" is artificial, created by us. Its status as an object is simply a product of how we individuate things. There are many such examples in scientific theory, electrons, and protons are said to be objects. Science is full of things which we know to exist only as parts, but we treat them in theory as independent objects.

The thing (or quality or habit) came before the name that some humans arbitrarily invented for it. — aletheist

Whether or not the thing came before the symbol which represents it, is debatable, The thing, the object, is dependent for its existence as an object, on the process of individuation carried out by the sentient being which individuates it, as described above. To determine which "came before", we must consider the temporal nature of this process. The sentient being exists at the present, and assigns the status of "object" to things observed to have temporal extension, things which remain relatively unchanged over a period of time, or demonstrate temporal continuity. Since the being exists only at the present, this, observing temporal continuity, requires memory of what has been in the past. And memory requires that what has been, is represented. Representation requires symbols. So I believe that the logic demonstrates that the symbol is prior in existence, to the object.

What would prompt the creation of the word "round" if there was nothing already observable for which such a name was needed? — aletheist

Imagination! Imagination may not be something real to you, but it is the inspiration behind creation.

I said that recognizing some judgments as true and others as false entails that there is a fact of the matter, which is independent of whatever anyone thinks about it; and that any argument to the contrary is self-refuting. — aletheist

I can't see your argument. If some judgements are true, and others false, then truth and falsity is a property of the judgement. Therefore it is impossible that truth and falsity are independent of the judgement.

You seem to be asserting that something is not real unless and until a word for it exists, which is what I find patently absurd. The reality of (what we call) roundness and the world does not depend on the existence of those names. The world was real, and was really round(ish), before humans ever existed. — aletheist

No I am saying that there is no such thing as the thing referred to by a word without the word. How is that absurd? Therefore it is impossible that there was a thing which the word "world" refers to before there was the word "world". To say that there was a reality of roundness before there was a word "round" is what is absurd. What would dictate what roundness is without the word and a corresponding concept? So how could there be a reality of roundness without this?

The geometry on a blank paper and the geometry on a sphere are different, but their existence doesn't make one or the other illogical. — ssu

It's not that one or the other principle is illogical, because it requires two opposing principles for there to be contradiction, and the contradiction is what is illogical. That the object, space, is described in these two contradictory ways is what is illogical.

That argument is wrong, but it doesn't make either geometry illogical. Especially in set theory you can choose your axioms and have different kinds of set theories with different answers, but that in my mind don't make them illogical. — ssu

What is the case, is that this subject, mathematics, which allows that the objects which it deals with are described in contradictory ways, is illogical. That one geometry is consistent within its own system, yet inconsistent with another geometry, or one kind of set theory is consistent within its own system, yet in inconsistent with another set theory, doesn't make any of them, in themselves, illogical. But this is not the issue. The issue is that the discipline of mathematics, which allows within it, such inconsistencies, is illogical. It's not that this or that branch of mathematics is illogical because this branch is inconsistent with that branch, but that mathematics itself is illogical for allowing such inconsistencies within the discipline.

Premises (axioms) can make the math to seem contradictory, but can be totally logical. Only if you prove that something that we call an axiom is actually false, then is the statement simply wrong. — ssu

Opposing axioms cannot both be true. Therefore, one or the other, or both must be false. It is illogical to hold opposing axioms, as both true, and this is what mathematics does.

Thank you for so convincingly demonstrating the patent absurdity of nominalism. — aletheist

Yes, the argument is very simple and clear, isn't it? So much so that you have no counterargument except, "that's absurd". I thought you said that the argument is "self-refuting". Is that how it is refuted, by you saying it's absurd?

This is very clearly false. It conflates the object of a sign with the sign itself. — aletheist

No it does no such conflation. It states the simple fact that it is impossible, that there is the object which corresponds with a particular sign without the existence of that sign. Correspondence requires two things, the sign and the object. Without the sign there is no correspondence, therefore no object which corresponds.

The reality of a character, and the existence of things that possess it, is very clearly independent of any particular system of signs that represent that character and those things. Otherwise, the same claim would apply to the world - i.e., it is absolutely impossible that there was a world before there was the word "world" - which is obviously absurd. — aletheist

Can you not grasp the very simple fact that it is impossible to have "the character which is represented" without the sign which represent? One is clearly prior to the other as "the character which is represented" requires for its existence, the act of representation, and this act is dependent on having a sign which represents.

