It can - it is the reversed order to "smaller prior to bigger". Magnitude defines both orders. — litewave

So magnitude allows for opposite orders. It also allows for any other order that one might like to use, counting by tens by twenties, odd numbers, even numbers, Fibonacci order, subtracting magnitudes, dividing or multiplying magnitudes, any possible order. Since it allows for the possibility of opposite orders, and any other order, it really doesn't define order at all.

Some of those groups do. — litewave

Your condition was "all possible groups of points". If you restrict this to some groups, then we no longer have that initial condition. And if you restrict the group of points, to the definition of a line, then clearly we are not talking about all possible groups of points in a given space, we are talking about a defined line.

You missed the point. Read what I wrote and reply to what I wrote. — apokrisis

To tell you the truth, I saw your statement as irrelevant, and bordering on meaningless gibberish.

It is the inability to suppress fluctuations in general, rather than the occurrence of some fluctuation in particular, which is the contentful fact. — apokrisis

We're discussing physical causes in inanimate objects. The "inability to suppress fluctuations", is a given, a background condition. Newton's law of inertia is not stated as a body which has the "ability to suppress fluctuations" will remain in an inertial state. It is assumed that the inanimate body has the "inability to suppress fluctuations". There is no such thing in physics as the capacity to resist potential causes (ability to suppress fluctuations), that would be an overriding supernatural power which would turn physics into nonsense.

Clearly, it is the existence of particular fluctuations which are of interest to physicists, not an inability to suppress fluctuations in general, which implies the existence of a supernatural capacity to suppress particular fluctuations in the first place.

So if your objection want to be coherent, you must now admit that thoughts and ideas are not existentially dependent upon sensory perception. — creativesoul

No, I gave thoughts and ideas, as examples of connections and correlations which are carried out completely within the living being, to support my premise that connections, correlations and associations are carried out completely within the being. Sensations are of things external to the living being and are therefore not a necessary part of such processes.

Have fun with that. I'm out. — creativesoul

If you want to demonstrate faults with my premises or my logic, then be my guest. If the logic is sound, and you'd prefer to ignore it and live in your own fantasy world, which excludes the possibility of such processes without sensation, then that choice is open to you as well.

It is not that they can't be identified. It is that the identification would miss the causal point. — apokrisis

How could identifying the causes miss the causal point?

It's true, in a sense, that 'events' have multiple causes. Recent work on the contrastive characters of causation and of explanation highlight this. But what it highlights, and what Aristotelian considerations also highlight, is somewhat obscured by the tendency in modern philosophy to individuate 'events' (and hence, also, effects) in an atomic manner as if they were local occurrences in space and in time that are what they are independently from their causes, or from the character of the agents, and of their powers, that cause them to occur. This modern tendency is encouraged by broadly Humean considerations on causation, and the metaphysical realism of modern reductionist science, and of scientific materialism. — Pierre-Normand

I believe that an "event" is completely artificial, in the sense that "an event" only exists according to how it is individuated by the mind which individuates it. So the problem you refer to here is a function of this artificiality of any referred to event. It is a matter of removing something form its context, as if it could be an individual thing without being part of a larger whole.

If we don't endorse metaphysical realism, then we must acknowledge that the event consisting in the two acquaintances meeting at the well can't be identified merely with 'what happens there and then' quite appart from our interest in the non-accidental features of this event that we have specifically picked up as at topic of inquiry. Hence, the event consisting in the two individual meeting can't be exhaustively decomposed into two separate component events each one consisting in the arrival of one individual at the well at that specific time. The obvious trouble with this attempted decomposition is that a complete causal explanation of each one of the 'component events' might do nothing to explain the non-accidental nature of the meeting, in the case where this meeting indeed wouldn't be accidental. In the case where it is, then, one might acknowledge, following Aristotle, that the 'event' is purely an accident and doesn't have a cause under that description (that is, viewed as a meeting). — Pierre-Normand

So here's the issue. If we are allowed to individuate events, remove them from their context, then we may look at events as distinct, independent of their proper time and space. By doing this, we can say that any two events, are accidental, or the common term, coincidental. So the two friends meet by coincidence, but any two events when individuated and removed from context may be seen as coincidental, despite the fact that we might see them as related in a bigger context. And when we see things this way we have to ask are any events really accidental or coincidental. it might just be a function of how they are individuated and removed from context, that makes them appear this way.

No. It seems you have (again) entirely missed the crux of QM here. It is not that the sequence of events is just unknown; it is that the sequence of events is indeterminate. See the chat above. — Banno

I've seen the chat. There's a big problem. When something appears to be indeterminate it is impossible to prove that it actually is indeterminate, until all possible techniques for determination have been ruled out. Quantum mechanics is far from that point, it actually appears quite primitive in its capacity for devising possible techniques, so failures in determination are most likely failures of technique.

That's just not so. What the OP describes is exactly a lack of a causal sequence. — Banno

A lack of causal sequence refers to unrelated events. What the quoted article in the op describes is related events in which the temporal order cannot be determined.