What you describe as "obviously absurd" is also obviously true. Sometimes truth is stranger than fiction. There is something which the word "world" refers to. Prior to the existence of this word, there was nothing that the word "world" referred to. Therefore there was no world prior to the word world.

However, many of us project, and claim that the thing which is now referred to by "world" had existence prior to the word. This requires a separation between the thing and the word. The thing must be conceived of as independent from the word. But when we conceive of the thing as separate from the word, we deny any necessary relationship between the thing and the word. So there is no logic which allows us to claim that this independent thing, which is conceived of as existing independently from the word associated with it, is actually the thing which is referred by this word. Therefore the claim involved with this projection, that the independent thing is the thing referred to by the word, is unsupported logically. The thing which is assumed to have existed before the word, cannot be proven to be the same thing as the thing referred to by the word. This inability of logic to prove that the independent thing is the thing referred to by the word, is indicative of the simple fact referred to above, that there is no such thing as the thing referred to by the word, without the word.

Again, mathematics is the science of reasoning necessarily about hypothetical states of affairs. Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry employ exactly the same (deductive) logic, but draw different conclusions because they begin with different premises; specifically, non-Euclidean geometry adopts one fewer postulate. Imaginary numbers are the perfectly logical result of defining "i" as the square root of -1, regardless of whether this corresponds to something actual. — aletheist

Right, so if the "different premises" are contradictory, then it is impossible that they are each true. I think that this is a problem for those who claim Platonic realism concerning mathematics. If mathematical forms are so variable that they are contradictory, then what good are they? You use your forms for your purpose and I use contradictory ones for my purpose, and we each come up with contradictory understandings of the reality which we apply them to.

Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry are different subjects with different hypotheses. Algebra with imaginary numbers and algebra without imaginary numbers are different subjects with different hypotheses. — aletheist

They are different subjects, as sub-classifications within the subject of mathematics, just like my example, biology and physics are different subjects as sub-classes within the subject of natural science. It is illogical to allow that sub-classes proceed with contradictory premises, as if each of the contradictory premises is true. Simply put, having different subjects which treat contradictory premises as if they are each true, is illogical.

Nonsense. That which the word "round" signifies - the real character of roundness - existed in everything that possessed it before any human being existed, and would continue to exist in everything that possessed it after every human being ceased to exist. — aletheist

This is very clearly false. Before there was the word "round", there was obviously nothing which the word "round" signifies, because there was no word "round" to signify anything . Therefore it is absolutely impossible that there was "the real character of roundness" before there was the word "round". That there is something which the word "round" signifies is very clearly dependent on the existence of the word "round".

Do you not recognize that some judgments are true and others are false? This entails that there is a fact of the matter, which is independent of whatever anyone thinks about it. Any argument to the contrary is self-refuting. — aletheist

I do not see how this is relevant. That the world is round is a judgement. Whether any such judgement is true or false is irrelevant to the fact that such predications are judgements.

Aristotle felt that Potential Infinities were OK but Actual Infinities were not allowable. — Devans99

If you allow that the eternal is infinite, then Aristotle does allow for an actual infinite, because he demonstrates that anything eternal is necessarily actual. This would appear as an inconsistency in Aristotle's principles.

Whilst it is not mentioned in the Bible, christian theologians have traditionally attributed infinity to God, stressing the unbounded nature of God’s power. To deny God anything was seen as belittling God. — Devans99

God is said to be eternal and actual, so it is the associating "eternal" with "infinite" which renders an actual infinite in the form of God. If we switch "infinite" for "eternal", then instead of being actual and eternal, God is actual and infinite.

The word ‘Eternal’ is often uses with infinite time and has two meanings:

Eternal Outside Time - existing for ever outside of time
Eternal In Time - existing for ever within time — Devans99

"Outside Time", being the sense of "eternal" which is generally associated with God, does not equate with "infinite". What it implies is that time is bounded (there is something outside time) and therefore time is not infinite. So "eternal" in this sense does not imply "infinite", it implies that time is finite, and there is consistency in Aristotle's principles which state that the eternal is actual, and that the infinite is potential.

HNIC!