“The weirdness of quantum mechanics means that events can happen without a set order… This is called ‘indefinite causal order’ and it isn’t something that we can observe in our everyday life.”

When physicists cannot determine the order of events, we cannot conclude that there is no order to those events, because this would require the premise that every time that physicists can't determine something it is indeterminate. I think you would agree that this is a nonsense premise. Therefore, when physicists cannot determine the order of certain events, we ought not conclude that there is no order, only that the physicists cannot determine the order. Is that not agreeable to you?

What the OP describes is an inability to determine temporal order, not a lack of temporal order. That was my point. Your reply was that you thought it was somehow wrong to expect that physicists should be able to determine temporal order. Do you hold this as a principle?

I guess my answer is that physics ought not try to determine the temporal order of events were there is none. — Banno

You mean when the events are simultaneous? Isn't simultaneity frame dependent though?

Apocrisis was talking about a generic force rather than a generic cause, or generic agent. I think is makes sense to speak of a general background condition that isn't happily conceived of as a cause of the events that they enable to occur (randomly, at some frequency). — Pierre-Normand

I think my criticism still holds if this is what was meant. If the particular causes cannot be identified, it is a cop-out to claim it's a "general background condition". All you are saying is that you cannot isolate the particular causes, but you know that there was something or some things within the general conditions which acted as cause. And if you make the "general background condition" into a unified entity, which acts as a cause, you have the other problem I referred to.

So, there may be events that are purely accidental and, hence, don't have a cause at all although they may be expected to arise with some definite probabilistic frequencies. Radioactive decay may be such an example. Consider also Aristotle's discussion of two friends accidentally meeting at a well. Even though each friend was caused to get there at that time (because she wanted to get water at that time, say), there need not be any cause for them to have both been there at the same time. Their meeting is a purely uncaused accident, although some background condition, such as there being only one well in the neighborhood, may have made it more likely. — Pierre-Normand

There is a clear problem with this example, and this is the result of expecting that an event has only one cause. When we allow that events have multiple causes, then each of the two friends have reasons (cause) to be where they are, and these are the causes of their chance meeting. So the event, the chance meeting, is caused, but it has multiple causes which must all come together. When we look for "the cause", in the sense of a single cause, for an event which was caused by multiple factors, we may well conclude that the event has no cause, because there is no such thing as "the cause" of the event, there is a multitude of necessary factors, causes.

What are the contents of this purported correlation? What things are being connected, correlated, and/or associated with each other?

Do you have an example? — creativesoul

For example, thoughts and ideas are connected and correlated. This occurs entirely within the being. Therefore sensation is not necessary for such activity. That is my argument, these connections and correlations occur entirely within the being, therefore sensation is not necessary. Have you ever had a dream?

It's your expectation that physics ought be able to distinguish the temporal order of events that is inadequate. — Banno

So you accept it as an epistemological principle that physicists ought not try to determine the temporal order of events?

The magnitude says that 100 is smaller than 200 and thus orders the numbers from smaller to bigger. — litewave

As I explained, to say 100 is smaller than 200, does not establish an order from smaller to bigger, it just states that one is smaller than the other. Size, and order are two distinct things. Why wouldn't the bigger be prior to the smaller?

All points in space exist and thus they constitute all possible groups of points, that is, all possible lines and curves in that space. — litewave

A line is a specific set of points. All possible groups of points does not make a line, nor does it make a curve.

It is an inertial frame. And I’m not claiming that there is no accelerating force. I argue that the necessary force ought to be considered generic rather than particular. The environment did it. Accidents happen because they can’t be suppressed. — apokrisis

That's a cop-out. You're just saying that if we don't have the capacity to determine the particular causes involved, we can just say it's a generic cause, "the environment did it". But that's an untruth, because it implies that the particular aspects which are the true causes, are acting together as a unified whole, called "the environment", when the claim of a concerted effort is unjustified. So your claim that "the environment" is an acting agent, is nonsense without some principles whereby "the environment" can be conceived as an acting, unified whole.

But the magnitude determines the order of natural numbers from smallest to biggest. — litewave

No. the magnitude does not determine the order. There is nothing inherent within magnitude which says that 100 is before or after 200, or 50, or whatever. Whichever arbitrary ordering that you choose could be completely random. That one is of a larger magnitude than another does not necessitate any order. It is a size, not an order. To produce an order of different magnitudes would require a stipulation, that the bigger are prior to the smaller, or vise versa, but then this would be the order, not the magnitudes themselves It is only when we assume a first, a second, third, etc., that there is a convention of order inherent within the numbering.

A line is defined as the set of points whose coordinates satisfy a linear equation. All the points are already there, in the space in which the circle is contained, and their geometrical relations are already there. All lines and all other possible curves in that space are defined. A human just selects those he finds useful for a particular purpose and may give them names. — litewave

You're being ridiculous again, claiming "all lines and all other possible curves in that space are defined", without the existence of any definitions. Come on litewave, think about what you are saying.

Irrational numbers are not contradictory. A perfect circle exists in an infinitesimally grained space, which may or may not be the physical space we live in. Anyway, you don't need a circle to define angles; an angle is a relation between two lines. — litewave

The point is that these circles are conceptual only, they can't exist in any space at all. This is proven by the irrational nature of the ratio between circumference and diameter. The perfect circle cannot exist in space.

You said natural numbers are not ordered from small to big unless someone counts them, which is nonsense. The magnitudes of numbers, which order them, are already there by definition of the numbers, no matter whether anyone counts anything. — litewave

Yes that's approximately what I said, but your rebuttal is false. Without the act of counting, starting from 1, and proceeding to 2, 3, etc.., there is no reason why one number is "prior" to another. 2 is not prior to 3 for example, nor is 5 prior to 10, without that order which starts at 1. You might say that 10 is larger than 5, or of greater magnitude, but our subject is not magnitude, it is priority.

But the circle is already there and thus the points on its circumference and the point in the center of the circle define all possible wedges. — litewave

Again, you are relying on falsity. A set of points does not create wedges, nor angles. This requires further definitions, lines. The point at the centre with the points on the circumference, without the lines, provides no wedges. So the definitions of "the circle", and "the line" must be created with coherency and consistency in order that they actual exist as compatible concepts. And there is a problem here with the relationship between the line and the circle, which makes pi "irrational". Despite tireless effort by the Pythagoreans, this irrationality could not be overcome. This is how we know that circles don't actually exist. A circle is an "ideal" which cannot be obtained in actuality because it contains an irrational ratio, i.e., it is contradictory.

It's that they place value on goals in the first place. Nothing is really determined. We don't have to be motivated by anything, but we CHOOSE to. we conjure goals to work towards, but unlike other animals, we have no determined reason to work towards anything. A bird cannot help but do its thing, we can. We choose to conjure up motivation. — schopenhauer1

The difference between human beings and other animals in relation to this matter, is not that we place value on goals, but that we identify value, and we name it. So all the animals you describe in their activities act accordingly because they place value on the various things and so carry out those acts because they value them. Human beings recognize this as holding "values", and name it as such. Some of us, like you, want to create an artificial separation between human beings acting because they value something, and animals acting because they value something. That is self-deception.

This presupposes that a creature can draw correlations, connections, and/or associations between things that have yet to have been perceived, sensed, and/or detected.

Impossible. — creativesoul

Correlations, connections, and associations, are drawn completely within the creature itself. The being does this completely internally. Therefore sensation of things exterior to the creature is not necessary for such activity, nor is it necessary for meaning, consequently.

You argue by asserting falsity.

No, it is relevant, because you said that a number doesn't exist until it is counted. — litewave

No, we were talking about the existence of sets, not the existence of numbers. I see very little point in discussing this with you if you're not going to at least try to follow what I say. I made one reply to you which had a section that was directly on topic for the thread, and you didn't even respond to that section.

Of course it had, that's what I said. And it also had 370 wedges and any other number of wedges. — litewave

No, the circle didn't have this. The fact that it could potentially have been divided into 370, 400, 500, or an infinite number of wedges, doesn't mean that it had these wedges.

Just because someone didn't name, count or draw them doesn't mean they were not there. — litewave

Yes, that's exactly what it means. I could potentially build myself a very nice house. Because I didn't actually do this, means that this very nice house is not there. Likewise with your conception of a circle with 370 degrees, if no one actually conceived of this, the conception is not there. Otherwise, you could insist that all sorts of contradictory "conceptions", the square circle for example, are "there". However, for a concept to "be there" it really requires that someone determine the meaning of terms, defining words, producing logical coherence and consistency. Logical coherency is something which is produced through reasoning, (as creativesoul says,correlations, connections and associations) it isn't just "there".

All meaning is attributed. All attribution of meaning requires a plurality of things and a creature capable of drawing a correlation, connection, and/or association between them. In order draw a correlation between different things, those things must first be perceptible. Physiological sensory perception facilitates this capability to detect the perceptible.

Sensations are detection based The sensation becomes meaningful when the perceiving creature draws a correlation between it and something other than it. — creativesoul

As I indicated way back when this particular topic arose, there are correlations, connections, and associations which are drawn by the living being, at the subconscious level, which are prior to, and necessary for the occurrence of sense perception. So sensation is inherently meaningful.

You're missing something though. What gave paw the idea that there was a god in the rock? That's the real start to religion, not paw telling the kid to please the god. And we can't say that paw got the idea from his paw because that implies infinite regress. If paw didn't see, hear, or apprehend in some other way, a god in the rock, then where did paw get the idea that there is a god in the rock?

So you don't believe that an atom of carbon had 6 electrons before someone counted them? That would be pretty outlandish. Those 6 electrons determine carbon's chemical properties without which no humans would come into existence. — litewave

As I said, the example is irrelevant because a set is artificial and an atom is not.