"Experience" is one of those annoying terms we use to mean different but related things. If I witness an event, the event itself can be described as my 'experience'. So can the sensation I have while witnessing the event, and so can my thoughts and feelings that result from witnessing the event. — Pattern-chaser

In this description, you have created a separation between the event, which is the object, and your witnessing of the event, your impressions, memories, etc., which if you were the "subject", would be subjective. But that is egotistical and you are not the subject. So I think that what StreetlightX is talking about is dissolving this artificial line of demarcation, this division between subject and object, such that your presence, and interaction with the world is the event itself. Your "witnessing", observing, or experiencing, is now seen as an activity in the world (an expression of one of your many capacities for action), and this activity, along with every other human activity, in general, is our subject. It appears that the capacity for a particular type of activity is thus called a subjectivity.

No, an object has properties even if no one assigns them to it. Planet Earth is round no matter whether someone assigns roundness to it. It was also round before anyone believed it was round, or before anyone even existed. — litewave

Since it requires someone to determine what "round" means, and whether the object referred to as Planet Earth fulfills those conditions, it is impossible that what you say is true. I conclude that you believe the word "round" existed before anyone existed, because this is what is required for the earth to have been determined as round, before anyone existed. Do you not recognize that whether or not an object has a specific property is a judgement, and nothing else?

Huh? An object is a particular and a subject is a universal? Where did you get this terminology? — litewave

OED: subject: 1a. A matter, theme, etc., to be discussed, described, represented, dealt with, etc.. object: 1. a material thing that can be seen or touched.

If what I said does not make sense to you, then you could perhaps explain why.

But biology is part of physics; properties of biological objects are physical properties. Curved space is not part of flat space and flat space is not part of curved space. — litewave

Have you ever been in a university before? Biology is not part of physics.

What you say is nonsense. If there is something referred to as "space", which has properties, then it is an object according to your own definition of object. It cannot be both curved and flat because this is contradictory.

Object is something that has properties. — litewave

I can tell you that this is the problem right here. You have absolutely no restrictions on "object". This is what I referred to, any random thing may be an object, because properties are what we, as human beings determine and assign. So what exists as "an object" is completely arbitrary, and dependent only on the way that human beings assign properties. if someone assigns properties, there is an object there. There is no principle of unity here, nor is there a principle of identity, whereby "an object" might be an individual, particular thing.

Is there any difference between object and subject? — litewave

The difference between an object and a subject is found in the way that the law of identity is applied. An object is something we point to, and we identify it that way. It need not have any definite properties, so long as we can identify it as something we can point to, "what it is" may remain indefinite. Therefore an object may be identified, even named, without having any properties assigned to it. A subject is identified through a description, as having specific properties, it is identified by "what it is". As a tool of logic, this allows that numerous different objects may be identified as "the same" subject, when the differences between them are deemed as accidental. So an object is identified as something individual, particular, and unique, while a subject is identified as something specific. One is a particular, the other a universal.

We don't attribute opposing axioms to the whole mathematical world, only to its parts (objects in the mathematical world). For example, zero curvature of space does not hold in the whole mathematical world but only in Euclidean spaces. And non-zero curvature of space does not hold in the whole mathematical world but only in non-Euclidean spaces. — litewave

Yes, that's exactly the problem I referred to. Mathematics, as a subject, is allowed to have opposing and contradictory predications. You justify this by claiming that the contradictory descriptions describe properties of different objects. However, you cannot point to the objects, to say that this is the property of this object, and that is the property of that object, because your so-called "objects" exist only by specification; this axiom indicates the existence of this object, and that axiom indicates the existence of that object. So these so-called "objects" are really subjects. And, they exist as subdivisions of the original subject, mathematics. It is irrational and illogical to allow for contradiction within the subdivisions of one subject.

Here's an example. Suppose that natural science is specified as one subject, with subdivisions specified as biology and physics. We could say that biology and physics are distinct subjects within the subject of natural science, just like Euclidean space and non-Euclidean space are distinct subjects within the subject mathematics. However, we cannot allow that biology and physics proceed from contradictory axioms, because this would signify incoherency within the subject of natural science. Likewise, the use of both Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry signifies incoherency within the subject of mathematics.

Not sure if you missed my reply: — litewave

I saw your reply. It looked too confused to be worthy of a comment. Here it is:

Only consistently defined objects can be part of the mathematical world.