The circle consisted of 360 wedges even before someone called them degrees. — litewave

The point is that those wedges were created, and counted in the act of creating them. The question would be whether the circle had 360 wedges without having been counted as 360. Since there was a reason why the circle was given 360 wedges, rather than some other number of wedges, they were obviously counted prior to assigning 360 to the circle. That's the thing with artificial things, they are created by intentional design, so the count is prior to the existence of the artificial thing.

A set is just a collection of objects. Its existence doesn't depend on whether some human names it or counts the objects. — litewave

Don't be ridiculous.

"Belief in God" is not invariably the product of child rearing practices, but it usually is. Parents teach religion to their children. That is where a belief in god comes from. — Bitter Crank

This cannot be where the belief in God comes from because it implies an infinite regress of parents teaching religion to their children. That would mean that there was always, forever in the past, parents teaching their children religion. That cannot be, because their was a time before parents and children. Therefore belief in God does not come from parents teaching religion to their children.

Sorry creativesoul, but I just can't follow what you're saying. It's completely foreign to me.

No, as I said, cardinality of a set exists whether or not someone counts it. The number of electrons in the atom of carbon was 6 even before anyone counted them. Counting does not create cardinality; it can only confirm it. — litewave

A set is artificial, and so is its cardinality. So your comparison to an atom, which is a naturally occurring object is not relevant. Here's a more relevant example. That a circle has 360 degrees is also something artificial. A circle would not have 360 degrees unless human beings designated this. Likewise, a set would not have a cardinality unless human beings designate the cardinality, because even the human designation of "set X", requires an interpretation of what is meant by "X" in order to create the set. You seem to be confusing the naming of the set, with the actual existence of it.

Regardless of this disagreement over cardinality, even if just naming a set gave that set existence, the naming itself is a temporal process requiring a temporal order. So your argument, even if it were acceptable, doesn't prove what you need it to prove because the existence of the set itself is dependent on a temporal order. You ought to realize that you cannot get beyond the priority of temporal order. All forms of order are dependent on and based in temporal order. Time gives us the fundamental intuition of "order". If you take the time to consider this proposition you will realize its truth.

Set cardinality expresses the same as natural numbers: how many things there are. That's the property that orders natural numbers from the smallest to the biggest. Time is not needed for this ordering. — litewave

That's true, except you are missing the premise which forces the conclusion that time is necessary for this ordering. Cardinality must be determined, and this is the process which takes time. Counting takes time, requiring numbering in the order of 1,2,3,4, etc.. Therefore time is required for this ordering. Set cardinality requires time.

The disorder I talked about is entropy, not absence of time ordering. — litewave

Right, the point though is that since you place temporal order as posterior to logical order you derive the conclusion that time creates a disordering. But if you work from the other direction you will see that temporal order is prior to logical order. Any example of logical order which you give (like the ordering of numbers above), can be demonstrated to rely on a temporal order for its validity.

High entropy = lots of randomness, much disorder; low entropy = little randomness, little disorder. According to the second law of thermodynamics, entropy of the universe increases with time. It is generally accepted that the arrow of time is defined as the direction of increasing entropy of the universe. So entropy of the universe provides time ordering of the states of the universe. — litewave

See, you are disregarding the ordering which is necessarily prior to the disordering of entropy which you describe. So an ordered universe is necessarily prior to the disordering which the arrow of time brings about. Therefore order is temporally prior to disorder. The logic which brings about the conclusion that disorder follows from the flow of time, assumes already a prior temporal order. It relies in the assumption of temporal order.

Sensations aren't meaningful. It makes no sense at all to say "the interpretations of our sensations". — creativesoul

I really cannot understand this at all. The statement that sensations are not meaningful appears as blatantly false. So until you back this up with an explanation, or a demonstration of a sensation which is not meaningful (because sensations seem to all be meaningful to me), I'll have to dismiss what you say as nonsense.

A set of 3 elements will always have a greater cardinality than a set of 2 elements, no matter whether someone counts them. This fact is not dependent on anyone counting the elements. Counting only confirms this fact (unless the counting person makes a mistake). So you don't need a temporal order to order natural numbers. — litewave

Clearly I was talking about "the ordering" of numbers, as the topic was "logical priority". So cardinality is irrelevant to my example.

Actually, it seems that temporal ordering can be reduced to logical/mathematical ordering. In the theory of relativity, time is treated as a special spatial dimension and space is a mathematical structure with no need for reference to time. On the time dimension of spacetime we can then define the arrow of time from past to future as the direction of increasing entropy (disorder) of the mathematical structure of each time slice. — litewave

Notice that you've reversed things. The product of your reduction is disorder, not order. A reduction with order as the subject, rather than disorder, brings the opposite result, logical ordering is reduced to temporal ordering.

Temporal order doesn't seem sufficient to explain causality: if one event precedes another in time, it doesn't necessarily mean that the earlier event caused the later. — litewave

Right, now we're getting down to the subject matter. Temporal ordering is not in itself sufficient to account for causality, I will grant you that. But if we maintain the principle that it is essential, as the concept of "cause" dictates, then we have a platform from which we can assess other possible conditions of "cause". We can treat the other elements as necessary accidentals, necessary in the sense that they are needed, but accidental in the sense that no particular one is required. We then place the various spatial relations associated with causation as secondary conditions, accidentals, and not essential to the nature of causation. So when the described spatial relations give the appearance of causation, without the necessary temporal order, we must dismiss the description as inaccurate. There cannot be causation without the appropriate temporal order therefore something is wrong with the description which says such.

How do you determine the particular spatial radius though? It seems that you must formulate a theory that involves laws of physics and based on this theory you deduce the effect from the cause, in the context of an arrow of time. — litewave

That's the point, there is no need to determine a particular spatial radius. Such determinations are made from experience and inductive reasoning, so they may be inaccurate due to empirical limitations. The true spatial radius can only be determined posteriorly, after the proper context, the true "arrow of time" has been represented. We maintain the logical principle, that temporal order is the necessary condition for causation, then when an event appears as a cause of another event we direct our representation of the "arrow of time" in this way, despite the fact that it contradicts empirical principles, because empirical principles are known to be, by their very nature, fallible. And the way to determine mistaken empirical principles is to strictly adhere to logical principles.

Sensations aren't meaningful. — creativesoul

Like I was born yesterday?

You are failing to draw and maintain the distinction between what you're reporting upon and your report. You've got plenty of company in philosophy. — creativesoul

That's correct, there's no distinction to be made there. Philosophers agree. Why do you bother to argue otherwise?

What is the difference between a cause and effect, if not their ordering in time? A common attempt to remove temporal ordering from the relationship, beloved by some fundamentalist apologists, is to replace temporal ordering with logical ordering, by which they envisage something like an entailment A->B, with the cause being the antecedent A and the effect the consequent B. The trouble with this is that, in most cases, when all information is incorporated into the calculation, the arrow becomes bidirectional A<->B. — andrewk

This I agree with. There is no point in speaking about cause and effect if you do not maintain the necessity of temporal ordering. That's what the concept is based in. And, by the way, it can be demonstrated that all logical ordering is reducible to temporal ordering, so the assumption that one can avoid temporal ordering by referring only to logical ordering is unfounded, because logical ordering becomes completely ungrounded, and random in an absolute sense, without temporal ordering.

For instance, there is no reason to the ordering of the natural numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc., without a temporal referencing. The ordering would be completely random, without the temporal act of counting, in which 1 is prior to 2, etc.. You might argue that 2 is greater than 1, but by what principle would this be true, other than the fact that 2 comes after one in the act of counting. If we were subtracting, then 1 comes after 2, and might be apprehended as greater than 2. If you say that 2 is more than 1, we have to ask "more" in what sense. And we are turned toward a temporal ordering in any determination of quantity due to the necessity of counting. A determination of quantity requires counting and therefore relies on the temporal order.

So you need both logical and temporal ordering to explain causality... — litewave

I don't agree that you need both temporal and logical ordering to explain causality. All that is needed is temporal ordering. The requirement for logical ordering leads to the problem of induction. We want the cause to be within a particular spatial radius because that's what experience and induction (consequentially our inductively produced premises) tell us must be the case. But if we release the need for logical ordering with premises derived from references to spatial relations , we can focus specifically on temporal ordering and avoid the problems which may be created by faulty spatial conceptions and the derived premises..

As apokrisis has said, the ball effectively vibrates, as its internal molecules move about (Unless the experiment takes place at absolute zero), so it 'pushes' itself, if nothing else does so first. No need even for QM, just Brownian motion is enough to explain it. — Pattern-chaser

But even internal vibrations are often demonstrated to have an external source. When I heat my lunch with the microwave, it causes internal vibrations, but there is an external source.

If the external source of the internal "push" cannot be found and identified, this doesn't mean that we can exclude the possibility of an external source, saying that there is no push just because we can't see the push.

Huh?
I chat with my neighbors all the time.
Why on Earth would they just be my sensations? — jorndoe

Are you hearing them? Are you seeing them? Are hearing and seeing, sensations? Why assume anything more than what is clearly the truth?

And why this double standard? — Hanover

I don't see any double standard. I see two distinct types of judgement with two distinct sets of criteria. A criminal trial is set to determine whether an individual committed a criminal act, and if so, the criminal extent of that act. A judgement of an individual's character is carried out for completely different purposes, and therefore proceeds form different premises of what constitutes evidence.

why block our courts from considering that in criminal matters. — Hanover

Actually, if such evidence were permissible in criminal matters the supply of evidence would be nearly never ending, the trial would be nearly never ending, and the courts would actually be blocked. So you have the idea of "block our courts" inverted.