Axioms are properties of an object (also called axiomatic system). Axioms like "The continuum hypothesis is true" and "The continuum hypothesis is not true" would be contradictory if they were properties of the same object but they are not contradictory if they are properties of different objects. — litewave

First, I see no definition of "object". Second, you say "axioms are properties of an object". Third, opposing axioms may describe different objects. Why this is totally confused is that you have no principle to differentiate one object from another object because you have no definition of "object". So, whenever opposing axioms are used, one might simply claim that they refer to properties of different objects. And mathematics might be composed of an endless number of inconsistent and opposing axioms each describing a different object, while each object is consistently defined by its one and only, and independent, axiom. In other words, we could make up an endless number of random axioms, each describing a different object, therefore mathematics would consist of an endless supply of random objects, each with its own axiom.

Now, let's get logical. Within logic we have subjects. You cannot attribute to the same subject, opposing predicates, without contradiction. Mathematics is a subject, so we cannot attribute to mathematics, opposing hypotheses, without contradiction.

Yet mathematics isn't an invented social construct that we can bend to whatever we want. All math is quite logical. — ssu

Is it really true to say "all math is quite logical"? Within mathematics in general, there are numerous contradictions such as Euclidean vs. non-Euclidean geometry, imaginary numbers vs. traditional use of negative integers. You might argue that it is just different branches of mathematics which employ different axioms, but if one discipline (mathematics) employs contradictory premises, can it be true to say that this is logical?

I believe that by the time Aristotle was writing, "Platonism" was already fractured. Because Plato's ideas evolved over his lifetime there was probably never a firm "Platonist" platform. In his "Metaphysics" Aristotle directs his cosmological argument against the Pythagoreans and "some Platonists". He may have considered himself to be a Platonist, at odds with the other Platonists.

The issue which Plato exposed, which is expounded on in Aristotle's division of passive and active aspects of reality, is that Pythagorean idealism assigns to "Ideas" a passive existence, as outlined in the theory of participation. That which is participated in (the Idea) is passive (being eternal), while that which is participating is active. The cosmological argument demonstrates that the passive cannot be prior to the active in an absolute sense, so it is impossible that these passive "Ideas" are eternal. The later Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians, following more closely Plato's later work, "Timaeus", developed a metaphysics whereby "Forms" are active, in a way more consistent with Aristotle.

Very tall trees, sequoia or redwood, manage to lift a lot of water from their roots into their canopy. You might investigate how they do that. (It's capillary action, of course. Could one duplicate the area of a sequoia's surface, under its bark, devoted to upward bound capillary action?

A piece of information from Wikipedia

"The water pressure decreases as it rises up the tree. This is because the capillary action is fighting the weight of the water. ... Scientists have found that the pressure inside the xylem decreases with the height of the tree, and similarly, the size of the redwood leaves decreases with the decrease in pressure. May 6, 2004" — Bitter Crank

It is not likely that capillary action alone is responsible for pumping water up the trees. In the case of maple sap a substantial pressure which cannot be accounted for by capillary action is built up within the tree. In this case there is a need for alternating freezing and thawing temperatures and it is hypothesized that CO2 is absorbed when it's cold, then expands when warmed up. However, the quantity of CO2 required has not been found. The process is known to be mysterious and not well understood. There is probably numerous physical processes involved, none of which alone can account for the phenomenon. In any case, it is probably naïve to think that simple capillary action is responsible for moving a large amount of water from a tree's roots to its canopy.

There is a lag between sensation and the experience of it, which puts all things sensed into the past, but we must allow that the things which come to pass are coming from the future. We can conclude that things coming from the future have a type of existence which makes it impossible for them to be sensed. Whether the cognitive mind functions in the past, future, present, or a combination of these, is another question.

According to your figures, you can only get substantial head from an insubstantial quantity of water. Since you need both, substantial head and substantial quantity, it won't work.

I was alerted to the possibility of the distortion by a handful of scattered remarks on Plato versus Platonism by John McDowell. But I haven't pondered much on the historical roots of the distortion, nor do I feel equipped for tracing such roots anywhere earlier than the modern period. — Pierre-Normand

What I understand is that modern-day Platonism is more like Pythagorean idealism. Although the refutation of Pythagorean idealism is commonly attributed to Aristotle, it has been argued that Plato actually laid the grounds for this. Plato worked to expose and clarify all the principles of Pythagorean idealism, and in the process uncovered its failings. I've seen it argued that the Parmenides, though it is quite difficult to understand, serves to refute this form of idealism.