Let's have some process to ferret out evil and mark the demons among us so that we're not subjected to these people. I was hoping our criminal justice system would do that, but it's apparently ineffective for that purpose. — Hanover

Sorry to shatter your illusion, but the criminal justice system is really set up to bring justice to bear on those who have committed crimes. The burden of preventing individuals from proceeding into criminal activity is placed on other social structures. So if you want a safe society for your family you should consider the adequacy of these other social structures rather than the adequacy of the criminal justice system.

I guess we ought reverse all laws excluding the consideration of juvenile history in adult court. — Hanover

The proposition that childhood behaviour is relevant to the judgement of an adult's character in no way implies that juvenile behaviour ought to be considered as relevant to an adult on trial for one's actions. The adult goes to court on trial for one's adult actions not for one's character.

Would be a bit rude if I walked over and said "Hi neighbor, you're just my sensations". — jorndoe

We're talking about reality here, not your fantasy world. In reality, the word "neighbour" above just refers to some possibility you've created.

Perhaps it is, but all of this boils down to the most important question of all. The question of meaning. — Blue Lux

I agree.

The question works from dubious presuppositions... — creativesoul

Yes, one ought to be dubious of any proposition, in the way of the skeptic. But you turn things around, as if it is the proposition which is dubious, rather than yourself who doubts the proposition. Are you really that confused? Do you really believe that it is the proposition which is dubious, and not yourself who is doubting the proposition? Why not state things to reflect the true reality, rather than creating such an illusion?

All interpretation is of something already meaningful. The meaning is precisely what is being interpreted. Sensations aren't meaningful in and of themselves. They are necessary but insufficient for the attribution of meaning. All sentient creatures use sensation by virtue of autonomously drawing connections between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or themselves. The complexity of the correlation translates to the cognitive ability and/or capability of the candidate. — creativesoul

Sure, but the point is that "objects" are created by the sentient creature, through the act of sensation. And, a very important part of what you call "the attribution of meaning" is the act of creating objects which occurs within the sentient being, Psychologically speaking, you might say that this act occurs at the unconscious level of the being, but nevertheless, it is an act carried out by the being. The attribution of meaning goes to much deeper levels of being than consciousness does.

So consider that "objects" are presented to the conscious mind of the being. You cannot take it for granted that the objects are external to the being, just because the objects appear as "given" to consciousness. You ought not dismiss the reality that it is the unconscious part of the being which is creating the objects and presenting them to the conscious mind, and therefore the objects are not external to the sentient being. And the act of "attribution of meaning" which is carried out by the conscious mind is just a layer on top of the substantial act of attribution of meaning already being carried out at the unconscious level.

When you say "the natural mumbers" you're ready conceding the issue because you're tacitly acknowledging that there's some common property or rule which makes some numbers "natural numbers". — MindForged

Yes, I agree that there is something common to "the natural numbers", they are the numbers that we use to count things with. They have a common use. However, they are not a whole, in the sense of a unified entity, by the fact that they are infinite. They are "numbers", plural, such that they are by their nature, a multitude, not an individual. An individual is represented by the number "1", "the natural numbers" represents every counting number. "The natural numbers" cannot refer to an individual, to avoid contradiction, because "1" is what refers to an individual.

The even numbers are necessarily part of the natural numbers, it's literally just the naturals without the odd numbers, that's a proper subset. — MindForged

I do not agree that the even numbers are a "part" of the natural numbers because I don't agree that the natural numbers are a unity, a whole. That status is reserved for "1". We must avoid contradiction.. As I said, the natural numbers are a multitude. They must be in order that we can use them to count a multitude of things. Each one, by its very nature, is necessarily different from each other one, and the difference between each of one them is necessarily the same difference, according to the simple formulae of arithmetic. One such formula is that an even number, is divisible by two, such that every second natural number is also an even number. This doesn't make the even numbers a "part" of the natural numbers, It just tells us which of the natural numbers can also be called even numbers. Some of the natural numbers are also even numbers. This is very basic arithmetic from grade school, remember?

No because no matter what even number shows us we will always get it in the naturals just a few spots down. I've already explained why not. Speaking of the natural numbers and the even numbers is not me creating said sets by extensionally writing out small parts of the set. That's simply to illustrate the pattern. Unless you seriously think understanding a mathematical relationship requires writing out a entire pattern, this response of yours isn't sensible. It's not a real objection. — MindForged

What you're not doing is showing how the natural numbers can be a "set". That's what I dispute, that the natural numbers may be infinite and also a set, by way of contradiction. You assume that the natural numbers are a set, but that's begging the question. I want to see your reasoning, the logic behind this principle which appears to me to be contradictory.

Thanks anyway, MU, but I don't eat fairy floss. — Janus

Seems you recognize that it's pointless to argue your false claim, so you make up some fairy tale.

But is there a real distinction, truthful, between the physical and non material or phenomenal? — Blue Lux

What does "the physical" refer to other than the interpretations of our sensations.