How about the self-sustaining hydro-electric power plant? Think it's possible? — BrianW

No, it takes a substantial flow of water with a large head to get significant power.

Right, so meaning does not require sensations, it appears like we now agree. So making connections, correlations and associations whereby a being establishes meaning, could be carried out by a being which does not sense. And in the evolution of living beings it is possible that they evolved so as to develop the capacity to make connections correlations and associations prior to being able to sense.

Where we disagree is whether sensation requires meaning. If it does, then meaning is prior to sensation and those primitive living beings which do not sense actually do establish meaning. Don't you see that sensation necessarily involves making connections, correlations and associations, through memory, and therefore sensation does requires meaning? Without these connections and associations and correlations to the past, each sensation would be like an entirely new experience to the being, and the being would be lost in the apparent randomness of it all, having completely new experiences at every moment of its life. This is not the case though as sensation is a useful thing to the being. It is useful because the being is drawing connections, correlations, etc., and therefore sensation itself is meaningful.

Rovelli begins with a simple definition of Mathematical Platonism, which "is the view that mathematical reality exists by itself, independently from our own intellectual activities." Now, he asks that we imagine a world M, which contains every possible mathematical object that could ever exist, even in principle. Not only does M include every mathematical object we have currently discovered (integers, Lie Groups, game theory, etc) it also includes every mathematical object we could possibly discover. M is the Platonic world of math. The problem, though, is that this world is essentially full of junk. The vast majority of it is simply useless, and of no interest to anyone whatsoever. — StreetlightX

Not only is this mathematical realm full of junk, but it's also full of contradictions. Go figure. Because of such contradictions, mathematics is clearly not logical. So, which is more reliable, mathematics or logic?

No, it defines all those orders you mentioned. — litewave

Obviously that's wrong, just like your claim that all the possible points in a space define al the lines, curves and angles. For an order to be defined, it must be defined, just like for a line, curve, or angle to be defined, it must be defined. The possibility of infinite different orders does not define those orders.

But the very same reductionist tendency can lead one to assume that whenever a 'composite' event appears to be a mere accident there ought to be an underlying cause of its occurrence expressible in terms of the sufficient causal conditions of the constituent material processes purportedly making up this 'event'. Such causes may be wholly irrelevant to the explanation of the occurrence of the composite 'event', suitable described as the purported "meeting" of two human beings at a well, for instance. — Pierre-Normand

It is when we allow for the ideas, thoughts, and intentions of the individuals, that the causal waters are muddied. It is only because the two people know each other, and recognize each other, that their chance meeting at the well is a significant event. Otherwise it would be two random people meeting at the well, and an insignificant event.

This is what also happens when Aristotle explains the causal significance of chance and fortune. Chance is a cause, in relation to fortune, so when the chance meeting is of a person who owes the other money, and the debt is collected, the chance occurrences causes good fortune. Likewise you can see that in a lottery draw a chance occurrence is the cause of good fortune. And some chance occurrences such as accidents, cause bad fortune. But "fortune" only exists in relation to the well-being of an individual So it's only within this framework of determine things as good or bad, that we say chance is a cause. The event is "caused" by whatever things naturally lead to it, but that it caused fortune is in relation to the well-being of individuals.


You seem to be headed off on some tangent and I have no idea what your trying to say. The uncertainty principle is a reflection of the Fourier transform which describes uncertainty in the relationship between time and wave frequency.

And metaphysically, it says instability is fundamental to nature, stability is emergent at best. And that flips any fundamental question. Instead of focusing on what could cause a change, deep explanations would want to focus on what could prevent a change. Change is what happens until constraints arise to prevent it. — apokrisis

This is a false conclusion though. The ball has to get there, to its position on the top of the dome. This requires stability. Stability is your stated premise, the ball is there, it has the capacity, by its inertial mass, to suppress fluctuations, therefore it has a position. You cannot turn around now and say that the ball rolls because of its incapacity to suppress fluctuations, and therefore instability is fundamental, without excepting contradictory premises. Stability is fundamental and instability is fundamental.