The physical realm is not created by sensing beings, sensing beings are created by the physical world, in the sense that they only come to be in the physical world; and in turn the physical world only becomes manifest in sensing beings. — Janus

No, it's quite clear that the physical world is created by the sensing beings, not vise versa. It is created by the nervous system. I am a being over here, you are a being over there, and there is a medium of separation between us. Through sensation and conceptualization we create an image of this medium and call it the physical realm. Our terms refer to the various aspect of that image, not the medium itself, so what we refer to as "the physical realm" is the image, not the medium itself..

But from a philosophical point of view, I still think what is being challenged is indeed the reality of the physical realm. — Wayfarer

What we tend to disregard is that what we know as "the physical realm" is only what our senses present to us as "the physical realm". So "the physical realm" is what is created by sensing beings. That's what Kant pointed to as phenomena. What we call the physical realm is only "real" to the extent that our senses have the capacity to show us what is real.

Not if you are thinking 4D space-time; you have to imagine the universe as a static object in 4D space-time. — Devans99

See why I don't accept 4D space-time? It results in too many contradictions.

What I mean is time exists inside the timeless base reality. So time is a finite 'thing' existing within a timeless, permanent, finite base reality. — Devans99

Don't you see the contradiction? You posit a timeless thing which has time within it.

As a way of thinking about what causes the ball to start to roll, the answer becomes we couldn't prevent that because any placement on the apex had to involve infinitesimal error. — apokrisis

So the act of placement is really a push, because placement cannot be precise. And, if the act of placement could be precise enough, or the surface flat enough, then a push would be needed. Therefore it's always a push.

The start of time. Time is finite and permanent. Has a start and end. Its possible the start and end are joined to form a circle. — Devans99

s contradictory, to say that something has a start and end and also that it is permanent. If it's circular there is no start or end.

The difference is:

- Eternal existence implies everything has existed for ever within time. Implies time has no start. Implies Actual Infinity. Implies all the paradoxes I listed in the other OP.
- Permanent existence outside of time does not require Actual Infinity. — Devans99

You're using a different definition of "eternal" again. We were talking about "eternal" in the sense of outside of time. This is clear from you assumption of a "timeless" base reality. So your argument here for a difference is just equivocation.

If we maintain "outside of time" as our definition of "eternal" and equate this with "eternal existence". we have a problem with your stated claim that time co-exists with this eternal existence. Unless you allow for a dualist separation, or some such thing, you have the contradictory properties of "timeless", and also "time", referring to one and the same reality.

Mathematicians create universes with different axioms and then study them logically. If such a creation finds practical application in the world then well and good but this isn't a necessity.

Strangely, it's more a rule than an exception that mathematical theories have actual real world applications. I don't know if infinity has practical applications but surely it is interesting to realize we can analyze it in an understandable way through set theory or whatever else it is. — TheMadFool

This is why we need good ontology, metaphysics, to separate the principles, or axioms which are consistent with the true actual reality, from those which simply appear to be such because they are useful.

No, they wanted to know if he tried to rape Ford back in high school. The goal post shift is now, "even if" his behavior was far less than attempted rape, and even if the behavior of a minor should not be imputable to a now 52 year old man, he's not qualified to be a Justice because he didn't admit to and apologize for his ancient misbehavior. — Hanover

Face the facts, often the cover up is worse than, and evidence of, the crime itself. This is especially relevant in politics.

How about we set forth a rule as it exists in every court of law across the country that says that juvenile acts cannot be used to attack the credibility of a witness? It seems we've focused heavily upon what most likely consider entirely irrelevant, but now we're interested in whether he's been dishonest about something that is irrelevant. — Hanover

I don't agree. Judging one's character on one's parents' character would be wrong, but one's childhood is definitely relevant in all forms of psychology, so it ought not be dismissed in judging one's character.

The institution that has been destroyed is not the Supreme Court, but the Senate for exploring the high school behavior of a 50+ year old man. — Hanover

I thought they wanted to see whether he's lying about his high school behaviour, to determine his credibility. If one cannot accept responsibility for one's own past actions, how could that person be accredited to the Supreme Court without destroying its reputation?

A universal speed limit makes sense for any universe; if you allow objects to be accelerated upto an infinite velocity (as in Newtonian mechanics), then you get bizarre paradoxes like objects suddenly disappearing from the universe. — Devans99

It's not that there is a universal speed limit which I doubt, it is that there is something (light) which has the same speed in every frame of reference. I think that it is quite plausible that there is a universal speed limit, but we do not know enough about the universe to be able to determine it.

If you doubt the speed of light is constant you are also dismissing much of modern science: — Devans99

Yes, and if you've read my earlier posts I've dismissed a lot of modern mathematics as well as contradictory. The two go hand in hand, mathematics and science, and I find them to be extremely misguided ontologically, like the blind leading the blind.

How would time be created/made real in such a base reality? Each moment in our time must have been mapped to a co-ordinate in timeless, permanent, base reality. Hence past, present, and future are equally real. — Devans99

The problem is that time passes. At each moment there is something new in the past. To ask how time is created is to ask how time starts passing. Can you imagine a point in time when there was a future with no past?

The problem is if you assume time is immaterial, you get eternal existence then you get all the paradoxes listed in this OP: — Devans99

I don't see the problem here. How is "eternal existence" different from your assumption of a permanent base reality? The difference is that the ontology I describe provides a proper separation between the "eternal existence", as outside of time, and temporal (material) existence, by placing time as the medium which separates the two. In this way, any physical activity, such as the activity of counting, described in the op cannot be attributed to the eternal existence because this would be a misappropriation of terms, to attribute physical, temporal, activity to that which is outside of time. You provide no such solution, attributing time to the permanent base reality just creates an infinite regress with no way to understand anything beyond the permanent time. Your claim that time is created contradicts your fundamental principles which render time as permanent.

Do you buy special relativity? He only has two axioms and both sound very reasonable: — Devans99

I don't think that it's reasonable to believe the speed of light to be constant. If something was going very fast, close to the speed of light for example, relative to something else, then I don't think the motion of light would be the same relative to these two things. Actually, I think that relativity theory in general, while it may be adequate for modeling many motions, is ontologically deficient.

1. Something can’t come from nothing
2. So base reality must have always existed
3. If base reality is permanent it must be timeless (to avoid actual infinity)
4. Time was created and exists within this permanent, timeless, base reality
5. So time must be real, permanent and finite — Devans99

I see a logical flaw here. You have a base reality which is permanent and timeless. You have a time which is created, comes into existence, within this permanent, timeless base reality. But then you conclude that time is permanent. That is contrary to your premise, that time is created.

The problem is to get beyond temporal existence, to understand that which is timeless. If you start to describe the timeless using the same terms we use to describe the temporal, you are bound to be contradictory. So even to say that the timeless is "prior" to the temporal, or that time "emerges", or is "created", from the timeless, is contradictory because these terms imply temporality, and these temporal attributes are assigned to the timeless in order for time to come into existence.

This is where dualism assists us because it allows us to separate the two aspects of reality, so that we do not end up assigning temporal properties to the non-temporal. To do this, we need a clear definition of time, which separates time (as immaterial) from the material existence of thing which exist, and move in time. Time itself is now the medium between the timeless and the temporal existence of material things. That's why I said we need a proper conceptual separation between time and spatial existence.

The amount of information you can get into a volume of space-time by regarding the spacial co-ordinates of particles as information:

- So in discrete space, I could represent a particle's position with (0.35, 0.60, 0.90); terminating decimals / rational numbers - a finite amount of information.

- But in continuous space, the particle's position is represented by (0.353534..., 0.604836..., 0.903742...); non-terminating real numbers - an infinite amount of information.

An infinite amount of information in a finite volume of space-time is nonsense and leads to paradoxes... — Devans99

I agree with you on this matter. Now look at what happens if we separate space from time, and postulate a discrete space with a continuous time. The particle has an infinite number of possible locations because the time between t1 and t2 is infinitely divisible. However, the discrete space limits these possibilities to a finite number. So within the immaterial realm, which is represented conceptually as the realm of time passing, there are infinite possibilities, the information is infinite. But in actuality, the possibilities (and therefore information) are limited by the true nature of space.

If you buy 4D space-time, then information is not transitory, it has permanent residence in a region of space-time, so I would expect information density to apply over a time period as well as a volume of space. — Devans99

Actually I don't buy 4D space-time. I think it is a mistake to unify the concepts of space and time in this way, they need to remain separate. And you haven't really explained what you mean by "information density" so I'm sort of lost here.

Say we have a system composed of 1 particle that travels 1 meter in 1 second. If space is continuous, how many different states does the system go through? IE If the particle is travelling along the X-axis, the states are just the different positions it occupies x=0 x=0.1 etc... — Devans99

Please read what I wrote to BB100 in my last post, about the incompatibility of activity and states. It really doesn't make sense to describe activity as an infinite number of states between state 1 and state 2.

You have got to be kidding me. Both the left and right contained 4 and 6, your just had to continue the mapping a few more spots. — MindForged

No, I'm not kidding at all, I think you must be totally confused, or ignorant, or something like that. If I continue the mapping a few more spots, the even numbers go to 8, 10. But these numbers will be outside of the set of natural numbers, on the left. Don't you see that with this type of mapping, the set of even numbers will always contain numbers outside the set of natural numbers which it is mapped to, so it is impossible for it to be a subset?

(4 & 6 appeared on the right side earlier because the right side was only even numbers, so obviously the natural numbers take longer to get to the even numbers since it also has the odd numbers). — MindForged

Right, so no matter how you lay it out, if you maintain equal cardinality the set on the right side will always contain numbers which are not contained in the set on the left side. Surely you can acknowledge this. So do you agree with me that it is impossible that the set on the right side is a subset of the set on the left side? If not, why not?